An enormous literature has emerged that attempts to explain the many different causes and effects of the recent housing market boom and bust. The usual suspects in these investigations include subprime mortgage lending, irrational expectations by homebuyers and lenders, the complex securitization process, government policies to promote affordable lending, measures that foster institutions that are “too big to fail” and, of course, the eternal villain in many economic debacles: greed. The boom and bust, however, varied greatly across housing markets, which suggests that local conditions also played an important role in determining how the crisis played out. This report relates the results of recent econometric research that reveal the sharp differences in house price patterns, their drivers, and the fallout from the crisis across markets. While some of the traditional drivers of house prices such as rents, vacancy rates, and employment were still important, the strength of the relationships varied over the bubble-and-bust period and across housing markets. During the bust, new drivers included the size of the distressed real estate inventory, the pace of price appreciation in the first half of the decade, and the amount of subprime lending just prior to the bust. Indeed, across metropolitan areas, the larger the volume of subprime lending and the larger the increases in prices prior to the bust, the larger the house price declines that were to follow.