This paper analyses the conundrum of the constitutional status of Gilgit Baltistan (GB). The question is raised consistently whether GB should be considered a fully integrated part of Pakistan or part of Kashmir. There has also been a lot of debate on a de facto integration of GB with Pakistan. The paper discusses the political history and developments in the region and what could be called a progressive realization of rights. It outlines the governance system in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), the fallout from the revocation of Article 370, and the major differences between IOK’s and GB’s constitutional status. Five possible policy options are presented for Pakistan, along with their respective advantages and disadvantages. In the end, specific recommendations are given regarding the next steps Pakistan needs to undertake to address the GB question.
The sparsely populated Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) region of Pakistan is immensely important. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enters Pakistan via Gilgit-Baltistan. GB is home to the world’s highest mountains, attracts a substantial share of Pakistan’s tourism, and provides unique mountain products. Nearly 500 km of the Pak-China joint venture, the Friendship/Karakoram Highway, traverses through the difficult terrain of GB from Khunjerab Pass to the border of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Gilgit-Baltistan has been locked in the struggle to acquire constitutional status ever since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. GB’s political status has stayed in perpetual limbo because of the linkage of this region with the Kashmir issue.
The status of GB and Kashmir is a politically antagonistic and analytically challenging topic. Pakistan administers GB directly, neither as a separate province nor as part of the adjoining KP province. Thus, there are varying and conflicting views on this issue in Pakistan, India, the people in both Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) IOK, the larger international community, and the people of GB.
GB is always associated with the dilemma of the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). Since it has become intrinsically tied to the Kashmir dispute, it does not seem hopeful that this matter will be decided any time soon. This paper looks into the constitutional status of GB and IOK, along with the future outlook for GB and how the Modi government’s abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution affects all future scenarios for lasting peace in this region and between Pakistan and India.
The status of the people of GB has been uncertain for over 70 years. GB’s linkage with the disputed larger region of Kashmir hinders any major change to its administration. With the advent of CPEC, this region has again come into the limelight. Strong opinions are being shared across the board from the AJK Assembly, the Indian government, and even the freedom fighters in the IOK.
At the time of the partition of the subcontinent, GB was a distant and almost unreachable region, which was then ruled by the Dogra rulers. Under British Raj that ended in August 1947, GB was made a part of Kashmir by force and afterwards sold to Gulab Singh in 1846 under the Treaty of Amritsar. However, there was hardly any trade between GB and Kashmir and people-to-people interaction was negligible. There was also an immense language barrier. As the linguistic map below shows, the people of GB speak Khowar, Shina, Balti, Burushaski, and Wakhi. On the other hand, the people belonging to Jammu and Kashmir speak Kashmiri, Hindko, Pahari, and Gojri. There was little to no shared heritage or culture. Hence, the people of GB harbored a feeling of resentment towards the merger of GB with Kashmir. A visual representation of the prevailing languages within the region.
The local people, supported by the Gilgit Scouts and the Muslims who were serving in the Dogra Army, freed Gilgit-Baltistan from India through an armed struggle. GB became a republic on 1 November 1947 and fifteen days later announced that it had acceded to Pakistan. At the time, this request was not accepted by the Pakistani government because of the uncertainty of the Kashmir situation.