Based on a unique data set referencing exposures on single-name credit default swaps (CDS) on European reference entities, we study the structure and the topology of the European CDS market and its evolution from 2008 to 2012, resorting to network analysis. The structural features revealed show bilateral CDS exposures describing growing scale-free networks whose highly interconnected hubs constitute both a strength and weakness for the stability of the system. The potential “super spreaders” of financial contagion, identified as the most interconnected participants, consist mostly of banks. For some of them, net notional exposures may be particularly large relative to their total common equity. Our findings also point to the importance of some non-dealer/non-bank participants belonging to the shadow banking system. The credit default swap (CDS) market has attracted significant attention since the beginning of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. While designed as a hedging instrument to protect investors against counterparty risk, CDS have raised significant concerns amongst supervisors with regard to their potential risks in a situation of generalized financial distress. The three main concerns relate to the capacity of the CDS market to settle the failure of a major reference entity; the ability to cope with the consequences of default by a major dealer; the major role played by banks as protection sellers and consequently, their potential vulnerability was given the evidence of under-collateralization of CDS positions. Such fears have been exacerbated by the fact that this market is perceived in some quarters as a very opaque over-the-counter derivatives market with too little information on bilateral exposures, notwithstanding the increase in the amount of public information on CDS in recent years.