Momentum seemed to be escalating in early 2014 for the passage of a comprehensive reform package of the housing finance system in the U.S., but that was not to be, as neither political party fully supported its passage, derailing the progress made over the previous few years. While consensus around the primary features of reform has grown, new research that questions these assumptions needs to be addressed and the inertia keeping the country mired in the current, uncertain system needs to be overcome. In this brief, we will discuss the progress made thus far en route to reform, analyze the disparate elements of the leading proposals, and incorporate new findings that will shape the additional research that must be done before policymakers can agree on the best path forward. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) both known as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—are the vehicles in the United States for creating a secondary market for residential mortgages and for providing liquidity to that market. They purchase conforming mortgages from lenders—primarily single-family, 30-year fixed rate mortgages that have not been insured by the federal government in order to allow lenders to make more loans to borrowers. They then maintain these purchased loans in their own portfolios or, more often than not, package them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) which they sell to investors. The fees charged to investors for guaranteeing payment on the MBS are a major source of income for Fannie and Freddie.1 Prior to 2008, both GSEs were private companies that had these same responsibilities, although Congress created them at different times. But as a consequence of the financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie were placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) on September 7, 2008.