

URBAN SPACES IN INDIA

edited by

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Housing and Dis-housing in Mumbai: A Historical Outline of Slum Discourse and Policy

HUSSAIN INDOREWALA

Urban development in Mumbai has presented a choice between two concerns, the first being the city's social policy, that required directing public investment towards the improvement of infrastructure and sanitation, and provision of adequate housing for most of its inhabitants; the second being the vision of its business and political class of developing a leading commercial and industrial center, or what Gordon (1978) calls its *Urbs Prima in Indis* policy. While the latter has almost always been pursued at the expense of the former, the former has been reluctantly conceded only when both have been seen to be interdependent. In the decades after Independence, the *Urbs Prima in Indis* ambition has been pursued under the aspiration of achieving 'world class' status by emulating other cities: Paris in the 1950s and 60s, New York in the 70s and 80s, Singapore in the 90s, and Shanghai in the first decade of the new millennium (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008). Each of these periods, including the colonial period, has seen shifts in 'slum' discourse and policy, something that this essay will explore, along with the consequences of these shifts on the city's poorer inhabitants. It appears that for more than a century, the municipal government and the various parastatal agencies operating in the city have been more efficient at dis-housing than housing the urban poor. However, the scale and intensity of dis-housing since liberalization in 1990s have increased dramatically (ibid).

Existing literature on public policy in housing in Mumbai is largely focused on the post-Independence period. One classification suggested has been based on the role of the government, namely as a *controller*, *provider* and *facilitator* (MMRDA 1995: 173). Various programs and policies pertaining to slums have been periodized by Bhide (2009) as phases of *negation* (1950s and 1960s), *tolerance* (1970s) and *acceptance* (1980s) (Bhide 2009). This essay will begin by looking at an earlier colonial period, where the first public interventions to address the 'slum problem' in Mumbai was undertaken, as it may be possible to identify some interesting continuities and contrasts in the post-colonial period. This brief survey is an attempt to highlight how 'slums' have been conceived through public policy, and how intervention strategies and tools have transformed. Beginning with the period before Independence where disease and sanitary concerns resulted in interventions by the Improvement Trust, policy in the first two decades after independence was motivated by similar concerns and sought to address the 'slum problem' through clearance and public housing construction. In the early 1970s slum clearance was combined with 'improvement' and self-building schemes, and large resettlement schemes; 'slums' had now become synonymous with informal settlements. Following a few experiments in upgrading as well as redevelopment in the mid-1980s, rehabilitation of 'entitled' dwellers through redevelopment soon emerged as the dominant approach of intervention in informal settlements. From early 1990s, in-situ redevelopment, and resettlement and rehabilitation projects – both based on unlocking land values and marketizing development rights – have been the primary mode of providing housing for the poor.

THE GLASGOW PHASE: IMPROVEMENT SCHEMES AND SUBURBANIZATION, 1898-1933

Modeled on the nineteenth century Glasgow Improvement Trust, the Bombay City Improvement Trust (BCIT) was formed after plague struck the city in 1896. Overcrowding and abysmal housing

conditions in the Indian section of the town contributed to the spread of the disease. One historian called it the 'most dramatic and destructive manifestation of municipal failure in the nineteenth century' (Chandavarkar 2009: 52). About 500,000 inhabitants fled the city, and in three years, the plague claimed 44,984 lives (Arnold 2012). The fear of commercial extinction forced the Government of Bombay to recognize the dependence of the city's economic future on its social policy. The BCIT was set up to develop the city in a planned way, by laying new roads, improving crowded localities, constructing sanitary dwellings for the working classes, and reclaiming land for the city (Gordon 1978: 121). The Board of the Trust was dominated by the city's elite: it had representatives of the Millowners Association, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Municipal Corporation – which itself was dominated by landed interests, its franchise limited to property owners, about 1% of the city's population (Hazareesingh 2007:29).

The City improvement strategy in colonial Bombay was a bastardized version of the European one. Democratization and municipalization of local government, and expanded municipal services financed by progressive taxes on property that helped achieve real gains in public health standards in Europe were safely provincialized by the colonial state. The BCIT approached the problem of insanitary dwellings and housing by carrying out improvement 'schemes' involving new housing construction on lands handed over by the Bombay government and the Corporation, and by targeting slum areas without providing alternative accommodation to evicted dwellers. Armed with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the power to designate blighted areas, the BCIT could undertake comprehensive renewal schemes in large areas of the city (Rao 2013: 25).

The Trust's activities, however, greatly exacerbated the housing crisis and increased congestion in some areas. By 1919 the Trust had demolished 24,428 houses and constructed only 21,387. At this point, of 1.2 million inhabitants of Bombay city, 0.89 million lived in singleroom tenements, and there was an overall shortage of 64,000 units in the city (Kidambi 2007: 112). In the

second decade of the twentieth century, the Trust began what it called an 'indirect attack' on the housing problem in contrast to the 'direct attack' of the earlier decade. This approach involved suburban expansion and the creation of new building sites in the northern peripheries, with the aim of relieving congestion in the overcrowded areas. To justify intervention, the BCIT 'effected a stunning epistemological transformation' (Rao 2013: 28) by listing agrarian villages in the fringe areas of Bombay as 'slums.' This was the first instance of blight labeling being used to incriminate self-built settlements and to legitimate clearance and resettlement for 'planned development'; the use of the term 'slum' was transformed: from being an indicator of inadequate conditions, it became the justification of a settlement's removal.

Municipal reform beginning in the early 1920s and the gradual withdrawal of the colonial state from urban intervention after the 'mis-adventures' of the Government of Bombay's executive organ the Bombay Development Directorate (BDD), meant that the planning process in the city was now increasingly in the hands of the Municipal Corporation (Rao 2013: 27). The BCIT itself was formally wound up in 1933 and absorbed into the Corporation.

THE PARIS PHASE: SLUM CLEARANCE AND PUBLIC HOUSING, 1950S AND 60S

Till the early post Independence decades, *chawls* remained the dominant form of lowcost dwelling for the city's working poor. The chawl, or single room tenement housing "warehousing" large numbers of labouring classes in as cheap a manner as possible' (Burnett-Hurst 1925: 20) were of three kinds. Single family dwelling houses that extended vertically and horizontally over time to become 4-5 story tenement blocks. These were described as 'some of the most insanitary buildings in the city' with little light and air, and sanitation in the form of basket privies that were manually serviced through narrow passages between buildings. The second type were tenement blocks built by private enterprise for profit, with shared toilets and water connections and mixed use when facing main thoroughfares. The third were buildings erected

by the Improvement Trust and other public bodies on 'sanitary lines,' that were criticized for being insensitive to the preferences of the inhabitants (Burnett-Hurst 1925: 20). Almost all the housing for the laboring classes, except ones built by public bodies, were reported to be grievously inadequate (Indorewala et al. 2016).

In these early decades, informal settlements were referred to as 'hutment colonies,' 'squatter colonies' or 'zopadpattis.' After this general survey before Independence, the Municipal Corporation in 1956-7 undertook a detailed survey and identified three types of 'slums.' The first were the permanent and multi-storeyed buildings with outdated sanitary and living standards. Chawls, mostly in the inner city and industrial areas were most commonly identified as this type. The second were authorized, semi-permanent residential buildings that deteriorated because of structural and sanitary conditions. These were in the outer parts of the city. The third type were the 'unauthorized and insanitary huts put up by vagrants and homeless population on vacant lands not necessarily their own' (BMC 1964: 91). The BMC noted that the number of hutments in the city was small, and that the 'main problem' was with respect to the first two types (Desai and Pillai 1970: 154). The Corporation survey showed that 415,875 people lived in 'slums' in the Island City, or about 15-18% of its population, and 21,000 people lived in hutments in the Island City – less than 1% of its population (ibid.). The Corporation did not carry out a survey in the suburbs which had a large population of hutment dwellers, and estimates suggest that in the mid-1950s hutments provided accommodation to about 5% of the city's population (A. M. Singh and De Souza 1980). By 1968, the population of the suburbs had crossed 2.5 million inhabitants, and at this point, people living in zopadpattis constituted 18% of the city's population, approximately equal to the number of people living in chawls and patra-chawls combined (R. N. Sharma and Narender 1996).

The BMC's powers to undertake slum clearance were expanded when an amendment to the BMC Act in 1954, to stop and remove 'unlawful buildings or works.' This empowered the BMC to declare an area a 'clearance area' that could be secured either by ordering the demolition of buildings, or through acquisition of the area.

TABLE 1: SLUM POPULATION IN GREATER MUMBAI 1961-2011

	1961*	1971*	1981	1991°	2001	2011
Mumbai Population	4,152,056	5,970,575	8,243,405	9,925,891	11,978,450	12,442,373
Slum Population	498,000	1,000,000	3,676,000	4,510,075	5,823,510	5,207,700
%	12.0	16.7	44.6	45.4	48.6	41.9

Source: Mumbai City Profile, (Indorewala et al. 2016)

The BMC could also declare 'redevelopment areas' and prepare redevelopment schemes for those areas as a whole. With the passing of the National Slum Clearance and Improvement Act in 1956, slum clearance and resettlement was taken up in Bombay and other cities. This became the official approach to informal settlements in the 1950s and 60s (IPTEHR 2005). In 1958 the first large scale evictions in Bombay were carried out when 4,000 families were displaced from various parts of the city and 'left to fend for themselves in the mangrove marshes of Mankhurd' in the city's periphery (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008: 554). In the late 1960s, the Deputy Prime Minister of the country Moraji Desai (who desired to make Mumbai like Paris), relocated more hutment dwellers from the Island City to the Eastern Suburbs (ibid).

THE NEW YORK PHASE: SLUM IMPROVEMENT AND UP-GRADATION, 1970S AND 80S.

A growing hutment population that went beyond the capacity of the clearance and housing program, organized movements of slum dwellers against evictions (Das 2003), and the recognition of slum dwellers as 'a politically sensitive entity' (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008) resulted in a move away from the standard approach to slum clearance and resettlement. The important initiatives were the Slum Improvement Cell set up by the BMC in 1969, and a centrally funded Slum Improvement Program (SIP) launched in 1970 to improve basic amenities. In 1974, the state government set up the Maharashtra Slum Improvement Board to coordinate the work under this program, and by 1975, the Board had spent Rs. 85 million and improved 200 slum pockets covering half a million slum dwellers (Sivaramakrishnan 1978: 90).

Significantly, only informal settlements were now considered 'slums,' and overcrowded, non-standard, and unserviced multistory buildings were identified as 'dilapidated' buildings (Kerkar et al. 1981). The slum was no longer a settlement *condition* to be addressed by municipal intervention – instead it was the *mode* of building, the *type* of dwelling and even the *status* of the dweller, that made dwellings unacceptable (Indorewala et al.

2016). Slum improvement was conceived a temporary measure, with the expectation that formal housing will eventually replace them. The Maharashtra Slum Improvement Board Act considered slums 'a source of danger to the health, safety and convenience of the slum dwellers and also to the surrounding areas, and generally a source of nuisance to the public' that needed to be serviced 'until such time as [they are] removed and persons settled and housed in *proper* buildings.' In 1976, during the national Emergency, the first census of hutment dwellers was undertaken, and 630,003 enumerated households were given photo-passes.

Despite the legitimacy gained due to the Census, there were parallel efforts to prevent further slum growth through new laws that gave the government more powers to evict squatters. The Slum Act of 1971 empowered the government to notify slums and carry out clearance schemes by declaring a 'slum area' if it is satisfied that (1) it may be a source of danger to health, safety or convenience of the public in the area or nearby, by reason of lack of amenities, insanitary condition, overcrowding, etc. and (2) if the buildings in any area are unfit for habitation due to dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light, sanitation, etc. The Slum Act was amended in 1978 to provide some protection to occupants from 'eviction and distress warrants.' In 1975, the state government enacted the Vacant Lands Act, under which all lands occupied by squatters were assumed as vacant, and dwellers can be evicted for accommodation on an alternate sites. Furthermore, slum dwellers were required to pay compensation for unauthorized occupation of land. A large number of demolitions were carried out in different parts of Bombay using this law (Bhide and Dabir 2010).

The Emergency saw extremely brutal demolitions, and largescale resettlement of slum populations in the eastern and western suburbs. 70,000 people were evicted from Janata Colony (which was formed when slums were evicted from the Island city in the 50s and 60s) to make way for housing officials and scientists (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008; Patel 2010). Thousands of people were evicted in the 1980s, under the Chief Minister A.R. Antulay, who declared that all squatters in the city must 'return to

their native places' if they do not possess photo-passes. In a city-wide effort to evict pavement dwellers, about 10,000 people were evicted before activist groups put a stop to them by getting the Supreme Court to intervene. When the Shiv Sena party gained office in 1985, it promised to once again to clear the city's 0.5 million pavement dwellers. According to its leader Bal Thackeray, there was 'no question of showing any humanity' as the the city was not the 'country's orphanage' (Mukhija 2002).

With the Fifth Five Year Plan (1975-1980), the role of the government in the provision of low-income housing was re-conceived from a direct provider to a 'facilitator' and 'enabler,' beginning another shift in housing policy in the country (Bjorkman 2015: 75). Task Force on Housing and Urban Development of the Planning Commission in 1983 declared that 'there is overwhelming evidence to show that efforts to produce affordable housing for the poor by corporate [government] bodies have failed.' Despite 'striking examples of successful low-cost self-help housing,' it continued, government house construction agencies 'patterned on the bureaucratic model and adopt a brick and mortar approach to housing' continue to 'proliferate' (MMRDA 1995: 184). The World Bank's advocacy and reform linked assistance for self-help housing with a focus on environmental improvement and security of tenure led to the Rs. 282 crore Bombay Urban Development Project (BUDP) in 1985, with two programs in the form of the Slum Up-gradation Program (SUP) and the Low Income Group Shelter Program (LISP). Under the SUP, land was given on lease to slum dwellers cooperatives, amenities (costs recovered from dwellers) were provided as well as loans were offered for house up-gradation. The LISP involved making state provided serviced land available to Low Income Group (LIG) and Economically Weaker Section (EWS) households for self-building. Only families that had been enumerated in 1976 and 1980 were eligible for programs under BUDP, and those that arrived later were left out (Panwalkar 1996; IPTEHR 2005; Bank 1985).

The BUDP aimed to shift public investment from subsidized apartment construction to programs focused on producing large numbers of serviced plots at lower costs with full cost recovery,

halting growth, and finding ways to shift private capital to produce legal affordable shelter for low income families. Affordability and full cost recovery were the underlying principles of the BUDP (ibid). According to the World Bank, the key objectives of its assistance to housing projects was (1) cost recovery from beneficiaries to reduce or eliminate housing subsidies, and (2) to achieve replicability by the private sector (Bank 1993: 5-6). Crucially, the World Bank's shelter strategy was based on a transformation of the system of classification of low-income settlements – from an earlier 'modernist' conception of classification based on *conditions* of housing, to a classification based on *origin*, as legal and illegal settlements. The assumption was the belief that illegality leads to insecurity and therefore a lack of investment in housing (Mukhija 2000: 135). The BUDP succeeded in selling 87,743 serviced plots to low income households, and providing the benefits of slum up-gradation to 22,204 households (Bank 1985).

Though the BUDP fell short of its project targets, some of its objectives from the policy perspective had been achieved by the time the project was completed in 1997. Public sector investment in housing had been downsized, and private supply was on the rise. In 1964, when the first development plan was prepared, the annual housing demand was expected to be about 50,000 housing units in 1960s and 40,000 units in the 1970s (BMC 1964: 90). This was based on a projected population of 7.06 million by 1981. To achieve this target, the plan apportioned 1436 hectares of land for 'public housing', where most of this demand would be met, and housing would be built by the state Housing Board, public sector agencies for their employees, and cooperative societies. Private supply, which the Plan considered 'not very reliable', was expected to fulfill 10-12% of the demand. However, as Table 2 shows, formal housing supply for the period between 1974-1991 did not exceed 19,600 units annually, less than 50% of the anticipated demand. Public housing supply dropped from an average 4,222 units (24%) annually between 1957-1964 to 1,522 (7.7%) units in 1983-1991. With the private housing market leaving out the bulk of the population and public sector supply dwindling, the period saw a rapid increase in informal housing supply. According to an estimate

by the regional planning authority MMRDA, informal supply provided on average about 45,000 units every year (MMRDA 1995: 171), and by the end of the 1970s, an estimated 44.6% of the city's population lived in informal settlements (Kerkar et al. 1981: 34).

Despite this situation, the legitimacy of informal settlements was subject to datelines or 'cut-off dates' that turned 'the whole issue of slum growth, eviction, resettlement and management into entirely and solely political activity' (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008: 555). Informal settlers had to prove that they have lived long enough in the city to not be evicted. The healthy policy 'pragmatism,' that was often endorsed vigorously by officials and representatives to justify market-friendly reforms did not extend to informal settlements, where the heavy hand of the state would crush all those that fall on the wrong side of datelines.

THE SINGAPORE PHASE: ENABLING MARKETS, THE 1990S

From the mid-1980s, redevelopment with an increased Floor Space Index (FSI) began to become established for informal settlements. In 1985, a major housing improvement program in Mumbai was initiated by the name the Prime Minister's Grant Project (PMGP). The project was focused on Dharavi, and aimed to provide new infrastructure and redevelopment housing for beneficiaries in the form of cooperatively owned walk-up apartment blocks. The

TABLE 2: AVERAGE ANNUAL HOUSING SUPPLY IN GREATER MUMBAI
1957-1991

	Public Housing Housing Board/ BHADB	Employers for Employees (Public Sector)	Private and Cooperative Societies	Total
1957-1964	4,222	3,666	9,673	17,561
1974-1982	3,183	494	15,949	19,626
1983-1991	1,522*	1,397	16,702	19,621

* 886 of these were units built by the Board, and 636 were allotted as plots.
Source: MMRDA 1995: 207.

PMGP was the first partially- implemented model of an *in-situ* redevelopment with increased FSI and a cross-subsidy component, and became an important precedent for slum redevelopment schemes of the 1990s (Mukhija 2000). The idea of redevelopment of informal settlements, argues Mukhija, goes all the way back to the early 1970s, and Redevelopment scheme ideas with a varying combination of factors such as location for resettlement, FAR values and cross-subsidies were proposed by different committees and individuals through the 70s and 80s (Mukhija 2000: 45).

The 1990s saw the coming of the 'enabling markets' strategy that was in line with the broader shifts in development policy around the world. According to this strategy, housing was to be re-conceived as an economic and not a public good, and governments were encouraged to reform policies, institutions, and regulations to 'enable housing markets to work more efficiently.' A stress on deregulation and decentralization also meant a greater involvement of NGOs and community cooperatives in the development process (Bank 1993; Mukhija 2001). This advice was formulated in an influential World Bank paper *Housing: Enabling markets to Work* in 1993, that mapped its own shifts in policy prescriptions from direct government *provision* of land, housing and finance in the 1970s, to provision of *housing finance* and *rationalization* of subsidies, to an *enabling role* to facilitate provision of land and housing by the private sector (Bank 1993: 53). Responding to the new policy context of privatization and deregulation, as well as the possibilities offered by redevelopment as opposed to slum up-gradation, the state government launched the Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRD) in 1991. FSI for redevelopment was doubled to invite private developers to rehabilitate slum dwellers in 18 square meter tenements in mid-rise or high-rise buildings. Beneficiary contribution was limited to about 40% of the cost of rehabilitation, and the rest was to be financed through the sale of additional floor space constructed on land freed up after rehabilitating slum dwellers (R. N. Sharma 2007).

In 1995 the Shiv Sena-BJP alliance came into office with a campaign promise to provide 'free houses' to 4 million hutment dwellers in Mumbai. A committee was set up to advise on how to

overcome 'difficulties and constraints experienced in implementing the existing slum redevelopment scheme' while ensuring that 'the finances of the Government are not unduly burdened and judicious utilisation of land values is fully realised' (Afzulpurkar 1995). Based on the Afzulpurkar Committee's recommendations, a scheme (SRS) was announced under a new agency called the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). The SRS pushed the market-led redevelopment logic further than the SRD, with higher incentives to developers now linked to the amount of floor area they produce for rehabilitation. The minimum house for rehabilitated dwellers was increased to 21 square meters. A 'cut-off date' of 1st January 1995 became the criterion to be eligible under the scheme. The SRD's partial cross-subsidy was removed and replaced by a full cross-subsidy for entitled dwellers. The promise of building eight hundred thousand 'free houses' in five to six years however failed to materialize, and only 157,402 units were produced under the SRA by 2014 (Praja 2015).

The 1990s witnessed a massive increase in house demolitions. Between 1994 and 1998, an average 72,000 houses a year, or about 200 huts each day. In 1999, the MCGM was destroying an average of 500 huts a day (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008). Since liberalization, a growing involvement of middle-class citizen groups and NGOs promoting citizenship based on property-rights and a notional environmentalism, began to seek direct intervention of the judiciary against informal settlements. In 1995 the environmental NGO called the Bombay Environmental Action Group (BAEG) filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) before the High Court against 'encroachments' in the area of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park that, it argued, could have 'ecologically disastrous effects'. The petition or the courts did not challenge the ecological effects of either the sprawling 140 hectare Film City that had infringed the southern part of the Park, nor the restaurants and bungalows that had come up to its north (Zérah 2007). Between 1999-2001, around 33,000 homes were demolished in phases from the Park (IPHR 2000). Later, in 2001, the Indian Railways under pressure from a PIL filed by a group 'Citizens for a Just Cause' and the media, unexpectedly demolished 2,000 huts

along railway tracks and around stations. However in this case the State Government assured the courts of a time bound resettlement, and in collaboration with NGOs, 60,000 people were resettled in multi-story apartments or single story transit accommodations (ibid). Another PIL filed by a group of prominent individuals in early 2003 alleged that slum dwellers were being ‘mollycoddled’ by politicians who treated them as ‘vote banks’ and argued that people living in illegal homes cannot be deemed citizens. They demanded that the city’s electoral list must be revised by deleting all names of ‘encroachers’ (D’Monte 2004).

THE SHANGHAI PHASE: MUMBAI’S ‘MAKE-OVER,’ 2000s

In the early years of the new millennium, the aspiration of a ‘Mumbai Make-over’ captured the imagination of business leaders, the political leadership and city managers. India’s Prime Minister signaled his acceptance of the the international consultancy firm McKinsey’s much publicized recommendations (McKinsey and Bombay First 2003) on restructuring Mumbai : ‘people think of the great changes that have come about in Shanghai. I share this aspiration to transform Mumbai in the next five years in such a manner that people would forget about Shanghai and Mumbai will become a talking point’ (Srivastava 2005). The stark imagery of a ‘world class city’ pathologized and criminalized the city’s strident *bastis*. The Shanghai Dream descended upon the city’s informal settlers with shocking brutality. Between November 2004 and February 2005, the State Government and the Municipal Corporation bulldozed between 80,000-94,000 homes over 44 localities, outdoing their own demolition plans. The BMC claimed that 124 hectares of land was cleared, of which 140 acres fell under ‘No Development Zones’ and 125 hectares, cruelly, were areas that were actually reserved in the Development Plan for public housing or for housing the dis-housed (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008). The State Home Minister candidly declared that ‘rehabilitation... is not the responsibility of the government’ (K. Sharma 2005). However, once the initial shock of the so called ‘demolition marathon’ was overcome, the evictions were fiercely resisted by

dwellers and activists, and many evicted households went back to their lands and rebuilt their homes.

Highest on the priority list of the Mumbai-transformation agenda have been infrastructure projects for new railways, flyovers, highways and link-roads. The partially World Bank financed Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) and the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project (MUIP) have displaced tens of thousands of hutment dwellers in the city. As the implementing agency MMRDA has constructed rehabilitation blocks for displaced dwellers, in a huge number of state sponsored high rise housing construction, 'unprecedented in modern times' (Nainan 2008). By awarding development rights as compensation to private landowners to build rehabilitation units, the state government could raise 42% of the project cost by offering TDR to land owners, much to the satisfaction of the World Bank (Nainan 2008; Bank 2004). The MUTP displaced 19,847 households (Bank 2011), making it the largest urban displacement caused by a World Bank aided project in India. The combined number of households displaced by the MUTP and MUIP is about 25,000 (Bhide 2014: 53). Estimates suggest that the MUTP & MUIP along with the Metro Rail Project or Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) and the Airport Modernization Project will result in the displacement of 136,000 households (Modi 2009), making it one of the largest forced relocations in recent times (Nainan 2008).

NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR OLD AMBITIONS: CONCLUSION

The ambition of a 'World Class' Mumbai and the various city emulation aspirations are more recent formulations for a persistent desire of city officials, managers and magnates to create and maintain the city as a leading industrial and commercial property regime and planning ideology center. Shelter strategies for low-income dwellers, always subordinated to this ambition, have transformed based on macroeconomic reforms and the consequent shifts in land and development policy. The framework of 'enabling markets', and the concomitant downsizing of the public sector means that public policy is focused single-mindedly on developing means

TABLE 4 : ESTIMATED DISPLACED HOUSEHOLDS FOR 'MUMBAI'S MAKE-OVER'

Project Name	Planning / Nodal Agency	Date of Implementation	Est. Displaced Households
01 Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP)	MMRDA	2004 onwards	20,000
02 Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project (MUJIP)	MMRDA	2004 onwards	35,000
03 Mumbai's Shanghai Makeover	-	2004-2005	94,000*
04 Mithi River Development Project (Phase I)	MMRDA + MCGM	2006	5,000
05 Mahatma Gandhi Path Kranti Yojna	MCGM + MMRDA	2007	5,000
06 Airport Expansion Project	MMRDA	Not Started Yet	90,000
07 Dharavi Redevelopment Project	SRA	Not Started Yet	60,000
08 Mumbai Metro Project	MMRDA	Not Started Yet	NA
09 BRIMSTOWAD	MCGM	2007	26,000

* This figure is from (Mahadevia and Narayanan 2008).
Source: S. Singh 2013.

to get the private sector to achieve social goals. Such a focus lies behind the aspiration to make cities 'slum free.' The government's commitments as a consequence are increasingly entangled with the interests of land owners and developers, making it a member of what Nainan (2008) calls the 'building boomers coalition.' While SRA schemes and resettlement projects are an illustration of such an arrangement, their outcomes despite being 'inclusive' allow urban inequalities to persist (Anand and Rademacher 2011). Successive deregulations that allowed an increase in the intensity of development (hence enhanced land values) as well as a dilution of density norms have means of facilitating redevelopment and greater housing construction, but serious concerns have been raised about the various exclusions inherent in the process, and about the deteriorating quality of living environment due to high densities (Patel 2010).

The World Bank's focus on developing property rights (Bank 1993) has also necessitated a classification of low-income housing based on legal status, on the assumption that insecurity of tenure, as a consequence of illegality, prevents investment in housing (Mukhija 2000). Although self-built settlements have always been considered illegitimate as low-income housing, the system of classification as one based on legal status has rendered settlements even more prone to eviction; paradoxically, the brief 'acceptance' of informal settlements as a housing option in the 1980s opened the door to greater intolerance towards 'encroachments' in the subsequent decades. Whether through redevelopment and rehabilitation of 'entitled' dwellers or through eviction of those falling outside datelines, slums have begun to function as a 'central vehicle for facilitating the alienation of public land to private developers' (Ghertner 2014). The production of private property through redevelopment or resettlement, is a process that Ghertner refers to as 'urban enclosure' – a process that signals the end of the post-Independence 'public city.' The so-called 'liberal approach' to urban development calls for the play of market forces in determining the scale and location of economic activity (Ahluwalia 2013), and with housing increasingly conceived as one, the silent compulsion of economic relations will determine where, and in what manner, the city's poor will reside.

NOTES

1. The BDD was set up by the Governor of Bombay George Lloyd, with an ambitious scheme of middle income housing in the suburbs, building 50,000 housing units for the working class and land reclamation for expanding business activity in the southern end of the city. Due to financial problems and technical blunders, the BDD was closed and absorbed by the Government in the late 1920s.
2. The Island City is the area from the southern tip of Colaba up to the Mithi river beyond Dharavi and Sion. This was the area administered by the Municipal Corporation till 1950, after which the municipal limits were extended periodically to encompass the entire area of Greater Bombay since 1965.
3. The actual population of the city in 1981 reached 8.24 million.
4. Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority, formed in 1975 as a planning authority for the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) with a jurisdiction over 4355 square kilometers. Apart from the core city of Mumbai, the MMR consists of 7 Municipal Corporations, 9 Municipal Councils, 35 census towns (together constituting 52 urban centers), and 966 villages.
5. This according to (Zérah 2007). Other estimates suggest a much higher figure of around 50,000 homes evicted at the end of the year 2000 (IPHR 2000).
6. No Development Zones (NDZs) are areas marked in the Development Plan and assigned very low development rights, restricting their use for most commercial and residential uses. A large part of the city's primary sector activities (fishing, agriculture, quarrying, dairy, etc) are practiced in these areas.
7. As Transfer of Development Rights (TDR), which is a market mechanism of 'moving' development rights from one place to another – typically from a low value 'generation' area to an area where land values are higher.

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