# Inequality in the gentrifying European city

Cody Hochstenbach

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ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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Information about publications and data

Publications

This dissertation consists of six empirical chapters that are published in, or submitted for publication in, peer-reviewed journals, three of which are co-authored. The publication details are as follows:

> **Chapter 2:** Hochstenbach, C. (2016). State-led gentrification and the changing geography of market-oriented housing policies *Housing, Theory and Society*. Online First. DOI: 10.1080/14036096.2016.1271825.
>
> **Chapter 3:** Hochstenbach, C. (2015). Stakeholder Representations of Gentrification in Amsterdam and Berlin: A Marginal Process? *Housing Studies*, 30(6), 817-838.
>
> **Chapter 4:** Hochstenbach, C., & Van Gent, W.P.C. (2015). An anatomy of gentrification processes: variegating causes of neighbourhood change. *Environment and Planning A*, 47(7), 1480-1501.
>
> **Chapter 5:** Hochstenbach, C., & Boterman, W. R. (2017). Intergenerational support shaping residential trajectories: Young people leaving home in a gentrifying city. *Urban Studies*, 54(2), 399-420.
>
> **Chapter 6:** Hochstenbach, C. Growing generational divides and the post-crisis rise of rental gentrification. *Manuscript currently under review.*
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> **Chapter 7:** Hochstenbach, C., & Musterd, S. (2017) Gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty: changing urban geographies through boom and bust periods. *Urban Geography*. Online First. DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2016.1276718

The co-authors have contributed in the following ways: all three co-authors have provided input for the research design and have helped writing the respective chapters. Wouter van Gent and Sako Musterd have also provided general guidance of the PhD trajectory.

Data

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present results based on calculations by the author using non-public microdata from the System of Social Statistical Datasets of Statistics Netherlands (*Stelsel van Sociaal-statistische Bestanden, CBS Nederland*).

Acknowledgements

When I started my PhD and would tell people outside academia I was doing research on gentrification, the term generally didn't ring any bells. It was a rather obscure academic term in the Netherlands. Things have changed. By now gentrification often features in public debates, is frequently mentioned in newspapers, and does not require introduction anymore. Especially in Amsterdam the term is now commonplace, as concerns about changes in the city are mounting. I like to think that I, together with various colleagues from the Urban Geography programme group, have played a role in this.

This dissertation is the product of some highly enjoyable years as a PhD candidate at the Urban Geography department. These were far from long and wasted years, not in the least due to my colleagues. Several of them deserve a special mention here. Sako Musterd, of course, who as my promotor has supported me right from the start. He went to great lengths to make this PhD project possible in the first place, and has always shown confidence in my work. Wouter van Gent as my co-promotor has been invaluable to this PhD too, and I consider him my mentor in academia.

During my time as a PhD I was fortunate enough to have – or to be able to take – the freedom to work on side projects, giving me the opportunity to work together with – and learn from – other colleagues. Willem Boterman has been a close colleague and mentor to me. We already collaborated on a project before I started my PhD and we continue to do so. I'm proud that one of our co-authored publications is now a chapter in this dissertation. On another research project I was able to collaborate with Justus Uitermark, from whom I learned a great deal and whose open mind and original insights I appreciate very much.

Wouter and Willem have not only been mentors to me, but perhaps more importantly have joined me for countless lunches, borrels, and ping pong games. Another colleague I've had many great lunches and drinks with is Rowan Arundel. His presence in the office was always fun, but generally did not benefit our productivity. Many other colleagues I shared a room, played football, drank, and worked with deserve a mention here as well, including but not limited to Caroline Uittenbroek, Floris van Slijpe, Jannes van Loon, Mendel Giezen, Nanke Verloo, Federico Savini, Koen Raats, Sebastian Dembski, Christian Lennartz, Michel van Wijk, Thijs Koolmees, Josse de Voogd, Jolien Groot, Annalies Teernstra, Emily Miltenburg, Joeri Scholtens, Marco te Brömmelstroet, Robbin Jan van Duijne, Richard Ronald, Inge van der Welle, Oana Druta, Myrte Hoekstra, Carolina Frossard, Francesco Colona, Fenne Pinkster, Marco Bontje, Tracian Meikle, Yves van Leynseele, and Aslan Zorlu.

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CHAPTER 1 — Introduction: Gentrification and social-spatial inequalities

Socio-economic and class inequalities are on the rise in a host of contexts (Piketty 2014; Savage 2015), underpinned by a restructuring of the global economy, labour markets, finance, and the welfare state (Sassen 1991, 2014). The Fordist welfare state that provided extensive social safety nets has been subject to a gradual dismantling and, instead, contemporary welfare states have been reoriented towards facilitating private accumulation and enabling market forces (Peck & Tickell 2002; Brenner et al. 2010). Although socio-economic inequalities are in essence a-spatial, they are typically also expressed in urban space. Most major European cities of the twenty-first century are marked by aggravating levels of socio-economic segregation (Tammaru et al. 2016). Affluent residents increasingly seem to be flocking together into areas of privilege, while lower class residents are ever more likely to concentrate in low status areas. Indicators of segregation say little, however, about the different dimensions of social-spatial inequalities and the underlying dynamics that forge them.

Gentrification, the transformation of urban space for more affluent users, is frequently attributed a key role in neighbourhood change. However, gentrification may also be an important force of urban change that reshapes the social geography of cities as a whole. Most gentrification studies focus – insufficiently – on the consequences of gentrification for urban-regional inequalities, for instance by only considering the gentrifying neighbourhoods themselves and ignoring their spatial flipside, or by only taking into account certain types of gentrification. This is a crucial lacuna given the ever growing footprint of gentrification (cf. Smith 2002; Lees et al. 2016). The main aim of this dissertation is therefore to understand the impact of gentrification on social-spatial inequalities at the urban-regional level to its full extent.

This dissertation innovatively employs a multi-scalar methodology that takes a bird's eye perspective to understand gentrification's social-spatial consequences at the urban-regional scale, while also zooming in at the neighbourhood level to unravel the conceptual and spatial diversity of gentrification. We currently have insufficient insight into the spatial reach of gentrification, insight that simultaneously remains sensitive to between-neighbourhood differences in the form that gentrification takes (cf. Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003; Hedin et al. 2012). I argue that precisely because gentrification has proven able to surface in different guises in different neighbourhoods, it has been able to extend across space. Although different forms of gentrification may produce different outcomes, only by considering all of these gentrification processes does it become possible to understand the magnitude of their impact. This illuminates the force of gentrification in remaking the social geography of cities and their surrounding regions.

It is often simply taken for granted that gentrification processes contribute to starker social-spatial contrasts. At the neighbourhood level, gentrification is assumed to go hand-in-hand with the eventual establishment

of virtually homogeneous affluent spaces – while acknowledging that in the short-run, it may contribute to a greater social mix. With the advance of gentrification, this translates into a more polarized urban landscape, with a gentrified core and struggling periphery. This dissertation not only seeks to establish whether this is indeed the case in contemporary cities, but also to investigate how such social-spatial inequalities come into being. Most importantly, it questions the dominant view that residential moves are the most important factor in changing population composition. The role of the state as a potential key actor in gentrification also comes into view here. States have influence not only by deploying policies that either stimulate or restrict gentrification processes, but also by determining where and how they do so. This has implications for how gentrification influences social-spatial inequalities.

It is important to stress here that social-spatial inequalities come in various forms and run along various dividing lines. New and stronger divides are currently emerging, especially along generational lines. Intergenerational inequalities are on the rise in many contexts, with younger generations increasingly struggling on the housing market. Related to this, the intergenerational transmission of resources has become more crucial in helping young adults to acquire housing (McKee 2012; Forrest & Hirayama 2015). Generational divides are, however, rarely considered in gentrification research, and neither is intergenerational support as a form of capital upon which young gentrifiers may draw. In this dissertation, I introduce these intergenerational dimensions into the framework of gentrification. For instance, gentrifiers of different generations may play a role in gentrification processes in different ways. Intergenerational support reproduces inequalities across generations and may play a role in fuelling gentrification and exacerbating social-spatial inequalities.

Displacement may constitute a key link between gentrification and wider social-spatial inequalities. The progression and expansion of gentrification may imply that exclusionary forces become stronger and different forms of displacement (cf. Marcuse 1986) more pronounced. Housing market structure plays an important mediating role, however: the presence of a large regulated housing stock is likely to dampen the scale at which displacement and exclusion occurs. Yet welfare state restructuring has not left housing markets untouched. There is a general push for homeownership, while rental housing faces decline (Ronald 2008; Doling & Elsinga 2012). It is important to establish the extent to which and where this translates into a diminishing of the social housing stock, in order to understand how a changing housing market structure shapes displacement and exclusion.

Establishing how and to what extent low income population groups are hit by displacement or exclusion has proven notoriously difficult. This dissertation picks up this major challenge by zooming in on the residential behaviour of low income groups to understand how their housing position is altered by gentrification processes. These impacts may be far from uniform, producing outcomes that differ across space, time, and population groups. Furthermore, the displacement engendered by gentrification not only disrupts or constrains individual residential and life trajectories, but is also likely to

hold important broader implications, altering the social geography of cities in a host of ways.

Together, the range of gentrification processes may play an important role in shaping and rearranging social-spatial inequalities along different dividing lines. This dissertation addresses this relationship by tackling the following research question:

> **How has gentrification been able to expand across space? What is the impact of gentrification processes on social-spatial inequalities in urban regions?**

This question is answered using a multi-scalar and multi-method comparative approach. The study is multi-scalar because it moves beyond the neighbourhood level in order to also consider the impact of gentrification at the urban and regional levels. While much of the dissertation primarily draws on micro-level longitudinal data and quantitative geospatial methods of inquiry, the dissertation also employs qualitative methods to analyse urban policies. Furthermore, the quantitative analyses are firmly embedded in a broader understanding of the structural factors that produce the conditions for gentrification to occur. The research question is answered through a comparison between the urban-regional contexts of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In so doing, this dissertation provides the most comprehensive study of gentrification in the Dutch context to date. The question is also answered through a temporal comparison that includes the boom period preceding the 2008 global financial crisis, and the recession that subsequently took hold.

This introductory chapter continues as follows. First, I will situate this dissertation in the broader gentrification scholarship. Second, I will introduce the broader theoretical framework, delving deeper into the factors that allow gentrification to expand in contemporary urban contexts, and how this influences social-spatial inequalities. Third, I will elaborate on the overall research design, the sub-projects, and important methodological considerations. Lastly, I will discuss and contrast various basic characteristics of the two main cases in this dissertation – Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Gentrification

In this dissertation I follow recent scholarship in adopting a broad definition of gentrification that understands the process as the class-based transformation of urban space for progressively more affluent users (Hackworth 2002; Lees et al. 2008). More conservative accounts would opt for a definition closer to gentrification's initial observation, conceptualizing it as the upgrading of lower class inner city neighbourhoods in major cities of the Global North. Such a narrow definition obscures, however, the fact that upward class transformations, despite occurring in different forms and spaces, may have similar underpinnings and produce very similar outcomes, for example in terms of displacement. Because the central aim of this dissertation is to establish how gentrification in its different guises influences social-spatial inequalities, a broader and more flexible definition is warranted (cf. Clark 2005).

It is possible to analyse gentrification from various angles rooted in different scholarly traditions. In this dissertation I distinguish between structural and material explanations for gentrification (cf. Abbott 2004). Structural explanations focus on the logics underpinning gentrification that emphasize the broader political economy. Material explanations, by contrast, place greater emphasis on how gentrification *processes* unfold in space and over time, highlighting how different population groups shape and are shaped by gentrification. It is worthwhile to briefly consider both perspectives[1], because the two approaches help our understanding of how gentrification has become a more widespread and pervasive process, with potentially stronger impacts on the social geography of cities and city regions.

The first approach foregrounds structural explanations for gentrification related to the factors producing (the conditions for) gentrification. Typically rooted in neo-Marxist analyses of contemporary capitalism, this approach ascribes critical importance to capital flows rather than population flows (Smith 1979). Through capital switching (Harvey 1982, 1985), accumulated capital washes into the built environment, prowling for profitable niches. Such niches may exist in disinvested neighbourhoods, where rent gaps – simply put, the difference between capitalized and potential ground rent – may emerge and can subsequently be capitalized upon (Smith 1979; also Clark 1988). In this vein, gentrification is primarily about private accumulation through investment in and speculation on real estate and land, thus supplying increasingly expensive housing (Lees et al. 2016: 69). Landlords, property owners, developers, investors, states, and liaised actors are therefore considered the main agents of gentrification (Smith 1979). They are the ones that gentrify neighbourhoods through reinvestment, that force out low income tenants, and that speculate on real estate and financial markets.

Based on this structural understanding of gentrification, Hackworth and Smith (2001) have schematized the ways in which gentrification has mutated over time. They define three waves separated by economic crises: the first occurring from the 1950s until the early 1970s, the second from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, and the third from the early 1990s onwards. Although they base this distinction on the very specific context of New York, it has found resonance in other contexts too and is a useful framework for contextualizing the expansion of gentrification. The waves are differentiated primarily on the basis of capital flows and the key actors producing gentrification. Gentrification in its first wave was a sporadic and isolated process limited to major cities, and driven by the piecemeal investments of private households frequently backed by state support. Large private players at the time typically still considered investment in gentrification too risky. The second wave saw gentrification transform from an anomaly into an anchored process integrated into wider economic and cultural processes, thus smoothing the flow of capital into gentrifying neighbourhoods. In its third wave form, gentrification has been able to spread rapidly across space and away from inner cities, to gain

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1.   The following section presents a literature framework that delves deeper into some of the points touched upon here.

hold in a wider range of neighbourhoods. This was enabled by intensified private capital investment and active support from interventionist states that consider gentrification a panacea to all their neighbourhood or urban woes (Smith 2002). In their overview work *Gentrification*, Lees, Slater, and Wyly (2008) suggest that during the early twenty-first century, a new fourth wave of gentrification emerged in the US. Rather than being a radical break from the third wave, fourth wave gentrification should be understood as an extension of it, with the state continuing to play an important role in promoting gentrification ever more directly and fiercely. Importantly, however, the fourth wave is also marked by the "intensified financialization of housing" (ibid.: 179) and the "tight integration of local gentrification with national and global capital markets" (ibid.: 180).

The second dominant approach highlights population dynamics and typically attributes an especially important role to residential moving patterns in driving neighbourhood population composition change. This approach draws on sociological class analysis to explain which middle class fractions move into (and stay in) gentrifying neighbourhoods, and why. It also employs analyses common in population geography and demography to explain how population flows alter population compositions. Class analyses typically forefront the agency of the middle classes, investigating their residential preferences and practices. In explaining the choice for a gentrification neighbourhood, these studies highlight, for instance, the importance of distinctive consumption practices, the value attached to residential spaces with an 'authentic' appeal, time-space management, and the preference to live among peers with similar consumption patterns (Butler & Robson 2003; Butler 2007; Karsten 2003; Ley 2003). These studies typically link such residential decisions to broader perspectives on the life course. An urban residential orientation has become more prominent among the middle classes, especially early on in the life course, for reasons of education and employment (Ley 1996; Smith & Holt 2007). This literature has been criticized for its lack of attention to the impact of gentrification on the lives and residential trajectories of vulnerable households (Slater 2006). Population geography or demography studies focus to a greater extent on overall population composition change, centring on changing moving patterns. Various studies ask, for instance, how and to what extent gentrification processes expose lower class residents to different forms of displacement (Newman & Wyly 2006; Wyly et al. 2010; Freeman & Braconi 2004; McKinnish et al. 2010). The key question of where the displaced end up has so far proven notoriously difficult to answer, however, as the displaced typically disappear off the radar post-displacement.

The approach focusing on population dynamics links the expansion of gentrification to broader economic restructuring, and the overall growth of middle class professions (Hamnett 2003). Furthermore, focus on the agency of gentrifiers naturally leads to the acknowledgement that there is not one type of gentrifier (Rose 1984), but that different middle class fractions have different motivations to move to a gentrification neighbourhood. This has led to the identification of different types of gentrifiers. These range from the low income but upwardly mobile 'marginal gentrifier' seeking affordable

residential niches in inner cities (Rose 1984), to high income 'family gen-
trifiers' and 'super gentrifiers' that prioritize homogeneous and safe urban
environments (Butler & Lees 2006; Karsten 2003). This variety is project-
ed onto urban space as it translates into different forms of gentrification.
Gentrification processes are shaped in different ways and to varying intensities
depending on who moves in. Furthermore, different forms of gentrification
catering to different gentrifiers are likely to take place in neighbourhoods that
are differentiated on the basis of factors such as location, affordability, and
housing characteristics. It follows that in order to understand the magnitude
and spatial reach of gentrification, it is important to take into account these
different forms of gentrification.

     In this dissertation I incorporate these two different approaches into
the analytical framework. Structural explanations focusing on political econ-
omy and class analyses, and with a focus on agency, provide different per-
spectives on the expansion of gentrification over time. Perspectives derived
from population geography and demography are in turn better geared towards
understanding how gentrification influences social-spatial inequalities at the
urban-regional scale. In so doing, this dissertation focuses on the residential
behaviour of residents as influenced and structured by structural conditions
including housing market structure, state policy, and the role of capital in
housing (cf. Giddens 1984).

Literature framework

This literature framework delves deeper into the perspectives touched upon in
the previous section. It focuses on how contemporary gentrification processes
can be understood, specifically their potentially widespread and pervasive na-
ture. To do so, this section covers new population dynamics, the role of capital
and of the state, and the disruptive impact of the 2008 global financial crisis.

New population dynamics[2]

To understand the expansion of gentrification processes, it is important to
consider contemporary demographic trends. An important point of reference
is Ley's (1996) work on the rise of a new middle class, which took place during
the post-war period marked by the transition to a post-industrial society
and economy (cf. Bell 1973). Economic growth and restructuring fuelled a
rapid expansion of the middle classes. While middle class suburbanization
burgeoned at that time, a counter-process was also on the rise. Expanding
university enrolment among the baby boom generation prompted specific
middle class fractions of this generation to develop a more urban residential
orientation (Ley 1996). Furthermore, the growth of middle class professions
in services, finance, and consumption also found their concentration in major
cities. For specific fractions of the middle class, the decision to live in the inner

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2.   The argument developed in this section is partly based on the publication
"Age, life course and generations in gentrification processes", co-authored by Willem
Boterman and forthcoming, in the *Handbook of Gentrification Studies* (edited by Lees
& Phillips). (Hochstenbach & Boterman forthcoming).

city constituted a rebellious choice that opposed the residential and household arrangements considered 'normal' in society. It often represented a rejection of suburban living arrangements closely intertwined with the nuclear male breadwinner family (Wilson 1991; Caulfield 1994), an embrace of left-liberal politics (Ley 1996), and alternative lifestyles (Rose 1984).

The choice for the city is, however, no longer a rebellious one. It has become the 'default' option in the residential arrangements of many young middle class households in Western countries. The city plays a key role in the residential and life course trajectories of ever more young people belonging to, or on their way to, the middle classes (Smith & Holt 2007; Boterman 2012a). These developments are related to changing population dynamics, which are propelled by the ongoing expansion of education, labour market restructuring, and destabilizing life course trajectories.

The ongoing expansion of higher education plays a pivotal role in this, as it brings growing numbers of young people flocking to the city (Smith & Sage 2014). As students typically look for affordable but centrally located housing, they may play an important direct role in driving gentrification, particularly its early forms (Ley 1996, 2003). In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, the presence of higher education institutions assures cities of an annual production of future gentrifiers who may remain in the city after graduation (Smith 2005). Studenthood as such constitutes a formative period during which young people become acquainted with urban living and develop a preference for it that informs their future residential behaviour (Smith & Holt 2007). There is an intergenerational dimension to this as well. With the ageing of the baby boom generation, a growing share of parents of new generations of students have been a student in the city themselves. Consequently, they may pass on the preference for specific urban environments to their children (Smith & Holt 2007; Rye 2011). This is important. It signals a shift in urban living from a decision that ran counter to dominant societal patterns, to an almost standard choice among the contemporary middle classes, and one that is reproduced across generations.

The increasing middle class presence in the city is, furthermore, linked to broader economic restructuring related to the transition towards a post-industrial economic structure. It is within this context that Hamnett (1994a, 1994b) forwarded the notion that the occupational structure of major Western cities has been subject to processes of 'professionalization'. Formulated in response to Sassen's social polarization thesis (1991), Hamnett argued that in these urban contexts, the number of highly skilled professional and managerial jobs rapidly increased at the cost of blue collar jobs. As such, the labour market became fundamentally professionalized, a process that opposed the growth of low-end jobs alongside high-end jobs envisioned in the polarization thesis, as proposed by the social polarization thesis. Though the professionalization thesis is primarily concerned with structural transformations in the (urban) economy, it is also implicitly linked to demographic shifts. Professionalization may occur along generational lines, with older working class generations being succeeded by younger higher educated age cohorts as they reach employment age. This holds important implications for gentrification: professionalization

of the labour force implies that gentrification is not so much about the *displacement* of working class households as it is about their gradual *replacement* by middle class professionals (Hamnett 2003; Butler & Hamnett 2009). This is especially the case when professionalization occurs in combination with demographic succession. Although this argument has not gone without criticism (Slater 2006, 2009), and class inequalities and the existence of different forms of direct and indirect displacement (Marcuse 1986) should indeed not be lost from sight, the professionalization thesis is important for understanding the profound changes to the class map of contemporary cities.

Apart from these changing structural conditions, it is also important to note that young people's life course trajectories have changed in crucial ways. Young people increasingly prolong a transitory life course situation and postpone settling down. These shifts are commonly associated with the second demographic transition (Lesthaege 2010), of which a steady increase in single-person households, a delay in child rearing, and an increase in female labour market participation are all markers. Spatially, this has resulted in a revival of inner city living (Buzar et al. 2005). This has longer-term implications too. While for many middle class people prolonging a transitory life stage may imply merely a delay in suburbanization, increasing numbers of middle class residents actually remain urban even after settling down and having children (Boterman et al. 2010). Increasing demand for specific urban residential environments is thus occurring not only because more middle class residents are moving to the city, but also because they stay there for a longer stretch of time.

This section has highlighted how expanding higher education, labour market restructuring, and destabilizing life course trajectories have strengthened an urban orientation among middle class households, which in turn fuels gentrification processes. It should be emphasized that these changes have long had a profound influence on urban change and gentrification in one way or another (cf. Ley 1996). Where they might have initially explained a reversal of fortunes for inner cities, now, in contemporary urban landscapes, these changes help to explain how gentrification advances and expands.

The state

In recent decades, state involvement in pushing gentrification has become ever more pronounced. Third wave gentrification is marked by pro-gentrification policies accompanied by intensified private investments, which have allowed the process to spread and become much more pervasive than before (Hackworth & Smith 2001; Smith 2002). It must be stressed, however, that pro-gentrification politics go a long way back. In fact, early studies of gentrification in the UK and US of the 1960s and 1970s ascribe an important role to the state in facilitating the process (Smith 1979; Hamnett 1973). Institutional context also plays a role in determining the scope of state involvement. In strong welfare state contexts with a highly regulated market, the state and liaised parties may play a crucial though often ambiguous role (Van Weesep 1994). Different urban and housing policies that simultaneously push and impede gentrification often coexist. In the domain of housing, the state takes

the hard edges off gentrification through tenant protection and the provision of social housing. This limits direct displacement and slows down gentrification. However, at the same time it actively pushes the process through housing market liberalization and social housing sales, accelerating indirect exclusionary displacement (Van Gent 2013; Hochstenbach et al. 2015). In this form, gentrification is very much a controlled and guided process, where the most negative impacts are mitigated but its constant progress is also ensured.

Despite the common perception that gentrification has taken the form of a mass produced blueprint policy (Smith 2002; Davidson & Lees 2005), there are different reasons why states engage in pro-gentrification politics. Policymakers may consider gentrification an instrument to improve the economic base and wellbeing of their city. This fits within a broader stream of new urban economist thought, highly influential in policy circles (for critical explorations see Peck 2005, 2012a, 2016; Engelen et al. 2016). This thought espouses a route to urban economic growth through fierce inter-urban competition over capital and talent (Harvey 1989). To do so, policymakers are encouraged to redevelop the city according to the tastes, preferences, and desires of the new middle classes, to remove barriers to capital investment, and to rid the city of undesirable elements (Smith 1996). Gentrification is considered a key policy tool to achieve this.

Gentrification may, however, also be a governmental strategy that serves goals other than economic ones. In an alternative reading, Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Kleinhans conceptualize gentrification as "a *means* through which governmental organizations and their partners lure the middle classes into disadvantaged areas with the purpose of civilizing and controlling these neighbourhoods" (2007: 127, original emphasis). The policy rationale is that strong poverty concentrations and the potential accumulation of social problems in such areas pose a threat to social order. Social mixing through gentrification constitutes a strategy to dissolve these concentrations, which allows for the control of problems, the reinstalling of social order, and an easing of the burden of management (Uitermark 2003). In more recent work, Uitermark (2014) has conceptualized this as control through integration, which opposes control through segregation whereby the urban poor are removed out of sight through containment in areas subject to intensified policing and surveillance. It is argued that the former approach is more dominant in Western Europe, where states have invested heavily in the renewal of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Yet the use of gentrification as a policy strategy to mix low income neighbourhoods has become ubiquitous all across the Global North, including in the US (Newman 2004). This policy strategy is, however, often disguised by different policy rhetoric (Bridge et al. 2012), and has been criticized for aiming to create predominantly affluent gentrified enclaves rather than a stable social mix (Lees 2003).

States have a plethora of policy options at hand to facilitate gentrification, including policies that support or subsidize middle class amenities (Zukin et al. 2009), policies that upgrade or privatize public space (Atkinson 2003), and policies that amount to hard punitive measures such as zero tolerance policing (Smith 1996, 2001). Housing policies are often at the

heart of state-led gentrification (also Wyly & Hammel 1999; Cameron 2003; Uitermark et al. 2007). Housing liberalization, the sale of social or public housing, and regulatory reforms may all serve to push gentrification in selected neighbourhoods. An important strand of urban policies may seek to spark gentrification through costly programmes of extensive renewal that include the demolition of affordable housing and the construction of more expensive dwellings.

It is important to bear in mind that state actors may promote gentrification in different neighbourhoods at the same time to serve different goals. Under these conditions, gentrification has been able to expand across neighbourhoods and cities as a 'successful' policy instrument. Stakes are therefore high for the state to ensure the continuity of the process. This may be threatened, however, by ongoing welfare state restructuring, the global financial crisis, and austerity measures, all of which constrain the state in its capacity to intervene. Consequently, state-led gentrification may have to change face, for example by using different policy instruments, by targeting different areas for gentrification processes, or by relying on private investment. How and where states intervene and promote gentrification influences the relationship between gentrification and social-spatial inequalities. Intervening in disadvantaged neighbourhoods may in the short-run reduce segregation levels, while intervening in well-performing neighbourhoods may amplify them (Walks & Maaranen 2008; Uitermark & Bosker 2014).

Capital and housing wealth

Although state support for gentrification continues to be central in contemporary gentrification processes, it is suggested that global capital flows, financial markets, and available mortgage credit are also of growing importance. The combined and intensive push by both state and capital is captured by fourth wave gentrification, as formulated by Lees, Slater, and Wyly (2008). Capital reinvestment in real estate and land markets, both by institutional investors and private households, has always been at the very heart of gentrification (Smith 1979; Lees et al. 2016). However, due to housing restructuring and new finance systems, speculation on housing – and on gentrification – has seen a huge boost (Lees et al. 2008). Housing in general forms an increasingly important domain for the strategic investments of institutions as well as private households. This is due in no small part to the fact that housing prices typically increase over time, making it an attractive vehicle in which to store capital (Aalbers & Christophers 2014). In times of over-accumulation, excess capital can effectively be switched to – and stored in – housing and the built environment, leading to speculation in these domains (Harvey 1982, 1985). For private households, the accumulation of assets has become more important over time, and housing represents a common way of doing so. Welfare state restructuring has typically led to the gradual erosion of collective social security systems, making private assets progressively more important for securing future welfare: accumulated wealth may, for instance, serve to augment future pensions or cushion the impact of job loss or unexpected life events (Kemeny 2005; Doling & Ronald 2010; Ansell 2014).

Western states have actively pushed private homeownership for decades, leading to rapidly increasing homeownership rates across Europe up until the onset of the global financial crisis (Doling & Elsinga 2012). This was enabled by the increasing availability of 'easy money': relatively cheap mortgage credit was expanded through low interest rates, mortgage interest tax deductibility schemes, and lenders' willingness to take on higher risks, frequently backed by state guarantees (Aalbers 2011; Van Gent 2013). Through re-regulation, governments across contexts removed barriers to investment and increased lender protections, leading to a boom in mortgage markets and mushrooming household mortgage debt (Schwartz & Seabrooke 2008). House prices also exploded – at least up until the global financial crisis of 2008 (which will be discussed in the following section). Crucially, however, there is a distinct geography related to the restructuring of housing finance. Mortgage markets have played an important role in linking local neighbourhoods to global capital markets (Newman 2009). In New York in the 1990s, mortgage credit in particular expanded in urban areas and even more so in gentrifying neighbourhoods (Wyly & Hammel 1999). There are various dimensions and geographies to this. Easier access to cheap mortgage credit made it less risky and more profitable to invest in previously low status neighbourhoods, which helped to kick off incipient gentrification there (also see Aalbers 2007). Furthermore, wealthy households and investors typically channel their capital into those segments of the property market that are 'hottest' and where large rent gaps can be closed, usually neighbourhoods already gentrifying (Lees et al. 2008). Housing finance restructuring has, together with widening rent gaps and housing liberalization, opened up new neighbourhoods as possible niche markets for capital to wash into, and while it has accelerated house price inflation across the board, it did so especially in selected gentrifying neighbourhoods.

Investment in gentrifying neighbourhoods may take different forms. In many cases, it will simply take the form of relatively affluent households purchasing a dwelling in a gentrifying area, both as a place of residence and as an investment (Butler & Robson 2003; Butler & Lees 2006). However, investment may also take the form of private landlordism. Recent years have seen a notable increase in investment in rental housing by large institutional investors as well as small-time private landlords (Fields & Uffer 2016; Ronald & Kadi 2016; Beswick et al. 2016). Regulatory reforms and increasing demand from specific population groups have triggered increasing investment in rental housing (Leyshon & French 2009; Kadi & Ronald 2016; McKee 2012). Especially when these investments are combined with residential turnover, they are set to spur gentrification. Although the effects of increasing capital investment in rental housing on urban space have not yet been closely examined, Fields and Uffer (2016) suggest that it has worsened housing affordability and accentuated social-spatial inequalities. Finally, capital investment in gentrifying neighbourhoods may also take on a host of other forms, which may include the purchase of second homes such as pieds-à-terre (Paris 2009; Chevalier et al. 2012).

The crisis

Because this dissertation focuses on gentrification processes in early twenty-first century cities, it is crucial to take into consideration the importance of the 2008 global financial crisis. Without going into details regarding the root causes of the crisis, this section aims to chart the effects of the crisis on the housing position of various groups. For one, housing market reforms have made access to mortgage credit and therefore homeownership more difficult. This includes the imposition of stricter mortgage lending criteria and the lowering of maximum loan-to-value ratios. Forrest and Hirayama therefore argue that "[t]he home ownership systems which have emerged from the crises are ones which favour the financially privileged – the *primes* rather than the *subprimes*" (2015: 237, original emphasis). It has, in other words, become more difficult for lower income and middle income households to buy. In many countries, the global financial crisis has also legitimized further welfare state reforms and austerity measures. This typically entails a further reduction in, and sobering of, social housing provision. This also goes for the Dutch context, where the social rental sector has traditionally been relatively strong, but current policies are gradually enforcing a more modest social rental sector (Elsinga et al. 2008; Boelhouwer & Priemus 2014; Musterd 2014). As a consequence, low income households are likely to become more vulnerable on the housing market – also because ongoing labour market restructuring leads to a greater dependence on precarious, often temporary employment. This may take the form of decreasing housing options, increasing rent burdens, a greater dependence on precarious or illegal housing arrangements, and a stronger spatial concentration in neighbourhoods low on the urban hierarchy, where affordable and accessible housing remains.

Sharper divides also come to the fore, not least along generational lines. While older homebuyers typically accessed homeownership under relatively favourable conditions and have been able to accrue substantial housing wealth, younger generations struggle to buy and have to deal with stronger housing and labour market insecurities (Arundel 2017). Consequently, many young adults have to prolong their stay in the parental home (Lennartz et al. 2016) or increasingly resort to precarious housing arrangements (Clapham et al. 2014; Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015). Intergenerational financial and non-financial support has in turn become more important in mitigating or avoiding these insecurities, with the consequence that socio-economic divides based on familial background become sharper (McKee 2012; Forrest & Hirayama 2015). It is important to note that many of these trends were already in place before the crisis, but have since been amplified in many cases.

Because the 2008 crisis has amplified insecurities in housing and labour markets, it is likely that the negative consequences of gentrification on individuals and households will become more pronounced, for example regarding displacement, rent burdens, and housing accessibility. Yet it is unsure the extent to which gentrification processes themselves have been hit by the most recent crisis, and how this translates into social-spatial inequalities. As housing bubbles burst, housing prices as well as the number of sales plummet (Ronald & Dol 2011), with the possible consequence that the progress

of gentrification through residential moves – e.g. successively higher income households moving in – may stagnate. Conversely, gentrification processes that progress through *in situ* social mobility may become more pronounced (cf. Bailey 2012; Teernstra 2014a). The crisis may necessitate middle class households to prolong their stay in a neighbourhood, for example due to an inability to sell and move up the housing and neighbourhood ladder. Likewise, young upwardly mobile households may also be unable to buy and as a consequence will have to prolong a transitory life stage typically associated with inner city living. In other words, these developments prolong or solidify an urban orientation during periods of upward socio-economic mobility, perhaps particularly fuelling forms of marginal gentrification (Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003).

The research
Structure of the research
The different strands of literature point towards a growing prominence of gentrification, and an increasingly forceful impact of gentrification on cities and their populations. However, although the literature helps us conceptually to grasp and explain these developments, few studies actually chart them. The main aim of this dissertation is therefore to gauge and understand the impact of gentrification processes on changing social-spatial inequalities at the urban-regional scale. This means that the effects of gentrification are not studied only at the neighbourhood level, but more broadly. As a first step, this requires taking into account the variegated expressions of gentrification that have enabled the process to expand. I therefore hypothesize that gentrification should be understood as a process that takes on various guises, and thus occurs in different forms across urban space simultaneously. Furthermore, the study of social-spatial inequalities can be approached from a range of scholarly positions. I argue that a focus on gentrification is not only crucial given gentrification's increasingly prominent role as a force of urban change, but it is also highly illuminating because it shows how changing social-spatial inequalities come into being.

This research consists of six sub-projects that focus on different aspects of gentrification processes in order to highlight the conceptually and geographically differentiated nature of gentrification. These chapters seek to understand how different aspects or dimensions of gentrification play out in urban space, and how they leave their mark on urban space in the form of changing social-spatial inequalities.

The first two empirical chapters of this dissertation focus on the role of institutional context in facilitating or alternately mitigating gentrification processes. Urban and housing policies often target specific areas and therefore by definition have spatially uneven implications. Furthermore, these policies are not constant but change over time as they are amended, augmented, or dissolved. **Chapter 2** therefore sets the scene by analysing how urban policies of tenure restructure change over time, and what their specific spatial impacts are. Especially in strong welfare state contexts, such policies have a pronounced influence on where, how, and in which tenures gentrification

processes are able to take hold. This study specifically considers the decline of social rent, focusing on the rate at which this occurs, but also on where and how this takes shape. Urban renewal and the marketization of previously regulated housing are often crucial ingredients of local housing policies. Yet ongoing welfare state restructuring and crisis-induced austerity measures have made it more difficult to intervene in disadvantaged neighbourhoods at large. This chapter investigates how local policies have changed, and links these policies to shifting strategies of state-led gentrification.Howe

Subsequently, **Chapter 3** studies how such urban and housing policies, as well as gentrification, are represented by key stakeholders. A premise of this chapter is that it matters who policymakers think should move into a neighbourhood. More specifically, it is hypothesized that when young upwardly mobile residents move in, gentrification processes are represented as softer, or even non-existent. Stakeholders consider gentrification as normal due to demographic and population shifts. Other factors, such as the perceived control that key state actors have over gentrification processes, may also play a role.

Building on this policy context, the subsequent chapters turn towards investigating the rise of new forms of gentrification, and understanding the links between these different gentrification processes and social-spatial inequalities. **Chapter 4** aims to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how social-spatial inequalities and segregation come into being, and are influenced by gentrification. It challenges the often assumed dominance of residential moves in driving neighbourhood-level socio-economic population composition change. Other drivers may also play an equivalent – or even a more important – role in propelling socio-economic changes and thus gentrification processes. More specifically, this research forwards *in situ* social mobility and gradual demographic shifts as important drivers that exist alongside residential mobility. *In situ* social mobility here refers to income gains achieved while staying in the same neighbourhood. Demographic shifts refer to ageing processes and the succession of cohorts. Through an innovative method to anatomize population composition change, this study is able to determine the extent to which these different mechanisms produce population composition change. Furthermore, I investigate the extent to which a specific geography of these different mechanisms produces neighbourhood change. In so doing, this chapter highlights the conceptual and spatial diversity of gentrification processes, and shows how social-spatial inequalities are deepening.

Young upwardly mobile and higher educated residents are typically ascribed a key role in gentrification processes, and as 'marginal gentrifiers' they may drive neighbourhood change through *in situ* social mobility. However, as gentrification processes have progressed and housing affordability continues to worsen, it is unclear how such initially low income marginal gentrifiers are able to acquire housing in gentrifying neighbourhoods at all. While gentrification research has paid ample attention to the different forms of capital that gentrifiers draw on, I argue that it has so far insufficiently recognized the importance of the intergenerational transmission of capital. **Chapter 5** therefore asks the question of how parental background influences young people's neighbourhood outcomes, focusing specifically on young people leaving the

parental home. Parents may lend direct support through financial transfers, or also for instance by brokering housing. Focusing specifically on family wealth and residential background, this study investigates where young people with 'wealthy' parents move to, comparing this with the neighbourhood outcomes of young people with 'asset-poor' parents. This provides novel insight into the intergenerational transmission of inequalities as an increasingly important driver of social-spatial divides, and as a force to be considered in fuelling gentrification.

The role of generational dynamics and divides in gentrification processes can be further unravelled. The global financial crisis has particularly restricted young people when it comes to entering homeownership or acquiring secure housing in general. While Chapter 5 stresses the importance of parental support in shaping housing and neighbourhood outcomes, **Chapter 6** focuses on the importance of different housing tenures for different age groups, and how this relates to gentrification processes. This chapter therefore investigates the post-move housing tenure outcomes of gentrifiers of different ages. Accentuated intergenerational inequalities may lead to the formation of different forms of gentrification associated with different age groups. Decreasing access to homeownership may imply that young gentrifiers are increasingly entangled in what can be called the *rise of rental gentrification*. In questioning the extent to which there is indeed a rise in rental gentrification among different age groups, this chapter also draws attention to spatial variation. That is, rental gentrification may pop up in different (types of) neighbourhoods than homeownership gentrification.

While the preceding chapters focus on variations in gentrification processes across urban space, **Chapter 7** focuses on the combined impact of these different forms of gentrification on social-spatial inequalities at the urban-regional level. It does so by studying how and to what extent the residential moving patterns of low income households have been subject to change over time. This gives insight into the extent to which different forms of displacement take their toll on the housing position of low income households. Subsequently, by considering the post-move destinations of low income households, it crucially illuminates how these patterns of displacement reshape and reshuffle social-spatial inequalities. Importantly, it considers the extent to which gentrification and displacement are linked to a *suburbanization of poverty*. Rather than considering lower income households as a homogeneous group, this study highlights diversity by distinguishing between unemployed, working poor, and low-to-middle income households. It also considers temporal variation, highlighting differences between the pre-crisis boom period and the bust period that followed. Finally, it considers differences regarding urban and housing market context.

Figure 1.1 identifies how these different sub-projects tie into each other and together help our understanding of how different forms and expressions of gentrification have reshaped social-spatial inequalities. In this model, gentrification is understood as a combination of housing policies, housing market changes, and population composition changes. Chapters 2 and 3 seek to unravel the policy context shaping gentrification and residential

behaviour. While Chapter 4 stresses the combined influence of residential moves, social mobility, and demographic shifts, subsequent chapters (5, 6, and 7) zoom in on residential moves specifically. Residential moves arguably constitute *the* key moment when individuals or households are confronted with constraints and opportunities on the housing market in the most direct manner. It is therefore to be expected that at this point the ability to tap into parental resources has the most influence on housing outcomes, and it is also at this point that households are confronted with an inability to enter homeownership. Likewise, for low income households, issues of displacement, exclusion, and housing unaffordability or inaccessibility come to the fore when moving. Housing policies typically also aim to intervene in the housing stock to enhance housing accessibility for specific groups, with the ultimate aim of altering residential flows.

FIGURE 1.1. Conceptual model of how gentrification processes impact social-spatial inequalities. The numbers correspond to the chapters dealing with the specific relationships.

Data

Although the research approach of each sub-project in this dissertation is discussed in detail in the individual chapters, it is worthwhile paying some attention here to commonalities in the data used and some of the overarching methodological considerations. The lion's share of this dissertation uses quantitative data and methods to investigate how gentrification processes have developed over time. I mainly draw on tax and register data available from the System of Social statistics Databases (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands. These anonymized datasets are individual-level and cover the entire population registered in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the data are geocoded and longitudinal, so it is possible to track individuals, but also neighbourhoods,

over time. These two qualities – data covering the entire population and their longitudinal character – allow for highly detailed and dynamic analyses to be conducted at low spatial scales. This means that it is possible to define very specific sub-categories in the population based on socio-economic and demographic characteristics, while retaining a sufficiently large number of cases to conduct neighbourhood-level analyses. At the neighbourhood level[3], it is subsequently possible to monitor changes in population composition over time, to unravel how these changes came about, and to track changes with regard to in-movers and out-movers. There are also some disadvantages to the SSD. It is a relatively 'narrow' database, meaning that although the entire population is included, the only data available is what is registered by official institutions. Data on stated preferences or other survey-type data is, for instance, typically not available, at least not without having to resort to a substantially restricted population. Furthermore, although the data are longitudinal, they do not go very far back in time. Although the available time span depends on the data used, most of this dissertation relies on SSD data from 2004 onwards.

In this dissertation I seek to provide a firm contextual basis for the quantitative analyses of individual residential trajectories and their relationship to gentrification. I do so by paying attention to housing market structure and changes therein, for example regarding tenure composition, real estate values, and the demolition or conversion of affordable rental housing. Likewise, I also pay attention to state policies regarding housing and gentrification.

The study of gentrification processes implies the study of class change. Most British gentrification studies have a tradition of using occupational categories to distinguish between classes (see for instance Hamnett 2003). However, the use of occupational categories as a proxy for class has been criticized as being too crude, too context dependent, a weak predictor of social outcomes (e.g. voting patterns), and substantially different from income or wealth (Savage 2016: 477). Income or wealth groups have been forwarded as a suitable alternative for occupational categories, although it should be emphasized that both income and occupational categorizations have their pros and cons (ibid.). Dutch class or gentrification studies more often draw on income or educational attainment (Boterman 2012a). Because education is not very well registered in the SSD, this dissertation relies on income measures. More importantly, income is best suited to capture social mobility[4]. This is especially pertinent to this dissertation because it builds on recent studies that have highlighted the importance of *in situ* social mobility to neighbourhood change (Bailey 2012; Teernstra 2014a; Hochstenbach et al. 2015; Bailey et al. 2016).

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3.   This dissertation follows the official neighbourhood classification of Statistics Netherlands, which generally means areas clearly bounded by major infrastructure or waterways. Chapter 7 uses four-digit postcode areas because of changes in the official neighbourhood classification during the studied period. This was not an issue in the other chapters.
4.   Education tends to remain stable for the adult population after entering employment. A move between occupational categories can indicate social mobility, but this is more fuzzy than income and ignores mobility within a category.

The research in this dissertation is based, in the first place, on a comparison between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Simply put, Amsterdam represents a booming city whereas Rotterdam continues to struggle in the post-industrial economy. This is reflected in economic structure and performance, population composition, and housing market pressures. The two cities therefore function as contrasting cases. The next section will further excavate important commonalities and differences between the two cases. Chapter 3 departs from this perspective to conduct an international comparison of gentrification processes in Amsterdam and Berlin (Germany) in order to better understand the influence of state context.

Methodological considerations

The use and interpretation of register data comes with a cautionary note. By focusing on the individual level, one might be inclined to locate the causes of neighbourhood change at the individual level as well. It is certainly true that gentrification processes *are* to a certain extent the product of residential practices of individuals belonging to different classes. Furthermore, I do also argue that it is indeed crucial to garner a better understanding of how gentrification processes come about and progress at this material level. However, this should not come at the cost of recognizing that there are also important broader explanations for gentrification that focus on political economy and "the key structural question of why people live where they do in cities" (Slater 2013: 367).

More broadly speaking, quantitative methods and positivism are often associated with conservatism, the status quo, and an uncritical approach to the topic under research. Mistakenly so, according to Wyly (2011), who calls for a better integration of positivist research methods into critical urban studies. The dire need to do so in gentrification research is illustrated by Lees, Slater, and Wyly (2008: 78-80):

> Very few gentrification researchers are able to integrate quantitative and qualitative methods […]. Even fewer have the specialized expertise to engage in neoclassical analyses on the terrain of multivariate modelling and longitudinal sociospatial analysis. As a consequence, when a series of studies based on government databases seemed to provide evidence that gentrification was not actually displacing low-income renters in gentrifying neighborhoods few researchers were able to respond. […] Many community activists shouted, "No!" and provided detailed accounts of the individual experiences of poor people whose lives were damaged by gentrification. But in mainstream public and policy discourse, such cases are always dismissed as 'anecdotal'.

On a personal note, only recently has the ongoing gentrification of Amsterdam aroused substantial attention and concern in mainstream public debate. Of course concerns had long existed, but they were not as widespread nor were they discussed in terms of gentrification. My own experience from contributing to the debate, at various occasions and through different outlets, is that

the use of 'numbers'[5] has indeed helped to question the previously, mostly uncritical, accounts of gentrification in public debate. With this dissertation I thus hope to answer the call for critical quantitative research.

Spatial context

As highlighted in the previous sections, at various points in this dissertation I compare gentrification processes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the two largest cities of the Netherlands. They may be considered two rather contrasting cases. Amsterdam represents a city that has successfully made the transition to a post-industrial economic structure. It is a second-tier global city with strong service and leisure sectors and an international financial centre (Burgers & Musterd 2002; Engelen & Musterd 2010). The harbour city of Rotterdam constitutes a city that is struggling to leave behind its industrial legacy and make the transition to a post-industrial economy (Doucet 2013). Because of these different economic profiles, both cities have served as comparative cases to study how urban context influences socio-economic and social-spatial inequalities (e.g. Kloosterman 1996; Meulenbelt 1997; Burgers & Musterd 2002). In this dissertation the two cities are compared in a similar vein. The Dutch context provides an interesting overarching institutional setting, especially the highly regulated housing market.

Population

The differences between the two cities are noticeable in various domains, although there are also important similarities. Both cities show similar historical trends in population size (Figure 1.1), with a steep loss in population during the period from the mid-1960s up to the mid-1980s, as suburbanization processes were in full swing. Between 1960 and 1985 the population of both cities decreased by 22 percent. Since then the population of both cities stabilized and saw a return to gradual growth. Only in more recent years, more or less since 2005, have the two cities shown diverging trends. While population growth accelerated in Amsterdam, especially since the 2008 crisis, Rotterdam only recorded modest population increases (the jump in population size in 2011 was due to the annexation of the bordering municipality Rozenburg). As of 2015, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are home to roughly 820,000 and 620,000 residents respectively.

Differences in both cities' economic structure are reflected in the employment position of the residents. Not only are unemployment rates structurally lower in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam, but the working age population is also relatively more often employed in highly skilled jobs (typically requiring a higher education degree). Although the number and share of residents employed in highly skilled jobs increased in both cities between 2003 and 2013, this was stronger in Amsterdam (CBS 2015). Yet compared to the Dutch average, both cities are characterized by above average unemployment rates but also above average shares of the working age population employed in highly skilled jobs. Amsterdam not only has a stronger economic and labour market

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5   Many of which can be found in the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

structure than Rotterdam, it also hosts more higher education institutions. This is clearly reflected in the number of students in higher education living in both cities: in 2014, a total of 54,720 higher education students officially lived in Amsterdam (OIS 2016), while this number was 23,447 in Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam 2016a).

Housing

Differences between the two cities clearly crystallize when looking at housing market dynamics. Amsterdam's housing market is considerably tighter, as is reflected, for example, in average sale prices for owner-occupied housing (Figure 1.2). These are substantially above the national average in Amsterdam, whereas they are structurally below the national average in Rotterdam. In the years leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis, the formation of a housing bubble can clearly be seen in Amsterdam, while price increases remained more modest elsewhere. The housing market crash and the 'double dip' (housing price decreases in 2008 and 2012 respectively) did, however, hit Amsterdam hardest in terms of average sale prices. Nevertheless, at the time of writing this introduction, housing prices are exploding once again in Amsterdam and increasing at unprecedented rates, with Rotterdam and the rest of the Netherlands increasingly being left behind.

Developments on the owner-occupied market only tell part of the story. At the national level, the Dutch housing context is still marked by high levels of social rent when compared to other countries, and it has traditionally been characterized as a unitary rental market (Elsinga et al. 2008). This means that social rental housing is, up to now, not reserved only for the lowest income households, but instead serves a broader segment of the population. Furthermore, Dutch social rental housing is of relatively high quality, is relatively dispersed within cities, and tenant rights are well protected (the same goes for tenants in the private rental sector). Nevertheless, in the Dutch context homeownership has also rapidly expanded under state support: while the share of homeownership stood at around 30 percent in the 1960s, it increased up to 50 percent in the mid-1990s, and to around 60 percent in 2010 (Doling & Elsinga 2012; Musterd 2014).

In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, rental dwellings in fact still constitute the majority of the housing stock. Most rental dwellings are social rent, which here refers to ownership by not-for-profit housing associations. These are effectively semi-private associations that are legally committed to rent the majority of their dwellings in the rent-regulated sector to lower income households[6]. Private rental dwellings can be owned by large investors as well as small-time landlords. Nevertheless, many private-rental dwellings are also rent-regulated.

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6. Rent regulation is determined on the basis of a point system related to quality. All dwellings that score below a set threshold are regulated so that their monthly rents do not exceed roughly €700 (subject to yearly incremental changes). EU regulations stipulate that the majority of these dwellings should be reserved for households earning below €34,000 (also subject to yearly incremental changes).

FIGURE 1.2. Population size Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 1960-2015. *Note:* y-axis truncated; population growth in Rotterdam in 2011 due to annexation of Rozenburg. *Source:* Statistics Netherlands, Statline (2016); own adaptation.


FIGURE 1.3. Average sale price of existing dwellings per quarter 1995-2016 in Amsterdam, Rotterdam (cities), and the Netherlands. *Source:* Statistics Netherlands, CBS Statline (2016); own adaptation.

The tenure composition of the housing stock as well as changes therein during the 2000-2013 period are rather similar in both cities (Figure 1.3). The social rental stock owned by housing associations is still the largest share in both cities, but has been subject to substantial absolute and relative decreases over time. Moreover, accessibility of the social rental stock is relatively low, especially in Amsterdam. Most social rental housing is allocated on the basis of waiting time (or urgency status). In Amsterdam, the average waiting time for a social rental dwelling is over nine years (AFWC 2016), compared to around four years in Rotterdam[7]. Policies of urban renewal that typically involve the demolition of social rental blocks and the sale of social rental housing are at the heart of these decreases. Furthermore, rental housing is increasingly often rented out in the free market sector, where rents are relatively high and maximum income criteria are absent. Indeed, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam actively aim to reduce the number of social rental dwellings in an attempt to expand housing for the middle classes.

FIGURE 1.4. Tenure composition of the Amsterdam and Rotterdam housing stock 2000-2013. *Source:* Data provided by OIS Amsterdam and OBI Rotterdam. *Note:* Social rental is owned by housing associations; private rental is owned by private landlords.

Geography

Amsterdam and Rotterdam are rather different in terms of their spatial layout. Amsterdam is renowned for its seventeenth century traditionally affluent canal belt. The earliest examples of gentrification in the Netherlands can also be found in neighbourhoods close to the canal belt, such as the Western Islands – with its many seventeenth century warehouses – and the former working

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7.   The average waiting time refers to the number of years registered on the waiting list of a central allocation system. The 'active' search period tends to be shorter.

class Jordaan neighbourhood from the same era (Cortie et al. 1982). These neighbourhoods fit the 'gentrification aesthetic' with their old housing stock, converted warehouses, and proximity to the inner city and amenities. By now, gentrification has matured in these neighbourhoods, which are among the most expensive in the city. Since then, the nineteenth and early-twentieth century neighbourhoods, which form a belt around the city centre, have become popular among gentrifiers for similar reasons (Wagenaar 2003). In addition, Amsterdam hosts a range of high status neighbourhoods popular among middle class families staying in the city (Boterman et al. 2010). An important physical and mental barrier in the city is the A10 motorway. This motorway separates the central boroughs, where much of the housing stock dates from before the Second World War, from the peripheral boroughs built up during the post-war era. Municipal policies seek to accommodate gentrification processes in centrally located erstwhile low status neighbourhoods through policies of 'rolling out' the city centre milieu and liberalizing the housing stock (Van Gent 2013).

Rotterdam, in contrast, lacks a historic core because the Nazi bombings of 14th May 1940 levelled much of the city centre. Furthermore, the city has a lower concentration of consumption- and service-oriented facilities and amenities than Amsterdam (Musterd & De Pater 1992). The New Meuse river divides the city into a northern and a southern part, with the city centre and the city's most affluent areas located north of the river. The local state aims to put the city on the map through flagship development projects as part of a wider attempt to attract and keep hold of more middle class households. Although several new flagship projects such as the renewed central railway station and the Markthal have been realized in recent years, the most prominent is the Kop van Zuid waterfront on the south bank of the river (Doucet 2013; Doucet et al. 2011). The redevelopment of this former harbour area combines landmarks – e.g. the Erasmus bridge – with new high-rise residential and office towers and converted warehouses. Kop van Zuid may be considered a form of new-build gentrification (cf. Davidson & Lees 2005), not only given the generally high-end developments, but also because it has kicked off gentrification processes in the adjacent Katendrecht neighbourhood. Apart from these exceptions, Rotterdam South is one of the poorest areas of the Netherlands, and in recent years various controversial urban policies have been implemented to alter the population composition and tackle social problems in several neighbourhoods there. These include hotspot policing (Schinkel & Van den Berg 2011) and the so-called 'Rotterdam Act', a controversial measure that bars unemployed newcomers from moving to a select number of poor neighbourhoods (Uitermark, Hochstenbach & Van Gent 2017; Van Eijk 2010; Ouwehand & Doff 2013).

Reading guide

The remainder of this book is structured as follows. The six sub-projects introduced in this chapter are each dealt with in a separate chapter. Each chapter is a standalone paper published in, or submitted for publication in, a peer-reviewed journal. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the role of housing policies

and urban policies in gentrification processes. Chapter 2 shows that the social rental sector is shrinking at an ever increasing rate in Amsterdam. Moreover, while renewal used to be concentrated in low status peripheral areas, the sale of social rental housing in gentrifying neighbourhoods has now become a dominant practice. This is likely to accelerate gentrification and amplify social-spatial inequalities. Chapter 3 uses interview data to look at stakeholder representations of gentrification in Amsterdam and Berlin, highlighting important differences between both cases: Amsterdam's policymakers explicitly discuss gentrification as a positive policy instrument, while the term is avoided in Berlin due to its contested nature.

The four chapters that follow (4, 5, 6, and 7) use longitudinal quantitative data to establish the pervasiveness and geography of different forms of gentrification. These chapters also link these different forms of gentrification to social-spatial inequalities in different forms. Chapter 4 does so by anatomizing neighbourhood population composition change in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, making a distinction between the impact of residential moves, social mobility, and demographic change. Chapter 5 subsequently forwards the importance of taking into account parental support and the intergenerational transmission of inequalities in terms of how they drive very specific forms of gentrification. Chapter 6 charts the rise of rental gentrification alongside progressive homeownership gentrification. Both forms have their distinct geographies and reflect generational divides. Chapter 7 considers the combined influence of the different variations in gentrification processes on social-spatial inequalities, focusing specifically on low income households' residential behaviour. It shows that gentrification drives an overarching suburbanization of poverty towards urban peripheries and the surrounding regions. The suburbanization of poverty is both a direct process of poor households moving from city to suburb, and a broader indirect process caused by exclusion.

Chapter 8, the final chapter, synthesizes the most important findings from the preceding six empirical chapters. It discusses how and to what extent new forms of gentrification processes are on the rise and how this reshapes social-spatial inequalities in urban regions. It also considers the theoretical contributions of this dissertation, as well as its societal implications.

CHAPTER 2 — The changing geography of state-led gentrification: The spatial impacts of shifting housing policies

Abstract

Governments in a wide range of contexts have long pursued policies of social mixing to disperse poverty concentrations, attract middle class residents, and manage disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Drawing on the case of Amsterdam, this chapter shows that the dominant instruments to facilitate social mixing have changed over time. The policy focus has shifted from large-scale urban renewal projects and the demolition of social rental housing to the sale of existing social rental dwellings. The changing nature of tenure restructuring is also expressed through a changing geography: while urban renewal was previously mostly concentrated in post-war neighbourhoods where market processes had spurred downgrading, social housing sales are increasingly concentrated in inner city neighbourhoods where already existing gentrification processes are thus amplified. These shifts need to be considered within their wider policy context. Local policies increasingly focus on catering to the preferences of middle class households. Welfare state restructuring and austerity measures push policies that seek to cut back on social rental housing. I argue that reductions in social rental housing are increasingly taking place in gentrifying neighbourhoods because they are areas where market-oriented restructuring can still be combined with the goals of social mixing. Thus this chapter shows that questions of where, how, and why governments pursue social/tenure mixing are closely interrelated and change over time.

Introduction

Housing policies form a key instrument for steering urban development. Across contexts, homeownership is ideologically pushed as the 'superior' tenure form (Ronald 2008), as it is assumed to have a positive influence on individual homeowners and society at large. At the urban or neighbourhood level, homeownership is also expanded to address a plethora of issues. These issues include social and physical neighbourhood problems, the economic strength of cities, and the provision of housing and urban milieus attractive to middle class residents. Tenure mixing policies typically entail the introduction of more expensive owner-occupied dwellings and more affluent residents to targeted neighbourhoods, frequently at the cost of affordable rental housing for lower income tenants. These policies may therefore be considered part of state-led gentrification processes (Smith 2002; Uitermark et al. 2007; Lees 2008; Bridge et al. 2012). State policies may amplify already existing gentrification processes, or alternatively seek to spark gentrification in downgrading and disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

The expansion of homeownership in existing urban neighbourhoods is generally coupled with a reduction in the number of rental dwellings, particularly cheaper or rent-regulated stock. There are different policy approaches

for doing so: rental dwellings may be demolished and replaced with new-build owner-occupied dwellings. Alternatively, rental dwellings may be brought onto the market and converted into homeownership. Furthermore, it is not only important to consider how changes in tenure composition come about, but also where tenure restructuring[8] is pursued. The promotion of homeownership at the cost of rental units may be focused on 'disadvantaged' neighbourhoods in an attempt to mitigate or counter developments perceived as negative (Uitermark 2003). Urban policies may also seek to facilitate market processes by deregulating the housing stock and expanding homeownership in those neighbourhoods that are already in high demand. Although much research attention has been paid to tenure mixing policies, little is in fact known about how the instruments and geography of tenure restructuring may be interrelated, and how both may have been subject to change over time. This chapter specifically focuses on social housing reduction. Drawing on the case of Amsterdam (the Netherlands), this chapter sets out to investigate these topics by answering the following question:

Where and how are policies of tenure mixing pursued, particularly reductions in social housing, and how has this changed over time?

This research question is answered using longitudinal and spatial data on the Amsterdam housing market for the period 1998-2015, describing both overall changes as well as specific tenure transitions. Furthermore, attention will be paid to how these changes have contributed to a changing accessibility of the social rental housing stock. The question of how and where tenure restructuring policies are pursued, and how this changes over time, may be related to broader contextual and policy factors. This chapter therefore not only describes these dimensions and shifts but also seeks to contextualize them. I do so by linking these shifts to recent urban and housing policies, as well as to macro trends and societal debates regarding social housing. Amsterdam is an interesting case through which to investigate this question because it has a rich history of providing affordable social rental housing owned by housing associations[9] to a large segment of its population. However, urban policies that promote homeownership at the cost of social rental housing have also been a permanent component of the national and local political landscape since the 1990s (Uitermark 2009; Aalbers 2004). Furthermore, the local government has embraced gentrification as a positive policy instrument, as stated in the city's most recent housing policy whitepaper (Van Gent 2013).

This chapter progresses as follows: first, the theoretical section further elaborates on welfare state restructuring, the various reasons for tenure mixing policies, and how these different rationales may also be reflected in

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8.   I use the term 'tenure restructuring' here to denote all policies that seek to change the tenure composition of certain areas.

9.   Housing associations are semi-private not-for-profit institutions and are the main providers of social rental housing in Amsterdam and the Netherlands.

the geography and instruments of tenure restructuring. Furthermore, it specifically highlights scholarly work on the linkages between social mixing and state-led gentrification. Second, this chapter further excavates the context of the Amsterdam case before presenting long-term and spatial data on overall shifts in Amsterdam's housing tenure composition, paying specific attention to the sale and demolition of social housing. Subsequently, these changes are contextualized by linking them to national policies and macro developments.

Literature

Tenure and welfare state restructuring

Tenure restructuring may be pursued for a range of different reasons, using different instruments at different locations. Urban and neighbourhood level policies intersect here with national policies and broader trends of welfare state restructuring. Most European welfare states have, through policies of de-regulation and re-regulation, shifted their attention and resources over recent decades towards enabling market forces (Brenner et al. 2010). Market-oriented reforms have solidified the privileged position of private property and stimulated the private accumulation of wealth (Aalbers & Christophers 2014). Homeownership has substantially grown under these conditions of welfare state restructuring, as the dominant ideology casts it as the most desirable form of tenure (Ronald 2008). Individuals must assume a greater responsibility in securing their future welfare through asset accumulation rather than relying on state services (Doling & Ronald 2010). Homeownership is promoted as an effective means for households to accumulate assets, as they pay off mortgage debt and raise house prices. Under conditions of crisis-related austerity, private accumulation may become even more important as state spending on public services is reduced.

In contrast, welfare state restructuring as well as austerity measures have hit rental housing segments in various ways. The share of rental housing, and particularly rent-regulated social rental housing, has decreased in most countries. These policies work towards a residualization of the social rental stock (Forrest & Murie 1983; Van der Heijden 2002). The underlying assumption is that as private ownership is considered more desirable, social housing should only cater to those with few or no options to acquire property themselves. Processes of social housing residualization cater to a dualization of the housing market, which entails that different housing market segments increasingly come to serve different strands of the population (Kemeny 2001): a small social rental sector for low income households, while owner occupancy but also private rent caters to households higher on the socio-economic ladder. Welfare state restructuring not only seeks to reduce the size of social rental housing, but policy reforms are generally also geared towards the de-regulation and re-regulation of rental segments. Examples of such reforms are the gradual erosion of tenant rights, a reduction in state subsidies, and efforts to give private landlords and investors more leeway (Kadi and Ronald 2016; Huisman 2016).

Various rounds of welfare state restructuring and austerity measures also have a more indirect impact on urban and housing policies. As a

consequence of reforms, it has become more difficult for states to intervene in traditionally key domains since they increasingly lack the means and power to do so. This makes it ever harder to address the structural causes of issues such as deepening socio-economic inequalities and social exclusion. Consequently, it has been suggested that states should increasingly shift their attention and efforts to specific areas or neighbourhoods where they are still able to manage and control the local effects and outcomes of these issues (Uitermark 2014). Local urban and housing policies may thus play a crucial role, as the following sections will highlight.

Tenure restructuring and disadvantaged neighbourhoods

At the urban level, a key reason for policymakers to engage in policies of tenure mixing is to achieve a change in population composition and reduce levels of residential socio-economic and/or ethnic segregation. High levels of segregation are often assumed to have additional negative consequences for those living in areas with a high concentration of poverty (Wilson 1987). The assumed underlying causal mechanisms for these additional effects are, inter alia, a lack of positive role models living in a neighbourhood, a negative work ethic, the lack of useful local social networks, and the stigmatization of neighbourhoods (ibid.). These assumptions form the core of the 'neighbourhood effects' thesis (Sampson et al. 2002; Van Ham et al. 2012). Although evidence for the existence of substantial neighbourhood effects remains mixed and conditional (e.g. Miltenburg 2017), the thesis has had a major impact on urban policies (Ostendorf et al. 2001). It provides a clear-cut legitimation for direct intervention in the social and physical structure of disadvantaged neighbourhoods to facilitate the introduction of more expensive housing and middle class residents, and to disperse lower income residents. In addition, it has been suggested that the neighbourhood effects thesis allows states to address incremental differences in poverty without addressing the key institutional arrangements responsible for producing structural inequalities (Slater 2013). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss these projects at great length, examples from the US include the Moving to Opportunity experiment (De Souza Briggs et al. 2010), and the demolition and renewal of public housing estates through the HOPE VI program (Popkin et al. 2004). In Western Europe, policy responses generally entail the wholesale or partial demolition or restructuring of impoverished neighbourhoods (Bolt et al. 2010; Andersson & Musterd 2005; Kleinhans 2004). Dutch urban renewal policies have been particularly ambitious in altering the housing composition of 'disadvantaged' urban neighbourhoods in an attempt to dissolve poverty concentrations and counter the corresponding accumulation of problems (Uitermark 2003).

Given the mixed evidence for neighbourhood effects and the generally modest effects of urban restructuring policies on individuals' life outcomes (Kleinhans 2004), states may have different rationales to invest in social mixing. Uitermark (2003) argues that in neighbourhoods where large poverty concentrations exist and the share of unemployment is relatively high, local bureaucrats may feel that they lack the means to address local problems. The

introduction of middle class households that are generally supportive of state policies is supposed to make neighbourhoods easier to manage and amenable to government interventions. Social mixing thus becomes a strategy to ensure or bring back social order and control over deviant spaces (Uitermark et al. 2007). Such policies of social mixing through tenure restructuring therefore take place in areas where poverty concentrations exist and segregation is most visible. These will generally be neighbourhoods that are considered to be low in the urban hierarchy. Here, governments may intervene to reverse negative developments and counter market processes of downgrading.

Tenure mixing and gentrification

Policies of tenure mixing and social mixing have frequently been associated with state-led gentrification processes, because social rental housing and low income tenants typically have to make way for more expensive owner-occupied dwellings and a higher income clientele (Lees 2008). Furthermore, in certain cases it may be considered a form of 'gentrification by stealth', as the language of social mixing conceals the class-based changes induced by gentrification (Bridge et al. 2012; Smith 2002, 1996). Social mixing policies may bring about the involuntary displacement of longer-term tenants, although in the Dutch context the relocation process is guided and compensated for, which mitigates some of the negative effects (Posthumus 2013; Kleinhans & Kearns 2013). In contexts where tenant protection is strong, rent regulation is in place, and relocation is guided, social mixing policies may nevertheless still have a substantial impact as the structural decrease in affordable rental dwellings available to those with a lower income effectively excludes such residents (cf. Slater, 2009). These shifts are especially likely to have a detrimental impact on the housing position of low income housing market outsiders, as well as those low income households in direct need of housing (Kadi & Musterd 2015).

The strong and proactive involvement of local states in pushing gentrification is one of the defining features of contemporary 'third wave' gentrification, setting it apart from the preceding wave. State involvement has also been important in allowing gentrification processes to spread geographically: away from the inner neighbourhoods of major cities into secondary cities, as well as to neighbourhoods further from the urban core (Hackworth & Smith 2001; Smith 2002). Governmental strategies that facilitate gentrification are often pursued for – or legitimized by – economic reasons. In some contexts, attracting middle class residents is important for municipalities to increase their local tax base. However, also in welfare state arrangements where tax revenues play little to no role – as in the Dutch case – attracting higher income and higher educated residents may be an important part of local authorities' entrepreneurial strategies to enhance their city's competitive position (Harvey 1989). These policies are often heavily inspired by Richard Florida's *Creative Class* thesis and seek to provide attractive, 'authentic' urban environments with which to lure in the creative class (Florida 2002; see also Peck 2012). Large-scale urban restructuring that includes the demolition of old housing stock and the construction of new dwellings may be at odds with the ambition to provide such environments. In this case, local authorities may opt

instead for other interventions in the housing stock that better suit this goal. Particularly in cities and neighbourhoods where the social rental housing stock is relatively large, local authorities can play a crucial role in spurring gentrification through encouraging the sale of social rental housing or the removal of rent controls (Hamnett & Randolph 1984; Boterman & Van Gent 2014; Andersson & Turner 2014). By bringing former social rental housing onto the market, these dwellings may become accessible to higher income households, since eligibility for social rental housing is generally restricted to lower income households. Tenure conversions as part of governmental gentrification strategies may therefore concentrate in neighbourhoods where demand from higher income households is already present and can be catered to. Consequently, the social rental stock that functions as a brake on gentrification in these neighbourhoods is gradually eroded (Van Gent 2013).

Housing and geographical context

This chapter charts how Amsterdam's housing composition has changed over time, where this is done, and how. It focuses particularly on shifts in the social rental stock owned by not-for-profit housing associations. Housing associations traditionally rent out the vast majority of their stock in the rent-regulated sector, with rents of up to roughly €700 (subject to yearly incremental changes)[10]. Exceptions notwithstanding, since 2011 only households with an income up to €35,000, or €39,000 for families, are eligible for social rental housing allocated via a central waiting list. The average waiting time for a social rental dwelling is around nine years, although the active search period is shorter. The maximum rent is determined on the basis of a point system that takes into account various dwelling characteristics (size and quality), and more recently location. When a dwelling surpasses the €700 points threshold, actual rents can be freely determined and the dwelling can be liberalized. Maximum income criteria and waiting lists do not apply to rent-liberalized dwellings. Therefore, next to the sale and demolition of social housing units, rent liberalization represents a third way through which the number of rent-regulated dwellings accessible to lower income households can be reduced. Rent-liberalized dwellings mainly house middle and high income households.

This chapter presents data on changing patterns of social rental housing sales and demolition, as well as overall tenure shifts in Amsterdam. Specific attention is paid to the changing geography of these tenure shifts. Because information on sales and demolition are only available at the borough level, I group together Amsterdam's four central boroughs (Centre, East, West, South) and its three more peripheral boroughs (North, New West, and Southeast) (Figure 2.1). This distinction roughly captures the division between Amsterdam's gentrifying central city and its struggling urban periphery (a point elaborated on in Chapter 4). Data on the overall changes in Amsterdam's tenure composition are available on a lower spatial scale,

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10.   The point system also applies to private landlords, and means that part of the private rental stock is also rent-regulated. This paper focuses, however, on shifts in the social housing stock owned by housing associations.

enabling the definition of a more fine-grained neighbourhood typology based on dominant building period and the traditional status of the neighbourhood (Figure 2.1). The first neighbourhood type comprises the central city – including the 17th century canal belt – and the Old South district. The neighbourhoods belonging to this type are traditionally affluent, or have been for a long time now. The second neighbourhood type is the 1800-1920 belt directly surrounding the inner city.

FIGURE 2.1. Neighbourhood typology in Amsterdam based on building period and urban milieu. *Source:* OIS Amsterdam; own adaptation.

Most of these neighbourhoods experienced socio-economic downgrading throughout the second half of the 20th century. The same goes for the third neighbourhood type in the 1920-1940 belt. Both the 1800-1920 and 1920-1940 belts are characterized by relatively large shares of social housing and relatively small apartments. However, both belts currently represent the city's gentrification frontiers, with the process in a generally more advanced stage in the 19th century neighbourhoods. The fourth neighbourhood type encompasses the post-war expansions to the city, which were built as a response to housing shortages as well as the low quality of housing that then dominated Amsterdam's central city. Although initially home to mostly (lower-) middle class households, the post-war neighbourhoods have experienced long-term processes of income decline and are now often low on the urban neighbourhood hierarchy. The fifth typology includes newly built areas (constructed

after 1990) as well as rural areas. These areas have been combined into a single type because they are both primarily middle class residential areas and are characterized by above average shares of owner occupation.

Amsterdam's changing tenure composition

Since the 1901 Housing Act, not-for-profit housing associations have played a key role in Amsterdam's urban development. During different time periods, housing associations built large numbers of affordable dwellings to accommodate lower and lower-middle class residents, including entire neighbourhoods in the 'Amsterdam School' architectural style during the interbellum period, and large modernist estates in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Bijlmermeer in the southeast). The 1970s and 1980s also saw housing associations and governments active in the urban renewal of inner city neighbourhoods, buying up private rental dwellings and replacing slum housing with new social rental housing complexes for the original residents, following the ideal of 'building for the neighbourhood' (Uitermark 2009). As a consequence of this historical development path, Amsterdam represents a city where social rental housing has long been the dominant tenure form. Yet from the 1990s onwards, the promotion of homeownership has gained greater currency at the national level, at the cost of social renting. A key event in this regard was the cutting of financial ties between housing associations and governments in 1995, officially eradicating state support for social housing[11] (Boelhouwer & Priemus 2014; Aalbers et al. 2017). Housing associations did, however, remain important players in urban development, as is evidenced by their important role in co-operating in various urban renewal policies initiated since then (Uitermark 2014). Despite the push for homeownership and the reduced financial and political support for social rental housing, the share of social rental housing in Amsterdam remained rather stable during the late 1990s and peaked in 2002 at 205,301 dwellings (55.1% of the city's total housing stock). However, since then the social rental stock has steadily decreased in size. In 2014 there were a total of 181,882 social rental dwellings, or 45.6% of the total stock. Compare this to the number of owner-occupied dwellings, which increased from 42,199 in 1998 (11.6% of the total stock) to 113,694 in 2014 (28.5%) (Figure 2.2).

Changing instruments and geography of tenure restructuring

The two dominant instruments used to reduce the size of the social rental stock are demolition and sales. In 1997 various stakeholders, including the Amsterdam housing associations and the municipal government, signed a first 'Social Housing Sales Covenant' allowing housing associations to sell part of their property to individual households (Aalbers 2004). After a slow start, the number of yearly social housing sales quickly increased after 2002 (Figure 2.3), partly because sales became an explicit local policy goal. Only 434 dwellings were sold in 2002, but this number increased to 2,402 sales in 2005. The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 had a profound impact

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11. State support continues in other ways, however, e.g. housing associations' ability to borrow money at favourable interest rates from state banks (Aalbers et al. 2017).

FIGURE 2.2. Tenure composition of the Amsterdam housing stock. *Source:* OIS Amsterdam; own adaptation.


FIGURE 2.3. Number of existing housing association dwellings sold per year 1998-2015. *Source:* AFWC (2016); own adaptation.

on the Dutch housing market, as the number of housing sales sharply decreased, as well as the average sales prices (Ronald & Dol 2011). Yet social housing sales quickly picked up again after 2010, showing substantial year-on-year increases, until reaching a peak of 2,682 sales in 2014[12]. Although the en bloc sale of multiple dwellings, for example post-renovation, also occurs, most sales are of individual dwellings in existing complexes. The vast majority of sales occurs after the previous tenants have vacated the dwelling: in 2015, only 11% of sales were to the sitting tenants (AFWC 2016).

In response to increasing concerns about the scarce availability of social rental housing and the growing social-spatial inequalities in the city (also see Gemeente Amsterdam 2013), the municipality, housing associations, and tenants organizations agreed upon the ambition to sell no more than 2,000 dwellings per year for the 2015-2019 period, considerably below the 2014 figure (HV Amsterdam, AFWC, & Gemeente Amsterdam 2015). The number of sales did indeed decrease between 2014 and 2015, although a total of 2,337 sales were recorded in 2015, still considerably greater than the targeted maximum. Figure 2.3 also highlights how the geography of social housing sales has shifted in recent years. In the years prior to the global financial crisis, the number of sales was somewhat higher in the urban periphery than in the city's central boroughs. However, from 2009 onwards, more than half of the yearly sales have occurred in the city's central boroughs. In 2014, 66% of social housing sales occurred in one of the central boroughs. While these spatial contrasts became less pronounced in 2015, still 59% of the total number of social housing sales occurred in the central city.

In contrast to growing social housing sales figures, large-scale urban renewal has become more difficult due to the decrease in allocated funds. The number of demolished social rental dwellings saw a steep decrease after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis: from 1,814 in 2007 down to 622 in 2014, before again increasing to 1,304 in 2015. The decrease in demolished dwellings is most notable in the urban periphery where urban renewal projects were previously typically concentrated (Figure 2.4). There is thus a general trend towards the increasing importance of the sale of dwellings vis-à-vis urban renewal in order to achieve tenure and social mixing, because state funding for urban renewal has become scarcer and ambitions to pursue such policies have been scaled down. Demolition did increase again in 2015 (although an important explanation for this is the planned removal of temporary student housing), which could indicate that demolition as part of urban renewal may pick up again with economic recovery. Nevertheless, the expectation is that the shift away from large scale urban renewal is more structural.

So far, two clear and interrelated trends come to the fore: first, social rental housing sales have strongly increased, while demolition as part of urban renewal has decreased; second, tenure restructuring, which used to be concentrated in the city's peripheral boroughs, is now increasingly concentrated in Amsterdam's central boroughs. Before contextualizing these shifts, Table 2.1

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12.   To compare, the total number of all sales in Amsterdam (not just social housing sales) only started to increase after 2013.

and Figure 2.5 further unravel the changing geography of tenure restructuring. Table 2.1 describes the tenure composition of each neighbourhood type in 1999 and 2014. It shows that over this period, the share of social rental dwellings saw the strongest decrease in the post-war neighbourhoods (from 69% to 57%), but also decreased in the 1800-1920 and 1920-1940 belts (to 43% and 47% in 2014 respectively), the city's current gentrification frontiers. Shifts in the share of social rental housing may, however, also be caused by new additions to the stock as part of new-build developments. Decreasing shares do not therefore necessarily reflect decreasing absolute numbers of social housing.

FIGURE 2.4. Number of housing association dwellings demolished per year 2007-2015. *Source:* AFWC (2016); own adaptation. *Note:* The steep increase in demolished dwellings in 2015 in central boroughs is mainly due to the removal of temporary student 'container' housing (located in Houthavens in West).

It is thus imperative to also consider changes within the social rental stock. Figure 2.5 does so by breaking down the time span 1999-2014 into three even time periods, and analysing the percentage changes in the social rental stock per neighbourhood type per time period. These overall shifts are the product of both subtractions (sales, demolitions) and additions to the social rental stock. It shows that the total number of housing association dwellings slightly increased between 1999 and 2004, mainly due to the long-term requirement to include at least 30% social rental housing in new-build developments. In the post-war neighbourhoods, the number of social rental dwellings showed the strongest decrease, although this decrease still only stood at 1.8% between 1999 and 2004. Yet between 2004 and 2009, the social rental stock clearly decreased in size in the city as a whole (-4.3%). This decrease was especially marked in the city's post-war neighbourhoods, where large-scale urban renewal was concentrated (-7.9%), as well as in the city's 19th century belt (-8.3%).

In other words, during this period the decrease in social rent was concentrated in the city's downgrading periphery, but also at the gentrification frontier.

The most notable spatial shift among the analysed time periods comes to the fore when comparing the 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 periods. The latter period saw a more intense decrease in the size of the social rental stock in Amsterdam overall (-5.3%). However, the decrease in post-war neighbourhoods slowed as a consequence of stagnating urban renewal. In contrast, particularly the 1920-1940 belt saw its social rental stock decrease at an increasing pace (-7.1%), while the decrease in the 19th century neighbourhoods remained more or less stable compared to 2004-2009 (-8%). Hence, during the last analysed time period, the decreases in the size of the social rental stock shifted particularly to these gentrifying belts. The size of the social rental stock has, however, remained relatively stable in the city's most affluent neighbourhoods, namely the central city and affluent south. On the one hand, this reflects the already relatively small size of the social rental sector in these neighbourhoods. On the other hand, it also reflects the ambition to keep hold of these dwellings. These more fine-grained spatial analyses thus highlight that the decrease in social rental dwellings has not simply been focused on the city's most up-market neighbourhoods where housing values are highest, but rather on the surrounding gentrification frontiers.

	1999				2014			
	Owned	Social rent	Private rent	Total	Owned	Social rent	Private rent	Total
Neighbourhood type	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
Central city/affluent south	23	32	45	50588	33	28	38	56271
1800-1920 belt	9	52	40	74511	27	43	30	75300
1920-1940 belt	8	54	39	94593	23	47	30	98399
Post-war (1945-1990)	14	69	17	125537	27	57	15	131635
New-build (>1990) / rural	40	33	28	20950	45	33	22	35250
Amsterdam	14	54	32	366979	29	46	26	398565

TABLE 2.1. Tenure composition per neighbourhood type in 1999 and 2014. *Source:* OIS Amsterdam. *Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

FIGURE 2.5. Percentage change (compared to 1999, 2004, and 2009) in the number of housing association dwellings. *Source:* OIS; own adaptation.

FIGURE 2.6. Number of new social rental housing allocations per year in central and peripheral boroughs. *Source:* AFWC (2016); own adaptation. *Note:* (1) These figures exclude student housing and direct allocations (i.e. not through the central allocation system). (2) In some years a small number of allocations have an unknown location and are not included in this figure (highest number of unknowns was 165 in 2013).

Current housing policies and tenure restructuring have had a particularly strong impact on the accessibility of this stock. Social housing sales, demolition, rent liberalization, and low residential mobility rates – itself a consequence of scarce housing availability, but also of the ageing of the social rental population – are all responsible for a marked 36% decrease in the number of new social housing allocations between 2007 and 2015: in 2007, 9,517 rent-regulated dwellings were rented out to new tenants through the official allocation system; this decreased to 6,050 in 2015 (Figure 2.6; AFWC 2016). Thus although social rental housing remains the city's largest share of the housing stock and overall shifts in tenure composition have been rather gradual (Figure 2.2), the accessibility of the stock has substantially diminished. As a result, divides between housing market insiders (those who enjoy tenant protection) and outsiders (those struggling to find housing) are reinforced (Kadi and Musterd 2015). Interestingly, this decrease occurred rather evenly across the central and peripheral boroughs.

Contextualizing shifting patterns of tenure restructuring

To understand the two key interrelated trends of increasing social housing sales and the shift of focus towards Amsterdam's inner neighbourhoods, they need to be situated within the broader policy context. This section pays particular attention to local urban and housing policy goals and rationales, as well as to the influence of the wider national and international political and economic context.

Previous urban housing policies were primarily focused on achieving a 'balanced' social mix, not only by attracting more affluent households to disadvantaged neighbourhoods, but also by retaining upwardly mobile households by offering them the opportunity to progress along their housing career within the same neighbourhood (see Aalbers 2004). Amsterdam's current housing policies are, on the other hand, increasingly focused on enhancing the housing opportunities of middle income households[13]. This group earns too much for social housing but also struggles on the increasingly expensive and exclusionary Amsterdam owner-occupied market. Because former social housing dwellings are often sold at comparatively low prices, they may be affordable and accessible to these middle income households. Housing associations therefore argue that the sale of social rental housing is important to offer middle income households, young people, and starters a place in the city (Woon Amsterdam 2015). In so doing, the sale of social housing is discursively recast as contributing to housing associations' traditional role of providing housing to groups in need. In the same vein, the large body of existing social rental dwellings is cast as harmful to the housing position of various housing groups – most notably young and upwardly mobile households. Two aldermen

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13.   A uniform definition of what constitutes a middle income household does not exist. Here, it indicates a household that earns more than the maximum income set for eligibility for social housing (approximately €35,000). The maximum (gross household) income to qualify as middle income is often set at €43,000 or €50,000.

of the local conservative-liberal VVD party, in the run-up to the 2014 municipal elections, echoed this position with the statement that the large social rental stock is responsible for keeping "talent outside the city walls" (Wiebes & Van der Burg 2014, author translation; also see Chapter 3). Although this is a political statement, the official municipal housing memorandum (Gemeente Amsterdam 2009) speaks in a similar vein of an oversupply of affordable rental housing out of sync with the city's actual population (see Uitermark 2009; Van Gent 2013 for critical reflections). Consequently, the sale of social housing becomes the logical – or indeed social – way to go.

In addition to the sale of social rental dwellings, recent years have seen the introduction of several other policies that aim to enhance the housing position of middle income households. Most importantly, the local government has committed to increasing the number of rental dwellings in the rent-liberalized segment, where waiting lists and maximum income criteria are absent (D66, SP, and VVD 2014). This is done particularly to help young upwardly mobile households that earn too much for social rental housing but also struggle to buy. Especially since the global financial crisis, access to homeownership has decreased among younger middle income households due to stricter mortgage lending criteria and growing insecurities on the labour market (McKee 2012; Lennartz et al. 2016). The liberalization of dwellings owned by housing associations represents an important instrument for the expansion of the rent-liberalized sector. Current agreements stipulate that a maximum of 1,000 dwellings per year may be 'liberalized' (HV Amsterdam, AFWC, and Gemeente Amsterdam 2015). Although housing associations retain ownership, these dwellings essentially move from being rent-regulated and reserved for low income households to being of higher rent and aimed at higher income groups. While the number of rent-liberalized housing association dwellings stood at 3,680 in 2008 – only 1.9% of the dwellings owned by housing associations – policy shifts enabled a rapid growth to 14,053 dwellings in 2016 (7.7% of the stock) (AFWC 2008, 2016)[14]. This shift may be considered a way of gearing the social rental stock towards serving other purposes or population groups.

A further reduction in the number of 'regular' social rental dwellings is envisioned through the experimentation with new policies that will ultimately allow housing associations to rent out up to one-third of their stock to young people using temporary five-year contracts (HV Amsterdam, AFWC, and Gemeente Amsterdam 2016). While these policies will improve the housing opportunities of young households, they will also contribute to a residualization of the remaining regular stock (cf. Van Duijne & Ronald 2016). The sale of social housing, rent liberalization, and the introduction of temporary contracts are all policy measures to enhance the housing opportunities of middle income, relatively young, and upwardly mobile households. This is partially the consequence of the national government's enforcement of EU regulations in 2011, which stipulate that at least 90% of the social housing stock should be rented

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14.   This increase is not only the product of rent liberalization, but also of new-build developments and of incremental rent increases for incumbent tenants.

out to households earning below the €35,000 income limit, creating a housing shortage for those households earning more (Boelhouwer & Priemus 2014).

Although these policy changes explain the increasing number of social housing sales over time and the concomitant rise of other policies such as rent liberalization to reduce the number of 'regular' social rental dwellings, they do not explain the changing geography of tenure restructuring. The overall shift towards Amsterdam's centrally located gentrifying neighbourhoods is the result of a combination of factors. Municipal housing policies aim not only to enhance the housing opportunities of middle income households, they also seek to meet their preferences. The municipality spends much resources on making the city more attractive to middle class households – especially the creative class that includes groups of 'new urbanites' that value urban amenities – by spurring commercial and residential gentrification (see Van Gent 2013). This is considered essential for the city's competitive position: policymakers are concerned that not catering to these groups will contribute to them moving elsewhere. In the residential domain, this means accommodating middle class demand for housing in the gentrifying neighbourhoods surrounding the historical centre. Many of these middle income households are also either single-person households or childless couples. The many relatively small apartments located in the 19th and early 20th century belts are thus considered particularly suitable to accommodate these household types. Because of their small size, these apartments are also relatively affordable to middle income households.

The gentrifying neighbourhoods located in the belts surrounding the city centre furthermore provide a specific spatial setting where burgeoning market demand is combined with the continuing presence of relatively large – but decreasing – shares of social rental housing. Selling off part of their stock in these neighbourhoods allows housing associations and local governments to combine the goals of attracting and accommodating middle class households with the aim of altering the population composition of often still low income neighbourhoods. At least initially, the sale of social housing contributes to more social mixing in these neighbourhoods. This also constitutes an important reason why sales are concentrated in the gentrifying neighbourhoods rather than in the central city or affluent south, where shares of social housing are already comparatively low: despite financial incentives to sell the valuable stock located in the most expensive neighbourhoods, the local state and housing associations are committed to preserving centrally located social housing (HV Amsterdam, AFWC, and Gemeente Amsterdam 2016).

The changing geography also relates to financial rationales. Housing associations work with a *revolving fund*, which means that extra income generated from increased rents or from social housing sales should be used for social purposes such as maintaining the existing stock or new-build developments. However, consecutive national government coalitions have sought to roll back the operations of housing associations, with the 2013 'landlord levy' being a recent example (Boelhouwer & Priemus 2014). The levy is a state-imposed austerity measure that taxes housing associations in order to transfer increased income from rents. It is part of a broader policy goal to set housing associations on a more sober trajectory (Nieboer & Gruis 2014). Although

the social housing stock is still rather large in the Netherlands, and even more so in Amsterdam, these new policies work towards the gradual residualization of the social housing stock (Van Duijne and Ronald 2016). Public spending on social housing is being trimmed and housing associations have to focus their activities on a more narrowly defined group of low income households (Boelhouwer & Priemus 2014; Van der Heijden 2002). These policies are partly the consequence of a longstanding ideological push towards homeownership (Ronald 2008) and crisis-related austerity measures (Boelhouwer & Priemus 2014). However, they are also the product of a loss of public support for housing associations. In the years before and after the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, the public legitimacy of housing associations suffered several blows due to a range controversies. Examples include high salaries for managers, high profile cases of fraud, failed flagship developments, and perhaps most significantly the heavy losses suffered by the housing association Vestia due to speculation with derivatives (Aalbers et al. 2017). Not only did these cases directly impact the financial position of housing associations – Vestia ultimately had to be bailed out for €2 billion, partly paid for by other housing associations (ibid.) – but they also fostered public support to reduce the role of housing associations in general.

Importantly, these trends have not only led to a decline in the social rental stock, but have also had particular spatial consequences, as described in the empirical sections above. It has become increasingly difficult for housing associations to engage in large-scale urban renewal projects, which tend to concentrate in the urban periphery. This is partly as a result of the financial crisis and related austerity measures, but also due to government policies that seek to restrict the role of housing associations. At the same time as housing associations have become financially more restricted due to government policies and financial mismanagement, they may become more inclined or be forced to sell off the more valuable property they possess. This could spur the further reduction of social rental housing in gentrifying locations, where selling becomes ever more profitable.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that questions of how and where local states pursue policies of tenure restructuring are closely interrelated, as well as how these questions are influenced by their broader societal and policy contexts. In Amsterdam, there is a shifting focus from urban renewal in the periphery to tenure conversions in centrally located gentrifying neighbourhoods. These shifts need to be considered in the context of welfare state restructuring and a reorientation of housing policies.

Particularly in the Dutch welfare state, tenure mixing policies have traditionally formed an important means to disperse poverty concentrations in order to mitigate potential negative neighbourhood effects (Galster 2012) and to manage disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Uitermark et al. 2007). Although these goals have not disappeared, they have become accompanied by other goals. More recent policies seek to expand the housing stock available and attractive to middle class households through the sale and liberalization of

social rental housing. Gentrifying neighbourhoods are considered the place to do so, and selling social housing here is relatively profitable due to inflating house prices.

In the context of austerity and the transition towards financially more restricted housing associations, this is a significant factor and has important theoretical implications: it suggests that welfare state restructuring and policy efforts influence the form, expression, and site of state-led gentrification. While older policies of urban renewal were typically aimed at sparking gentrification processes in downgrading low income neighbourhoods (see Uitermark et al. 2007; Aalbers 2011), current policies are increasingly geared towards accelerating gentrification processes in neighbourhoods of burgeoning demand.

In recent decades, Western welfare states have gone through successive waves of market-oriented restructuring. Rather than replacing state regulation with market forces, restructuring typically entails the reorientation of state resources to promote private property and private accumulation (Peck & Tickell 2002; Brenner et al. 2010). Likewise, Amsterdam's tenure mixing policies are increasingly imbricated with 'market logics'. However, the local government and not-for-profit housing associations have not simply become the agents of private capital. Despite rapidly increasing sales, the state continues to play a key role in determining where and how many units may be sold. Mounting concerns about housing affordability and social-spatial inequalities are currently re-opening public and political debate about the desirability and necessity of selling social housing, and official ambitions are to reduce the number of sales after years of substantial increases. Furthermore, sales do not concentrate in the city's most expensive areas but instead sales and rent liberalization policies are focused on gentrifying areas where market-oriented restructuring can still be combined with the goal of social mixing. Hence this chapter suggests that market-oriented restructuring is balanced with policy ambitions of social mixing.

Nevertheless, by selling social rental housing in these high demand neighbourhoods, the municipality and housing associations remove barriers to gentrification in such areas. The gradual decline of Amsterdam's social rental stock currently has distinct spatial outcomes, as the effects of tenure restructuring are increasingly felt in the gentrifying neighbourhoods. Access to these neighbourhoods becomes increasingly reserved to those who possess sufficient financial resources. Consequently, although Amsterdam remains to date a rather mixed city, current housing policies open up space for increasing socio-economic inequalities, social-spatial divisions, and the segmentation of tenure forms serving different strands of the city's population.

BOX CHAPTER 2 — Housing tenure changes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Chapter 2 has charted recent developments on the Amsterdam housing market, focusing on the development of the social-rental sector – that is, dwellings owned by housing associations. Simply put, it highlighted three overarching trends for the period 1999-2014: First, the decline of the social-rental stock has accelerated over time. Second, the decline of the social-rental stock increasingly concentrates in the city's nineteenth-century or early twentieth-century neighbourhoods. These may be considered Amsterdam's gentrification frontiers. Third, the decline of the social-rental stock increasingly often occurs through the sale of social-rental dwellings while demolition as part of urban renewal used to be dominant.

This chapter briefly investigates how the Rotterdam housing stock has developed during – roughly[15] – the same period, and compares trends between the two cities. As has been noted in chapter 1, the Amsterdam and Rotterdam housing stock are rather similar in terms of tenure. In both cities social-rental housing has long been the dominant tenure, but homeownership is on the rise at the cost of social and private rent. Figure 2.7 shows these developments in detail for Rotterdam for the period 2000-2013.

Table 2.2 compares the decline of social rent in Amsterdam and Rotterdam over time, revealing rather different patterns in both cities. First of all, both in absolute and relative terms the decrease was substantially stronger in Rotterdam. Between 2000 and 2013 the Rotterdam and Amsterdam social-rental stock declined by 23,864 and 17,868 dwellings respectively. For Rotterdam this constitutes a decrease of 14.9%, for Amsterdam 8.9%. Furthermore, there are interesting temporal differences. In Rotterdam, the size of the social-rental stock diminished at the fastest rate in the years preceding the global financial crisis: with 8,028 dwellings between 2004 and 2006, and 5,101 between 2006 and 2008. Also in the years directly after the crisis kicked in the decrease remained relatively strong with 4,470 dwellings between 2008 and 2010. In Amsterdam, the size of the social-rental stock decreased at a substantially slower rate during these years preceding and directly after the crisis commenced.

However, in the years that followed, different trends come to the fore. While in Rotterdam the decrease slowed down substantially after 2010, they accelerated in Amsterdam. The differences are striking: between 2010 and 2013 Rotterdam's decrease stood at 2,338 dwellings, while this was 7,999 in Amsterdam. Chapter 2 has shown that in Amsterdam after 2010 demolition of social housing decreased substantially, but was compensated by rapid increases in social housing sales (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). In Rotterdam demolition as part of urban renewal also grinded to a halt, but the yearly number of social-housing sales stayed rather stable at around 1,000 (Pellenbarg et al. 2014).

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15. For reasons of data availability, the analyses presented in this Box focus on the period 2000-2013.

FIGURE 2.7. Tenure composition of the Rotterdam housing stock 2000-2013. *Source:* OBI Rotterdam; own adaptation. Note: Rozenburg, annexed in 2011, excluded from analyses.

Period (change)	Rotterdam		Amsterdam	
	Absolute	%	Absolute	%
2000-2002	825	0.5	4,427	2.2
2002-2004	-4,752	-2.9	-4,648	-2.3
2004-2006	-8,028	-5.1	-4,582	-2.3
2006-2008	-5,101	-3.4	-2,950	-1.5
2008-2010	-4,470	-3.1	-2,116	-1.1
2010-2013**	-2,338	-1.7	-7,999	-4.2
2000-2013	**-23,864**	**-14.9**	**-17,868**	**-8.9**
2000	**160,666**	**(57.3%)***	**200,874**	**(54.1%)***
2013	**136,802**	**(47.0%)***	**183,006**	**(46.1%)***

TABLE 2.2 Absolute and percentage change in the size of the social-rental stock per two-year time period in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Note: Rozenburg, annexed in 2011, excluded from analyses ; *percentage of the total housing stock. ** three year period. Note:. Source: OBI Rotterdam and OIS Amsterdam, own adaptation.

It is interesting to consider how the decline of social rent in Rotterdam not only plays out over time, but also in space. Table 2.3 does so using four neighbourhood types, defined on the basis of a central versus peripheral dichotomy, and below or above average average real-estate values in 2014[16]. It is shown that for the overall 2000-2013 period the decrease of social rent mainly concentrated in peripheral neighbourhoods with comparatively low real-estate values (-20.5%). This has remained rather constant over time: For most of the defined sub periods decrease concentrated in the peripheral areas with low housing values, or alternatively in the cheap central areas. In other words, no notable spatial shifts have occurred during the period 2000-2013 contrasting developments in Amsterdam where the decline of social rent increasingly concentrates in central gentrifying neighbourhoods.

	Central low		Central high		Peripheral low		Peripheral high		Rotterdam	
	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%
2000-2002	283	0.5	182	1.7	-104	-0.1	519	1.9	825	0.5
2002-2004	-1,219	-2.3	-105	-1.0	-3,495	-4.9	-536	-2.0	-4,752	-2.9
2004-2008	-1,987	-3.9	-547	-5.2	-3,667	-5.5	-1,158	-4.3	-8,028	-5.1
2006-2008	-1,861	-3.8	193	1.9	-3,493	-5.5	-631	-2.5	-5,101	-3.4
2008-2010	-1,762	-3.7	-35	-0.3	-1,532	-2.6	-439	-1.7	-4,470	-3.1
2010-2013**	-475	-1.0	-224	-2.2	-2,173	-3.7	32	0.1	-2,338	-1.7
2000-2013	**-7,021**	**-13.4**	**-536**	**-5.1**	**-14,464**	**-20.5**	**-2,213**	**-8.2**	**-23,864**	**-14.9**
2000	**52,252**	**(66.1)***	**10,486**	**(35.2)***	**70,723**	**(62.9)***	**26,918**	**(46.0)***	**160,666**	**(57.3)***
2013	**45,231**	**(57.0)***	**9,950**	**(28.5)***	**56,259**	**(51.8)***	**24,705**	**(37.3)***	**136,802**	**(47.0)***

TABLE 2.3 Absolute and percentage change in the size of the social-rental stock for two-year time periods per neighbourhood type. Note: *percentage of the total housing stock. Source: OBI Rotterdam, own adaptation. ** three year period. Note: Rozenburg, annexed in 2011, excluded from analyses.

These data give the suggestion that while Amsterdam, backed by a tight housing market, has been able to continue tenure restructuring and state-led gentrification, Rotterdam struggles to do so. Here, austerity measures and reduced funding for urban renewal have made it more difficult for local policymakers to intervene in the housing stock to alter the social composition of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The exclusionary "Rotterdam Act", a national policy that originated in Rotterdam and was officially put in place in 2006, may serve as a more affordable replacement (Van Gent, Hochstenbach &

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16. A neighbourhood typology based on construction period, as was used for Amsterdam, has less value in Rotterdam, partly due to historic developments (see chapter 1). Furthermore, as will be discussed in chapter 4, gentrification processes are much more scattered in Rotterdam than they are in Amsterdam.

Uitermark fc). Rather than trying to attract middle-class households to disadvantaged neighbourhoods through renewal (Uitermark 2014), this controversial act aims to change population composition by excluding low-income groups from moving in. Up to now this act has been used in six Rotterdam neighbourhoods to exclude unemployed residents with a short duration of residence in the Rotterdam region (less than six continuous years) from targeted disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Uitermark, Hochstenbach & Van Gent 2017).

In early 2016 the local Rotterdam government published a draft version of a new Housing Vision formulating the ambition to reduce the affordable housing stock – many of which likely to be social-rental dwellings – with a further 20,000 dwellings between 2016 and 2030, through sales, rent liberalization and, primarily, demolitions (Gemeente Rotterdam 2016b). This would imply again an increase in the demolition of social-rental dwellings, and stronger decreases than recorded during the post-crisis years although still of a smaller magnitude than the decreases during the pre-crisis years. However, this housing vision has sparked waves of protest among political parties, tenant associations, and residents. Consequently, due to these protests a referendum was held to decide on ratification of the proposed Housing Vision. Due to low turnout rates this referendum was unsuccessful though, meaning the Housing Vision can be ratified.

CHAPTER 3 — Stakeholder representations of gentrification in Amsterdam and Berlin

Abstract

In recent years several studies have highlighted how gentrification strategies are imposed under the discursive umbrella of 'social mixing'. However, most evidence is based on Anglo-Saxon experiences. This chapter sets out to expand the geography of gentrification by looking at the representation of processes and policies of gentrification as put forward by key stakeholders in the Nord-Neukölln (Berlin) and Indische Buurt (Amsterdam). It shows that, in both contexts, stakeholders and policy documents actively engage with the concept of gentrification, rather than avoid it. Due to public-policy influence and local criticisms this engagement differs between both cases. In Nord-Neukölln the term is heavily contested and policymakers attempt to refute accusations of gentrification, while in the Indische Buurt, the process is explicitly pursued as a positive policy instrument by policymakers. Different representations within each case are shown to be influenced by the characteristics of in-moving and out-moving residents; the employed timeframe; and the perceived influence of institutions on urban regeneration.

Introduction

Over the years the literature on gentrification has conceptually and geographically expanded. An important addition to this literature examines the shift towards generalised, blueprint strategies of state-led gentrification implemented in a range of contexts (Hackworth 2002; Smith 2002; Uitermark et al. 2007). A crucial element of state-led gentrification is the way it is represented by policymakers, other stakeholders and in general discourse (see Lees 1996). A growing body of critical literature highlights how gentrification is represented as a positive policy instrument to enhance, inter alia, the liveability, social order and residential composition of disadvantaged neighbourhoods to prevent negative neighbourhood effects (e.g. Bolt et al. 2010; Uitermark et al. 2007; Walks & Maaranen 2008). Furthermore, various scholars have highlighted gentrification strategies are frequently imposed under the discursive umbrella of social mixing to avoid the association with class struggles and displacement (Davidson 2012; Slater 2004; Smith 2002).

This chapter questions the notion that gentrification has become a generalised blueprint strategy, sugar-coated with the policy vocabulary of social mixing or similar terminology. These assertions are predominantly based on studies from the Anglo-Saxon context. We know little about how and to what extent discourses and specific representations of gentrification can legitimise or delegitimise policies of state-led gentrification in other contexts (with the notable recent exception of Rose et al. 2013), where the term gentrification is often less known and hence less value laden (Lees 2012). Thus, a knowledge gap exists regarding the way different contexts can influence the way representations of gentrification as part of public policies are construed.

In this chapter I contend that gentrification is not so much avoided by involved stakeholders in the context of two neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Berlin. Instead, stakeholders and policy documents engage with the concept gentrification in various ways. This chapter proposes three context-specific elements that can influence stakeholders' representations and can, in turn, also be used by the same stakeholders to construe their desired representations. These elements are the characteristics of in-moving, sitting and out-moving residents; the employed timeframe to assess neighbourhood change (e.g. shorter-term or longer-term focus); and the perceived extent and form of influence of local institutions on urban regeneration. Stakeholders can potentially emphasise or suppress these contextual elements in their representations of localised gentrification processes to their own interests.

This chapter focuses on the Continental-European context by conducting a comparative analysis of two cases situated within the Dutch and German context. It investigates the (re)production of different representations of gentrification (Lees 1996) by different stakeholders and in official policy documents. This chapter also assesses how both contexts, specifically the three contextual elements highlighted above, influence these representations. The main research question of this chapter is:

How is gentrification represented by different stakeholders and expressed in local discourses in the context of Nord-Neukölln (Berlin) and Indische Buurt (Amsterdam)? How do both specific contexts inform these representations?

Nord-Neukölln (specifically Reuterquartier and Schillerpromenade) and Indische Buurt are selected for two main reasons. First, while Amsterdam and Berlin are characterised by different housing systems, traditionally dominated by social-rental and private-rental housing respectively, both housing contexts are subject to processes of neoliberalisation (Aalbers & Holm 2008; Van Gent 2013). Second, in both neighbourhood contexts gentrification started relatively recently, and the changes in these neighbourhoods can be defined as marginal gentrification (Rose 1996), because in-moving residents are relatively low income themselves and the 'old' character and population of the neighbourhood have not (yet) been displaced. This enables the cross-case comparison of local representations and discourses.

The remainder of this article begins with the theoretical framework to explain the rise of state-led gentrification, its link to social mixing, and address the contextual factors of the role of institutions, residential mobility, and issues related to time. Next, I elaborate on discourse and representations in the methodological framework. Third, empirical evidence from Berlin and Amsterdam is presented. In the synthesis the two cases will be compared.

Theory
The expansion of gentrification as a state-led process
Over time the literature on gentrification has expanded to include different contexts, types of cities and neighbourhoods. As a result of these conceptual

expansions, gentrification is now often broadly defined as the 'production of space for progressively more affluent users' (Hackworth 2002: 815). Perhaps the most significant shift in the form of gentrification relates to the neoliberalisation of public institutions, the welfare state and housing systems across the world (Brenner & Theodore: 2002). As the welfare state retrenches, cities have to compete for capital and talent through strategies of urban entrepreneurialism. Hence, Smith (2002: 440) has argued that gentrification has become a 'crucial urban strategy for city governments in consort with private capital in cities around the world' to make neighbourhoods more attractive for middle-class residents as well as private investors. In the US, and particularly in New York, these strategies of state-led gentrification have been termed 'third-wave gentrification' (Hackworth & Smith 2001; Smith 2002), although other studies identified processes similar to third-wave gentrification in other contexts, including Amsterdam (Van Gent 2013) and Berlin (Bernt 2012).

State-led gentrification has been associated with a new phase of urban policies (Smith 1996), including repressive tactics of surveillance and control to clear the city from undesirable elements and make it safe for the influx of global capital (Atkinson 2003). It is also characterised by a 'symptomatic silence' about rent increases, displacement and class struggles (Smith 2002: 440). The term gentrification itself is predominantly circumvented by involved stakeholders as they instead opt for less contested terms such as revitalisation, regeneration or renaissance (Slater 2004; Smith 2002). These elements are considered part of generalised blueprint gentrification strategies aimed at a remaking of urban space.

An emerging literature links gentrification as a (blueprint) policy instrument to pre-occurring territorial stigmatisation of neighbourhoods. Depicting a neighbourhood as declining, disproportionally disadvantaged and hosting a range of problems can be a way for stakeholders to justify policies of state-led gentrification, and removing social-rental dwellings (Kallin & Slater 2014; Sakizlioglu & Uitermark 2014). On the other hand, as noted by Sakizlioglu and Uitermark (2014: 1370), 'a description of the same neighbourhood as a working-class area with affordable housing works in the opposite direction'.

Emphasising already existing neighbourhood problems can thus be a strategy to pursue policies of state-led gentrification. Similarly, as mentioned above, avoiding the term gentrification can also be a way to 'ease' implementation (see Bridge et al. 2012). In addition, this chapter signals out three specific contextual factors that can influence policymakers' representations of gentrification and can influence (discursive) implementation strategies of gentrification as a public policy. These contextual factors concern the role of local institutions, residential-mobility patterns and the progression of gentrification during a certain timeframe.

Local institutions: Gentrification and social mixing

The links between state-led gentrification and ambitions and policies of social mixing has been extensively studied in recent years (see Bridge et al. 2012). Social mixing is considered an important policy instrument in a wide range of

(Western) contexts to improve the quality of disadvantaged urban neighbour-hoods and the lives of the residents of these neighbourhoods (Friedrichs et al. 2003; Rose et al. 2013). Theories on social mixing argue that the settlement of middle-class residents in disadvantaged neighbourhoods brings about positive neighbourhood effects – or minimises negative neighbourhood effects (see Wilson 1987). Sitting residents would, for example, benefit from better facilities and services, positive role models and, potentially, reduced territorial stigmatisation, or the improved quality of local schools. Nevertheless, the evidence base for positive neighbourhood effects on sitting residents resulting from social-mixing policies remains contested (Andersson & Musterd 2005).

The combination of gentrification and social mixing has been referred to as 'impossible' for a range of reasons (Davidson 2012), of which I will briefly highlight three here. First, the in-migration of higher-income middle-class residents would not enhance the social mobility of sitting residents. Most improvements in neighbourhood status can be attributed to spatial mobility, i.e. the in-migration of higher-status residents and the dispersal of disadvantaged and lower-income residents (Van Criekingen, 2012). Second, 'gentrification theorists have tended to dismiss social class mix within gentrifying neigh-bourhoods as a transitory phenomenon' (Rose 2004: 282; original emphasis). In other words, over time, gentrification and housing-market liberalisation may rather lead to a deepening of social inequalities and spatial divisions (Uitermark & Bosker 2014; Walks & Maaranen 2008). Third, even when a social mix can be established in a neighbourhood, residents with different backgrounds do not necessarily have to have contact with each other. Instead, despite spatial proximity actual contact may remain superficial or absent and can even create mutual distrust (Slater 2004; Walks & Maaranen 2008).

The extent to which local institutions are able to alter a neighbour-hood's residential composition or stimulate gentrification differs between contexts. This depends, for example, on the historical layering of institutions and policy interventions. Contradictory policies, originating from different time periods, can simultaneously stimulate and mitigate gentrification ten-dencies (Van Gent 2013). For example, already-existing social-rental housing provides a counterweight to more recent policies of housing-market liberali-sation. However, these already-existing policies and institutions that protect residents from the negative consequences of gentrification (e.g. rent increases and displacement pressures) may serve as a justification for policymakers to question the extent of displacement and call for further housing-market liberalisation and state-led gentrification (Wyly et al. 2010).

Marginal gentrification as an exception?

Discussions about the influence of gentrification policies on social-mix levels are related to gentrification's stage model. This model assumes early in-mov-ers initially possess incomes similar to the neighbourhood's sitting residents. Subsequently, as the attractiveness of the neighbourhood continues to in-crease, predominantly higher-income residents will move to the neighbour-hood (Clay 1979). Following the stage model, first signs of neighbourhood

gentrification indicate the beginning of a process towards a fully matured final stage with few long-term residents remaining.

The concept of marginal gentrification potentially sheds a different light on discussions about the relationship between gentrification and social mixing. Marginal gentrification is driven by fractions of the new middle class who were highly educated but only tenuously employed or modestly earning professionals, and who sought out niches in inner-city neighbourhoods—as renters in the private or non-profit sector, or […] as co-owners of modestly priced apartment units. (Rose 1996: 134).

Marginal gentrifiers were found to reject dominant (middle-class) suburban living and instead appreciated the diversity, tolerance and afford-ability of inner-city neighbourhoods. They also created some simultaneous understanding and extensive cross-class relations with sitting non-gentrifier residents (Caulfield 1994). Growing labour-market flexibility and insecurity, higher levels of student enrolment, an extension of the transitory period to adulthood, and the postponement of marriage and parenthood all contribute to growing numbers of young, potential marginal gentrifiers (Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003).

Van Criekingen and Decroly (2003: 2456) argue marginal gentrifica-tion should be 'thought of as lying outside the framework of the stage model […] rather than as a temporary prelude to the inevitable transformation of the neighbourhoods into new wealthy inner-city enclaves'. Consequently, marginal gentrification could be associated with structural forms of social mixing – particularly in housing contexts with strong renters' protection and a large social-rental stock. Nevertheless, marginal gentrification is simulta-neously associated with steep rent increases, displacement (pressures), and decreasing housing accessibility.

These characteristics of marginal gentrification can exert influence on representations of the process. For neighbourhoods that have recently begun to experience gentrification it might be unclear whether processes of marginal gentrification will develop into more mature forms as suggested by the stage model of gentrification or will be structural. Presumably, this allows for more negative and more positive representations respectively.

Methods

This chapter focuses on representations of gentrification by different stake-holders as expressed in local discourses. Discourses can be defined as com-posed of a range of spoken and written texts 'involved in producing or con-structing reality, specifically our perception or knowledge of the world and the meanings we make about it' (Hastings 2000: 131). Discourse analysis has been applied to critically examine policy interventions and their implementation (Fairclough 1992; Hajer 2006). Discourses can play an important role in the implementation of housing policies through the construction of specific 'social problems' that need to be addressed (Jacobs et al. 2003). In addition, they can ease policy implementation by rendering particular consequences of these interventions 'harmless' (Hajer 2006: 67). Emphasising neighbourhood prob-lems can make policies of state-led gentrification appear harmless or indeed

even necessary to address problems. Discourses are often closely related to the interests of the producers of these texts (Fairclough 1992). Individuals can reproduce discourses through representations, which Lees (1996: 455) defines as 'an act of description by a person or by a group of people'. Lees found that actors with different backgrounds construed representations of gentrification that constitute binary opposites of dominant processes at work. That is, they defined gentrification by what it is not, e.g. suburbanisation or decline.

In this chapter I analyse how stakeholders with different backgrounds represent (policies of) gentrification. Discourse analysis is applied to illuminate how and to what extent these stakeholders refer to specific concepts and topics in their representations (cf. Hajer 2006). Specifically, this discourse analysis highlights how residential-mobility patterns, employed timeframes and the perceived extent and form of state influence play a role. I analyse how these topics inform debates on gentrification and how stakeholders draw upon them to either legitimise or contest policies of state-led gentrification. The analyses are based on twenty-seven interviews with key stakeholders in Nord-Neukölln, Berlin (fourteen interviews) and Indische Buurt, Amsterdam (thirteen) undertaken throughout 2012 and an analysis of relevant policy documents and additional written texts (e.g. opinion articles and press releases).

Stakeholders were selected and approached for an interview after an analysis of relevant policy documents and – where necessary – news items. From these sources it was possible to derive a comprehensive and balanced list of involved stakeholders[17]. Stakeholders from all major officially involved organisations (planning bureaus, housing associations, governmental departments at the urban and neighbourhood level) were interviewed[18]. In addition, major parties representing local residents' interests (renters' associations, artist networks, active resident networks) were interviewed[19]. The interviews were semi-structured and addressed a range of topics presented in Table 3.1. The discourse analysis assesses to what extent these topics play a role in legitimising or criticising policy interventions (of state-led gentrification). The analysis of the interviews was complemented by the analysis of relevant policy and planning documents focusing on both the neighbourhood and urban scale.

All interviews were transcribed and analysed using Atlas.ti. I linked expressed attitudes towards gentrification, neighbourhood change and public policies to quotes related to a range of topics – most notably residential-mobility patterns, the role of the state and time perspective (Table 3.1). This gives insight into how specific (discussions of) topics are situated within particular discourses and representations and illuminates related complexities and contradictions.

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17. This was discussed with local academics knowledgeable about the neighbourhoods.
18. When a stakeholder refused to participate, it was always possible to arrange an interview with a close colleague, often after referral by the initially-approached stakeholder.
19. Included are one of the larger, overarching communities closely involved in formulating a community neighbourhood vision (Indische Buurt Community 2013) and a community that received ample media attention.

General topics	Exemplary themes	
Neighbourhood description	• Housing stock	• Population
	• Public space/facilities	• Image
Perceived role of the state (aims and influence)	• Local residents (e.g. opportunities, schooling)	• Social mix (tenure mix, new residents)
	• Neighbourhood (e.g. reduce stigmatization/ ghettoization liveability)	• Level of control or influence
Residential mobility	• Moving in (reasons)	• Sitting
	• Moving out (reasons)	
Timeframe, future focus (concerns, issues)	• Long/short term	• Upward (social) mobility
	• Displacement, exclusion	

TABLE 3.1. Analytical framework for the analysis of interviews and policy documents

Quotes have been translated from German or Dutch into English. It is important to take into account the influence each language may exert on representations and discourses. In general, the term gentrification is more common and contested in Germany (particularly Berlin) than in The Netherlands. Although all stakeholders were familiar with the concept, different stakeholders may use different definitions of what gentrification precisely entails. To avoid confusion and signal out potential differences, I asked them how they would define concepts like gentrification when they came up during the interview.

Contested gentrification in Nord-Neukölln

Since the fall of the Berlin wall, many inner-city neighbourhoods have experienced gentrification during different time periods (Holm, 2011). Formerly run-down neighbourhoods like Prenzlauer Berg became more popular and witnessed gentrification. Since Berlin is dominated by rental housing, gentrification primarily takes place in the private-rental sector. The sale of social-rental housing to private investors and, subsequently, privately financed renovations of the housing stock have spurred gentrification in specific. This can lead to steep rent increases in short periods and works as an incentive for investors to push for eviction. Large-scale renovation projects, creative-city policies and city-marketing strategies further support gentrification (Colomb 2012). In recent years, gentrification has progressed from one neighbourhood to the next moving through Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg before landing in Nord-Neukölln (Holm 2011).

Until recently, Nord-Neukölln was considered one of the worst districts in Berlin and often portrayed as a ghetto (see Eksner 2013). Consequently, the Socially Integrative City (Soziale Stadt) programme in 1999, an area-based

initiative to target Berlin's districts with 'special development needs', focused on many parts of this district: Ten of Berlin's 34 'Neighbourhood Management' areas (Quartiersmanagement, QM areas) are located in the district. These area-based initiatives pursue the broad goal of 'stabilising' the population and conserving the social mix by ensuring the attractiveness and the competitiveness of the neighbourhoods (Quartiere) (SenStadt 2010). Primarily, stabilisation is linked to goals of retaining upwardly-mobile households, particularly families with children, for neighbourhoods like Reuterquartier and Schillerpromenade. These two neighbourhoods of Nord-Neukölln – with 38,000 and 30,000 residents respectively – have recently started to experience upgrading. Both neighbourhoods are favourably located in Berlin's western inner city with Reuterquartier bordering the popular district Kreuzberg and Schillerpromenade benefiting in particular from the conversion of the adjacent, former airport Tempelhof into a public park. These autonomous forces and public policies push gentrification in these neighbourhoods, leading to rent levels spiralling upward. Table 3.2 uses GSW housing market data to give a rough impression of how rents developed in Reuterquartier and Schillerpromenade between 2007 and 2011, and how this compares to Berlin.

	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
	in €	*Rel.*	in €	*Rel.*	in €	*Rel.*	in €	*Rel.*	in €	*Rel.*
Schillerpromenade	327	*75*	343	*72*	334	*77*	372	*86*	414	*88*
Reuterquartier	334	*76*	360	*76*	392	*90*	469	*108*	528	*113*
Berlin	*437*	*100*	*476*	*100*	*434*	*100*	434	100	468	100

TABLE 3.2. Average 'cold' rents (in €) for new rental contracts and relative to Berlin (= 100). *Source*: GSW (2012); own adaptation.

Decline or gentrification?

The case of Nord-Neukölln is distinct from Anglo-Saxon experiences because policy documents and policymakers do not avoid the term gentrification, but actively engage with it. This engagement is related to strong criticisms voiced by active left-wing groups aiming to contest (neoliberal) urban developments including gentrification (see Scharenberg & Bader 2009). In reaction to these criticisms, policymakers tend to downplay processes of gentrification and represent it as merely a perception of residents and visitors. For example, the QM Reuterquartier in their Development Concept 2012 speaks in terms of 'gentrification on the waiting list' (QM Reuterplatz 2010: 7 [author translation]) and '[…] as a result of the quarter's improved image, a part of the residents of the Reuterquartier fear gentrification of the area and displacement of the poor' (QM Reuterplatz 2012: 11). A distinction is made between perceptions and images of gentrification inspired by the increasing presence of visitors, students, shops and gastronomy (ibid.: 2) on the one hand, and a reality of

structural poverty (and decline) on the other. The discrepancy between a hyped image andreality was a frequently recurring theme during interviews with local public-policy stakeholders as well:

> Since one or two years we have 60 or 70 interested visitors for a single house in Schillerpromenade. Five years ago this would have been unthinkable. It surprises me. These houses are not modernised. They are really slum houses sometimes, but the people want to live here. That's the current hype; the wish to live here is so great that they accept bad living conditions. (QM coordinator Neukölln)

Simultaneously, these public-policy stakeholders express frustration with 'outside' visitors and critics who frame attempts to reduce poverty as an attempt to displace unwanted residents:

> When we act against bad landlords and bad living conditions it is called gentrification and when we don't do anything we are blamed for these bad conditions. The situation exists that one or two houses are not renovated and the people still live there, also when the staircases are broken and the rooftop is leaking. When you act against this, it is framed as a theme of upgrading or gentrification. (QM agent Schillerpromenade)

Stakeholders mainly represent interventions as a (short-term) necessity to prevent decline and help the large local poor population (QM Reuterplatz 2012: 2) and that gentrification is not taking place. If gentrification does take place, the local QM agencies do not see themselves to blame, as a news item (in reaction to their local office being vandalised with stones and paint bombs) on the website of QM Schillerpromenade stresses: 'to repeat it once again: we do not renovate, we do not sell or buy houses; we do not cast out, displace or repress anybody' (QM Schillerpromenade 2012 [author translation]). This implicitly refers to the large role of private real-estate investors and a perceived impossibility of state-led gentrification due to limited state influence.

Despite these officially communicated representations of gentrification not taking place, several interviews reveal underlying motives and desires to fuel gentrification. For example, a key stakeholder of the Senate for Urban Development notes that 'a few more Kollwitzplätze [in Neukölln] would be good' for the neighbourhood. His point of reference, Kollwitzplatz, is one of the most gentrified parts of Prenzlauer Berg and Berlin as a whole. Another QM agent sees gentrification as a logical outcome of interventions:

I have invested millions in Reuterplatz, in Maybachufer, everywhere the streets and squares have been improved. I have worked together with the neighbourhood's residents. What do they want? We have made it more attractive, […] the landlords will notice this and demand higher rents.

This (often-reproduced) notion arguably creates a false dilemma between gentrification and disinvestment or slummification, which allows policymakers to remain vague about the actual benefits for sitting residents.

Generally, policymakers mainly point to general notions of social contact, positive role models, a new clientele (for local shops and services) and reduced stigmatisation.

Reimaging the neighbourhood

Despite a general emphasis on preventing decline, several public-policy stakeholders make implicit references to a desired remaking of the neighbourhood and its image for a different type of residents. These focus, for example, on the retail composition of the neighbourhood. One public-policy stakeholders argues it is necessary to prevent the opening of 'the 500th mobile-phone shop'. This vocabulary refers to the many ethnic shops in the area and qualifies them as undesirable. It also reflects an intention to counteract market tendencies and instead produce a retail landscape that is more 'gentrification friendly' (see Rose et al. 2013), for example by considering other types of shops as desirable and preferable:

> We held a Fashion Week here, because we have a lot of designers that unfortunately are not situated on the Karl-Marx Strasse [the main shopping street of Nord-Neukölln], but rather on the side streets. We want to have them front row. (Urban planner 'City management')

More critical stakeholders refute these policies as they see no benefits for sitting residents. Rather, these schemes are considered to contribute to the commodification of the neighbourhood. They doubt sitting residents will benefit from these developments:

> Public space is increasingly commercialised. [...] There have been protests, but the [Maybachufer] market is there the whole week. It brings money into the neighbourhood, but I doubt it will reduce unemployment and those who live here longer cannot afford the products anymore. I have never spoken to anyone here who likes the market. (active neighbourhood resident)

Issues of commodification relate to broader representations by critical stakeholders of current public policies, which they see as attempts to subtly reclaim public space using predominantly soft strategies. Interestingly, various critical stakeholders argue that investments to make the neighbourhoods bicycle friendly are indicative of class shifts, because these would not appeal to the large local immigrant population, who are seen as not riding bicycles. Other critical stakeholders also reflect on harder, repressive strategies including 'law and order' policing strategies to remove alcoholics and the homeless from the streets. Interestingly, these stakeholders link such intentions and interventions directly to the Neighbourhood Management programme. This contrasts policymakers' representations of having no influence on gentrification and investing to prevent, what they term, ghettoization. Critical stakeholders uncover underlying motives to attract a new class of residents and spur gentrification, referring to subtle and less subtle attempts to remake public space.

Residential mobility: legitimisation and criticisms

Questions about who moves into the neighbourhood as well as who moves out – and under what conditions – play a key role in legitimising or, alternatively, criticising current policies. Despite rents rising quickly, survey research by TOPOS (2011) suggests that relatively recent in-movers in Reuterquartier and Schillerpromenade are in a relatively marginal position themselves, possessing incomes similar to the neighbourhood average (Table 3.3).

	Period of moving in				
	pre-1990	**1990-1999**	**2000-2008**	**2009-2010**	**Average**
Reuterquartier	1771	2145	1939	2160	1989
Schillerpromenade	1582	1754	1719	1690	1691

TABLE 3.3. Average net household income in 2011 in Euros; based on move-in date. *Source:* TOPOS, 2011; own adaptation.

The characteristics of in-moving residents provide public-policy stakeholders with a justification to continue investments and represent current developments as something else than gentrification. Public-policy stakeholders routinely refer to the notion that current in-movers do not 'bring a lot of money with them'. They do so by reproducing a main conclusion of the recently published report 'Social Structure Development in Nord-Neukölln' (Sozialstrukturentwicklung in Nord-Neukölln), which states that 'the poor displace the very poor' (TOPOS 2011). This creates a distinction between the type of residents currently moving in and the type of residents 'necessary for a real population turnover'. Seemingly, it also contrasts official policy goals to 'attract socially more stable residents' (Planergemeinschaft 2010: 7 [author translation]), although it does not become clear who these residents exactly are. This distinction leads most key public-policy stakeholders to conclude that gentrification is not occurring in Nord-Neukölln:

> What happens here is something different. For us, it has nothing to do with gentrification. Completely nothing, but that's how it is discussed: 'displacement is occurring here and the long-term residents are cast out' […] The residential structure is changing, but young residents are moving in. (urban planner 'City management')

Interestingly, these stakeholders pay little attention to how similar household incomes may represent substantially different levels of purchasing power for households of different types and sizes. Furthermore, these stakeholders represent Schillerpromenade and Reuterquartier as unsuitable for further gentrification, for example due to the small size of most dwellings. This reinforces their claim that 'it is much too early to speak of gentrification'.

On the other end of the spectrum, critical stakeholders clearly frame in-moving residents as different from sitting residents, despite their low incomes. They make repeated claims that structural differences in class or future perspectives underlie current similarities between in-moving marginal gentrifiers and sitting residents. They do so by describing in-movers in terms such as 'temporarily poor', 'middle class', 'able to afford more rent', 'rich compared to those on benefits' and argue they experience a 'different kind of poverty' as they are often students with little financial obligations or with parental support. Furthermore, they argue in-moving residents fuel rent increases regardless of their socioeconomic position.

Differences also exist regarding the representations of out-moving residents. Public policies argue 'families tend to move out of the area as soon as their children have to go to school' (SenStadt 2010: 55). Policymakers problematize this as it leaves behind, as one respondent calls it, a 'ghetto where all better-paid, education-oriented households move out of'. Processes of direct displacement are generally dismissed by policymakers as impossible by law. Furthermore, even when indirect displacement is acknowledged by policymakers, they refer to it as an insignificant and necessary side effect to improve the quality of life for most sitting residents. Again, critical stakeholders dismiss this view by highlighting how incremental rent increases and official regulations can produce, perhaps unintended, displacement:

> This is also direct displacement: When people on benefits live in too expensive housing they receive a demand […] to move to reduce their expenses on housing. This can be the case when homeowners have only carried through incremental rent increases. (stakeholder renters' association)

Several (critical and public-policy) stakeholders reflect on their own position in the neighbourhood. These stakeholders perceive a discrepancy between their own lived experiences of gentrification on the one hand, and policy vocabulary – referring to reports and statistics – of structural decline and poverty on the other:

> I find the presentation [of data] playing it down a bit. One result was that there's no gentrification in Neukölln and that's a subjective conclusion. What I notice is really totally different, I don't know if data supports this, […] I know so many examples of people who lived here in a house that got sold. They just got informed that rents would be raised. You also notice it in the residential structure, which has changed enormously. (public-policy stakeholder; cultural department)

To summarise, the low-income characteristics of in-moving residents make processes of gentrification appear softer and further investments more justifiable. The employed timeframe plays a role, because critical stakeholders see current developments as the precursor of policy aims to facilitate more mature, long-term gentrification forms. Public-policy stakeholders and policy

documents represent current investment schemes as a short-term necessary reaction to problems of decline and ghettoization or slummification.

Celebrated state-led gentrification in Indische Buurt

Gentrification in Amsterdam started in the 1970s as a spontaneous process in inner-city neighbourhoods like the Jordaan, but already in the 1980s acquired a state-led character as it became part of local policy goals (Musterd & Van De Ven 1991). Traditionally, Amsterdam is dominated by affordable social-rental dwellings owned by housing associations, which are allocated on the basis of waiting lists and for which income limits exist[20]. This stock, as well as extensive tenant protection, hampers the progression of gentrification (Van Gent 2013). Since the late 1990s the local government and housing associations pursue policies that promote homeownership and the sale of social-rental dwellings (Aalbers 2004). Still, in 2013 social-rental dwellings composed 46% of the city's total housing stock. The conversion of social-rental dwellings in owner-occupied or more expensive private-rental dwellings fit within policy ambitions to create attractive and affordable neighbourhoods for upward-ly-mobile 'middle-income' groups households (Dienst Wonen 2007; also see Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015).

Indische Buurt was for a long time represented as one of Amsterdam's least liveable neighbourhoods, and is consequently targeted by national policies aiming to improve the neighbourhood through social and tenure mixing. Changes in the housing stock provide evidence for state-led gentrification: Particularly in the Western part of Indische Buurt the share of social-rental housing declined and average real-estate values rose faster than in Amsterdam, proving relatively resilient to the financial crisis (Table 3.4). Still, real-estate values remain considerably below the citywide average and the social-rental sector continues to dominate.

	Social-rental stock				Real-estate values (total stock)			
	2005		2012		2005		2013	
	in %	*Rel.*	In %	*Rel.*	*€1000	*Rel.*	*€1000	*Rel.*
Indische Buurt West	75	*139*	61	131	136	*69*	193	*79*
Indische Buurt East	79	*146*	72	154	159	*81*	200	*82*
Amsterdam	54	100	*47*	100	*197*	*100*	244	*100*

TABLE 3.4. Share of social-rental stock (left) and real-estate values of total stock (right) and relative to Amsterdam (=100). *Source:* Research and Statistics, 2012; own adaptation

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20. The maximum annual household income was €34,229 in 2013.

Gentrification as necessary normalisation

Interestingly, in Indische Buurt local stakeholder criticism remain largely absent. Gentrification is even explicitly put forward in policy documents and by policy makers as a positive policy instrument. Policies of state-led gentrification are predominantly represented as a 'normalisation' of the housing tenure structure and a 'necessity' to adapt the city's housing market to the changing residential composition. For example, the Housing Vision 2020 mentions gentrification as one of the city's key qualities and as a necessary process to retain 'new urbanites' for the city (Dienst Wonen 2007: 33). These representation relate to the fact that gentrification is a less value-laden term in the Dutch context. The representation of gentrification as a necessity to accommodate these households is also reproduced by stakeholders for Indische Buurt specifically:

> Students should not become depressed in Geuzenveld [a neighbourhood on the city's outskirts], everyone wants to be as close to the expanding city centre as possible. You have to accommodate this or else they will leave. Graduates and starters have little access here. (Senior urban planner)

These representations tap into citywide discourses of Amsterdam as a creative knowledge city and as an escalator for upwardly-mobile households. Social-rental housing is referred to as a 'problem' in Amsterdam as it limits accessibility for certain households – predominantly young, upwardly-mobile and highly-educated starter households – and is thereby seen to endanger the (economic) wellbeing of the city[21]. Local policymakers argue the situation in Indische Buurt is even more problematic due to the above-average share of social housing. Therefore, policymakers and policy documents put gentrification forward as an instrument to 'synchronise' the housing stock with the population composition. Gentrification is also represented as bringing structural benefits specifically due to its state-led character, as this presumably ensures control over the process:

> Through gentrification, with an influx of twenty per cent new households – both students and arrived households – the effects on neighbourhood quality are enormous. Sitting residents also benefit, they benefit from the Coffee Company [an upscale coffeehouse chain] even though they won't go there every day. At least they have the opportunity to do so. (Senior urban planner)

This quote is exemplary for the often-reproduced notion that state involvement can ensure neighbourhood continuity by controlling the gentrification

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21. Eric Wiebes and Eric van der Burg, at the time both aldermen representing the local liberal party, argued the large social-rental housing stock is responsible for 'keeping talent outside the city walls' (Wiebes & Van der Burg 2014 [author translation]).

and retaining a large social-rental stock. Notions of controlled, limited, soft or mild gentrification all implicitly hint at ideas of structural marginal gentrification. Furthermore, the quote above highlights how gentrification is represented as improving the opportunity structure for both sitting residents and local businesses. Most stakeholders perceive sitting residents as being disadvantaged on several accounts, among which a lack of (positive) social contacts (also see Stadsdeel Oost 2007). A developer of a major housing association in the neighbourhood describes current problems as follows:

> Everybody lived very anonymous lives here, with a lot of hidden poverty and nuisances between residents. There was no sense of community […]. Economically [it was] the same: High unemployment rates, low incomes, struggling shops.

Subsequently, (state-led) gentrification and social-mixing initiatives are frequently presented as the 'cure' to these perceived ills. Perceptions of 'hidden poverty' and, similarly, 'problems behind the front door' are frequently mentioned by policymakers as well as locally embedded stakeholders. These stakeholders argue middle-class residents can employ their social capital to improve the position of the worst-off sitting residents. Locally embedded civic-society communities play an important role in this narrative. The Indische Buurt is characterised by a range of such communities, which aim to foster contact between different resident groups:

> Problems remain with the 'lowest' 20 to 25% of the population […], the others do not need the communities […], but we do need their resources to help these 25%. We facilitate this connection [between residents], that is the principle idea behind [this] community. (civic-society community leader)

Various stakeholders mention a range of success stories of civic-society communities contributing to more contacts between (middle-class) newcomers and disadvantaged sitting residents. Examples include festivals, language courses, homework assistance for children, and a local currency (Makkie, named after the Makassar-square) that pays out residents who do choirs for other – predominantly disadvantaged – residents. The success of such community initiatives provides stakeholders with an important, 'tangible', justification to represent gentrification as an apt policy to create positive neighbourhood effects through social mixing.

Moreover, the neighbourhood communities have formulated a vision and a set of goals for the Indische Buurt in their Neighbourhood Bid (Indische Buurt Community 2013). This bid implicitly supports policies of gentrification and represents the current situation as problematic: 'the neighbourhood is still far from an ideal society. Poverty, violence, and threats still exist […] also in public space, exclusion and nuisances exist. This forms an obstacle for developing potentials and realising ambitions' (ibid.: 1 [author translation]). Throughout the bid, it is stressed how 'bundling' the social capital of

disadvantaged residents with new in-movers is essential to deal with these local problems. Policymakers use this 'bottom-up' support for gentrification, arguing they have the voice of approval of the local residents (represented by the communities).

Limited criticisms

Despite this perceived bottom-up support for state-led gentrification, a (limited) number of critical locally embedded stakeholders exist. These stakeholders (active residents and squatters, rental associations, local housing support offices) reject the representation of state-led gentrification as a positive process on two main accounts. First, these stakeholders contradict the representation that state involvement can ensure 'positive', 'soft', and 'controlled' gentrification. Instead, they argue the state guidance allows for, or even ensures, widespread upgrading because even areas that do not possess the qualities to experience autonomous gentrification, are now 'injected' by gentrification-inducing policy measures. Furthermore, critical stakeholders argue the guided character allows the process to progress without having to deal with much:

> It is a classical Dutch way to have policy implemented in an easy manner: you compensate everyone and this way you remove the sharp edges. It is softer, but still mean. […] The train moves on and the tracks are there; they know where it will end. It never goes very fast, but also never stops or gets off its tracks, these inconsistencies are removed. (critical stakeholder; renters' association)

Second, these stakeholders attribute the limited amount of local criticisms to the dominance of civic-society communities in Indische Buurt, which they see to represent the interests of only a limited group of residents:

> It is a group of people ruling over other people. […] I cannot see any long-term benefits; the Indische Buurt has a lot of communities, it is driving me nuts. It only leads to segregation of public space and politics. I have heard them participate in council meetings and they are always preaching their own interests. (renters' association)

Hence, critical stakeholders argue that the perceived bottom-up support for gentrification policies predominantly comes from middle-class residents already living in the area. Critical stakeholders fear that the effective state involvement and bottom-up middle-class support will lead to gentrification processes progressing quickly and swiftly to a distinct endpoint: 'they [authorities] have no idea that through privatising the housing stock, they are letting go of something that will lead to Amsterdam becoming London; and London is hell when it comes to housing'. This vision juxtaposes policymakers' representation of soft and controlled state-led gentrification.

Residential mobility patterns

Discussions about the current and desired socio-economic composition of in-moving and out-moving residents reflect the absence of critical representations. Policymakers openly acknowledge the goal to attract residents with higher incomes or better prospects. They describe current in-movers in terms like 'starters', 'pioneers', 'initially low income', and 'hip young residents', but also in terms like 'increasingly better-off residents', 'yuppies' and 'arrived households'. Even though some of these representations hint at low levels of economic capital, all indicate new residents are different from the structurally low-income residents already living in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, and regardless of income levels, several policymakers argue that in-moving residents possess specific values that contribute to positive social mixing:

> People who come to live here are often defined as being post materialistic on the basis of lifestyle research. They are involved in society. […] People moving here are not so much concerned about their career. They value other things more than a paid job. (Planner district East, involved in civic-society communities)

Again, this quote shows how policymakers legitimise state-led gentrification by (implicitly) referring to positive social mixing through the new residents' willingness to participate in, for example, local civic-society communities, which form a successful vehicle for new residents to be involved in society.

In addition, policymakers and employees of housing associations represent the voluntary or involuntary displacement of residents in the social-rental sector as a logical and necessary given to achieve the desired mix. They downplay the potential effects and impacts of displacement, by using vocabulary like 'ensuring the right balance' and 'a few people having to leave [emphasis added]'. The view of people having to leave is contrasted by ambitions to 'retain middle incomes' and to 'facilitate the housing careers' of upwardly-mobile households. The Housing Vision underlines the necessity to sell social-rental dwellings to facilitate these two ambitions (Dienst Wonen 2007: 41).

Furthermore, displacement itself is discussed as a soft process with potential positive outcomes for the displaced. Two institutional arrangements underlie these positive representations. First, housing-association employees argue participatory schemes empower and support residents to be involved in renovations (and tenure conversions). It is often claimed sitting residents voluntarily decided not to return:

> Do we retain enough social housing? Based on several studies we conducted, it is enough. Everybody had to indicate if they wanted to return. […] For some projects, only five people [wanted to return], for a current project no one. (area developer housing association)

Involved stakeholders stress they have experienced little resistance from residents. They argue that sitting residents are predominantly in favour of renovations and willing to pay higher rents for better or larger accommodation,

claiming that 'it is ultimately their own choice to be rehoused' (but see Sakizlioglu & Uitermark 2014 for a critical study). Second, evicted residents receive an urgency status giving them priority for social-rental housing in their current district. Hence, displacement is represented as a small-scale side effect, claiming that most residents are able to move to another dwelling in the same district. Other stakeholders add to this that many evicted residents strategically use the acquired urgency status to skip the regular waiting list and acquire more desirable – often more spacious – apartments in other parts of the district or city. Hence, evictions are framed as potentially beneficial to displaced residents even when they are not able to return within the same neighbourhood or district. This narrative of positive displacement focuses on large families that were considered to be living in too small apartments.

Critical community stakeholders criticise this narrative of positive displacement. By giving displaced residents priority over the regular waiting list, other residents who follow the regular waiting-list trajectory are subsequently increasingly excluded from the social-housing market. Practices of gentrification-related exclusion are then extended geographically, i.e. to the entire metropolitan area's social-rental sector, and conceptually, i.e. not only on the basis of financial resources, but also on the basis of waiting times:

> The urban renewal urgency status…it's full, there is no housing available. You can give them an urgency status, but there is no housing. (renters' association)

They relate this to the promotion of owner-occupied housing in Indische Buurt (from 9% and 11% in the Western and Eastern part respectively in 2005 to 25% and 18% respectively in 2013). These dwellings are, they argue, only accessible for those who have 'big bags of money' or earn 'double the average income'. This links to wider debates that the subtraction of social housing essentially leads to the future exclusion of other low-income residents due to the smaller supply of affordable dwellings.

This section has given insight in the representation of current processes and policies at work in Indische Buurt. It has shown that public-policy makers explicitly represent gentrification as a beneficial process for the neighbourhood (e.g. a normalisation of the housing stock and social mixing), for the city (improved accessibility for upwardly-mobile households), and for sitting residents (through mixing and positive displacement). The specific characteristics of in-moving residents and the increasing prominence of civic-society communities provide policymakers with legitimisation and bottom-up support for state-led gentrification.

Synthesis

This chapter has highlighted three contextual elements that influence, in both cases, how stakeholders with different interests and visions construe opposing positive or critical representations of gentrification and policies. First, the characteristics of in-moving residents are used to justify interventions or, alternatively, to criticise them. In Nord-Neukölln policymakers justify

interventions by representing current in-moving residents as poor themselves and having few alternatives. This element of marginal gentrification is employed as an important justification for further investments despite apparent neighbourhood changes, including steep rent increases. Due to the different class orientation of in-moving residents regardless of their low income, critical stakeholders problematize this view. Representations of marginal gentrifiers form a key 'battleground' between stakeholders with different interests. In Indische Buurt this distinction is subtler, because policymakers recognise that in-moving residents have better prospects than (most) sitting residents. Instead, policymakers define them as 'post materialistic' and willing to engage with local residents. This relates to conceptions of the tolerant marginal gentrifier (cf. Caulfield 1994) and explicitly aims to counter the notion of different social groups living separately, even within the same neighbourhood.

Second, the employed timeframe plays an important role in the construction of more positive or negative representations. Policymakers and policy documents construe positive representations by employing a short-term focus and stressing the necessity of investments to prevent decline and 'slummification' and improve the state of the neighbourhood. This injection, the influx of better-off residents, will improve the state of the neighbourhood on short notice. However, this is achieved through spatial mobility (of upwardly-mobile residents), rather than through social mobility of disadvantaged sitting residents (Van Criekingen 2012). The employed timeframe also plays a role because current gentrification tendencies are still marginal and negative effects remain limited. Critical representations focus on the longer term, highlighting how current investment schemes are essentially a prelude to more mature forms of gentrification and increasing exclusion and displacement. These representations counter the idea of structural marginal gentrification, instead linking current developments to the first stage of the gentrification stage model, in which social mixing is considered merely a transitory phenomenon.

Third, different stakeholders interpret the role of local institutions and public policies in different ways. In Indische Buurt in particular, positive representations are informed by the belief that state involvement can ensure controlled, limited gentrification in which only a limited number of new (types of) residents is attracted. In other words, these representations are based on the assumption that public policies can prevent gentrification from progressing from its (current) marginal and socially mixed state towards more mature and exclusive forms. Critical stakeholders in Indische Buurt, in contrast, perceive state involvement as able to effectively guide gentrification through the sale of social housing without having to deal with many interruptions or criticisms. State involvement, they argue, obscures forms of neighbourhood development other than gentrification. In Nord-Neukölln policymakers stress that the large private-rental stock prevents them from leading gentrification processes. This produces a (discursive) distinction between policymakers and policy interventions, and what policymakers consider the actual drivers of gentrification processes. In contrast to these representations, critical representations argue policy interventions (indirectly) drive gentrification, for example, by remaking

public spaces, by enhancing the local image, and by removing undesirable elements to facilitate the influx of private investors and middle-class residents.

Through a direct comparison of Nord-Neukölln and Indische Buurt, the different ways stakeholders engage with gentrification becomes apparent. On the one hand, in Nord-Neukölln policymakers actively try to counter criticisms of state-led gentrification, representing current investments as necessary to prevent ghettoisation and decline. A strong, critical discourse by locally embedded stakeholders fuels concerns about gentrification, subsequently reinforcing policymakers' desire to contradict these criticisms. This can be considered a negative engagement with the term gentrification. On the other hand, in Indische Buurt, and in Amsterdam as a whole, most stakeholders and policy documents explicitly represent gentrification as a positive process arguing that the process creates attractive living environments, 'normalises' the housing stock (i.e. sale of social-rental dwellings), and produces positive neighbourhood effects through social mixing. Contrasting the Nord-Neukölln case, critical voices remain relatively weak in Indische Buurt.

These differences between the two cases can be linked to the institutional context: the large social-rental stock in Amsterdam allows local authorities and housing associations to actually pursue state-led gentrification by determining the number of social dwellings to be sold. Furthermore, state guidance ensures the compensation – at least to some extent – of residents displaced by renovations or demolitions (cf. Kleinhans 2003). In Indische Buurt civic participation in civic-society communities is framed as bottom-up resident support for gentrification policies. However, concerns exist that these communities only represent local middle-class residents rather than the entire residential base. These factors allow stakeholders to explicitly represent gentrification as a positive policy instrument and dismiss negative effects like displacement and exclusion as non-existent, or a necessary by-product of creating a 'normal' housing market that suits the city's population structure.

In Nord-Neukölln gentrification is better described as state-supported rather than state-led; i.e. due to the large private-rental stock the direct influence of local authorities is limited. Consequently, policymakers reject criticisms by arguing they are not responsible for renovations, displacement or gentrification. However, other policy measures (e.g. investments in public space) indirectly facilitate gentrification. Simultaneously, local authorities can do little about the steep rental increases (for new contracts) and the resulting displacement pressures. Nord-Neukölln is also characterised by strong, local discourses that are highly critical of current developments. In Berlin in general, a broad range of left-wing social activists have proven able to organise themselves effectively against large-scale projects (Scharenberg & Bader 2009). This factor arguably enhances the necessity for local authorities to engage with accusations of gentrification. Hence, the absence or presence – in Indische Buurt and Nord-Neukölln respectively – of strong, local criticisms can significantly influence the representation of gentrification by policymakers and in policy documents. Rather than avoiding the term gentrification, the absence of critical voices allows for distinctly positive and uncritical representations of gentrification (also in policy documents) in Indische Buurt, while

the presence of criticisms forces local policymakers to deal with (and reject) these discourses in Nord-Neukölln.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the local representations of gentrification (Lees, 1996) and public policies by involved stakeholders and in discourses in Nord-Neukölln (Berlin) and Indische Buurt (Amsterdam). It has compared the localised representations with general scholarly debates, in which it is often argued policymakers avoid the term gentrification due to its negative connotation and instead use terms such as social mixing (e.g. Slater 2006; Smith 2002). However, in the context of Nord-Neukölln and Indische Buurt, stakeholders with varying interests as well as official policy documents do not avoid the term gentrification, but engage with it either negatively or positively. This nuances the idea of state-led gentrification as a mass-produced blueprint strategy including supporting discourses avoiding the term 'gentrification' (Smith 2002), since implementation strategies and accompanying representations and discourses show considerable contextual variation.

The representations of gentrification in public policy are intertwined with various context-dependent factors, specifically residential-mobility patterns, the employed timeframe, and the perceived role and influence of local authorities. Stakeholders in both contexts use these contextual factors to construe representations of gentrification that are more or less positive – dependent on their own interests. Public-policy stakeholders strategically employ these factors, such as the relatively marginal characteristics of in-movers and limited extent of gentrification to legitimise further interventions. Critical stakeholders point to class differences and long-term repercussions of gentrification strategies for the sitting population. The limited criticisms of gentrification in Indische Buurt allow stakeholders to explicitly pursue gentrification strategies. Of course, gentrification is a dynamic process that changes over time. Accompanying discourses and representations are thus also liable to change.

CHAPTER 4 — An anatomy of gentrification processes: Variegating causes of neighbourhood change

Abstract

Several theoretical debates in gentrification literature deal with the role and importance of migration, *in situ* social mobility, and demographic change in urban social change. These debates primarily focus on structural processes. However, we have comparatively little insight into how and to what degree different mechanisms actually underpin upgrading in urban neighbourhoods. This chapter uses Dutch register data to show how residential mobility, social mobility and demographic change each contribute to gentrification in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. First, our findings show that residential mobility remains key to understanding the growth of higher-income residents in gentrification neighbourhoods. At the same time, social mobility and demographic change – notably ageing– are most important in explaining dwindling numbers of lower-income residents. Second, large differences exist across neighbourhoods. By mapping three ideal-typical drivers of gentrification, we show how the migration-based 'displacement model' predominantly occurs in upgrading neighbourhoods with a high status. Conversely, in low-status upgrading neighbourhoods social mobility is more important in explaining gentrification. These different forms of upgrading occur simultaneously in both cities and should be integrated to advance our understanding of gentrification as a process that is both widespread and occurs in different, ever-changing forms across neighbourhoods.

Introduction

Recent debates on urban gentrification have revolved around the question on what is structurally causing the middle class transformation of North American and European cities. Notwithstanding the literature on neo-liberal urbanism and the political economy of capitalism (notably Smith 2002), two related debates have dominated conceptualisations of the gentrification process: the displacement versus replacement debate (e.g. Freeman 2005; Slater 2009; Butler & Hamnett 2009), and class versus demography debate (e.g. Buzar et al. 2007; Van Criekingen 2010; Davidson & Lees 2010). To put it simply, disputes revolve around the question of which structural cause is predominant: class politics resulting in displacement or population shifts related to demography and economic restructuring. As a result, urban and neighbourhood change has been analysed and appraised in light of either position. Yet, strangely, even though positions on structural causation have become highly developed, we have comparatively little insight into the material causes of neighbourhood change[22]: how and to what degree do different

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22. The distinction between material and structural processes is based on Aristotelian causality (Abbott 2004: 95-97).

processes actually underpin upgrading in urban neighbourhoods, and do they vary for different types of cities. [23]

To explain neighbourhood social change, gentrification studies typically focus on migration and the characteristics of both in-movers and out-movers. Classic definitions refer to the arrival of more affluent middle-class and by lower-income, lower-class residents increasingly moving out (e.g. Atkinson 2000; Slater 2006; Newman & Wyly 2006). Yet, residential mobility is insufficient in explaining neighbourhood change, and changing migration trends are one of multiple processes causing neighbourhood upgrading. A few studies have stressed the importance of *in situ* social mobility processes in explaining processes of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading (e.g. Clay 1979; Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003; Teernstra 2014a). Likewise, in explaining social change at the urban level, several authors have pointed to demographic shifts in Western European cities (see Buzar et al. 2007), particularly in cities that are performing well economically. Notable shifts include the increased influx of young people, the willingness of middle class residents to remain in the city after family formation, and the ageing traditional working class (see Butler & Hamnett 2009; Boterman et al. 2010; Rérat 2012). As life course processes are unevenly distributed within the city (Musterd et al. 2015), demographic trends will likely contribute to neighbourhood change and do so unevenly across the city.

These three mechanisms - residential mobility[24], social mobility, and changing demographics - have become associated with theoretical positions on gentrification, and in some cases central to the structural debates. This chapter sets out to disentangle these processes in an empirical fashion. Our key research goal is to explore to what degree different forms or models of gentrification can simultaneously take place within single urban contexts. Furthermore, we investigate whether we can discern a spatial logic as to where these models occur within a city. Further insight into material causes may shed new light on current structural readings of gentrification and ongoing theoretical debates. The main research questions are:

To what extent do causal mechanisms related to residential mobility, in situ social mobility and demographic processes individually contribute to changes in the social composition of upgrading neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam over time?

How are these processes spatially distributed among different neighbourhoods and neighbourhood types in Amsterdam and Rotterdam?

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23.   We are aware that the terms 'upgrading' and 'downgrading' may be value laden. In our argument, we use these just to describe income gains or losses at the neighbourhood level.

24.   We use the term 'residential mobility' to denote the mechanism as a whole, and 'migration' to describe migration patterns of individuals or (income) groups.

This chapter compares Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The comparative approach serves to account for, and understand, the role of housing market context in gentrification and upgrading processes (cf. Kadi & Ronald 2014). While both cities have comparable tenure structures and are subject to the same welfare state context, they differ in terms of economic profile. Amsterdam is characterised by a larger share of middle class households and, consequently, higher levels of housing demand and more cases of gentrification since the early-1980s (Van Gent 2013). To be clear, Rotterdam certainly has sites of gentrification (e.g. Doucet et al. 2011; Karsten 2007), but the change in erstwhile low-status neighbourhoods has been more visible and persuasive in Amsterdam's central city. We expect that the urban context will impinge upon the prevalence of causal mechanisms of gentrification and in their spatial distributions. As gentrification has matured more in Amsterdam, we expect a bigger impact of migration and to see clearer patterns along the outward-expanding frontier (see chapter 1).

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The theoretical framework will further discuss and investigate the role of residential mobility, *in situ* processes and demographic change in facilitating or mitigating gentrification processes. Based on this theoretical discussion, we develop three ideal-typical models of upgrading. Then, we will further elaborate upon our case selection (Amsterdam and Rotterdam) and our data and methods. Subsequently, the empirical section will focus on three aspects of neighbourhood gentrification: General causes – or mechanisms – of change, testing the ideal-typical models, and investigating the spatial dimensions related to different models of upgrading. Lastly, the conclusion will reflect on the theoretical implications of our findings.

Theoretical framework

In this theoretical discussion, we present an overview of the causal mechanisms that can produce – or provide a counterweight to – a change in the residential composition of gentrifying neighbourhoods: migration patterns, *in situ* income upgrading, and demographic processes. Furthermore, we link these mechanisms to associated theoretical debates – often linked to discussions about the effects of gentrification.

First, throughout the literature, it is argued distinctive patterns of migration play an essential role in shaping – and defining – processes of gentrification. As a higher-income, better-off population increasingly moves into an area, lower-income residents are slowly replaced or displaced (e.g. Atkinson 2000; Slater 2006; Newman & Wyly 2006). The gentrification stage model links neighbourhood upgrading to successive waves of in-movers (Clay 1979; Kerstein 1990). Initially, newcomers may be able to enter the neighbourhood with a relatively low income as early 'pioneering' gentrifiers. As they continue to move in to the neighbourhood and the upgrading progresses, these early gentrifiers pave the way for successive waves of higher-status in-movers, leading to more mature gentrification and further income upgrading (Kerstein 1990).

As gentrification matures, it has often been found that the out-migration of lower-income residents is the result of displacement practices (Lyons 1996; Slater 2006; Newman & Wyly 2006). Marcuse (1986) distinguishes between direct and indirect forms of displacement. Exclusionary displacement, an indirect form, does not reflect the out-migration of lower-income residents though, but rather the inability of low income residents to move into gentrified neighbourhood as a result of changing housing-market conditions, e.g. higher rents or a reduction of the number of affordable rental dwellings (Millard-Ball 2002; Boterman & Van Gent 2014). Some studies have problematized the direct relationship between gentrification and displacement by highlighting that neighbourhood change does not always lead to low-income residents moving out, or that moving away may be beneficial. Ellen and O'Regan (2011), for instance, found that low-income homeowners are more likely to move out of upgrading areas, suggesting that these households capitalized on increased property values (see also Hamnett 2003; Freeman 2005; McKinnish et al. 2010).

Second, next to migration, *in situ* upgrading processes can also contribute to changes in socio-economic composition. While residential mobility processes can reproduce or further strengthen already existing segregation patterns, some recent studies stress that *in situ* mobility can simultaneously ameliorate these tendencies (Bailey 2012; Jivraj 2013). Still, comparatively little is known about the precise role and importance of *in situ* mobility in processes of neighbourhood upgrading and downgrading. Upward social mobility of residents can allow gentrification to progress, even when in-migrating residents are relatively low income for a prolonged period (McKinnish et al. 2010). Teernstra (2014a) shows that, in Dutch cities, the in-movers into both upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods possess incomes below the neighbourhood average but subsequently experience comparatively steep income increases. In a study of Athens, Maloutas (2004) demonstrates that in-situ social mobility does not occur to the same extent in all neighbourhood types. Particularly in working class neighbourhoods with relatively low levels of residential turnover *in situ* mobility comes to the fore as an important driver of neighbourhood composition change.

Previous work also demonstrates that not all residents experience these *in situ* income gains to the same extent. Instead, particularly young highly educated people will show substantial income gains in the period following in-migration. Rose (1984) stresses the role of the 'marginal gentrifier': Often low income, precariously employed and seeking an affordable place to live. They generally move to (relatively) low-status neighbourhoods, which function as entry points to the city's housing and labour markets (see Robson et al. 2008). Here, successive waves of marginal gentrifiers may follow up on each other, maintaining a form of marginal gentrification that does not necessarily progress into a more mature status (see Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003).

Third, neighbourhood change may also result from demographic shifts. Without referring to demography specifically, several authors have noted changing urban populations with constantly increasing middle and upper-class workers, mostly professionals, and a decreasing blue-collar working

class population (e.g. Préteceille 2007; Hamnett 2003). While these studies emphasize residential mobility and social mobility as main drivers, there also seems to be a notion of a demographic shift whereby an ageing working class population is being replaced by a younger middle class group (Buzar et al. 2007). As such, social economic change at the local level is also the result of a 'demographic conveyor' (Bailey 2012). Indeed, some studies have shown that growing numbers of young people move to the city for study or following graduation; often these young people stay and become the gentrifying middle class (Smith & Holt 2007; Rérat 2012).

This life course perspective on gentrifiers can also be applied to non-gentrifiers in some neighbourhoods: Change may result from higher death rates among an older working-class population than among a relatively young middle class. Musterd (2014) for instance, found that, as access to housing has become increasingly difficult in Amsterdam, the population in social-rental housing has begun to age. Another Amsterdam study shows that neighbourhood outcomes of young newly-formed households are substantially influenced by parental wealth. Inner-city gentrifying neighbourhoods are predominantly accessed by children from wealthier parents (further discussed in the next chapter). These findings suggest that affordable (social-rental) dwellings in Amsterdam's inner centre are relatively inaccessible to lower-class young people as they are often occupied by an ageing group with few moving options.

The demographic replacement of the working-class population contradicts notions of change according to classic neighbourhood life-cycle theory. This theory states that as housing is ageing more affluent households move away and are replaced by lower income young households leading to decline or downgrading ('filtering', Temkin & Rohe 1996). This view does not hold in cases of gentrification, yet ageing of different cohorts of residents may be an important driver of neighbourhood change, both in terms of upgrading and downgrading (Wiesel 2012). In general, when gentrification takes place is important: While recently gentrifying areas may display a demographic outflow of low income households, long-standing gentrification areas will also see ageing gentrifiers from the baby boomer generation (Bonvalet & Ogg 2007).

Synthesis: dominant debates on gentrification

The three causal mechanisms of neighbourhood population change outlined above also inform current theoretical debates on gentrification. One key debate concerns the question whether population change is mainly due to displacement practices or, alternatively, results from a gradual replacement processes related to demographic changes. The first stresses the necessity to focus on various forms of displacement and the related influx of affluent households (Slater, 2006, 2009). The latter acknowledges the importance of a changing 'urban class map' in cities due to wider economic changes which have led to an overall growth of middle-class professional – and a decline in working classes from the industrial era (Butler & Hamnett 2009: 219).

A second related debate is concerned with the question of whether or not primarily demographic patterns drive re-urbanisation (e.g. Buzar et

al. 2007) as more young people move to the city and prolong their transitory life-stage before settling down. Other studies highlight, besides the demographic dimensions, underlying structural class differences between the long-term working-class residents and the new, young population settling in gentrification areas (Van Criekingen 2010; Davidson and Lees 2010). This is, *inter alia*, expressed in the latter group's upward social mobility, despite their initial low income.

Case studies: housing market and urban context

This chapter adopts a comparative approach by investigating Amsterdam and Rotterdam, two cities with different social-demographic and economic profiles. Global connectedness and economic restructuring have led to labour market changes in both cities. Yet, Amsterdam's economy is strongly service-oriented and more globally connected, while Rotterdam's economic profile remains characterised by a legacy of deindustrialisation (Burgers & Musterd 2002). Consequently, the average income level is higher in Amsterdam. As such, Amsterdam and Rotterdam can be considered representative examples of cities that have been, respectively, relatively more and less successful in making the transition to a post-industrial economic structure.

In terms of housing market, there are a few important similarities and differences. The tenure structure is roughly similar, with a dominant social-rental sector. Also, in both cities the size of the social-rental sector is gradually decreasing, facilitating gentrification (Boterman & Van Gent 2014). Yet, in general, Dutch tenants' rights are well protected. Normal rent increases can only be carried out incrementally, meaning that direct forms of displacement tend to be limited (Musterd 2014; Van Gent 2013).

The cities are rather different in terms of housing-market demand and accessibility. High levels of demand and population growth have substantially pushed up real-estate values in Amsterdam since the late 1990s, particularly in centrally located neighbourhoods (Teernstra & Van Gent 2012). In Rotterdam, real-estate values are comparatively lower and show lower growth (CBS 2013). Furthermore, Amsterdam's large historic centre appeals to the aesthetic preferences of the urban middle class (Bridge 2001). In Rotterdam, the city centre is dominated by post-war offices and housing with pre-war residential areas scattered around it. Most poverty neighbourhoods are located south of the New Meuse river.

Differences in demand are also expressed in local urban policies. Gentrification is actively pursued by both municipalities to enhance the 'liveability' of low-status neighbourhoods. Yet, while the Rotterdam municipality focuses on attracting and retaining middle- and higher-income households (Doucet et al. 2011), gentrification in Amsterdam is promoted as a means to adapt the housing market to already-existing demand (Van Gent 2013).

These factors have an impact on the historical trajectories of gentrification in both cities. Gentrification started in central Amsterdam in the 1970s and has since spread outwards to most pre-war neighbourhoods (Van Gent 2013). In Rotterdam downgrading was, for a longer period, the dominant

process in inner-city neighbourhoods, while the high-status neighbourhoods were more peripherally located in the north. In the late 1980s, marginal forms of gentrification in inner-city neighbourhoods began to appear (Meulenbelt 1994). More recent studies of Rotterdam have focused on gentrification through urban redevelopment schemes (Doucet et al. 2011; Uitermark et al. 2007).

These cases were selected because the difference in housing and economic context may impact the prevalence of different gentrification processes, underlying mechanisms and their spatial patterning. Lower housing demand in Rotterdam may result in lower levels of displacement. Notwithstanding new-built sites, gentrification may be caused by a more gradual demographic shift related to deindustrialisation: blue collar working class being replaced by white collar middle class. Conversely, Amsterdam has been subject to inner city change for a longer period and attracts more middle class workers and students. Migration from outside the city and *in situ* social mobility may therefore play a more important role than demographic shifts.

Data and methods

This chapter draws on individual-level, longitudinal register data from the Social Statistics Database (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) to investigate residential mobility, socio-economic grading, and demographic shifts for the period 2004-2011. This period covers sufficient years to chart the effects and importance of these mechanisms.

The dataset includes data on income, household composition, age, and neighbourhood of residence for all individuals who were registered in Dutch municipalities. Our research population consists of all individuals, aged 25-64, who lived in Amsterdam or Rotterdam in 2004 and/or 2011. By looking at individuals (rather than households), we are able to track them over time. We focus on the working-age population because we use income as a measure of social class. While income is an important dimension of social stratification, it should be noted that it is not the only one. Unfortunately, we are unable to include political resources, social networks, and education for a substantial population. The focus on income means that pensioners are excluded because their income does not necessarily reflect social economic status. For similar reasons, we have excluded the age group of 18-24 year olds from the analyses. They are often higher education students and may receive parental support (see the next chapter). Our dataset does include the young adult cohort in 2004 who remained or moved into the city. In 2011, they are part of the 25-64 year old group included, where we assume income levels reflect their social economic status and influence their housing trajectories. Furthermore, self-employed individuals and other members of a household where the main earner is self-employed have been excluded from the analyses, as their registered income is relatively unreliable[25]. Their exclusion constitutes

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25.   Their income is highly volatile, in part because many self-employed individuals report (year-to-year) varying incomes to maximise tax returns. In both years, roughly 17% of the 25-64 age group is excluded following this selection criterion.

a caveat in our study. The self-employed include successful professionals, entrepreneurs and shopkeepers, but also low-income service and construction workers living in precarious conditions (Dekker & Kösters 2011).

This chapter measures aggregate upgrading processes and composition changes at the level of statistical neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods are stable over time and are predominantly delineated by natural boundaries or major roads. To ensure reliable results, we have excluded small neighbourhoods (less than 400 individuals)[26] and neighbourhoods with considerable population change due to renewal or construction. The latter were excluded because we are interested in processes taking place in relatively stable built environments. Following these selection criteria – and the exclusion of individuals with missing income data for any one year or living in an institutional household – our dataset consists of a core population of 313,863 (in 2004; 70% of the total number 25-64 year olds in the entire municipality for that year) and 322,234 (2011; 69%) in Amsterdam, and 253,683 (2004; 78%) and 253,481 (2011; 75%) in Rotterdam. The included percentage is higher for 2004, which is the result of excluding neighbourhoods constructed, or substantially expanded, after 2004. For the same reason, the percentage is lower for Amsterdam.

Before analysing migratory, grading and demographic patterns, we first assessed the initial status of the different neighbourhoods and whether they subsequently showed patterns of upgrading or downgrading. The initial status – high or low – is based on a division between respectively above-average and below-average median income levels in 2004, related to the city average. Similarly, neighbourhoods with an increase of the median income (corrected for inflation) during the period 2004-2011 are defined as upgrading. It should be noted that this period also includes the economic crisis of 2008. Preliminary analyses reveal that this slowed income growth in both cities (results not presented). Regardless, multiple neighbourhoods show real income upgrading for the entire period, also after correcting for inflation. Both cities improved their position relative to the rest of the country in recent years in terms of income (but also real-estate values, see CBS (2013)), although more so in Amsterdam.

After defining our neighbourhood categories, we have used gross-household-income percentiles to group individuals into three income categories: low incomes (the lowest 40 per cent), middle incomes (the middle 30 per cent), and high incomes (the top 30 per cent) for multiple years[27]. As mentioned, income is but one dimension of class. For the sake of interpretation, 'high

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26.   Excluded areas are rural, business or industrial with scattered housing, or new built neighbourhoods. Because of limited moves and changes, small neighbourhoods would result in skewed visualisations and counts in the GIS analyses. We have kept our neighbourhood selection constant for all analyses to enable comparison of figures and tables.

27.   The delineation of these categories is based on preliminary bivariate correlations between (the level of) neighbourhood grading and the increasing/decreasing presence of individual income decile groups.

income' roughly corresponds with upper and upper middle classes, 'middle income' with lower middle classes, and 'low income' with lower classes.

The percentile groups are based on nation-wide data. Referencing national income enables a cross-case comparison of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, as well as an assessment of their relative composition changing over time[28]. These income groups will serve to shed light on the three mechanisms from our theoretical section and on their (net) effect on (changes in) population composition. We also look at the "share" of the population involved in each mechanism, which can be seen as the relative importance of each mechanism. Colloquially, this share represents the percentage of residents that migrates, experiences social mobility, ages out of/in to the core population, or remains stable over time. Fifugre 4.1 presents a schematic overview of the causal mechanisms contributing to – or mitigating – neighbourhood composition change. We look at demographic trends through ageing patterns; i.e. individuals turning 25 years old and entering the population group, or individuals becoming 65 and, hence, exiting the population group. Deaths are also included in this latter category. In some cases individuals experience a combination of these mechanisms (e.g. they migrate and experience social grading). In all these cases, they are grouped within the residential mobility mechanism.

FIGURE 4.1. Schematic overview of possible neighbourhood composition change through residential mobility, social mobility, and ageing.

28. An alternative approach is to base income groups on city averages. Major disadvantages are that income groups are no longer comparable between cities and that rising income levels in both cities will shift decile boundaries between 2004 and 2011, leading to mathematically induced downward social mobility.

Figure 4.1 shows all possible processes of composition change, with horizontal lines depicting residential mobility flows and vertical lines demographic (ageing) processes. The gentrification literature makes various assumptions with regard to salient mechanisms. In other words, some mechanisms are seen as more important in explaining neighbourhood upgrading than others. Based on the literature, we distil three ideal-typical models through which neighbourhood upgrading can occur (Figure 4.2). We define a displacement model, an ageing model and an *in situ* social mobility model on the basis of a set of criteria related to the individual mechanisms. For each model, we require both the net effect and the "share" of each involved mechanism (schematically represented by arrows in Figure 4.2) to exceed average municipal levels. Additionally, the net effect of the mechanisms also needs to reflect upgrading, i.e. a net loss of low-income categories or gain of middle and high-income individuals. We determine the following three models on the basis of a set of rules:

(1) Displacement model[29]:
  · Above average (negative) net effect of migration and an above average share of migration among low-income residents, and;
  · Above average (positive) net effect migration and an above average share of migration among middle- or high-income residents.
(2) *In situ* social mobility model:
  · Above average (negative) net effect and share of social low-income residents who experience *in situ* upward social mobility (and move to the middle- or high-income category) while staying in the same neighbourhood.
(3) Ageing model:
  · Above average (negative) net effect and share of ageing (out) of low-income residents.

We investigate whether these three ideal-typical processes occur in both cities, and to what degree they contribute to social change. Several models can apply in single neighbourhoods, which would imply a volatile neighbourhood population or the existence of different smaller neighbourhoods within a statistical unit. Using GIS, we map the occurrence of these various processes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. By defining to what extent these different ideal-typical models occur and in which type of neighbourhoods, and by mapping these different models, this chapter aims to uncover whether and

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29. Although we cannot make definitive claims regarding the occurrence of displacement, the likelihood of any form of particularly direct displacement taking place is greatest for this model of upgrading. For the sake of simplicity, we therefore refer to this model as the displacement model. This does not imply that displacement cannot occur in the other models. Indirect (exclusionary) displacement is to be expected in all three models.

to what degree multiple causes take place in different city types, and if there is a spatial logic to these processes.

Displacement (migration)

In situ mobility (social grading)

Demographic (ageing)

FIGURE 4.2. Schematic representation of salient models that can produce neighbourhood (population) upgrading/gentrification.

Analyses and results

Population changes in upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods

Figure 4.3 shows the spatial distribution of the four defined neighbourhood categories for both cities. Amsterdam shows a concentrical pattern in which high-status upgrading neighbourhoods are predominantly located in the central city and the southern boroughs. Low-status upgrading neighbourhoods are concentrated mainly in the nineteenth-century belt surrounding the city centre. Downgrading is mostly found in the outer-ring neighbourhoods (cf. Teernstra & Van Gent 2012). In Rotterdam, low-status upgrading neighbourhoods are fewer in numbers and more scattered, mostly located directly to the east and west of the commercial city centre, or in the vicinity of the Kop van Zuid waterfront development (notably Katendrecht, [A in Figure 4.3]). High-status upgrading neighbourhoods are primarily found in the more suburban north, the city centre itself, and the renewal area Hoogvliet in the southwest. Downgrading occurs mainly in the largely post-war areas south of the New Meuse river and in pre-war former working class neighbourhoods west and north of the centre, often right next to upgrading areas.

When looking at income groups in these four types of neighbourhoods for the 2004-2011 period, we find different patterns of change. Table 4.1 shows overall population composition for both cities' different neighbourhood types as well as both percent point and absolute percentage changes in the population composition.

The cities show little difference in their compositions and change. They both testify to a decrease among low-income individuals. Also, both urban populations show nearly identical gains in income (figure not shown). Yet, there is one important difference: Amsterdam shows a greater growth of high-income individuals, both in share and in numbers. This is also reflected by the structurally higher average income level in Amsterdam (figure not shown).

Legend

Neighbourhood typologies (initial status, grading)

- Low status, upgrading
- High status, upgrading
- Low status, downgrading
- High status, downgrading
- Excluded areas

Amsterdam

City centre

0 0,5 1 2 3 4
Kilometers

Legend

Neighbourhood typologies (initial status, grading)

- Low status, upgrading
- High status, upgrading
- Low status, downgrading
- High status, downgrading
- Excluded areas

City centre

New Meuse River

Rotterdam

0 0,5 1 2 3 4
Kilometers

FIGURE 4.3. Neighbourhood grading (2004-2011) and initial status (2004) in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Source: SSD Data, own calculations. Source: SSD data, own calculations.

These differences in income category change over seven years are not evenly distributed across neighbourhoods. Especially low-status upgrading neighbourhoods saw overall decreases in the share of low-income residents. This decrease was stronger in Amsterdam neighbourhoods than in Rotterdam (-5.9 and -4.1 p.p. respectively). The overall loss of low-income individuals meant a comparable increase in share of middle-income and high-income categories in Rotterdam (+1.9 and +2.2 p.p. respectively). Amsterdam's low-status upgrading neighbourhoods saw a smaller growth of middle income (+1.0 p.p.) and a substantial growth of high-income individuals (+4.9 p.p.). It is notable that the low-status upgrading neighbourhoods in 2011 still host an above-average share of low-income residents compared to both cities. High-status upgrading neighbourhoods show similar trends in both cities with the share and number of low-income and middle-income residents decreasing in favour of the high-income category. It appears that in these neighbourhoods gentrification further matured and, again, this process was substantially stronger in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam. Overall, it is also notable that in both cities the upgrading neighbourhoods experienced some population growth (final column Table 4.1), while downgrading neighbourhoods saw only a small increase in Amsterdam, and a decrease in Rotterdam.

Net effects of residential mobility, social mobility and demographic trends

These trends do not reveal how and to what extent various mechanisms (residential mobility, *in situ* social mobility, and demographic trends) cause changes in population, either by contributing to one another or by cancelling each other out. Table 4.2 presents a precise breakdown of how each mechanism has contributed to overall population growth, or decrease, and to shifts in population composition per neighbourhood type. The net effect of the individual mechanism is calculated for each neighbourhood and for each income category (for the period 2004-2011), and is computed as follows: it is the absolute inflow to minus the absolute outflow from the neighbourhood per mechanism (via in- and out-migration, *in situ* income gains and losses, or ageing in and out). This net balance is subsequently divided by the *total* 2004 neighbourhood population. Thus, the net effect of a mechanism can be read as the percentile change of a single income category relative to the *total* neighbourhood population during the period 2004-2011. In Table 4.2, the net effects are aggregated from individual neighbourhoods to the four neighbourhood types. The percentile changes of all mechanisms together add up to the overall population growth or decrease (also presented in the final column of Table 4.1).

To aid interpretation, we will give an example: Table 4.2 gives a net effect of +0.7 for migration of low-income residents living in low-status upgrading neighbourhoods. This means that more low-income residents moved into than out of these neighbourhoods and that – isolated from other mechanisms and changes in the population size – this would result in a 0.7 percent point increase in the share of low-income residents living in the neighbourhood. Yet, due to the negative net effects of the other mechanisms – social mobility and

Neighbourhood type	N	2004: Income categories (in %)			2011: Income categories (in %)			Percent point change 2004-2011			Percentage change 2004-2011			
		Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High	Total
Amsterdam														
Low status, upgrading	25	43.0	33.6	23.4	37.1	34.6	28.2	-5.9	+1.0	+4.9	-10.6	+6.6	+25.1	+3.5
High status, upgrading	29	28.6	28.4	43.0	25.3	27.6	47.2	-3.3	-0.8	+4.2	-8.0	+1.1	+14.1	+4.1
Low status, downgrading	11	39.5	33.9	26.6	39.4	35.4	25.3	-0.1	+1.4	-1.3	+0.6	+5.1	-4.1	+0.9
High status, downgrading	13	22.3	29.5	48.3	25.3	30.0	44.7	3.1	+0.5	-3.6	+14.5	+2.4	-6.9	+0.6
City wide	78	34.6	31.5	33.9	32.1	31.9	36.0	-2.5	+0.4	+2.1	-4.8	+4.1	+8.9	+2.7
Rotterdam														
Low status, upgrading	12	41.6	34.2	24.2	37.5	36.1	26.4	-4.1	+1.9	+2.2	-8.4	+7.4	+11.0	+1.7
High status, upgrading	21	23.6	31.9	44.5	21.4	31.5	47.1	-2.2	-0.4	+2.6	-7.8	+0.2	+7.4	+1.5
Low status, downgrading	15	44.2	33.1	22.7	43.2	34.1	22.7	-1.0	+1.0	+0.0	-4.8	+0.5	-2.4	-2.5
High status, downgrading	13	23.3	32.0	44.6	26.1	32.9	41.0	+2.8	+0.9	-3.6	+10.9	+1.9	-8.9	-0.8
City wide	61	33.3	32.8	33.9	32.0	33.5	34.5	-1.3	+0.8	+0.6	-4.0	+2.2	+1.6	-0.1

TABLE 4.1. Population composition of the different neighbourhood types in 2004 and 2011 and percent point and absolute change. Source: SSD data, own calculations.

ageing – the presence of low-income residents saw a 4.6 percentile decrease. Finally, when taking into account the percentile change of the other income categories (+2.2 for middle incomes and +5.9 for high incomes), we come to an overall population growth of 3.5 percent. The other figures, for individual mechanisms, income groups and neighbourhood types, can be interpreted in the same fashion. For all neighbourhood types and in both cities the data show that migration has a positive (net) effect on the number of low-income residents living in the neighbourhood. Hence, residential migration patterns of low income residents, isolated from all other mechanisms and income groups, do not directly contribute to a decreasing presence of low income residents in upgrading neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the positive net effect of low-income migration is substantially greater in downgrading than in upgrading neighbourhoods. This indicates that migration patterns of low-income residents are still distinctively different in upgrading and downgrading neighbourhoods.

The decreasing presence of low-income residents in upgrading neighbourhoods can instead be explained by looking at the two other mechanisms – *in situ* social mobility and demographic trends. Indeed, particularly in Amsterdam, *in situ* social mobility contributes to a decrease in the share of low-income residents in low-status and high-status upgrading neighbourhoods. Alternatively, in Rotterdam social mobility only leads to a net decrease of the number of low-income residents in low-status upgrading and low-status downgrading neighbourhoods. Demographic processes, in all neighbourhood types, contribute to the greatest extent to a net decrease in the low-income population. In other words, ageing processes result in a declining low-income working-age population. Furthermore, the (negative) net effect of these demographic patterns is greater in low-status upgrading neighbourhoods than in other neighbourhood types. Nevertheless, since the vast majority of this population remains in the neighbourhood after ageing out of the core population, [30] ageing patterns should be interpreted as a more gradual process resulting in slowly dwindling numbers of low-income residents.

In addition to a net increase in low-income residents, Table 4.2 highlights that migration causes increasing shares of both the middle-income and high-income population in low-status upgrading neighbourhoods. In Amsterdam, migration accounts for a net percentile increase of 3.1 for the middle-income group and of 4.8 for the high-income group in low-status upgrading neighbourhoods. Likewise, in Rotterdam these groups saw a 3.8 and 2.3 percentile increase respectively. Also, the effects of the other mechanisms – whether positive or negative – are substantially smaller in this neighbourhood type for these income categories. Social mobility primarily leads to an increasing share of high-income residents in these neighbourhoods. The net effects of social mobility on the number of middle-income residents are small in both cities, as the (net) upward mobility of low incomes is cancelled out by a similar net upward mobility of erstwhile middle-income residents.

30.　All residents in the category 'ageing out' have stayed in the neighbourhood, at least in 2011, except those individuals that died.

	Amsterdam, 2004-2011					Rotterdam, 2004-2011				
	Upgrading		Downgrading		City wide	Upgrading		Downgrading		City wide
	Low status	High status	Low status	High status		Low status	High status	Low status	High status	
Low incomes										
Net migration	+0.7	+1.7	+3.7	+5.8	+2.4	+1.4	+1.5	+2.9	+5.2	+2.7
Net social mobility	-1.0	-0.9	-0.5	+0.2	-0.7	-0.7	+0.0	-0.9	+0.5	-0.3
Net ageing	-4.2	-3.0	-3.0	-2.8	-3.4	-4.2	-3.4	-4.1	-3.1	-3.7
Sum	-4.6	-2.3	+0.2	+3.2	-1.7	-3.5	-1.8	-2.1	+2.5	-1.3
Middle incomes										
Net migration	+3.1	+2.3	+2.5	+2.9	+2.7	+3.8	+3.1	+0.9	+3.3	+2.7
Net social mobility (with low)	+1.0	+0.8	+0.8	+0.2	+0.8	+0.8	+0.1	+1.1	-0.2	+0.5
Net social mobility (with high)	-1.0	-0.9	-0.1	+0.2	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	0.0	-0.5
Net ageing	-0.9	-1.9	-1.5	-2.5	-1.6	-1.5	-2.6	-1.2	-2.5	-1.9
Sum	+2.2	+0.3	+1.7	+0.7	+1.3	+2.6	+0.0	+0.2	+0.6	+0.7
High incomes										
Net migration	+4.8	+7.0	-0.1	-1.2	+3.5	+2.3	+4.7	-0.7	-1.7	+1.3
Net social mobility	+1.0	+1.0	-0.2	-0.6	+0.5	+0.5	+0.5	+0.4	-0.3	+0.3
Net ageing	+0.2	-1.9	-0.8	-1.6	-0.9	-0.2	-1.9	-0.3	-2.0	-1.1
Sum	+5.9	+6.1	-1.1	-3.3	+3.0	+2.7	+3.3	-0.5	-4.0	+0.5
Sum of total population	+3.5	+4.1	+0.9	+0.6	+2.7	+1.7	+1.5	-2.5	-0.8	-0.1

TABLE 4.2. Net effect (percentile change) of individual mechanisms for individual income categories in different neighbourhood typologies 2004-2011*. *Source:* SSD data, own calculations. Note: *The overall growth or decrease (*sum*) of each income category (slightly) differs from the percent point changes presented in Table 4.1. This is due to the fact that Table 4.2 takes into account overall population growth or decrease in these neighbourhoods.

In sum, our analyses show that residential mobility has a positive net effect on the share of low-income residents in low-status and high-status upgrading neighbourhoods, hence seemingly providing an initial counterweight to neighbourhood upgrading. Nevertheless, overall, we see relative decline of low-income residents in both cities, resulting from demographic processes and social mobility. Moreover, residential mobility also plays a substantial role in furthering upgrading processes via substantial net in-migration of middle-income and high-income groups.

"Share" of residential mobility, in situ social grading and demographic trends

While individual mechanisms may produce net effects, it is possible that only a relatively small share of the population is actually involved in the mechanisms. To gain a sense of the scale of population dynamics, Table 4.3 presents the "share" (in percentages) of the residents involved in each individual mechanism. As with the net effects, the share consists of non-overlapping, mutually exclusive categories.

Table 4.3 reveals that migration accounts for a greater share of residents (for all income categories) than *in situ* social mobility, and ageing and death[31]. In other words, even though the net effects of migration are relatively modest, the mechanism itself accounts for a substantial population overturn. Around 40% of the research population moves neighbourhood at least once in the seven year period. The moderate net effect and large magnitude imply that the residents of the same status replace each other through moving, which essentially dampens any neighbourhood income upgrading or downgrading.

Interestingly, in low-status upgrading neighbourhoods in Amsterdam residential mobility rates among low-income residents are considerably lower than other income groups. In Rotterdam, the share of migration is slightly higher among low-income residents than the other categories (for all neighbourhood types). This confirms the notion that higher levels of housing demand in Amsterdam cause lower income groups to become 'trapped' in their current dwelling and neighbourhood. Yet, the share of demographic (ageing) processes is greater for the low-income category than for the other income categories, in both cities but, as expected, more so in Rotterdam. Although this share is small compared to migration (around ten percent), the above-average out-ageing of the low-income population in particular may shape neighbourhood change.

Three ideal-typical models and spatial patterns

The previous analyses gave insight into the dynamics involved in producing neighbourhood population change in different types of upgrading neighbourhoods. Focusing on the three previously identified and defined ideal-typical models (see Figure 4.2), it is possible to establish which forms of upgrading are prevalent across each city.

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31.   This is partly due to our choice to favour migration over other mechanisms. In most cases migration does not coincide with others mechanisms.

	Amsterdam, 2004-2011					Rotterdam, 2004-2011				
	Upgrading		Downgrading		City wide	Upgrading		Downgrading		City wide
	Low Status	High status	Low status	High status		Low status	High status	Low status	High status	
Low incomes										
Migration	42.1	46.6	44.7	44.5	44.1	42.5	44.1	43.4	47.0	43.9
Social mobility	11.6	12.2	12.7	14.2	12.3	12.4	14.4	11.6	13.7	12.7
Ageing	9.8	10.5	9.5	10.5	10.0	10.6	12.7	10.4	11.5	11.1
No change*	36.4	30.7	33.1	30.7	33.6	34.5	28.8	34.6	27.8	32.3
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	67.7
Middle incomes										
Migration	46.6	49.4	43.2	38.4	45.4	40.7	41.8	40.0	40.1	40.7
Social mobility (with low)	11.1	8.6	11.6	8.4	10.1	11.3	7.6	12.2	7.9	9.8
Social mobility (with high)	9.3	11.2	10.4	15.7	11.0	11.2	14.6	11.2	14.9	12.9
Ageing	6.9	7.3	8.5	9.0	7.7	9.0	8.7	8.7	8.9	8.8
No change*	26.1	23.4	26.3	28.6	25.8	27.8	27.3	28.0	28.2	27.8
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
High incomes										
Migration	52.7	54.1	39.8	35.4	47.5	40.5	40.1	37.5	33.1	37.8
Social mobility	15.7	8.8	17.7	12.0	12.5	19.3	11.9	20.8	13.3	15.1
Ageing	5.6	4.9	7.9	5.8	5.7	7.0	5.6	7.2	6.1	6.3
No change*	26.0	32.2	34.6	48.8	34.3	33.3	42.5	34.5	47.5	40.8
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 4.3. The share of neighbourhood residents involved in each mechanism of population change per income category (in %) and per neighbourhood type (2004-2011). Source: SSD data, own calculations. Note: *The category 'no change' represents individuals who did not move to another neighbourhood, remained in the same income category and were part of the 'core population' (aged 25-64) in both 2004 and 2011.

Table 4.4 shows how often the different models of upgrading can be found in both low-status and high-status upgrading neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Although multiple models can be applicable to single neighbourhoods, in the majority of upgrading neighbourhoods just one dominant model prevails. The three models only occur simultaneously in one neighbourhood (Westindische Buurt in Amsterdam, [B]). Alternatively, it may be the case that no dominant model can be identified, which indicates several mechanisms contribute to population change, albeit each one only to a minor extent. This was the case for 15 upgrading neighbourhoods (14%). The spatial prevalence of the three models in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam is mapped in Figure 4.4. Overall, and key to this chapter, the findings reported here suggest there is a clear association between neighbourhood status and dominant model of upgrading in both cities.

Importantly, these data show how the displacement model, in which migration patterns are key in explaining population change, predominantly occurs in upgrading neighbourhoods with an already high status. This association is particularly well highlighted by spatial patterns in Amsterdam (Figure 4.4a). It shows that the displacement model primarily applies to the affluent South borough, but also to neighbourhoods that experienced gentrification since the mid-1990s (e.g. Oude Pijp, [C]). Similarly, the displacement model also occurs in combination with the ageing and the social mobility model, predominantly in neighbourhoods in the South and West districts where gentrification has also been occurring for a longer period already, and is still ongoing. These neighbourhoods boast a large pre-war housing stock and are located to the city centre or the affluent southern borough (e.g. Da Costabuurt, [D]).

The social mobility model, where social upgrading forms an important explanation for decreasing shares of low-income residents, is primarily associated with low-status upgrading neighbourhoods in the Amsterdam context (e.g. Indische Buurt [E] in the east and Spaarndammerbuurt [F] in the west). These neighbourhoods represent current frontiers of gentrification processes in Amsterdam and are subject to a changing population as well as substantial changes in the local housing stock via the privatisation of former social-rental dwellings. The dominance of the social mobility model in these boroughs suggests a relatively large share of upwardly mobile households moving to these neighbourhoods, which may indicate early and more marginal forms of gentrification.

The ageing model can mostly be found in stable, upgrading high-status neighbourhoods – for example in central neighbourhoods where gentrification has matured and seemingly stabilized (e.g. Jordaan [G]). Low-income groups are even less likely to 'age in' these high-status neighbourhoods, due to restrained accessibility, while older cohorts of low income residents 'age out'. Alternatively, the ageing model applies to low-status upgrading neighbourhoods located further from the city centre - for example several garden villages in the north or east (e.g. Tuindorp Oostzaan [H]). These garden villages have only recently begun to show minor tendencies of upgrading, as

their ageing populations are slowly changing. Here, liberalisation of the local housing stock enables these processes of upgrading to occur.

In Rotterdam, it is more difficult to discern clear spatial patterns of the various models of upgrading. Nevertheless, here too we find the displacement model to be primarily associated with high-status upgrading neighbourhoods. These are, for example, the various high-status upgrading neighbourhoods directly north of the commercial centre (e.g. Provenierswijk [J]).

Interestingly, the social mobility model is relatively equally distributed over low- and high-status upgrading neighbourhoods in Rotterdam (Table 4.4). This model drives upgrading in several (low- and high-status) neighbourhoods scattered throughout the inner city (e.g. Spangen [K], Kralingen-West [L]). These spatial patterns contrast to the situation in Amsterdam where social mobility primarily contributes to the upgrading of low-status neighbourhoods.

Finally, Rotterdam shows comparatively more peripheral neighbourhoods experiencing upgrading. In the affluent, leafy, suburban north most neighbourhoods do not adhere to a specific model of upgrading. This reflects these neighbourhoods' continuous status as high status and their further increasing affluence. South of the river, most neighbourhoods demonstrate downgrading, albeit with a few exceptions. Although it is difficult to identify a causal model of upgrading for these southern neighbourhoods, a closer examination of their characteristics and developments reveals that upgrading is likely due to the conversion of a substantial share of the social-rental stock to owner occupancy during this period[32]. Here, the large-scale renewal of Hoogvliet in the southwest [M] is a case in point (cf. Uitermark et al. 2007).

	Amsterdam		Rotterdam		Total	
	Upgrading		Upgrading		Upgrading	
	Low status	High status	Low status	High status	Low status	High status
Displacement model	4	16	2	7	6	23
Social mobility model	16	8	8	7	24	15
Ageing model	6	10	4	6	10	16
No dominant process	3	4	1	7	4	11

TABLE 4.4 The absolute number of neighbourhoods in which the different models of upgrading can be found in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Note: multiple processes can occur within a single neighbourhood, as can be seen in Figure 4.4. Source: SSD data, own calculations.

32.   Housing-tenure register data provided by OBI Rotterdam.

Legend

Models of upgrading

- Displacement model
- Ageing model
- Social mobility model
- Displacement+ageing
- Displacement+social mobility
- Ageing+social mobility
- Displacement+ageing+social mobility
- No dominant model
- Excluded areas/downgrading

City centre

Amsterdam

0 0,5 1   2   3   4
Kilometers

Legend

Models of upgrading

- Displacement model
- Ageing model
- Social mobility model
- Displacement+ageing
- Displacement+social mobility
- Ageing+social mobility
- Displacement+ageing+social mobility
- No dominant model
- Excluded areas/downgrading

City centre

**Rotterdam**

0 0,5 1   2   3   4
Kilometers

FIGURE 4.4. Different (combinations of) upgrading models per neighbourhood in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Source: SSD data, own calculations.

Key Findings

In order to contribute to theoretical debates on causes of urban gentrification, this chapter has anatomised the material processes involved in producing (different forms of) gentrification at neighbourhood level. Our study highlights how the degree to which material causes (migration, social mobility, ageing and death) are producing – or alternatively, mitigating – gentrification varies both between different urban contexts and between different neighbourhoods. The influence and effect of these material causes differ between different neighbourhoods and between different income categories.

Overall, in upgrading neighbourhoods, we see more low-income residents moving in than moving out. Yet, these areas see a declining share of low-income residents due to social mobility processes and an ageing low-income cohort. Compared to migration, these two gradual shifts have been relatively understudied in analysing gentrification processes. These findings also indicate the importance of selective in-migration of initially low-income upwardly-mobile residents into these neighbourhoods as well as more general patterns of income improvements over the life course (see marginal gentrification below).

To be clear, residential mobility is by far the most important process in neighbourhood dynamics in terms of magnitude, and directly causes gentrification through the influx of middle- and high-income residents in specific neighbourhoods. Yet, the modest net effects at the urban scale confirm that residential mobility predominantly reproduces the social economic composition of neighbourhoods, sustaining social segregation (Sampson 2012; Musterd et al. 2016).

In addition to dissecting processes, we have charted different forms of gentrification in upgrading neighbourhoods. Our analyses found three ideal-typical models occurring in close proximity to each other in both cities, and doing so beyond the inner city, in a wide range of neighbourhoods across urban space (see Smith 2002; Préteceille 2007). While the presented maps may resemble patchwork quilts, we can discern some patterns. The displacement model mostly applies to high-status neighbourhoods, and gentrification in low-status neighbourhoods is mainly characterised by patterns of *in situ* socio-economic upgrading. These findings conform general trends discussed above and hint at marginal gentrification, where earlier in-migration of upwardly mobile residents delay shifts in the population composition in terms of income (Van Criekingen 2010; Hochstenbach et al. 2015).

The spatiality of the three models also reflect housing market differences in both cities. Amsterdam shows clear concentric patterns. The displacement model is primarily confined to the traditionally affluent southern boroughs and adjacent gentrifying neighbourhoods. In the current gentrification frontiers east and west of the centre, change is primarily characterised by *in situ* social mobility. In Rotterdam, pockets of upgrading are predominantly confined to, either, areas with a relatively large pre-war housing stock, or to neighbourhoods where governmental interventions have pushed gentrification through renewal (Uitermark et al. 2007). The association between neighbourhood status and dominant mode of upgrading is less pronounced than in Amsterdam. Here,

lower housing costs will likely enable households to better adjust their housing situation to their household situation, while displacement pressures seem comparatively lower in Rotterdam's high-status neighbourhoods.

Conclusion

This chapter has extended original conceptualisations of gentrification processes to include multiple causes of neighbourhood upgrading. Our analyses show that modes of gentrification vary between neighbourhoods in both cities, and that causation is contingent on both neighbourhood and urban context. These findings inform ongoing and interrelated theoretical debates about gentrification, most notably about the question whether dwindling numbers of lower-income or working-class residents in gentrifying neighbourhoods are the result of gentrification-induced displacement, or the result of broader, gradual replacement processes (e.g. Hamnett 2003; Freeman 2005; Slater 2006, 2009). Furthermore, a second key debate addressed in this chapter concerns the need to focus on either the demographic shifts involved in gentrification, or to focus on underlying class dimensions and differences instead (e.g. Buzar et al. 2007; Davidson & Lees 2010; Van Criekingen 2010; Rérat 2012). In these core debates, the implication is that gentrification, at least when it occurs within a single urban context, can be decisively explained through a single theoretical model of change. In contrast, our findings stress that the different models of upgrading – corresponding to theoretical positions – are varyingly involved in producing gentrification within various neighbourhoods resulting in different forms of gentrification across the city. Therefore, the different models underlying these debates are not contradictory, mutually exclusive or irrelevant to study gentrification. Instead, they should be effectively integrated to advance our understanding of gentrification as an urban phenomenon that stretches far from the inner-city core, that occurs in multiple guises and is liable to change its spots over time. This allows for interpretations of gentrification that simultaneously recognise its widespread nature as well as neighbourhood-level variations in the mechanisms of population composition change, apart from migration.

To advance a more integrated understanding of gentrification, we would like to suggest four avenues for future research. First, this chapter uses administrative neighbourhood boundaries to analyse neighbourhood change. These neighbourhoods are comparably large, in many cases exceeding residential perceptions of neighbourhood. As hinted above, some of our neighbourhoods may actually consist of smaller units with each their own dynamic. The ability to take lower levels of scale into account would benefit our type of analysis (see Fotheringham & Wong 1991; Jivraj 2013).

Second, while we have emphasised the role of urban context, the national context may also play an important role. The Netherlands presents a highly regulated case with a welfare state legacy which has served as a brake to rapid gentrification and direct displacement (Van Gent 2013). Consequently, neighbourhood upgrading may, to a larger degree, be shaped by more gradual causal processes related to social mobility and ageing. Alternatively, residential mobility may be more dominant in market-oriented contexts.

Third, our study has referred to marginal gentrification and the importance of life course, social mobility and residential mobility. To understand how these relate to neighbourhood change and displacement, we suggest investigating how individuals move between different neighbourhoods in a series of moves and how these moves link to life-course events and social mobility (see DP Smith, 2002). Such individual-level analyses can provide important insights into the importance of housing and life course trajectories on neighbourhood change and displacement.

Fourth, our research suggests that different processes take precedence in different stages of neighbourhood development. Direct and indirect forms of displacement become increasingly more likely as gentrification progresses (see Clay 1979; Kerstein 1990). As our dataset is limited to a seven-year period, we were unable to examine the temporal dimension in more detail. Yet, as data comes available, it becomes possible to investigate changes in material causation over time, for instance, by performing cohort analyses of subsequent waves of in-migrants and out-migrants. This allows for further investigations of the (changing) role of neighbourhoods while they are undergoing gentrification.

CHAPTER 5 — Intergenerational support shaping residential trajectories: Young people leaving home in a gentrifying city

Abstract

Parental support, in both financial and non-financial ways, is important in explaining the residential trajectories of young people leaving home. For instance, the influence of parental support on the ability to leave home or enter homeownership is well established. This study adds a dimension by investigating how inequalities in terms of parental background – particularly assets – are spatially articulated. More specifically, we study whether parental background influences the types of neighbourhoods young people leaving home move to. Drawing on the case of Amsterdam, we show that these "fledglings", despite their generally very modest income, disproportionally move to gentrification neighbourhoods. Moreover, fledglings with wealthy parents are even more likely to move to both early gentrifying and expensive mature-gentrification neighbourhoods. Gentrification research should therefore also take into account the importance of middle class social reproduction strategies as well as the potential intergenerational transfer of (financial) resources – rather than merely personal financial situation – in shaping housing outcomes and spatial inequalities of young people leaving home. Drawing on parental support, young people may be able to outbid other households and hence exclude them from gentrifying neighbourhoods. Consequently, parental wealth and other resources can thus contribute to gentrification and exclusion.

Introduction

Moving out of the parental home to form an independent household is a key moment in the life course. It is a rite of passage from adolescence into adulthood that also involves changes in the relationship between the generations (Jones 1995). The residential mobility of nest leaving also coincides with social mobility and social reproduction (Harvey 1985). Often, leaving home is associated with a step in the working and educational career and fits into broader trajectories of class formation. The rapid rise in participation in higher education has fuelled the numbers of young people that move to university towns to study (Smith & Holt 2007). A key spatial manifestation of this nexus of life course and trajectories of class formation is gentrification: The class based transformation of urban space, commonly associated with young, higher educated households.

Whereas young people used to find affordable rental housing in inner-city locations, often close to universities and other preferred amenities, rising rents and property prices associated with gentrification have rendered ever larger parts of western cities unaffordable (Ley 2003). In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 poses disproportionate housing constraints on this population group. Stricter lending criteria have, for example, restricted their ability to enter homeownership (Andrew 2012; Lennartz et al. 2016).

Generally, endowed with relatively limited economic resources, young people have to make very sharp trade-offs between location, housing quality, and housing costs.

As a consequence, it is suggested that not so much resources of young people themselves, but their parental background is of increasing importance in determining "who gets what" on the housing market (McKee 2012; Sage et al. 2013). This can be in terms of tenure (who can buy a home) but also in terms of place (who can access the most desirable neighbourhoods). This differentiation in residential trajectories and consequently mobility chances may thus increasingly be connected to intergenerational transference of capital (see also Harvey 1985).

The role of parental background in the residential trajectories of young people leaving home has been studied from various perspectives. A large body of literature demonstrates how parental background and wealth transfers can enable young people to enter homeownership (e.g. Helderman & Mulder 2007; Öst 2012; Lyons & Simister 2000). Much less attention is paid to the role of parental background in residential destinations of young people leaving home. Some studies have focused on the neighbourhood outcomes of young people, but they were primarily concerned with the eventual intergenerational transmission of neighbourhood poverty and disadvantage (Vartanian et al. 2007; Van Ham et al. 2014). In terms of locational choices, a range of studies address the role of family background in migration decisions after leaving home, particularly from rural to urban areas (Garasky 2002). However, despite the key role of urban space for the reproduction of class through processes of gentrification, and the importance of the urban experience for a large number of young people in the transition to adulthood, no studies exist that link parental background to young people's residential mobility to specific neighbourhood types.

This paper addresses this research gap by investigating the neighbourhood outcomes of young people directly following their move out of the parental home. Although we include all young people, the move out of the parental home for education is a key part of this dynamic: About two-third of the home leavers in our population are students. We hypothesise that financial and non-financial forms of parental support play an important role in young people's neighbourhood of destination after leaving home. Particularly, we suggest parental wealth and parental background may be relevant for young people's residential trajectories into gentrification neighbourhoods, often the typical residential milieus for young people but also characterised by decreasing affordability. The following research question is central to these analyses:

How and to what extent does moving to different types of gentrification neighbourhoods by young people leaving the parental home relate to parental (class and financial) background?

To address this question we draw on the case of Amsterdam for two key reasons: First, Amsterdam is consistently and increasingly a magnet for young people in search of employment and educational opportunities. Amsterdam

hosts a range of institutions for higher education. About 105,000 people follow higher education in the city, of which 40% officially also lives there (ABF research 2014). Furthermore, Amsterdam has the most dynamic labour market of all large cities in the Netherlands and attracts many graduates from other university cities (PBL 2015), also from abroad. Second, due to the influx of young people, alongside international migration and the aging of the local population, demand for housing is high. This pressure inflates rents and property prices, particularly in inner-city neighbourhoods. On top of this, national and municipal governments promote homeownership, liberalisation of rents and the sale of social housing (Boterman & Van Gent 2014). As a result accessibility and affordability of housing in the city is severely reduced, affecting the opportunities for young people. These processes of gentrification cause social divisions between the increasingly affluent centre and the downgrading periphery (see Chapter 4).

Internationally, major cities are becoming increasingly important in providing education and labour-market opportunities to young people. Consequently, issues of housing market affordability and gentrification affect cities in a wide range of contexts (Lees 2012). We hence consider Amsterdam as a rather typical case for how young people both navigate and affect the changing urban social geography of major cities (in the Global North).

Using individual-level register data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) we analyse and map the neighbourhood outcomes of all individuals that left the parental home and made a start in Amsterdam for the years 2010 and 2011. Multinomial regression analyses are used to disentangle the different individual and parental characteristics and their influence on early housing trajectories. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the literature section addresses the topics of young people's residential trajectories, their association with gentrification, and the role of parental support. Then, we address the data and methods used in this chapter. In the third section we present descriptive, GIS and regression analyses to demonstrate the importance of parental background in shaping neighbourhood outcomes. Finally, the conclusion section discusses the consequences of these findings for both individuals and neighbourhoods.

Literature
Residential trajectories of young people

The formation of housing trajectories has often been linked to the life course and life stages of individuals and households (Clark & Onaka 1983). Changes in household composition or changes in earnings may generate dissatisfaction with the current housing arrangement and trigger a move to a different type of dwelling, form of tenure or neighbourhood (Clark & Huang 2003; Mulder 1996). The move out of the parental home to form an independent household is, evidently, a key moment in the life course.

For many young people the period after leaving the parental home represents a transitional period, not in the last place regarding their housing situation. In spite of common belief that fledging from the parental home is a step in a linear housing career, various studies demonstrate that housing

trajectories of young people are often complex, unstable and non-linear, resulting from unplanned events, substantial constraints and limited resources available (Ford et al. 2002; Clapham et al. 2014; Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015). Furthermore, many young people choose not to settle down directly and remain flexible in their housing arrangement (Mulder & Manting 1994).

A distinction can be made here between the residential trajectories of students and non-students: While young people not following higher education may be faced with constraints, students may profit from generally supportive institutional factors, such as the provision of student housing across cities (Rugg et al. 2004). Furthermore, the residential preferences of students and young graduates are commonly associated with specific inner-city facilities, including gastronomy, leisure and nightlife venues (Chatterton 1999). Also the location of higher-education institutions is an important aspect of the urban preferences of young people. Yet, most young people have limited economic capital and hence have to make very sharp trade-offs between housing quality, location and affordability. Students may for instance accept substandard accommodation, anticipating moving to higher-quality dwellings in the future (Chatterton 2010). Sharing accommodation and facilities can also be part of a distinct (student) lifestyle as well as a strategy to pool financial resources (McNamara & Connell 2007). Furthermore, tenure insecurity and temporary contracts are part of regular trade-offs for young people (Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015).

Young people and gentrification

The spatial manifestation of these trade-offs is closely associated with processes of gentrification. Young people are often looking for inner-city locations that boast specific urban amenities, but their generally low income urges them to look for residential niche markets (Clay 1979; Ley 2003). While sometimes these early gentrifiers remain as long-term residents, oftentimes living in these neighbourhoods represents only a temporary phase of their life course. After experiencing income gains or having kids they leave the area again and settle elsewhere (Robson et al. 2008). The stay in a gentrification neighbourhood may thus represent a short-term living arrangement during the transitory phase of young people – towards both adulthood and financial independence (Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003). Due to the fewer constraints and preferences described above, we expect that particularly the residential trajectories of students lead into gentrifying neighbourhoods.

Students can play an important role in (early forms of) gentrification. Although they may economically be a rather marginal group, most of them are on a trajectory into the middle classes and should be seen as 'apprentices' to professional middle class gentrifiers. This trajectory entails the learning and embodiment of specific forms of social and cultural capital, and with it the development of residential preferences. Moreover, it is also the "predilection to gravitate to 'people like us'" (Smith & Holt 2007: 151; Butler 2007). The whole residential and social experience of being a student in the city as a transitional period in the life course is thus crucial for the building of the middle class habitus. This idea of the formation of a specific middle class

habitus coinciding with broader trajectories into the middle classes should be explicitly linked to the massive influx of young people into tertiary city-based education (Sage et al. 2012). The 'urban experience' is now an important stage in the residential biographies of almost all higher educated. The urban dimensions of middle class habitus are hence much more pervasive than they used to be and are, in this sense, a spatial manifestation of changing reproductive strategies of the middle classes (Boterman 2012a). In the work of Smith and Holt the focus lies on 'grooming' children as apprentices for the middle classes. It is about the transition from youth into adulthood and not so much concerned with how parental background may shape residential trajectories. More generally, we know little about how and to what extent young people's residential trajectories are influenced by parental support in both financial and non-financial ways. Indeed, the role of intergenerational support has remained understudied across the broader range of gentrification studies as a whole. Especially in high-demand contexts where the housing stock affordable and accessible to young people is small, parental support may be of crucial importance for young people to realize their housing preferences and aspirations, reduce structural barriers and constraints, and minimise trade-offs between housing quality, location, tenure security and other factors. As such parental wealth and class background can play a key role in forging differentiated residential outcomes and, in doing so, sustain class differentiations across generations and space (Harvey 1985).

Parental background, support and young people's housing trajectories

Outside the gentrification literature, a substantial body of research investigates how parental support plays an important role in the ability of young people to leave the parental home, acquire housing, and the subsequent housing trajectories they may follow (Ermisch & Di Salvo 1997). The role of parental background and parental support has primarily been studied in relation to young people's ability to access homeownership, which can be enhanced by financial gifts by the parents. This can lead to an intergenerational transmission of homeownership: parents who are homeowners are generally better able to give financial support than those who are renters, since via homeownership they have generally accumulated housing equity (Helderman & Mulder 2007; Lyons & Simister 2000). Indeed, it was found (for The Netherlands) that gift giving (e.g. mortgage support) is substantially more common among home-owning parents than among renting parents, and, similarly, home-owning young adults are more likely to have received such a gift than their renting counterpart (Mulder & Smits 1999). Furthermore, Öst (2012) found that parental assets and the broader parental class affiliation – as for example expressed by parental education levels – influence tenure outcomes of young adults.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, levels of homeownership among young people have, notwithstanding local variations, generally dwindled across Europe (Lennartz et al. 2016) due to high unemployment rates and tightened mortgage lending criteria (McKee 2012). Financial support by

parents thus emerges as an increasingly important financial resource to access homeownership or assist in leaving the parental home altogether (Clapham et al. 2014). This widens the inequality between young people whose parents possess substantial (housing) equity and young people whose parents do not.

Some scholars have investigated the relationship between the parental neighbourhood and the type of neighbourhood young people move to after leaving the parental home. Van Ham and colleagues (2014) find evidence for the intergenerational reproduction of "neighbourhood poverty", which entails that young adults move into neighbourhoods that are in socio-economic terms similar to those they grew up in. Other studies highlight that the intergenerational reproduction of neighbourhood poverty takes places along ethnic lines. Young people with a non-native background are very likely to end up in poor neighbourhoods when they grew up in a neighbourhood with a similar status (Vartanian et al. 2007; Sharkey 2008; Van Ham et al. 2014).

Focusing specifically on the disruptive move of leaving the parental home, we contend that potential parental support (in both financial and non-financial ways), in combination with the spatiality of middle class reproductive strategies, can facilitate and trigger young people to move to gentrifying neighbourhoods.

Young people, parental support, and the neighbourhood

The influx of particular groups of young people can contribute to neighbourhood change, for example by advancing gentrification processes in some neighbourhoods while also shifting the gentrification frontier onwards. Smith and Holt (2007) argue that because higher-education enrolment among young people has substantially increased, the predominance of students in specific neighbourhoods is becoming a more wide-spread phenomenon. Furthermore, 'student life' – among which student accommodation and student-related facilities – has become increasingly commodified since private investors have recognized it as a profitable and continuously growing niche market (Chatterton 2010; Smith & Hubbard 2014). Renting out apartments to groups of students (or graduates) may be more profitable than renting to individual families. In addition, high mobility rates among young people allow landlords to readjust (i.e. increase) the rent to current market rates relatively frequently. Hence, despite their low incomes, young people may drive up housing prices in specific neighbourhoods – particularly in the private-rental sector – through home sharing, flexible living arrangements and high turnover rates (Van Criekingen 2010). Even when this does not lead to direct forms of displacement, exclusionary displacement is likely to become an ever more prominent issue (Marcuse 1986). Furthermore, building student housing can also serve as a governmental strategy to rejuvenate disadvantaged neighbourhoods and spark gentrification.

Taking parental background and parental wealth into the equation, the relationship between young people's residential trajectories and progressing gentrification becomes even more apparent. In the most direct sense, parents can buy up property in (up-coming) neighbourhoods both for their children to live in and as a financial investment strategy (cf. Paris (2009) on second

homes as an investment strategy contributing to gentrification). Other forms of financial parental support, e.g. to buy a home or to pay (part of) the rent, all essentially enhance the 'purchasing power' of young people on the housing market vis-à-vis other groups. Hence, wealth transmitted from one generation to the next may play a role in fuelling gentrification as it allows young people to outbid other households. Here, we find that parental capital essentially "urbanizes" as it flows from the parents to their children in the city (cf. Harvey 1985). Via this route, parental wealth can ultimately contribute to processes of direct and indirect exclusionary displacement (Marcuse 1986).

Data and methods

This chapter uses individual-level register data from the Social Statistics Database (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands. This database contains, for all individuals officially living in The Netherlands, information on various social, demographic and economic dimensions. We specifically look at individuals (aged 16 to 35) leaving the parental home (termed "fledglings") who were registered as a child in a household for at least three years[33], before forming an independent household in the following year. As an additional clause fledglings must change address when forming a new household. We analyse two waves of fledglings: those who made a start between 2009 and 2010, and those who did so between 2010 and 2011. For these fledglings their first year registered as an independent household is 2010 and 2011 respectively. We look at their neighbourhood outcomes for these specific years. These two "waves" are combined in the following analyses. To account for potential differences between the two years, we include a year variable in the regression analyses. After excluding those cases with missing values on any of the background variables (6%), the total number of fledglings making a start in Amsterdam during these two years stands at 19,571.

Through descriptive analyses and GIS mapping we highlight how the different residential outcomes of fledglings, in spatial terms, are stratified according to parental background (in terms of financial assets). Subsequently, we use multinomial logistic regression analyses to control for other variables potentially influencing neighbourhood outcomes[34].

Table 5.1 gives a descriptive overview of the variables included in the different models[35]. The parental-background variables are based on the year prior to nest-leaving (i.e. 2009 or 2010), while the individual variables are measured post nest-leaving (2010 or 2011). Included parental variables are the location of the parental home, the average real-estate value in the parental

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33.   That is, either the years 2007/2008/2009; or 2008/2009/2010.
34.   The neighbourhoods in our study follow the official definition by Statistics Netherlands and are predominantly delineated by natural boundaries, railways or major roads. Scarcely populated areas (<1000 residents, e.g. office parks, industrial areas) and neighbourhoods where less than ten fledglings move to (privacy regulations) are excluded. This leaves 78 neighbourhoods with a population between 1,000 and 25,000.
35.   The N reported in Table 5.1 and used in the regression analyses is lower than the 19,571 cases, due to the exclusion of those who live in student-only areas (N=1304, 6.7%).

neighbourhood and, most notably, parental assets (in percentile groups relative to the total Dutch population)[36]. We use assets instead of income, as assets give a more sophisticated insight into the various financial resources parents may draw upon to support their children. Hence, they are more indicative of the potential intergenerational transmission of wealth or poverty. At this point, it is important to stress that in this chapter we do not look at actual financial transfers taking place.

In this study we use average neighbourhood income (in 2004) and income change (between 2004 and 2011) as a proxy for neighbourhood status and gentrification[37]. This proxy is of course a simplification of the complex dynamics of gentrification. Yet, (changes in) other indicators (e.g. real-estate values, education levels) as well as other recent studies point, to a large extent, to the same neighbourhoods (Boterman & Van Gent 2014; Uitermark & Bosker 2014). Although income gains do not necessarily imply gentrification takes place, by and large, these changes at the neighbourhood level do signify gentrification in the case of Amsterdam (Teernstra 2014b). Furthermore, we only include centrally located inner-ring neighbourhoods in the gentrification categories[38]. To be sure, although gentrification tendencies can also be discerned in the outer ring, the process remains more pervasive in the inner ring, as the previous chapter has highlighted. This chapter uses a neighbourhood typology that is similar, but slightly different, to the one used in the previous chapter. The only difference is that apart from socio-economic status and grading patterns, this typology also takes into account centrality because this dimension plays an important role in the residential trade-offs of young people (Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015). The following four neighbourhood types are defined (see Figure 5.1): (1) low-status gentrifying neighbourhoods (income below the municipal average; increase above municipal levels), (2) high-status, centrally located gentrified areas (with a constantly above average income), (3) other low status neighbourhoods (downgrading, stable and/or peripheral), and (4) high status peripheral neighbourhoods. Finally, student-dominated neighbourhoods are separately defined and not included in the regression analyses.

36.   Information about parental income, tenure and housing value are available, but excluded from our analyses due to high levels of correlation with parental assets.
37.   Using gross individual income of all residents aged 24 to 65 as to exclude the majority of students, young adults living at home, and pensioners to gain a more realistic view of actual (changes in) neighbourhood status.
38.   Amsterdam North, physically detached from the rest of Amsterdam by the IJ river, is also considered an outer-ring borough.

Variable	Share	Mean		Share	Mean
Individual variables			Year (of first address)		
Household type			*2010*	47.9	
Single person	59,9		*2011*	52.1	
Couple without children	27.7				
Household with children	3.3		**Parental variables**		
Other household types	9.1		Parental assets (groups)		
			1st (low: 0-40%)	30.4	
Ethnic group			*2nd (middle 40-80%)*	34.7	
Native Dutch	64.9		*3rd (high 80-100%)*	34.9	
Non-Western non-native	25.6				
Western non-native	9.4		Real-estate value parental nbhd quintiles		
			1st (lowest)	20.8	
Personal income (quintiles)			*2nd*	20.0	
1st (lowest)	65.0		*3rd*	19.9	
2nd	10.6		*4th*	19.9	
3rd	10.1		*5th (highest)*	19.3	
4th	8.4				
5th (highest)	5.8		Location parental home		
			Same borough (as destination nbhd)	12.0	
Student (dummy)	65.9		*Amsterdam*	20.6	
Self-employed (dummy)	2.6		*Amsterdam region*	11.9	
			Rest of Netherlands	55.6	
Gender					
Male	47.0				
Female	53.0				
Age		22.9			

TABLE 5.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model (N=18,267).
Source: Social Statistics Database, own calculations.

FIGURE 5.1. Neighbourhood typology based on average income (2004) and grading (2004-2011) and inner/outer ring location (divided by the ring road). Source: Social Statistics Database; own calculations.

Results

General patterns

Figure 5.2 maps the share of fledglings as percentage of the total population moving into or within[39] Amsterdam's different neighbourhoods in 2010 and 2011. In most cases, fledglings make up a considerable share of the total number of residents moving to or within a given neighbourhood: about 5 to 11 percent (city average: 8%). Comparatively large numbers of fledglings can not only be found in student areas, but also in the (nineteenth-century) neighbourhoods west of the city centre. Although recently affected by gentrification these neighbourhoods are still relatively affordable, also due to the small average size of apartments[40]. Similarly, a large share of fledglings can also be found in some more mature gentrification neighbourhoods in

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39.   Changing address, but remaining in the same neighbourhood.

40.   In 2011, 60% of the dwellings in low-status gentrifying neighbourhoods were smaller than 60 square meters, compared to 37% in the entire city. Real-estate values were on average some 10% below the city average in these neighbourhoods (€223,000 versus €249,000 in 2011). Data provided by Amsterdam's Research and Statistics (O&S), and Statistics Netherlands (CBS).

the south. Affordability of these neighbourhoods has steadily declined over recent years as discussed in the previous chapter. However, proximity to the city centre, university locations and other facilities as well as their trendy reputation, make these neighbourhoods a popular destination for young people, while still cheaper than traditionally affluent areas. Conversely, a low share of fledglings can mainly be found in the outer-ring neighbourhoods (including the north), and the expensive high-status neighbourhoods in the centre or close to the centre. These patterns highlight that many fledglings acquire housing in Amsterdam's gentrifying neighbourhoods, despite decreasing levels of accessibility and affordability of those neighbourhoods.

FIGURE 5.2. Fledglings moving to or within a neighbourhood as percentage of the total movers (into or within) the neighbourhood (in 2010 and 2011). Source: Social Statistics Database; own calculations.

Table 5.2 shows how fledglings with different parental backgrounds – using parental assets to measure inequalities – move to different types of neighbourhoods. The parental assets are grouped in three percentile categories, based on their assets relative to that of *all* Dutch households (0-40th, 40-80th and 80-100th percentiles). It is noteworthy that relatively many fledglings have parents with large assets (35% of fledglings have parents belonging to the top 20% wealthiest Dutch households). This could partly be explained

by the fact that parental households generally represent mature households, where the parents have throughout already spent a considerable number of years on the labour market and have progressed in their life course. It is thus to be expected that this age group is comparatively wealthy. Also, the tight Amsterdam housing market may particularly be a barrier for home leaving for those younger people with relatively poor parents.

We find that the largest share of fledglings with parents in the highest asset quintile move to high-status gentrification neighbourhoods (42.1%), while many also move to low-status gentrification neighbourhoods (24.8%). Conversely, fledglings with asset-poor parents primarily move to other low-status non-gentrifying neighbourhoods (42.8%). Only a small portion of these fledglings move to high-status gentrified neighbourhoods (18.3%). Interestingly, we find that the percentage of fledglings moving to low-status gentrifying neighbourhoods is rather similar across asset groups. Still, fledglings with high-asset parents and – to a lesser extent – those with medium-asset parents are relatively overrepresented here (24.8% and 23% respectively), while those with low-asset parents are underrepresented (20.1%).

Neighbourhood type							
Parental assets in three groups	Low-status gentrifying	Central high status (gentrified)	Other low status	Peripheral high status	Student areas	Total %	Total N
1st (low 0-40%)	20.1	18.3	42.8	14.4	4.3	100	5800
2nd (middle 40 - 80%)	23.0	27.5	29.5	12.1	7.9	100	6877
3rd (high 80 -100%)	24.8	42.1	17.3	8.4	7.4	100	6894
All fledglings	22.8	29.9	29.2	11.5	6.7	100	19571
Total population (2011)*	20.8	28.5	30.8	18.0	2.0	100	778817

TABLE 5.2. The share (in %) of fledglings with different parental backgrounds (in terms of financial assets) moving to different neighbourhood types.Note: the neighbourhood types correspond to the neighbourhoods defined in Figure 5.1. Source: Social Statistics Database and O+S Amsterdam, own calculations. *This is not counting population living in excluded areas (see Figure 5.1).

Mapping spatial differences

By mapping the destination neighbourhoods of fledglings with different parental backgrounds, stark differences come to the fore. In Figure 3 we map the destination neighbourhoods of fledglings with low (lowest 40%), medium (40 to 80%) and high parental assets (top 20%). Figure 5.3a shows, per neighbourhood, what percentage of the total number of fledglings moving to or within the neighbourhood have parents with low assets. Here, we find that

these groups are overwhelmingly concentrated in the (post-war) Southeast (A in the map) and the post war extensions located in the city's western periphery ("New-West") (B), as well as in the North borough (C). Although substantial variations between neighbourhoods in these boroughs do exist, the outer-ring neighbourhoods are generally characterized by declining average incomes over the years (cf. Figure 5.1), as well as below-average real-estate values and income levels. Within the ring road fledglings with low asset parents are generally underrepresented, except for some neighbourhoods in the west and east, often not-yet or only very recently gentrifying .

The neighbourhood outcomes for fledglings with medium-asset parents are less marked, although some patterns and trends can be discerned (Figure 5.3b). These fledglings predominantly concentrate in gentrification frontiers to the east (e.g. Indische Buurt (D)) and gentrifying neighbourhoods west of the centre (e.g. Staatsliedenbuurt (E)). Interestingly, fledglings with middle-asset parents are underrepresented in the traditionally affluent boroughs in the centre and south of the city, as well as in the majority of neighbourhoods outside the ring road.

For fledglings with high-asset parents (Figure 5.3c) we find an almost inverted picture of those with low-asset parents. In the city's most popular and up-market neighbourhoods – the city centre's canal belt and the affluent Old South area (F)– this group is heavily overrepresented. Similarly, we find that around 50% of the fledglings moving to mature gentrified neighbourhoods (e.g. Jordaan (G), De Pijp (H)) have parents belonging to the highest quintile in terms of assets. These neighbourhoods are among Amsterdam's earliest and most established examples of gentrification and up to now continue to gentrify. Overall, these maps suggests clear links between parental background (in this case stratified in terms of assets) and destination neighbourhood. Since the majority have very modest incomes (Table 5.1), these outcomes suggest potential parental support can indeed be of great direct importance in shaping the neighbourhood outcomes of young people.

Modelling the relationship

We have estimated various multinomial logistic regression models to analyse if the relationship between parental background and (type of) destination neighbourhood type (cf. Figure 5.1) persists when controlling for various individual characteristics. Table 5.3 presents two models[41] estimating the likelihood of

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41.   We checked the robustness of our results by estimating different models (available from the authors), inter alia by:
  - using other parental variables including income, tenure (homeownership), and housing value;
  - altering the dependent variable (e.g. by imposing stricter neighbourhood definitions, or by using real-estate values as opposed/in addition to income levels).
Using these alternative dependent and independent variables did not substantially alter the direction, size, and significance of the reported effects. We also investigated subgroups of the total fledgling population: →

fledglings moving to low-status gentrifying neighbourhoods (models 1A and 2A), high-status central gentrified neighbourhoods (models 1B and 2B), or peripheral high-status neighbourhoods (models 1C and 2C) rather than moving to non-gentrifying low-status neighbourhoods (the base category). Given the focus of this chapter on gentrification neighbourhoods, the estimates for models 1C and 2C will not be discussed.

Model 1 includes only individual-level variables. Notably, model 1A indicates that the personal income of fledglings shows only a weak significant relation to the chance of moving to a low-status gentrification neighbourhood rather than other low-status neighbourhoods. Yet, fledglings' personal income is of greater importance in moving to high-status gentrification neighbourhoods (model 1B). Apart from income, models 1A and 1B report similar findings: Fledglings moving to (low-status or high-status) gentrification neighbourhoods are, compared to fledglings moving to low-status non-gentrifying neighbourhoods, more likely to be enrolled in higher education (student), self-employed, older, and female. Conversely, fledglings with children (both single-parent and dual-parent) are less likely to move to low-status or high-status gentrifying neighbourhoods as are fledglings with a non-western non-native.

Model 2 subsequently includes parental assets, the average real-estate value of the parental neighbourhood, and the location of the parental home. While parental assets indicate the extent to which parents may be able to directly provide financial support to their children (more so than parental income), the variable on parental neighbourhood status may also be indicative of broader class orientation and affiliation. Models 2A and 2B show that inclusion of the parental variables contribute to an improvement of the model fit (from 12% to 19%), while the effects of individuals' characteristics remain largely the same. Adding the parental variables does lead to a reduction of the importance of personal income as well as enrolment in higher education. Nevertheless, the models show that even when controlling for parental background and other personal variables, being a student is positively associated with moving to a low- or high-status gentrifying neighbourhood. Interestingly, these models demonstrate that fledglings with low-asset parents are significantly less likely to move to both low-status gentrifying and high-status gentrified neighbourhoods (compared to moving to other low-status neighbourhoods) than fledglings with parents belonging to the highest asset group.

FIGURE 5.3A. Fledglings with parents with low assets (percentiles 0-40) as share (%) of the total number of fledglings per neighbourhood (2010 and 2011). Source: Social Statistics Database; own calculations.

FIGURE 5.3B. Fledglings with parents with medium assets (percentiles 40-80) as share (%) of the total number of fledglings per neighbourhood (2010 and 2011). Source: Social Statistics Database; own calculations.

FIGURE 5.3C. Fledglings with parents with large assets (percentiles 80-100)), as share (%) of the total number of fledglings per neighbourhood (2010 and 2011). Source: Social Statistics Database; own calculations

Using predicted probabilities, Figure 5.4 visually illustrates the relationship between parental assets and destination neighbourhood, keeping all other variables included in model 2 constant. It shows that fledglings with high-asset parents are relatively more likely to move to both low-status gentrifying and high-status gentrified neighbourhoods, while for fledglings with low-asset parents there is a higher probability to move to other low-status neighbourhoods in particular. The predicted probabilities for fledglings with medium-asset parents fall in between the other two categories for all neighbourhood types.

Additionally, parental neighbourhood status (in terms of real-estate value) also poses a significant influence: Lower real-estate values (quintiles) show progressively lower odds ratios of moving to a (low- or high-status) gentrification neighbourhood. Finally, the location of the parental home returns some interesting results. Compared to fledglings who move in from outside Amsterdam, those fledglings who remain in the same borough after nest-leaving are significantly less likely to move to a low- or high-status gentrification neighbourhood. Yet, fledglings with parents living in Amsterdam (but in another borough) are significantly more likely to move to low-status gentrification neighbourhoods.

To be sure, although models 2A and 2B report similar estimates for parental-background variables, we find that – looking at the odds ratios and predicted probabilities – the influence of parental assets and parental neighbourhood status are substantially stronger on the likelihood of moving to a high-status gentrification neighbourhood (rather than to a non-gentrifying neighbourhood), than on moving to a low-status gentrification neighbourhood. In other words, parental background is of greater importance in facilitating the residential move to high-status gentrified neighbourhoods than to low-status gentrifying neighbourhoods.

FIGURE 5.4. Predicted probabilities for the effect of parental assets on destination neighbourhood type. Note: Based on the variables included in model 2 (see Table 5.3), average predicted probabilities estimated by computing the group means of individual predicted probabilities. Source: Social Statistics Database; own calculations.

TABLE 5.3. Multinomial logistic regression analyses (N=18,267). Dependent variable is destination neighbourhood (base category = "moves to other low status neighbourhoods"). Note: *p<0.05; **P<0.01; ***p<0.001. See footnote 41 for conducted robustness checks. Source: Social Statistics Database, own calculations. →

Individual variables	Model 1: individual variables						Model 2: individual and parental variables					
	Model 1A: Moves to low-status gentrifying		Model 1B: Moves to central high status		Model 1C: Moves to peripheral high status		Model 2A: Moves to low-status gentrifying		Model 2B: Moves to central high status		Model 2C: Moves to peripheral high status	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Household type (ref: single person household)												
Couple without children	.051	1.053	-.259	.772***	-.080	.923	.041	1.042	-.251	.778***	-.081	.922
Household with children	-.398	.671**	-.419	.657**	.230	1.259*	-.281	.755*	-.250	.779	.253	1.288*
Other household types	.239	1.269**	.196	1.216**	.035	1.035	.206	1.229**	.148	1.160*	.026	1.026
Ethnic group (ref: native Dutch)												
Non-Western non-native	-.913	.401***	-1.671	.188***	-.309	.734***	-.478	.620***	-1.038	.354***	-.155	.857*
Western non-native	-.099	.906	-.017	.983	-.023	.977	.003	1.003	.123	1.130	.021	1.021
Personal income quintiles (ref: 5th (highest))												
1st (lowest)	-.030	.971	-.426	.653***	-.592	.553***	.013	1.013	-.364	.695***	-.588	.555***
2nd	-.270	.764*	-.925	.396***	-.806	.447***	-.137	.872	-.735	.480***	-.791	.454***
3rd	-.232	.793*	-.685	.504***	-.493	.611***	-.110	.896	-.515	.598***	-.482	.617***
4th	-.318	.728**	-.829	.437***	-.318	.728**	-.225	.799	-.691	.501***	-.305	.737*
Age	.055	1.057***	.020	1.020*	-.004	.996	.051	1.053***	.016	1.017*	-.007	.993
Student (ref: no student)	.330	1.391***	.362	1.437***	-.150	.860*	.154	1.167*	.136	1.146*	-.190	.827**
Self-employed (ref: not self-employed)	.302	1.353*	.384	1.469**	-.034	.966	.207	1.229	.243	1.275	-.083	.920
Female (ref: male)	.116	1.123**	.141	1.151***	.042	1.043	.128	1.136**	.169	1.184***	.048	1.049
Fledgling in 2011 (ref: in 2010)	-.135	.874**	-.140	.869***	-.172	.842**	-.139	.870**	-.138	.871**	-.176	.839***

Parental variables										
Parental assets in 3 groups (Ref= High 3rd, 80-100%)										
Low (1st 0-40%)					-.425	.654***	-.636	.528***	-.249	.779*
Middle (2nd 40-80%)					-.313	.731***	-.478	.620***	-.120	.887
Real-estate value parental neighbourhood in quintiles (ref: 5th (highest))										
1st (lowest)					-1.020	.360***	-1.528	.217***	-.205	.815*
2nd					-.677	.508***	-1.068	.344***	-.124	.883
3rd					-.490	.613***	-.759	.468***	-.043	.958
4th					-.313	.731***	-.563	.570***	.028	1.028
Location parental home (ref: rest of Netherlands)										
Same borough (as destination neighbourhood)					-.906	.404***	-.499	.607***	.192	1.211*
Amsterdam					.192	1.212**	.093	1.098	-.119	.888
Amsterdam region					.055	1.057	.031	1.032	.088	1.092
Intercept	-1.366	***	.290	-.017	-.512	*	1.436	***	.229	
-2 log likelihood	16153.649				33775.089					
Likelihood Ratio Chi²	2100.29***				3477.60***					
Df	42				69					
Nagelkerke Pseudo R²	.117				.186					

Discussion

This chapter has addressed how young people leaving the parental home move to specific neighbourhoods in Amsterdam. Particularly, we show how fledglings disproportionally locate in both low-status gentrifying and high-status gentrified neighbourhoods, despite their generally very modest incomes. This suggests that fledglings may be able to realise or approach their housing preference, at least in terms of destination neighbourhood, possibly because they are willing to accept lower quality housing and prioritise location over other preferences.

More specifically, this chapter has highlighted the important role parental background, especially parental wealth, plays in determining the housing opportunities and destination neighbourhoods of young people. Simply put, this chapter has shown that after controlling for individual characteristics fledglings with wealthy parents are more than twice as likely to move to high-status gentrified neighbourhoods than those with low-asset parents. Fledglings with low-asset parents disproportionally locate in the city's outer ring neighbourhoods; more than twice as often as fledglings with high-asset parents . Hence, parental background does seem to allow young people to minimise constraints and make a start in popular inner-ring neighbourhoods. In this regard, two points deserve specific attention. These points focus on differences in individual residential trajectories and on processes of neighbourhood change respectively.

First, the relationship between parental background and destination neighbourhood can be established in various ways. Parents may give direct financial support to their children to buy a home, pay the monthly rent, or pay other housing-related expenses. However, parental assets and parental neighbourhood status are also closely related to other dimensions of social class. Middle-class parents are also more likely to provide their children with specific non-financial resources, such as for example social networks or knowledge of the housing market (Boterman 2012b). Furthermore, housing preferences, the choices for particular types of housing, tenure and residential environment, are affected by historical experiences in the parental home and residential environment. Parents do not just support their children directly via economic transfers or by brokering housing, they have also passed on various forms of cultural capital to their offspring. This is not solely related to taste or aesthetic dispositions (Smith & Holt 2007), it may also be forms of symbolic capital that are related to urban space itself (Boterman 2012a). Parental wealth may allow young people to make a start in now expensive gentrified neighbourhoods and in doing so reproduce this particular 'urban experience'. After moving in, the stay in a gentrification neighbourhood may further enhance the residential preferences and contribute to the formation of the middle class habitus of these "apprentice gentrifiers" (Smith & Holt 2007). Here, it is important to also consider structural factors including the provision of specific forms of housing. The supply of student housing can play a role in exacerbating inequalities between young people. It eases the often middle-class student trajectories out of the parental home while effectively excluding non-student trajectories. On the other hand, student housing can

dampen housing-market inequalities between students, since (in the Dutch context) it mostly consists of relatively affordable apartments and rooms, reducing the need for parental support.

Ultimately, differences in parental (class) background contribute to inequalities that are expressed in urban space; for example via the exclusion of fledglings with parents with a working class background by fledglings with wealthy parents. While the latter group is then able to realize or approach their housing preferences, the former group is disproportionally confined to housing in lower-status neighbourhoods or may not be able to leave the parental home at all. Differentiated access to housing and space is then reproduced across generations as parental wealth and support can effectively reduce constraints and enhance mobility chances in terms of education, labour market but also space (Harvey 1985). This corresponds with findings from Van Ham and colleagues (2014) who demonstrate that parental neighbourhood background plays an important role in shaping and reproducing spatial opportunities of young people. While we found a clear effect of parental asset background, we also confirm the independent effect of neighbourhood background. This is not to imply any deterministic relationship between residential neighbourhood and life chances. Neighbourhoods are not homogeneous and may mean different things to different people in different stages of their lives (Pratt & Hanson 1988). The intergenerational reproduction of neighbourhood status should in our opinion be explained by broader perspectives on residential trajectories over the life course and the role of space and neighbourhood in social reproduction. Gentrification as a spatial strategy in the reproduction of the middle classes, is one of the key residential trajectories that connect intergenerational transfers of economic, social and various forms of cultural capital to neighbourhood choice.

We suggest that a second, related, finding is the potential effect of individual trajectories on processes of neighbourhood change. The findings of this chapter touch upon the importance of parental wealth and background in specific forms and expressions of gentrification. In this regard, it is relevant to link our findings to previous studies on marginal gentrification. In these studies, marginal gentrifiers are conceptualised as young, low-income but upwardly-mobile residents moving to gentrifying neighbourhoods as a spatial strategy to negotiate between the preferences and benefits of central-city living on the one hand, and keeping housing costs down on the other (Rose 1984; Rérat 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003). In doing so, they ultimately contribute to rising rent levels and subsequent processes of (indirect) displacement (Van Criekingen 2010).

However, in addition, this chapter shows that many fledglings have parents who possess, compared to the Dutch average, large amounts of wealth. Although this does not necessarily imply intergenerational financial support, it does suggest parental support is of substantial importance. Hence, we pose that these fledglings should not only be considered low-income, upwardly-mobile marginal gentrifiers, but also the *potential* carriers of additional wealth into these neighbourhoods. For example, intergenerational wealth transfers can allow fledglings to pay otherwise unaffordable rents or may even be part

of (parental) investment strategies in housing in gentrifying areas where returns may be relatively high. We expect that such potential parental support may also be important for other groups of marginal gentrifiers, such as young university graduates (who have already left the parental home). Via these ways, parental wealth could effectively be put to use to outbid other households and household types, contributing to their exclusion or displacement – ultimately advancing the gentrification process by bringing more money into these neighbourhoods. These patterns can be amplified by investors who recognise the opportunity of providing housing aimed at young people backed by parental financial support (cf. Chatterton 2010)

Given the growing importance of parental support in facilitating young people's housing opportunities in a range of contexts, it is imperative for gentrification scholars to take this form of wealth into account as a useful additional capital form to acquire housing in gentrifying neighbourhoods. From an international perspective Amsterdam is not unique in the sense that housing market accessibility and affordability have decreased and parental wealth is becoming of growing importance to make a start on the housing market or acquire secure housing later on (McKee 2012; Clapham et al. 2014). Particularly in major (capital) cities that are increasingly popular, London being a prime example, it is likely that parental wealth will become more important in facilitating young in-movers to outbid other households and thus contribute to the direct or indirect displacement of various other residential groups despite their potentially modest incomes. This ultimately facilitates further gentrification.

Further research should investigate the extent to which actual intergenerational wealth transfers contribute to gentrification processes, potentially as a dimension of parental financial investment strategies. Also, qualitative studies can potentially find explicit evidence of an intergenerational transmission of the gentrification aesthetic – the preference for specific old, diverse inner city neighbourhoods. Extending beyond gentrification research it would be useful to more fully investigate intra-generational inequalities emerging between young people on the basis of other factors than parental background following decreasing housing access. Overall, by linking intergenerational inequalities to gentrification research, this chapter has shown how and to what extent these inequalities are reshaped in the neighbourhood outcomes of fledglings. Moreover, in doing so, we have made a first step in analysing how gentrification may also be influenced by the inflow of "intergenerational" capital (parental wealth) rather than solely those forms of capital possessed by in-moving residents themselves.

CHAPTER 6 — Growing generational divides and the post-crisis rise of rental gentrification

Abstract

Following the global financial crisis, the housing position of younger adults has worsened and intergenerational divides are growing. Drawing on the case of Amsterdam, this chapter develops the argument that these shifts have a profound impact on gentrification processes, not in the least because young adults are generally ascribed a key role in them. However, rather than gentrification retrenching, accentuated intergenerational inequalities are involved in producing different coexisting tenure-specific forms of gentrification. Older generations of residents are increasingly often the purchasers of gentrified property, whereas younger generations have become more entangled in rental gentrification, as a consequence of their changing housing position, labour-market insecurities, and transitory life-course arrangements. Rental housing segments previously left untouched have consequently come to be in the crosshairs of states and investors seeking to accelerate gentrification. While homeownership gentrification particularly expands in the city's gentrification frontiers, rental gentrification expands in high-status neighbourhoods where the owner-occupied stock is largely gentrified already. With the advance of both rental and homeownership gentrification, issues of housing affordability and accessibility become more pressing.

Introduction

The 2008 global financial crisis and housing-market restructuring have had a deep impact on the housing position of different population groups. Particularly younger adults find it increasingly difficult to gain access to owner occupancy, or find secure independent housing at all (Forrest & Hirayama 2009, 2015; McKee 2012; Hoolachan et al. 2016; Clapham et al. 2014; Lennartz et al. 2016). Although young adults on low incomes and from modest family backgrounds are hit worst, higher-educated and upwardly-mobile young adults also face increasing insecurities (Moos 2015; Arundel 2017). This may have a profound impact on gentrification processes, because these young adults are generally assumed to play a key role in driving gentrification processes, especially in the process' earlier and more marginal stages (Ley 1996; Rose 1984).

How does gentrification evolve under these changing conditions? Without pretending to give a complete set of structural and material explanations this chapter focuses on two key interrelated aspects. First, rental housing may become more important in driving gentrification processes. Rental housing is particularly associated with facilitating particular marginal or early forms of gentrification, or with specific urban contexts (Rose 1984; Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003). However, when gentrification advances in a neighbourhood homeownership rates will typically increase. Forms of "rental gentrification" are not assumed to increase at the cost of "homeownership gentrification". But as access to homeownership is decreasing for various

population groups, especially young people, rental housing may come to play a more prominent part in gentrification processes (Paccoud 2015).

This does not mean homeownership gentrification is necessarily a thing of the past though. Instead, and this is the second aspect, homeownership gentrification may increasingly be geared towards serving those 'prime' households that are still able to access mortgage credit and purchase (Forrest & Hirayama 2015; Aalbers & Christophers 2014). This may leave behind households unable to buy at a premium who do not meet the stricter mortgage criteria. Among them is a growing group of young upwardly-mobile households (Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015), whose specific life-course trajectories are associated with gentrification (Rérat 2012). As they increasingly have to rely on rental housing, they may contribute to gentrification in this sector despite otherwise potentially insecure housing or labour prospects (Van Criekingen 2010). Different tenure-specific forms of gentrification – homeownership gentrification and rental gentrification – may thus exist alongside each other and serve different strands of the middle-class population. That is, homeownership gentrification may become more and more associated with high-status 'prime' households, while other groups of gentrifiers may become more dependent on rental housing. Intergenerational inequalities may be of crucial importance here as older generations with a high income, fixed contract, and accumulated housing wealth increasingly exclude younger generations.

I first investigate whether and to what extent rental gentrification has indeed become more important during recent years, a period shaped by the global financial crisis. I then unravel where rental gentrification takes place, and whether specific population groups have become increasingly associated with the process. I pay particular attention to generational divides, and related household and employment situation. These topics are discussed within the context of Amsterdam – a highly relevant case to investigate gentrification processes in relation to tenure restructuring because of the city's housing structure. Since the onset of the global financial crisis the city's private-rental sector has experienced a remarkable growth after years of decline. This revival conforms to trends in other countries, most notably in the UK (Pattison 2016). In contrast to the UK trajectory, homeownership has also continued to grow in Amsterdam during this period. At first glance this gives reason to expect that gentrification in Amsterdam's post-2008 landscape occurs through both rent and homeownership. I draw on longitudinal register data for the period 2006-2014 to tease out the linkages between different tenures, population groups, and gentrification processes.

Literature
Expanding homeownership, constrained access
Although gentrification is not necessarily linked to a specific housing tenure, in many urban contexts, the process' progress has been closely linked to expanding homeownership. For many decades states have actively promoted homeownership as part of a social project (Forrest & Hirayama 2015; Ronald 2008). Expanding mortgage credit availability and lenient lending practices

set the scene for rapidly expanding homeownership during previous decades (Doling & Elsinga 2012). It enabled many households to access homeownership where this previously was out of reach. Many of those who bought under favourable circumstances were subsequently able to benefit from rising property values making windfall gains (Forrest & Hirayama 2015). Although these policies are mostly a national affair, they also have specific urban dimensions. For instance, in a study of New York in the 1990s Wyly and Hammel (1999) note that urban areas and especially gentrifying neighbourhoods saw above average increases in invested mortgage capital, fuelled by transformations in housing-finance systems. Expanding mortgage credit was crucial for ever more neighbourhoods to fall under the sway of gentrification: easier access to cheap mortgage capital means it becomes more profitable to invest in, and speculate on, low-status neighbourhoods previously considered too risky for investment (Wyly & Hammel 1999). This goes for both owner occupiers and landlords. Especially relatively well-off households stand to benefit from these shifts because they can generally access credit under the best terms (Hamnett 1999; Walks 2016).

However, the push of homeownership and mortgage-credit expansion have also contributed to long-term house price booms in many (Western) countries (but importantly also set the scene for the subprime mortgage crisis). Housing has come to play an increasingly crucial role in the wider political economy of contemporary capitalism, and has become more integrated in global and financialized capital markets (Aalbers 2008; Schwartz & Seabrooke 2008; Aalbers & Christophers 2014). The financialization of housing and the expansion of mortgage credit availability ultimately did not so much increase accessibility, but rather contributed to long-term price increases, stronger booms and busts, and decreasing affordability. Lenient lending practices, low interest rates, and state support drew in wealthy households and investors who channelled their capital into housing, often as a means of speculation (Lees et al. 2008: 179-181) and linked to over accumulation in other capital circuits (Harvey 1985).

House-price increases outpacing income increases have made it especially more difficult and burdensome for prospective first-time buyers to buy (Forrest & Yip 2012; McKee 2012). Labour-market flexibilization has particularly affected young people who increasingly depend on temporary employment contracts, further impeding access to homeownership (Aassve et al. 2013; Lersch & Dewilde 2015; Arundel 2017). The global financial crisis has amplified these already existing trends of decreasing affordability and accessibility of homeownership for younger households. Generational divides are forged between older generations of homeowners who were able to benefit from rising prices, and struggling younger households (Forrest & Hirayama 2009). Across countries this has led to a declining share of homeowners among young generations (Lennartz et al. 2016), and in a range of countries – including the UK and US – the *overall* homeownership rate has shown a marked drop since the crisis (Beswick et al. 2016). Especially in tight urban housing markets this does not only change the housing position and opportunities of those belonging to the lower classes, but also of those

who belong to the middle classes or are upwardly mobile. The now common urban middle-class residential trajectory – moving to the city for education and staying there post-graduation (see Smith & Holt 2007; Rérat 2012) – closely associated with gentrification – may therefore become increasingly strenuous to follow. Nevertheless, in many cases they may still envision to pursue middle-class trajectory. For those households moving into rent instead of homeownership may be part of a range of trade-offs in order to be able to live in a gentrifying neighbourhood where price increases have rendered homeownership out of reach (Butler et al. 2008).

Rent and gentrification

If gentrification processes are to accommodate this growing group of potential gentrifiers, rental housing may play a key role. However, rental housing has long been associated with driving particular forms of gentrification as well as. Most specifically rent may play a particularly prominent role in marginal and early expressions of gentrification. These incipient forms of gentrification are typically associated with young, upwardly-mobile households who do not yet have sufficient economic capital to buy (Rose 1984; Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003). These may for instance include students or recent graduates in flexible household arrangements in the years prior to settling down (Smith & Holt 2007; Buzar et al. 2005).

Apart from driving marginal forms of gentrification, rental housing also plays a particularly important role in gentrification processes in specific urban contexts. In major cities like New York rent levels in certain neighbourhoods may reach heights only affordable to the highest earners, contributing to processes of super gentrification (Butler & Lees 2006). In other cities like Berlin rental housing dominates the city and is therefore the default option for many gentrifiers, also when the process is in a more mature phase (Holm 2011). Nevertheless, even in these contexts progressing or advanced neighbourhood gentrification often goes hand in hand with expanding rates of homeownership (cf. Marquardt et al. 2013; Van Criekingen 2010; Wyly & Hammel 1999). Although homeownership does not necessarily have to expand – gentrification can progress within the rental sector through rent increases and population turnover – progressing gentrification would typically not be associated with decreasing levels of homeownership and an expanding rental segment. Especially in urban housing contexts where the rental sector is large and highly regulated, expanding the share of homeownership at the cost of rent likely continues to be an important way through which gentrification can progress (Van Gent 2013). An integral part of many state efforts to push gentrification is altering the tenure composition of targeted neighbourhoods by promoting homeownership, often under the pretext of "social mixing" (Bridge et al. 2012; Uitermark et al. 2007). However, decreasing access to homeownership among specific middle-class groups may prompt states to adapt their policies. They may for instance develop new gentrification strategies to accommodate the struggling middle-class fractions, or focus on different middle-class fractions still able to buy.

Expanding rental gentrification

So, while rental housing may play a key role in gentrification processes, the tenure is generally not expected to expand in gentrifying neighbourhoods. However, rental housing has in recent years come to take on a more important role in the investment strategies of a 'new asset class' (Fields & Uffer 2016; Fields 2015) This concerns both small-time landlords – individuals owning a small number of rental properties – and large investors (Leyson & French 2009; Ronald & Kadi 2016; Beswick et al. 2016). Investment in rental housing has become more lucrative for a range of reasons. Interest rates are low and market-oriented regulatory reforms of the sector effectively remove barriers for investment (Fields & Uffer 2016; Kadi & Ronald 2016; Wyly et al. 2010, also see Harloe 1995). As a consequence capital can now wash into the rental market more easily. In various contexts the state promotes the private-rental sector, as is evidenced by examples of buy-to-let policies in the UK (Kennett et al. 2013) and the Dutch state supporting private investment in market-rate rental housing (Jonkman & Janssen-Jansen 2015). Investors and landlords also respond to the rapidly increasing demand from middle-class households unable to buy a home (Kemp 2015; Pattison 2016). I argue these developments have prompted the rise of new and more prominent forms of rental gentrification (also Paccoud 2015). Contrasting more marginal forms of rental gentrification (Van Criekingen 2010), new mutations of rental gentrification may rather operate in higher segments – guided by speculative and profit-making motives (Paccoud 2015; Fields & Uffer 2016).

This does not mean the new tenants are by definition in a strong or secure socio-economic position though. Even when they are upwardly mobile or already relatively high earners, they may be in an insecure employment situation: the trend towards employment flexibilization has also impacted higher-income persons. Nevertheless, rental gentrification may have particularly strong effects on low-income households (Van Criekingen 2010). Generally speaking security of tenure is lowest and semi-illegal housing arrangements most common in the private-rental sector. Low-income tenants in this sector are therefore particularly vulnerable to direct displacement, but also new tenants often have to settle for short-term and insecure tenancies. Given the tight rental market in many contexts, investing parties are in a relatively powerful position to lobby for the further erosion of tenant rights (Fields & Uffer 2016). Even in the Dutch context, where tenant rights are well enshrined, the current trend is one of flexibilization, for example by allowing short-term tenancies where indefinite contracts used to be the standard (Huisman 2016).

An increase in rental gentrification does not necessarily entail the end of gentrification through homeownership though. Homeownership gentrification may continue via various ways of tenure restructuring including tenure conversions from social rent to owner occupation (Boterman & Van Gent 2014; Andersson & Turner 2014), urban renewal projects (Uitermark et al. 2007), and high-end new-build developments (Davidson & Lees 2005). Instead, rental gentrification and homeownership gentrification may coexist and supplement each other. Different segments of the rental stock may simultaneously be sold off and de-regulated (as described in chapter 2). In those

cases homeownership and rental gentrification are likely to cater to different population groups. Divides between these tenure-specific forms of gentrification may increasingly run along generational lines, reflecting disparities in housing and labour-market position (see Forrest & Hirayama 2015).

Amsterdam's housing context

Amsterdam's history of providing decent and affordable social-rental housing to a large segment of its population is often rehearsed. The same goes for developments since the 1990s that saw a turn towards policies promoting homeownership and gentrification on the one hand, and the gradual decline of the social-rental sector owned by housing associations on the other (Uitermark 2009; Van Gent 2013)[42]. Relatedly, gentrification processes have swept through most of the city's inner neighbourhoods as a consequence of local state policies as well as the city's strong economic position. Expanding homeownership and gentrification are closely connected, most evidently through the sale of social-rental housing in gentrifying neighbourhoods (see chapter 2).

A more recent and less often highlighted development is the revival of the city's private-rental sector, reversing a long-term trend of decline. Long waiting times for social-rental housing, owned by housing associations, and high purchase prices, have led to a policy shift to both private-rental and rent-liberalized housing[43]. Given the absence of maximum income criteria as well as mortgage-lending criteria, the rent-liberalized sector is considered vital to enhance the housing opportunities of middle-income groups as well as upwardly-mobile residents. Private landlords are considered important partners to expand this sector, and the post crisis years have seen a return to growth of the private-rental sector[44]. Although a large share of the private-rental sector is still rent regulated, the current growth of private rent is accompanied by a swift increase in rent-liberalized dwellings: in 2015 39% of the private-rental sector was "rent liberalized", while this was just 21% in

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42. The social-rental sector owned by housing associations has decreased from 200,874 dwellings in 2000 (54%) to 181,882 in 2014 (46%). The owner-occupied sector has shown an increase from 54,881 dwellings (15%) to 113,694 (29%) during the same period (data provided by OIS Amsterdam).

43. Private rent and rent liberalized refer to two different aspects and partially overlap. Private rent refers to ownership by private landlords, the alternative being social rent owned by not-for-profit housing associations. For all rental dwellings, regardless of ownership, a point system exists to calculate the maximum rent (taking into account various measures of quality). If a dwelling "scores" enough points rent levels can be freely determined ("rent liberalized"). The threshold for liberalization stands at a monthly rent of roughly €700 (subject to yearly incremental changes). All dwellings scoring below this threshold are rent regulated (with rents below €700). Crucially, while maximum income criteria for new tenants apply in the regulated sector (only households earning less than €35,000 are eligible) this is not the case in the liberalized segment allowing higher-income households to move in.

44. Private rent decreased from 113,495 dwellings in 2000 (31%) to 91,760 in 2008(24%)), but has since then grown again (102,989 in 2014 (26%))(data provided by OIS Amsterdam).

2007 and 9% in 1999[45]. Furthermore, also the social-rental stock owned by housing associated is increasingly subject to liberalization. This entails that previously rent-regulated dwellings reserved for lower-income groups are transferred to the free-market sector. These dwellings remain in the hands of housing associations but come to house higher-income groups. While still comparatively marginal, the number of rent-liberalized dwellings owned by associations shows rapid growth: from 3,680 dwellings in 2008 to 14,053 dwellings in 2015 (AFWC 2016).

Data and methods

The next sections investigate whether new forms of rental gentrification are on the rise in Amsterdam, and whether these have come to replace or supplement gentrification through homeownership. To do so, I analyse whether the post-move housing outcomes of potential gentrifiers have changed between 2006 and 2014. The choice for this time period is guided by data availability regarding housing characteristics, but this crisis period also saw the revival of private rent and the acceleration of rent liberalization. I use longitudinal register data from the Dutch Social Statistics Database to construct a database covering the entire Amsterdam population. The analyses focus on the household level, because this gives a better indication of housing-market position than the individual level. Equivalized income in five quintile groups relative to the total Dutch household population is used to determine socio-economic position. Households in the bottom quintile (q1) are among the 20% poorest of all Dutch households, and households in the top quintile (q5) belong to the 20% richest. Because this chapter focuses on potential gentrifiers, the empirical analyses focus on top 20% households[46]. Bear in mind that belonging to the top 20% does not necessarily indicate stability of income (e.g. fixed contract) and especially for single-person households a high equivalized income may not be matched by a similarly high gross income.

As highlighted in the sections above, age and life course figure prominently in the analyses. The age of the oldest household member is used to determine the household age and delineate age groups. Households where no members are 25 years or older are left out of the analyses as to exclude student households where income does not align with social status or class. This chapter primarily focuses on the housing situation and housing outcomes of recent movers because they are the ones most directly confronted with current housing-market conditions. A household is defined as moving if *all* members aged 25 or older have moved to their current address at any point during the last three years. The post-move address is used to assess housing

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45. Data from the municipal WiA (Living in Amsterdam) survey, (provided by OIS Amsterdam, available on request from the author).

46. The analyses have been run for all income groups. The trends remain roughly the same when looking at the top 40% or top 30% rather than the top 20%. Available from the author on request.

outcomes in terms of tenure – homeownership or rent[47] – and real-estate value. Housing tenure is unknown for 4.8% of the addresses in 2006 and 1.6% in 2014. This has an effect on absolute changes (increases are slightly overestimated), and therefore represents a caveat in this study. A comparison with aggregate housing data from other sources reveals no particular bias in missing values though, and additional analyses to check reliability of the results have been run. Missing values are therefore unlikely to substantially impact relative changes. Location of the destination dwellings is taken into account by mapping changing moving patterns. The impact of moving patterns and destination tenure on neighbourhood population change is subsequently assessed using a neighbourhood typology with five categories: (1) the central city and affluent Old South neighbourhoods; (2) neighbourhoods constructed between 1800 and 1920; (3) neighbourhoods constructed between 1920 and 1940; (4) post-war neighbourhoods in the urban periphery; and (5) new-build neighbourhoods (developed post 1990) and low-density rural areas. The central/affluent south category represent traditionally high-status neighbourhoods with high prices. The 1800-1920 and 1920-1940 are two belts surrounding the central city, and are traditionally low status and working class. These are now the sites where gentrification concentrates. The post-war neighbourhoods in the urban periphery are, in contrast, subject to downgrading hosting an increasing share of lower-income households. The new build and rural areas are generally located in the city's outskirts and are relatively high status with large shares of spacious owner-occupied family dwellings. See chapter 2 (especially Figure 2.1) for a more elaborate description of these five categories.

Multinomial logistic regression models are estimated to gauge how and to what extent these household characteristics relate to specific tenure outcomes. The model distinguishes between four housing outcomes (the dependent variable of the models) rather than six by combining the low and average real-estate categories. Descriptive analyses show that patterns for the tenures with low and average real-estate values are rather similar. Bringing down the number of categories helps to reduce complexity and enhance interpretability. Although the analyses focus on the household level, the various individual-level characteristics used in the model are either based on the oldest or highest-earning household member (indicated in the tables).

Empirical analyses

Before turning to different tenure-specific forms of gentrification and the involvement of different age groups, it is interesting to note how the socio-economic composition of Amsterdam's population has changed between 2006 and 2014. The share of high-income households (top quintile) showed an overall increase from 20.6% to 22.2% in Amsterdam while the share of low-income households remained rather stable around 27% (Figure 6.1). Overall, the Amsterdam population composition shows a rather polarized

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47.   It is impossible to further distinguish between social and private rent, or liberalized and regulated rent. Because we focus on high-income households, in most cases rental dwellings will be private rent and/or rent liberalized..

structure in terms of income. There are various interesting age dynamics underlying these aggregate patterns. Notably, only for those aged 35 to 44 the share of low-income households showed a substantial decrease (from 29.4% to 25.8%). This age group also saw the strongest increase in high incomes (q5 went from 23.9% to 29.2%). Opposite trends can be found for the age group 55-64 year old with the share of households belonging to the poorest quintile increasing and of those belonging to the top quintile decreasing. For the age group 45-54 year olds both the top and bottom quintile increased in relative size.


FIGURE 6.1. The socio-economic composition of Amsterdam households in 2006 and 2014 per age group. Note: age group defined on the basis of oldest household member; quintiles based on equivalized household income.

High-income households' destination tenures

To gain a better sense of gentrification processes in different tenures the following analyses will specifically zoom in on high-income (top quintile) households that have moved to their current address during the last three years. Looking at their destination address (Table 6.1) it shows that more than half of the "top 20%" households move into a rental dwelling. It should be considered though that in 2014 71% of Amsterdam's total stock was rental, high-income households are thus, as may be expected, relatively likely to be homeowners. However, between 2006 and 2014 the share of high-income households moving into rent increased from 55.5% in 2006 to 57.6% in 2014. To understand this shift it is crucial to unravel the underlying age dynamics at work. Contrasting the overarching trend, older age groups (45+) increasingly move into homeownership during this period. The shift towards rent is thus caused by younger households, and is most visible among the large group of

Tenure →		Owner occupied				Rental				Total	
Real-estate value →		Low	Mid	High	*Total*	Low	Mid	High	*Total*	%	N
25-34	2006	11.7	10.3	18.1	*40.0*	21.1	14.0	24.9	*60.0*	100	8129
	2014	11.7	7.5	13.9	*33.1*	22.6	16.6	27.6	*66.9*	100	10214
	Change	**+0.0**	**-2.7**	**-4.2**	*-6.9*	**+1.5**	**+2.6**	**+2.7**	*+6.9*	0	**+2085**
35-44	2006	6.7	8.2	36.1	*51.0*	10.8	8.7	29.5	*49.0*	100	5887
	2014	10.1	7.2	32.5	*49.8*	11.6	8.5	30.1	*50.2*	100	6335
	Change	**+3.4**	**-0.9**	**-3.7**	*-1.2*	**+0.8**	**-0.2**	**+0.6**	*+1.2*	0	**+448**
45-54	2006	5.0	6.0	36.5	*47.4*	13.7	9.2	29.7	*52.6*	100	2115
	2014	10.3	5.8	37.4	*53.5*	11.1	6.7	28.6	*46.5*	100	2540
	Change	**+5.3**	**-0.2**	**+1.0**	*+6.1*	**-2.5**	**-2.5**	**-1.1**	*-6.1*	0	**+425**
55-64	2006	4.8	5.6	33.4	*43.8*	14.1	10.6	31.5	*56.2*	100	1176
	2014	9.5	5.1	37.8	*52.4*	12.6	7.4	27.6	*47.6*	100	1265
	Change	**+4.7**	**-0.5**	**+4.4**	*+8.6*	**-1.5**	**-3.3**	**-3.9**	*-8.6*	0	**+89**
65+	2006	2.3	3.1	29.3	*34.7*	20.2	10.8	34.4	*65.3*	100	649
	2014	11.5	3.1	35.4	*50.0*	16.7	6.8	26.4	*50.0*	100	836
	Change	**+9.2**	**+0.0**	**+6.1**	*+15.3*	**-3.4**	**-4.0**	**-7.9**	*-15.3*	0	**+187**
Total	2006	8.4	8.5	27.6	*44.5*	16.4	11.3	27.8	*55.5*	100	17956
	2014	10.9	6.9	24.5	*42.4*	17.1	12.1	28.4	*57.6*	100	21190
	Change	**+2.5**	**-1.6**	**-3.0**	*-2.2*	**+0.8**	**+0.7**	**+0.7**	*2.2*	0	**+3234**

TABLE 6.1. Post-move destination of households belonging to the top income quintile in 2006 and 2014. Tenure and real-estate values of the destination dwelling combined. Note: (1) Low real-estate values are at least 10% below the city average; High real-estate values at least 10% above city average. The city averages are €205,000 for 2006; and €235,000 for 2014 (source: OIS Amsterdam). (2) Dark shades mark the strongest percentage point increase per group, light shades the strongest decrease.

25 to 34 year olds, where the share of households renting increased from 60% to 66.9%. These shifts seem to confirm that while affluent older age cohorts are able to successfully operate on the owner-occupied market, younger age groups find it increasingly difficult to enter into homeownership (see McKee 2012; Forrest & Hirayama 2015). This also goes for those on a relatively high income. When also taking into account the destination dwellings' real-estate values, it shows that for 25-34 year old high-income households especially access to relatively expensive owner-occupied dwellings decreased (-4.2 percentage points). Access to relatively inexpensive homeownership remained stable at 11.7%. Their shift towards rent is especially notable for rental dwellings with high real-estate values (+2.7 pp). Thus among young high-income households we see a dominant trend where entry into expensive

homeownership is replaced with entry into expensive rent. A possible explanation could be that although these households are still able to spend relatively much on housing, they struggle to meet stringent mortgage-lending criteria. The choice for renting may also be part of trade-offs especially younger households make in order to acquire housing in the central or gentrifying parts of the city where buying is too expensive. Although high real-estate values do not necessarily translate into high rents, there is likely to be a strong relationship between the two especially among recent movers. For the older age groups rather different trends come to the fore. Although we can also discern a slight shift from homeownership towards rent among 35-44 year old households, the dominant trend for this age group is a shift towards relatively inexpensive homeownership (+3.4 pp). In contrast, the older age groups (45+) see substantial increases in moves into expensive homeownership, indicating they have strengthened their housing position.

Modelling destination tenures

Generational dimensions may influence tenure outcomes in several direct and indirect ways. Tenure outcomes are critically entangled in broader residential, employment, and life-course trajectories. Table 6.2 presents various characteristics of the studied households, comparing the 2006 and 2014 cohorts, as well as the younger age group and the total group of high-income households. Several trends come to the fore. Importantly, there is an overall shift towards flexible and insecure employment as the share of fixed (indefinite) contracts decreases and is replaced by temporary employment contracts and self-employment. The increase in Western non-native households points at the expansion of expats in Amsterdam's service and knowledge economy. This trend is also captured by the increase in households moving in from outside the urban region, a trend that is partly also the consequence of the growing pull of Amsterdam for employment or education. A growing share of households has negative or only little assets, a direct consequence of plummeting house prices following the global financial crisis leading to negative housing equity especially among new homeowners.

In Table 6.3 it is estimated to what extent these characteristics each are associated with different housing outcomes for the 2014 cohort. The models present the odds (relative risk ratios, RRR) that a household moves into relatively affordable homeownership (A), relatively affordable rent (B), or expensive rent (C) *instead of* expensive homeownership (the reference category of the dependent variable). This model confirms that households (mostly) dependent on income from temporary employment contracts are significantly more likely than those on a fixed contract to move into rent.

This indicates these households struggle to access mortgage capital in the post-crisis era. However, they do access relatively expensive rental housing meaning they are able to shoulder high rent burdens. Households dependent on self-employment are only significantly more likely to move into expensive rent, although differences are not as marked. Similarly, those who moved in from outside the Amsterdam region – compared to those moving within the city – are significantly more likely to move into, especially, expensive

rent than homeownership. The same goes for Western non-native households when compared to native Dutch. The fact that these households move into rent may signify that they have not settled in the city yet or are planning only a temporary stay. Alternatively it may indicate these households are not as knowledgeable about the local owner-occupied market making access more restricted necessitating a move into expensive rent. In contrast, as may be expected, households with children are significantly more likely to move into expensive homeownership than other groups.

Additionally, this model highlights that also after controlling for these various life-course and employment characteristics there remains an independent association between age and housing outcomes. More specifically, the 25-34 age cohort is most likely to move into rent rather than homeownership. Although they are also significantly more likely to move into expensive rent, this is even more so for moving into rental dwellings with low or average real-estate values. This relationship between age and housing outcome is thus 'on top' of employment position (in terms of income and contract type), household composition, residential trajectory, and other factors. It may be that the included variables do not entirely capture, for instance, their transitory life-course stage. In addition, younger households generally have fewer assets at their disposal than older households, giving them a comparative disadvantage that plays an especially important role in tight housing markets and in the context of stricter mortgage lending[48]. Another explanation may be that younger households are a group that are especially willing to include tenure in their housing trade-offs to access specific neighbourhoods. That is, in order to get housing in centrally located, up-market or gentrifying neighbourhoods they may be willing to settle for rent. It is to the spatial dimensions of rental gentrification that the next section turns.

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48.   Housing equity cannot be added in the models for reasons of endogeneity. Being a homeowner (as measured by the dependent variable) is strongly associated with the possession of substantial assets as well as household indebtedness (mortgage debt surpassing housing values).

Variable	Characteristics	25-34		Total	
		2006	2014	2006	2014
Age (oldest household member) *	25-34	100	100	45.2	48.1
	35-44	-	-	32.8	29.9
	45-54	-	-	11.8	12.0
	55-64	-	-	6.6	6.0
	65+	-	-	3.6	4.0
Household type *	Single person	39.5	35.9	39.5	37.0
	Multiple person (no children)	51.4	54.1	42.5	42.2
	Multiple person (with children)	6.9	6.9	14.7	16.8
	Single parent	0.4	0.3	1.7	2.0
	Other	1.8	2.7	1.7	2.0
Gender (highest earner) *	Male	66.9	64.3	68.6	66.6
	Female	33.1	35.7	31.4	33.4
Ethnicity (highest earner) *	Native Dutch	69.8	63.9	67.7	61.0
	Non-western non native	10.3	13.1	10.3	12.2
	Western non native	19.9	23.0	22.0	26.7
Area of origin (previous address) *	Amsterdam	60.0	59.8	65.3	62.6
	Surrounding metropolitan region	5.0	3.8	5.4	4.1
	Outside region	35.0	36.4	29.3	33.3
Most important source of income (of highest earner) *	Employment (fixed contract)	72.6	63.8	69.2	63.6
	Employment (temporary contract)	13.6	22.2	10.3	16.2
	Employment (unknown contract)	4.4	3.0	4.7	4.0
	Self employed	8.1	10.6	10.9	12.5
	Other	1.3	0.6	4.8	3.7
Household assets	<€0 (negative assets)	14.2	20.1	13.1	21.0
	€0-€10000	20.9	24.3	17.1	19.1
	€10000-€50000	29.1	33.2	24.2	25.6
	€50000-€150000	13.8	13.4	14.8	14.0
	>€150000	12.2	9.0	22.7	20.4
	Unknown	9.9	0.0	8.1	0.0
Gross household income *	Median (*€1000)	94.8	100.5	96.8	105.5
Equivalized household income	Median (*€1000)	37.8	39.4	37.7	39.8
Total N		**8103**	**10167**	**17908**	**21119**

Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics for high-income households in 2006 and 2014, divided according to age group. *Note*: *Variables included in the multivariate model presented in Table 6.3. *Source*: Social Statistics Database, own calculations.

A) Homeownership total

B) Rent total

Legend

Percentage point change 2006-2014

- >1.5 pp decrease
- 0-1.5 pp decrease
- 1-1.5 pp increase
- 1.5-4 pp increase
- >4 pp increase
- N/A

0   1   2   4 Kilometers

Legend

Percentage point change 2006-2014

- >1.5 pp decrease
- 0-1.5 pp decrease
- 1-1.5 pp increase
- 1.5-4 pp increase
- >4 pp increase

0 1 2   4 Kilometers

C) Expensive rent total

FIGURE 6.2. Percentage point change in high-income households (q5) moving into owner occupation (A), rent (B), or expensive rent (C) between 2006-2014 (as share of all movers). Note: percentage point changes are relative to *all* moves to or within a neighbourhood, regardless of income or tenure.

Neighbourhood change: charting rental and homeownership gentrification

Changes in the residential moving patterns of high-income (top quintile) households between 2006 and 2014 are mapped in Figure 6.2, showing their percentage point change among all movers at the neighbourhood level. An increasing inflow of high-income households suggests gentrification processes taking place. The maps distinguish between high-income homeowners (2A), high-income tenants (2B) and high-income tenants in "expensive" rental units (2C). The share of high-income homeowners particularly increased in those neighbourhoods directly surrounding the inner-city borough. These are predominantly neighbourhoods built during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the city's current gentrification frontiers (chapter 4). In contrast, the share of high-income homeowners decreased not only in the periphery but, more importantly, also in most expensive high-status neighbourhoods in the central city and affluent Old South district. Although homeownership rates are relatively high here, these shifts do indicate that homeownership is not integral to the further progress of gentrification in these already expensive areas.

| | Destination tenure (base category = owned, high real-estate value) | | | | | |
| | (A) Owned, low/mid real-estate value | | (B) Rental, low/mid real-estate value | | (C) Rental, high real-estate value | |
	Coef	RRR	Coef	RRR	Coef	RRR
Age (oldest member)						
45-54 (Ref)						
25-34	.763	2.144***	1.280	3.597***	.956	2.601***
35-44	.291	1.338***	.303	1.354***	.302	1.352***
55-64	-.224	.799*	-.009	.991	.023	1.023
65+	-.480	.619**	-.468	.626**	.167	1.181
Household type						
Multiple person (no children) (Ref)						
Single person	.218	1.244***	-.076	.927	.240	1.27***
Multiple person (with children)	-.778	.459***	-.904	.405***	-.177	.838**
Single parent	-.038	.962	-.178	.837	.474	1.607***
Other	1.266	3.546***	.922	2.513***	1.263	3.535***
Gender (highest earner)						
Male (Ref)						
Female	.074	1.076	.029	1.029	-.049	.953
Ethnicity (highest earner)						
Native Dutch (Ref)						
Non-western non native	.295	1.344***	.618	1.856***	.245	1.277***
Western non native	-.017	.983	.219	1.244***	.523	1.686***
Area of origin (previous address)						
Amsterdam (Ref)						
Surrounding metropolitan region	.680	1.974***	.525	1.691***	.280	1.323*
Outside region	.166	1.181**	.674	1.961***	1.004	2.730***
Most important source of income (of highest earner)						
Employment (fixed contract) (Ref)						
Employment (temporary contract)	.105	1.110	.567	1.763***	.517	1.677***
Employment (unknown contract)	.018	1.018	.237	1.268*	.115	1.122
Self employed	-.115	.892	.081	1.085	.150	1.162*
Other	-.624	.536***	.049	1.050	-.230	.795
Gross household income (Log, *€1000)	-1.595	.203***	-1.696	.183***	-.117	.890**
Intercept	6.009	406.996***	6.298	1342.758***	-.566	.678***
Log likelihood	-26025.137					
Likelihood Ratio Chi²	5785.71					
Df	54					
Pseudo R²	0.100					

Looking at the changing influx of high-income households in rent in general (2B), or expensive rent more specifically (2C) a somewhat different picture emerges. Yet there are also similarities: the share of high-income tenants also increased in the city's aforementioned gentrification frontiers. A crucial difference though is that the share of high-income tenants has increased in many of the city's most expensive neighbourhoods such as the traditionally affluent Canal Belt (Centre) and Willemspark (South), as well as neighbourhoods where gentrification is in a highly advanced, or mature, stage (e.g. Jordaan). These maps reveal that the rise of rental gentrification does not only take place in gentrification's frontiers but also in the expensive inner-city neighbourhoods where gentrification processes are in an advanced stage. Here, rental gentrification may take over from homeownership gentrification. This may be achieved through homeowners renting out their dwelling, or by rent liberalization within the private-rental or social-rental sector. As rent levels increase, renting out property at a premium becomes an increasingly attractive alternative to selling for private landlords.

In Table 6.4 changes in the share of high-income households among in-movers between 2006 and 2014 are measured per neighbourhood type. Subsequently, Table 6.4 decomposes these changes according to post-move destination in terms of tenure and real-estate value. It does so for both the total population and the 25-34 year old population. The share of high-income households particularly increased for the gentrifying late nineteenth century neighbourhoods: from 20% in 2006 to 24.3% in 2014. A decomposition of this 4.2 percentage point[49] increase reveals that it was driven by notable increases of high-income households moving into rent as well as homeownership, especially with relatively high real-estate values (+1.7 for expensive homeownership, +2.0 for expensive rent). Also in the early twentieth century neighbourhoods an increase in the share of high-income households was recorded although not quite as steep (+1.3), and here too the increase took place both in the owner-occupied sector and the rental sector. Although the share of high-income households remained high among movers to/within the central city and affluent southern neighbourhoods (34% in 2014) this share decreased by 1.4 percentage point. Looking at the different tenures we see that this decrease mainly took place in the owner-occupied sector while the share of high-income tenants in fact increased. This is an important trend as it suggests that during the 2006-2014 period homeownership gentrification in these already expensive neighbourhoods stagnated while rental gentrification was able to progress.

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49.   Difference due to rounding.

Relative to the city's total population – of all ages and incomes – the share of young high-income households increased from 9.5% to 10.6% between 2006 and 2014. Their share showed the strongest increase in the 1800-1920 neighbourhoods, while decreasing slightly in the central and affluent neighbourhoods as well the post-war periphery. Crucially though, the share of young high-income households moving into rent increased in *all* neighbourhood types. In the central city the increase in young high-income tenants is in fact relatively steep, contrasting overarching trends towards decreasing accessibility. The strongest increase in young households' moves into expensive rent is in the gentrification frontiers. These spatial trends suggest rental gentrification has become a more important process, especially for young households, supplementing processes of homeownership gentrification already in place.

Discussion and conclusion

This chapter has charted the recent rise of rental gentrification, and has highlighted the important generational dynamics involved therein. Despite the strong growth of the owner-occupied sector, recent trends indicate a shift of high-income households towards rent. Although the role of rental housing in accommodating or driving particular forms of gentrification has long been acknowledged, the current rise of rental gentrification as found in Amsterdam differs in several important ways. Importantly, the rise of rental gentrification follows after a period of intensifying homeownership gentrification. On the one hand it thus represents a break from recent developments and previous rounds of gentrification, but on the other hand this new wave arguably also augments previous forms of gentrification. To understand these shifts it is imperative to consider the implications for different households, as well as for the forms and substance of gentrification as a force of urban change.

Contemporary cities are not only marked by deepening socio-economic divides (cf. Tammaru et al. 2016), but also by deepening divides between generations. This is reflected in, inter alia, the tenure and neighbourhood outcomes of residents belonging to different age groups. Even when they are on a relatively high income, younger households increasingly often have to negotiate insecurities in various key domains including employment – as evidenced by the shift towards temporary contracts – and household situations. Combined with the tight housing markets in many urban contexts these factors push growing numbers of young households towards the rental housing as homeownership drifts out of reach, at least temporarily. This is also the case for higher earners such as dual earner childless couples. This allows for a remarkable combination: rental gentrification marks the turn towards increasingly upmarket and exclusive rental segment, but at the same time feeds off households' inability to buy.

In contrast, older high-income households are more likely to be in a secure employment situation and if they were previously homeowners they may have accumulated substantial stocks of housing wealth. This fits within a trend towards greater intergenerational inequalities, not in the least regarding housing (Forrest & Hirayama 2015). These generational disparities are also

visible in the housing outcomes of households belonging to the upper income echelons. This connects to a key finding of the chapter: Accentuated inter-generational inequalities are involved in producing different tenure-specific forms of gentrification. Older generations are increasingly the purchasers of gentrified property, these may be families staying in the city or empty nesters taking on a more prominent role in gentrification. Younger generations, in contrast, have come to be more entangled in rental gentrification. This marks a break from previous trends when gentrification was driven by expanding homeownership across age cohorts.

Total		Central/ affluent	1800-1920	1920-1940	post war	new build/ rural	total
Share q5 2006	%	**35.4**	**20.0**	**20.8**	**10.6**	**37.4**	**20.9**
Share q5 2014	%	**34.0**	**24.3**	**22.0**	**10.4**	**33.1**	**21.8**
Change 2006-2014	pp	**-1.4**	**+4.2**	**+1.3**	**-0.2**	**-4.2**	**+0.9**
Owner occupied	Low RE	+0.2	+0.4	+0.8	+0.7	+1.5	+0.6
	Mid RE	-0.4	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3
	High RE	-2.2	+1.7	+0.9	-0.3	-9.0	-0.4
Rental	Low RE	+0.9	+0.0	+0.4	+0.0	+0.8	+0.3
	Mid RE	+0.5	+0.2	+0.0	+0.0	+3.6	+0.3
	High RE	-0.4	+2.0	+0.1	-0.4	-0.7	+0.4
Total	**Sum**	**-1.4**	**+4.2**	**+1.3**	**-0.2**	**-4.2**	**+0.9**
25-34 year olds		Central/ affluent	1800-1920	1920-1940	post war	new build/ rural	total
Share q5 2006*	%	**13.2**	**11.5**	**12.0**	**3.6**	**12.8**	**9.5**
Share q5 2014*	%	**13.0**	**15.1**	**12.7**	**4.1**	**12.3**	**10.6**
Change 2006-2014	pp	**-0.3**	**+3.6**	**+0.8**	**+0.5**	**-0.5**	**+1.1**
Owner occupied	Low RE	-0.1	+0.2	+0.2	+0.2	+0.2	+0.1
	Mid RE	-0.3	+0.0	-0.3	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2
	High RE	-1.4	+0.8	+0.2	-0.0	-3.3	-0.2
Rental	Low RE	+0.6	+0.2	+0.6	+0.3	+0.2	+0.4
	Mid RE	+0.6	+0.6	-0.2	+0.2	+2.5	+0.4
	High RE	+0.4	+1.7	+0.2	+0.0	+0.1	+0.6
Total	**Sum**	**-0.3**	**+3.6**	**+0.8**	**+0.5**	**-0.5**	**+1.1**

TABLE 6.4. High-income households (q5) as percentage of movers to/within different neighbourhood types in 2006 and 2014, change and dissection of change per tenure. Note: * as percentage of total population (all ages).

The main point here is not to establish that young high-income households are somehow losing out to older generations. Rather it emphasizes that these shifts towards rent are responsible for producing new and intensified forms of rental gentrification that run parallel to ongoing forms of homeownership gentrification. Homeownership gentrification continues not in the least due to ongoing social-housing sales, while rental gentrification is currently also pushed by state actors and private institutional investors. The restructuring and liberalization of the rental market is considered a solution to cater to young middle-class households unable to buy and not eligible for social rent. Consequently, an increasing share of rental housing is rented out at high rents, while at the same time security of tenure is gradually eroded (e.g. by allowing short-term tenancies)(Huisman 2016). In addition, private investors and landlords jump on the opportunity to cater to those – often young – households that cannot buy but are nevertheless able to shoulder high rent burdens.

Possibly the main impact of rental gentrification's rise is that it allows gentrification to extend into different housing tenures and therefore spread out. Segments of the housing markets previously left untouched are now in the crosshairs of states and investors seeking to accelerate gentrification. As a consequence the availability and accessibility of affordable rental housing is further constrained, with the very likely outcome that social-spatial inequalities will be further exacerbated. With the advance of both rental and homeownership gentrification, low-income households are likely to face stronger threats of exclusionary displacement. Furthermore, as tenant rights gradually erode and potential rents soar, direct forms of displacement may also become more prominent, especially in the private-rental sector where winkling practices are more common (Van Criekingen 2010).

The question is how the current rise of rental gentrification fits within broader societal developments. Various future scenarios are possible. Rental gentrification may partly represent a temporary crisis effect. Following the global financial crisis housing markets across contexts ground to a halt. Steep price drops made it more difficult to sell, which has led more homeowners to stay put, or alternatively move on and sublet their dwelling for the time being. This would imply that in times of economic booms process of rental gentrification would wane and again be replaced by vigorously expanding homeownership. However, growing schisms between generations also have more structural underpinnings such as increasing employment insecurities. Furthermore, housing markets increasingly serve those "prime" households that are high income, securely employed and possess substantial assets (Forrest & Hirayama 2015; Pattison 2016; Arundel 2017). Structural generational divides imply that younger generations will have to settle for rental housing increasingly often, unless they can rely on substantial parental support. This would make expensive rental gentrification a constant fixture in the social geography of contemporary cities. A final future scenario would be that rental gentrification becomes more prominent. House price inflation combined with stricter mortgage lending criteria may imply that homeownership drifts out of reach for ever more middle-class residents – not just the

youngest generation. This would imply that rental gentrification not only becomes a more prominent phenomenon, but also that current generational divides implicated in rental gentrification would fade away.

CHAPTER 7 — Gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty: Changing urban geographies through boom and bust periods

Abstract

Many major post-industrial cities across Europe and other contexts are marked by growing social-spatial inequalities, housing liberalization, and gentrification, which limit the housing options of low income households. We investigated changes in the residential moves of different low income households (working poor, low-to-middle income, and unemployed) in the Amsterdam and Rotterdam urban regions for the time period 2004-2013. We found an overarching trend for the suburbanization of poverty towards the urban peripheries and surrounding regions. While this trend appears to be relatively crisis-resistant in the tight Amsterdam housing context, it is more cyclical in Rotterdam and has slowed following the global financial crisis. Low-to-middle income and unemployed households are increasingly moving to the urban regions surrounding cities, particularly to higher density satellite towns. Nevertheless, a growing number of working poor households remains highly urbanized, employing various coping strategies to acquire housing. This chapter reveals how the suburbanization of poverty is both a direct process of poor households moving from city to suburb, and a broader indirect process caused by exclusionary mechanisms such as the decreasing accessibility and affordability of inner-urban neighbourhoods, which reflect broader changes in the geography and socio-economic patterning of urban regions.

Introduction

Over the course of the past few decades, many cities have experienced profound changes regarding the class composition of the population. Overall, major post-industrial cities have become not only more middle class – 'professionalized' (Hamnett 1994; Butler et al. 2008) – but also more divided along socio-economic and class lines ('polarized'), as is reflected, for example, in rising levels of socio-economic segregation in many European capital cities (Tammaru et al. 2016). As cities' class maps are redrawn, urban poverty also shifts; it may, for example, move away from the inner city milieu and 'suburbanize' or 'decentralize' (Hulchanski 2010; Hedin et al. 2012; Cooke & Denton 2015; Kavanagh et al. 2016). Although these changing divisions are the product of various drivers, welfare state retrenchment and accompanying economic liberalization play an important role. These policy shifts are inter alia reflected in the sale of social rental housing and the gradual reduction in rent controls and tenant protections, ultimately making economic resources more important in determining housing and neighbourhood outcomes. In many cases, expanding gentrification and the associated (direct or exclusionary) displacement of low income residents are the spatial expressions of these tendencies towards liberalization. Indeed, state-led gentrification has become emblematic of neoliberal urban and housing policies that seek to remake the

city according to the preferences of the middle class and capital (Smith 2002; Peck & Tickell 2002; Harvey 1989).

In this chapter, we investigate changes in the social-spatial layout of cities by focusing on one crucial element: the spatial dimensions of (urban) poverty. We examine the changes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (the Netherlands) during the period 2004-2013. Rather than elaborating on more static existing poverty concentrations, we target the residential moves of low income residents and the changes therein. We consider residential moves particularly important because this is where displacement, exclusion, and issues of housing accessibility or affordability become most apparent. Furthermore, what 'happens' to urban poverty and where it goes are especially pertinent questions in the face of gentrification becoming the modus operandi in many (inner) cities.

We illuminate these issues by addressing the extent to which structural urban conditions as well as cyclical conditions impact urban social processes. We start with the question of what the overarching trends are in terms of the residential mobility of low income residents (RQ1). In the face of ongoing urban gentrification, we expect that a focus on residential moves will reveal the growing suburbanization of poverty; a trend that may still appear to be only a minor undercurrent when looking at the total population, where movers might be obscured by non-movers. Importantly, we argue that the suburbanization of poverty is not only produced by low income households directly moving from the central city to the suburbs, but also by exclusionary mechanisms that prevent low income households from moving into central urban areas.

RQ1: How and to what extent are the moving patterns of (different groups of) low income residents subject to changes over time?

The onset of the 2008 global financial crisis was a crucial event that has played a key role in re-articulating existing inequalities and forging new ones. Yet it is so far unclear how this has played out in urban space, specifically in relation to urban poverty. Various patterns are possible. The boom and bust periods – both preceding and following the onset of the crisis – may be marked by substantial shifts in urban poverty; these changes may, however, either be accelerating or slowing down. Alternatively, trends occurring during the boom period may see a reversal or annihilation during the bust period. More specifically, the boom period preceding the crisis was in the Dutch context – as in many other settings – marked by substantial housing liberalization and the formation of a housing bubble, which had already placed constraints on housing affordability and accessibility, producing increasingly divided social-spatial outcomes (Musterd & Van Gent 2016). During boom periods, gentrification generally progresses the most vigorously, while the process slows during busts (Hackworth & Smith 2001; Hedin et al. 2012). The global financial crisis exacerbated inequalities and had a profoundly negative effect on the housing position of various population groups, particularly the growing group of those hit by unemployment, precarious employment

situations, and growing household debt. This growing group faces decreasing access to homeownership (Forrest & Hirayama 2015) and depends on a shrinking affordable social rental sector.

At the level of the neighbourhood, this may have several consequences. The most affordable neighbourhoods in an urban-regional system may increasingly serve relatively low income residents, thus amplifying already existing trajectories of neighbourhood decline (Zwiers et al. 2016a). Neighbourhood upgrading may also be reversed, contributing to de-gentrification (Lees & Bondi 1995) as overall poverty levels increase during crises. We expect these consequences to depend on housing and urban context. We formulated the following sub-question regarding cyclical economic trends:

> **RQ2: How do (changes in) patterns of low income residential moves differ between boom and bust periods, both preceding and following the onset of the global financial crisis?**

Amsterdam and Rotterdam represent two cities with rather different historical pathways that have contributed to their different economic profiles. While Amsterdam represents a city that has successfully made the transition to a post-industrial economy, Rotterdam is still struggling to leave its industrial legacy behind (Burgers & Musterd 2002). Rotterdam's housing market is considerably more relaxed than the tight and expensive situation in Amsterdam, and Chapter 4 showed that gentrification remains a more marginal and scattered phenomenon in Rotterdam. As a result, we would expect there to be more stability regarding low income residents' moving patterns in Rotterdam, while changes are likely to be more prominent in Amsterdam. Yet despite substantial differences regarding housing demand and prices, the housing tenure composition is roughly the same in both cities, with almost half belonging to the social rental stock. We address the differences between the cities with the following sub-question:

> **RQ3: How do (changes in) patterns of low income residential moves differ between a relatively successful and a relatively struggling city?**

In short, this chapter aims to investigate how low income residential moving patterns in urban space have changed over time – through different boom and bust periods – and how these patterns and changes differ between structurally different cities.

Spatial dimensions to urban inequality

To gauge how and to what extent low income residential moving patterns change over time, it is imperative to situate these changes within broader debates regarding the economic structure and global connectedness of cities, as well as debates regarding shifting social-spatial urban inequalities.

It has been influentially argued that global economic restructuring has a profound effect on the socio-economic population composition of major

cities (Sassen 1991). As finance and highly specialized service industries concentrate in these cities, so do their highly paid managers and workers. Concomitant to this shift, Sassen posits, is an increase in the number of low skilled and low paid jobs, often in industries serving a higher income clientele (e.g. domestic workers and jobs related to leisure and consumption). The outcome is a polarization of the social and economic structure of a city's population, as both the high end and low end jobs increase. Alternatively, Hamnett (1994) has argued that the occupational structure of major cities is professionalizing rather than polarizing, which entails that these cities are becoming more middle class overall through a gradual replacement of the traditional working classes by an expanding middle class (Hamnett 2003; Butler et al. 2008). Professionalization is an outcome of the shift towards a post-industrial society, which leads to many traditional (semi-skilled or un-skilled) working class occupations becoming less important or obsolete, and contributes to the growth of middle class professions. Professionalization is coupled with an overarching trend of replacement of one class by another, for example following the ageing of the traditional working classes.

Others have argued that this is a rather static perspective regarding class structures and inequalities, equating a decline in traditional working class occupations to an overall replacement of the working class by middle class fractions (Watt 2008; Davidson & Wyly 2012, 2015). The overall shift towards more middle class occupations may, however, ignore the emergence of new inequalities and class oppositions. One trend is the growth in precariously employed workers in sectors that are traditionally considered middle class. Furthermore, new social-spatial dividing lines are being forged, for example through the intergenerational transmission of wealth, as discussed in Chapter 5. Recent evidence suggests that major cities such as Amsterdam are currently experiencing a trend towards greater socio-economic polarization (Van der Waal 2010; Maloutas 2007; Musterd & Van Gent 2016).

On top of these structure-related changes, the 2008 global financial crisis and housing market downturn have had a disruptive impact on the housing trajectories of many population groups. Notably, the financial crisis and consequent institutional reforms have made access to owner occupancy more uneven and restricted (Forrest & Hirayama 2015), and the overall number of sales and sale prices have plummeted in the post-crisis years (Van der Heijden et al. 2011; Ronald & Dol 2011). Particularly for low income households, those in a precarious employment situation, and younger age cohorts, access to homeownership has dwindled and rent burdens in rental sectors have increased. Yet many of these trends towards increasing inequalities regarding housing position were already in place before the financial crisis set in and should be seen as a consequence of the commodification and financialization of housing and real estate, and the flexibilization of employment (Dewilde & De Decker 2015; Forrest & Hirayama 2015).

Structural processes such as social polarization and professionalization, as well as the disruptive impact of the global financial crisis, have a profound impact on the socio-economic composition of cities, and as such also have a spatial expression. A recent study of various European capital cities shows

that as inequalities are on the rise in the early 21st century, most cities are also showing growing segregation levels, further fuelled by government retrenchment in specific domains and liberalization (Tammaru et al. 2016). Despite an overall positive correlation between socio-economic disparities and social-spatial divisions, the actual spatial outcomes differ between contexts. Increasing polarization and inequalities may also co-exist with decreasing levels of segregation or social-spatial divisions (Hamnett 2001; Maloutas 2007). Through, among other things, neighbourhood gentrification and the introduction of more expensive owner-occupied housing in previously low status areas, actual segregation levels may (initially) decrease. This can create more fine-grained maps of class fractions and class inequalities. While this temporarily suppresses spatial divisions, it does exert a negative influence on housing options and affordability for lower income residents, for example through rent increases or the sale of social rental housing. It is to be expected that the relationship between socio-economic and spatial divisions is more robust in more liberal societal and housing contexts (Reardon & Bischoff 2011), while stronger welfare state arrangements suppress spatial inequalities to a greater extent through a range of policies, including tenure mixing at low spatial scales (Musterd & Ostendorf 1998).

Gentrification, displacement, and the suburbanization of poverty

One of the main ways through which socio-economic inequalities are expressed in urban space is gentrification, even if this is not directly visible in greater social-spatial divisions. While individual neighbourhoods may become or remain more mixed due to gentrification, the aggregate effects at a higher scale may instead be the opposite. As gentrification has morphed into a mainstream process and extends far from the urban core into neighbourhoods previously deemed unlikely candidates for gentrification (Hackworth & Smith 2001), low income residents are increasingly confined to, and concentrate in, those areas left untouched by such processes (Musterd & Van Gent 2016).

An important way in which gentrification contributes to deepening social-spatial divisions is displacement. Yet the extent to which displacement occurs as a consequence of gentrification has been subject to substantial academic debate in recent years. Proponents of the professionalization thesis argue that neighbourhood gentrification is primarily the result of class replacement, suggesting that displacement – though it may still occur – is not the dominant phenomenon (Hamnett 2003; Butler et al. 2008). Other academic debates have been primarily concerned with the distinction between direct and indirect forms of displacement. While gentrification may not necessarily lead to heightened levels of out-migration among low income households (a proxy for displacement) (Freeman & Braconi 2004; Freeman et al. 2015), it does still exclude low income newcomers from moving in (Newman & Wyly 2006; Slater 2009). Low income households may overcome affordability and accessibility barriers by taking on higher rent burdens or employing different coping strategies when moving in order to find affordable housing, for instance by doubling up with relatives, friends, or others (Wiemers 2014) or by

accepting precarious housing arrangements (Huisman 2015). While this might lend access to neighbourhoods that would otherwise be unattainable – for example due to gentrification – it could in turn be used as evidence for a lack of exclusionary displacement despite the potentially destabilizing impacts of precarious housing arrangements on housing and life course trajectories (cf. Newman & Wyly 2006; Davidson 2009).

In Rotterdam and Amsterdam, as a consequence of the large social rental stock, extensive tenant protection, and rent regulation (for example, sitting residents' rents can only be increased incrementally and within limits set by the state), direct displacement is limited. On the other hand, indirect exclusionary displacement is relatively common due to the state orchestrated sale and liberalization of social rental dwellings and steep price increases in the private rental and owner-occupied sectors (Van Gent 2013). While insiders enjoy security of tenure and are able to retain relatively low housing costs, outsiders face decreasing options and rising rent burdens (Kadi & Musterd 2015).

The outward expansion of gentrification away from the inner city into other neighbourhoods may be accompanied by parallel outward shifts of poverty into the suburbs of the urban periphery. The suburbanization of poverty (Hulchanski 2010; Randolph & Tice 2014; Cooke & Denton 2015) represents a significant break from previous periods, where poverty was first and foremost an inner city problem, and reflects the growing cleavage between a gentrifying urban core and a disadvantaged 'filtering' periphery (Skaburskis & Nelson 2014; Hedin et al. 2012). These shifts are generally gradual and take place over a longer period of time, as many areas are also marked by high levels of stability (Zwiers et al. 2016b) due to non-moving residents and selective mobility patterns that tend to reproduce neighbourhood status (Hedman et al. 2011; Musterd et al. 2016). Yet when looking specifically at low income residents' moves, we expect a starker picture because here issues of affordability and accessibility are at the forefront.

Welfare state restructuring, housing liberalization, and state-led gentrification

Welfare state arrangements exert a considerable influence on residential mobility patterns, particularly through housing. Housing policies concerning tenure mix, access to homeownership, and acceptable rent levels can play a key role in determining the magnitude of social-spatial divisions. Strong welfare regimes like that of the Netherlands have typically invested heavily in housing policies to reduce the socio-economic disparities produced by market forces and to minimize social-spatial divisions through the provision of regulated social rental housing (Musterd & Ostendorf 1998). Yet in many contexts such policies have in the last few decades made way for policies promoting homeownership as part of an ideological project privileging private property and private accumulation (Ronald 2008; Forrest & Hirayama 2015; Aalbers & Christophers 2014). This has enabled a growing number of households, including those on a lower income, to buy. However, strong state support, financial subsidies for homeownership (e.g. mortgage tax deductibility), and expanding mortgage credit all contributed to house prices increasing sharply.

As a consequence, access to owner occupancy once again became increasingly confined to financially well-off and secure households able to overcome the barrier of high prices (Forrest & Hirayama 2015). The global financial crisis and the subsequent response to tighten mortgage lending criteria have amplified this trend. Less privileged households are increasingly unable to enter an owner-occupied sector that has vastly expanded over the past decades, while the social rental sector has declined due to these same policies.

The dominant logic of promoting homeownership has, in many contexts, notable urban dimensions. Cities are the sites where house price increases have generally been steepest and affordable rental housing has disappeared at the fastest rate. In Western urban contexts, the ideology of homeownership materializes particularly in urban policies that expand homeownership to alter the population composition in an attempt to improve the liveability, safety, manageability, and overall quality of neighbourhoods (Uitermark 2003). These policies are built on the assumption that homeownership creates responsible citizens, or at the very least leads to manageable neighbourhoods by dissolving urban problems. Because these housing policies work towards creating more middle class neighbourhoods, gentrification is essentially their intended spatial outcome (Uitermark et al. 2007). Through tenure conversions from rent to owner occupation and large urban renewal projects, such policies also result in a direct loss of affordable social rental housing. Although state-led gentrification commonly includes a range of policies that focus on, among other things, policing, public space, and commercial property (Atkinson 2003; Uitermark et al. 2007; Zukin et al. 2009), housing policies are a core component because they influence the population composition in the most direct way. This is always an integral part of state-led gentrification, whether it is to manage and control neighbourhoods (Uitermark et al. 2007) or to attract capital investment and the middle classes (Hackworth & Smith 2001; Smith 2002; Peck 2005) as part of more entrepreneurial state strategies (Harvey 1989; Peck & Tickell 2002).

Data and methods

This chapter focuses on (changing) patterns of low income moves and economic boom-bust patterns in two structurally different cities. We use long-term secondary data on both cities' housing markets in combination with highly detailed longitudinal register data from the Social Statistics Database (provided by Statistics Netherlands). Register data allow us to define different low income groups in a very precise way and to monitor their moving patterns for the 2004-2013 period. We define a move as a change in address that takes place during a given year and we focus on the post-move destination as of the 1st of January the following year[50]. Although we investigated all individual years, we focus specifically on the neighbourhood outcomes for 2004, 2008, and 2013, which are, respectively, the earliest time point in our data, the last

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50. To give an example, movers' neighbourhood outcomes for 2004 are the outcome of a residential move taking place anytime during 2003. It is possible that households move several times, in which case we only measure the last outcome/destination.

pre-crisis year with peaking house prices, and the most recent time point, still a crisis year.

In our study, we distinguish between three types of low income household: unemployed households, working poor households, and low-to-middle income households. Because a household may consist of employed and unemployed members, we define household employment status on the basis of the most important source of income (in Euros). We term employed households with a total gross annual income below €19,095 as 'working poor' and those with an income between €19,095 and €34,085 as 'low-to-middle income'[51]. We use gross income and these specific classifications to reflect existing policies: the €34,085 threshold corresponds to the maximum income for eligibility for social rental housing[52]. The €19,095 threshold corresponds to 110% of the minimum wage for full-time employment[53].

We only include the population aged 25-65, in order to focus on the working age population (thus excluding retired households and young people whose income may not reflect their socio-economic status). Households are only included when the oldest member falls within this age bracket and is not a student. Because household composition changes over time, we define a household as moving when at least one of its working age members has moved. Institutional households and households moving to an address where more than 10 households are registered are excluded, as these groups generally reflect special household types.

Regarding the destination area, we focus on Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and both cities' urban regions. We construe a broad typology based on the geographical distinction between the urban centre, the urban periphery, and the surrounding region. For Amsterdam, the border between central and peripheral neighbourhoods roughly corresponds to the city's ring road and IJ river. In Rotterdam, the central neighbourhoods are mostly bounded by the New Meuse river (although parts of the south bank are also included), the ring motorway to the north and east, and the municipal border to the west. For both cities, the municipal border marks the distinction between the urban periphery and the surrounding region. This broad definition suffices to chart general shifts in low income households' moving patterns.

In Chapter 4 it was already shown that the centre-periphery divide closely approximates an upgrading-downgrading divide in both cities, as most gentrification neighbourhoods can be found in the cities' inner rings. Such a crude typology will, however, necessarily obscure more fine-grained spatial variations. Therefore, this chapter also maps the (percentage point) changes

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51.   All incomes are corrected for inflation to the 2013 level.
52.   Since 2011, 90% of rent-regulated social rental housing has to be allocated to households with an income below the official threshold. For some household types, this threshold stands at approximately €38,000 (subject to yearly fluctuation), but for the sake of clarity we stick to a single threshold.
53.   We also ran additional analyses using different income classifications, for example equivalized household income. These analyses returned similar results to those presented here (and are available from the corresponding author upon request).

in moving patterns between 2004 and 2013[54]. We calculate per year the share of moving[55] households belonging to one of the three abovementioned low income groups. We also investigate the tenure outcomes of the different low income groups per neighbourhood type. We not only distinguish between social rent, private rent, and owner occupancy, but also use 'home sharing' as an additional category, which entails multiple households registered at one address. Although this is not a form of tenure in itself – sharing occurs in all tenures – we suggest that identifying sharing as a coping strategy provides greater insight than measuring the underlying tenure. Due to data availability, we can only investigate tenure outcomes for the most recent years; we therefore focus on the tenure outcomes for 2013. In both cities, for about 6% of the addresses no information on tenure is available, and this percentage is higher in inner city neighbourhoods where the older housing stock is less well registered (around 10%).

Results

Urban housing policies and boom-bust patterns

It is important to situate low income households' moving patterns within their specific urban and regional housing contexts. Both Amsterdam and Rotterdam are currently focusing on expanding homeownership, a policy focus that has gained traction since the mid-1990s and that stands in sharp contrast to both cities' longstanding legacy of providing affordable social rental housing (Aalbers 2004; Uitermark 2009). The expansion of homeownership is integral to municipal gentrification strategies as an attempt to attract and keep hold of middle and higher income residents (Van den Berg 2012; Doucet 2013; Van Gent 2013) and has led to a substantial change in tenure composition[56]. At the turn of the century, owner occupancy made up 15% of the Amsterdam housing stock, while by 2013 this share had increased to 28% (Table 7.1). During the same period, homeownership increased from 22% to 35% in Rotterdam. On the other hand, the social rental sector in both cities has gradually decreased in size through tenure conversions and urban renewal projects where rental dwellings are demolished to make way for owner-occupied dwellings. The size of the social rental sector is being reduced in order to cut spending, but it also serves as a strategy to change the population mix of specific neighbourhoods. Since access to social housing is limited to lower

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54.   We use stable four-digit postcode tracts to map changes. The average number of included households per postcode area is roughly 2,400. Postcode areas with less than ten observations for a specific income category are excluded from these specific analyses to meet privacy requirements.

55.   We define moving as changing address, which may also occur within a neighbourhood.

56.   In this paper, we distinguish between social and private rent. Social rental dwellings are owned by housing associations, while private rental dwellings are owned by private landlords. This in itself does not imply that a dwelling is either rent-controlled (with a monthly rent below €700, subject to yearly changes) or liberalized. Dwellings owned by housing associations are mostly rent-controlled, although a small but increasing share has been liberalized. Similarly, a large share of the private rental stock is rent-controlled, although this share is shrinking fast.

income residents, conversion to free market housing is considered a prerequisite to align the housing stock with the actual as well as desired middle class population (Van Gent 2013).

Despite these trends, social rental housing remains the largest tenure in both cities (Table 7.1). Yet the decreasing accessibility of this form of tenure may be better judged by looking at allocations by housing associations. In Amsterdam, the number of social housing allocations via the official allocation system decreased by more than 36% between 2007 and 2014 (AFWC 2015)[57] as a consequence of social housing sales, rent liberalization, and tenants staying put. Looking at spatial patterns and trends, we see that in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the share of social rental dwellings has decreased in both central and peripheral areas. This reflects governmental strategies to facilitate gentrification processes through tenure conversions in central neighbourhoods in order to accommodate the new middle classes, as well as the simultaneous aim of establishing a new social mix in disadvantaged neighbourhoods through urban restructuring (Uitermark & Bosker 2014; Teernstra 2015). Table 7.1 only covers both cities. When looking at the surrounding Amsterdam region, the owner-occupied sector represents 57% of the regional stock (in 2013), while social rental and private rental housing makes up 30% and 13% respectively. In the region surrounding Rotterdam, the share of owner-occupied dwellings stands at 55%, with social and private rent at 35% and 10% respectively (CBS 2013). Social rent thus remains a relatively large share of the housing stock in both cities when compared to the surrounding regions, but liberalization trends are strong in both urban contexts.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Amsterdam housing associations sold a total of 23,824 dwellings between 1998, when they started selling, and 2014. After a slow start, yearly sales increased substantially during this period, reaching a peak in 2014 with a total of 2,682 sales. These sales increasingly concentrate in Amsterdam's central neighbourhoods, accelerating gentrification in already burgeoning areas. In Rotterdam, the sale of social housing dwellings has followed a somewhat different trend, as it stood at around 1,400 sales per year during the pre-crisis years, but since the crisis the number of sales has decreased in line with an overall stagnation in housing sales to around 1,000 social housing sales during 2013 (Pellenbarg et al. 2014). In addition, in both cities, especially since the crisis, housing associations and local states have turned to rent liberalization, which entails formerly rent-regulated social rental dwellings being moved into the free market sector in an attempt to expand the housing opportunities of middle income groups and upwardly mobile young households.

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57.   These are allocations of 'affordable' dwellings eligible for tenant subsidies. Although the allocation system is the dominant way through which social rental dwellings are allocated, some dwellings are allocated in other ways (e.g. directly by the housing association).

City	Area	Year	Social rental (%)	Private rental (%)	Owner-occupied (%)
Amsterdam	Total	2000	54.4	30.7	14.8
		2004	53.4	26.9	19.7
		2008	50.2	23.9	25.9
		2013	46.2	25.6	28.1
	Central	2000	45.4	41.4	13.2
		2004	45.1	36.5	18.7
		2008	42.8	32.4	24.8
		2013	39.9	33.3	26.9
	Peripheral	2000	69.4	13.2	17.4
		2004	68.3	11.0	21.3
		2008	62.6	9.9	27.5
		2013	56.6	13.4	30.0
Rotterdam	Total	2000	57.3	21.2	21.5
		2004	54.6	20.8	24.6
		2008	49.9	18.9	31.1
		2013	46.9	18.5	34.7
	Central	2000	57.8	26.8	15.4
		2004	55.1	26.5	18.4
		2008	51.1	23.6	25.3
		2013	48.3	23.7	27.9
	Peripheral	2000	57.2	17.8	25.0
		2004	54.3	17.4	28.3
		2008	49.1	16.2	34.6
		2013	46.6	15.2	38.2

TABLE 7.1. Tenure composition of Amsterdam and Rotterdam 2000-2013. *Source:* Data provided by OIS Amsterdam and OBI Rotterdam; own adaptation, available upon request.

As an increasing share of both cities' housing stock is being commodified, the housing stock in general becomes more susceptible to economic patterns of boom and bust. Figure 1.3 in the Introduction chapter charts the longer-term average sale prices in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, showing remarkable boom-bust patterns in Amsterdam and more stability in Rotterdam. Between 2004 and 2008, average sale prices rose by 33% in Amsterdam, from €237,000 to a high of €314,000. During the same period, average sale prices in Rotterdam increased some 20%, from €160,000 to €193,000. Price increases during this period were the product of relatively favourable mortgage lending conditions, including high loan-to-value ratios and low interest rates, and the structural

tax deductibility of mortgage interest as part of a wider governmental strategy to push homeownership (see Aalbers 2011). High prices in Amsterdam reflect the city's increasingly tight housing context due to considerable population growth, and demand from middle classes moving to the city for employment or remaining after graduation (Boterman et al. 2010). Yet in the wake of the global financial crisis, house prices dropped steeply: by 18% in Amsterdam and 14% in Rotterdam between the first quarters of 2008 and 2013; though they have subsequently increased again.

It is important to consider the extent to which housing sales and sale prices influence the residential moving patterns of low income households. Particularly in central Amsterdam, prices are generally high, thus pricing out low and middle income residents from the owner-occupied sector. Yet it should also be taken into consideration that in both cities large groups of lower income residents cannot and will not enter homeownership, also due to the existence of a large social rental stock in urban areas. In post-crisis times, price drops may enable some households to buy, but the dominant development is that decreasing sales and more restricted mortgage lending practices that privilege 'prime' households (see Forrest & Hirayama 2015) are reducing post-crisis access to homeownership.

Low income households' changing moving patterns

So how have low income households' residential moving patterns changed during the pre- and post-crisis periods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam? Before turning to residential moves, Table 7.2 shows the percentage of all households belonging to the three different low income categories for the central city, urban periphery, and surrounding region. The table shows that both cities host a larger percentage of low income households than the regions, although this percentage decreased between 2004 and 2013 – with only working poor households increasing their share. In contrast, the shares of all low income categories increased in the cities' surrounding regions.

Differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and differences between the cities and their regions, can be linked to the occupational structure of the local populations. Not only are unemployment levels structurally higher in Rotterdam, but a larger share of the employed population is active in lower skilled sectors (CBS 2015)[58]. These are specifically the sectors where employees have been most hit by the crisis: during the 2008-2013 period, the number of residents in lower skilled jobs decreased by roughly 15,000 in Rotterdam (25,000 in the surrounding Rotterdam region) and by 7,000 in Amsterdam (and 19,000 in the surrounding Amsterdam region). In contrast, in both cities the number of residents in high skilled jobs is high and grew consistently during the 2004-2013 period despite the crisis, although this occurred at a faster rate in Amsterdam. These general employment data highlight how Amsterdam's occupational structure is to a larger extent professionalized

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58.   Statistics Netherlands groups job types into four categories regarding skill level (ISCO classification). We colloquially refer to the lowest two sectors as lower skilled jobs (see CBS 2015).

and continues to professionalize and grow, while Rotterdam has been hit by the decreasing demand for lower skilled jobs, which contributes to greater increases in unemployment.

Area	Year	Working poor	Low-to-middle	Unemployed	Total low
Central Amsterdam	**2004**	7.0	12.4	15.8	35.2
	2013	7.9	11.0	13.5	32.4
	Change (pp)	**+0.9**	**-1.4**	**-2.3**	**-2.7**
Peripheral Amsterdam	**2004**	3.7	11.0	18.1	32.8
	2013	5.5	11.0	17.2	33.7
	Change (pp)	**+1.8**	**-0.1**	**-0.9**	**+0.9**
Surrounding Amsterdam region	2004	2.2	7.0	6.5	15.7
	2013	3.1	7.7	7.1	18.0
	Change (pp)	**+0.9**	**+0.8**	**+0.5**	**+2.2**
Central Rotterdam	**2004**	4.4	12.4	22.1	38.9
	2013	5.8	11.1	19.9	36.7
	Change (pp)	**+1.4**	**-1.3**	**-2.2**	**-2.1**
Peripheral Rotterdam	**2004**	2.6	10.0	17.5	30.1
	2013	3.8	10.2	17.3	31.4
	Change (pp)	**+1.2**	**+0.3**	**-0.2**	**+1.3**
Surrounding Rotterdam region	**2004**	1.9	6.9	7.8	16.6
	2013	2.6	7.7	8.5	18.9
	Change (pp)	**+0.7**	**+0.8**	**+0.8**	**+2.3**

TABLE 7.2. The three low income population groups as a share of the total population in percentages (and their aggregated total share) per area for 2004 and 2013, and percentage point change. *Source:* Social Statistics Database; own adaptation.

Changes become most visible when we focus on residential moves, when households are directly faced with housing constraints. At this point, it is important to note that while these figures show the share of different low income groups among the total number of movers, increasing or decreasing shares are in almost all cases matched by similar increases or decreases in absolute numbers. Figure 7.1 charts the percentage of (in-) moving households belonging to the different low income groups for Amsterdam's centre, periphery, and surrounding region, and how this changed during the 2004-2013 period[59]. In a general sense, these data highlight the importance of analysing these

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59. Note that the year represents the address on the 1st of January in the year following the move.

different low income groups separately, rather than as one broad low income category. It shows that working poor households (earning less than 110% of the minimum full-time wage) mainly move to/within the city, as opposed to the region. In the pre-crisis period, their share slightly decreased in central Amsterdam, contrasting trends in the urban periphery and surrounding region where their share showed a slight increase. After the onset of the crisis, however, the share of working poor residents increased in all areas, though most substantially in the urban periphery (from 6.4% in 2008 to 10.6% in 2013). Notably, also in central Amsterdam, their share increased during the post-crisis period (from 7.6% to 10%). It should be taken into account that the working poor are a rather diverse group, encompassing those who are structurally low paid as well as self-employed people and recent labour market entrants. The financial crisis and related austerity measures have contributed to an increase in persons in temporary and precarious employment, particularly among younger cohorts (Aassve et al. 2013).

The other low income working households – those earning more than 110% of the minimum full-time wage, but less than the social rental cap – show different moving patterns. In the boom period, their share decreased most substantially in central Amsterdam (from 13.3% to 11.4%), and also decreased somewhat in the periphery (from 13.5% to 12.9%). In contrast, already during the boom period, their share increased in the region – although this increase accelerated after the beginning of the crisis – while remaining relatively stable in the city's central and peripheral neighbourhoods. Consequently, as of 2013, the share of low-to-middle income employed households among movers is higher in the surrounding region than in central Amsterdam.

Regarding unemployed households, by far the largest share can be seen to be moving to/within the urban periphery, reaching 16.6% in 2005. Yet also due to large scale restructuring, there was a steep decrease in unemployed households in the periphery during the boom period, as well as in the first two years after the financial crisis began. Interestingly, during the bust period the share of unemployed households showed a strong increase in the region, and from 2009 also in the urban periphery. In contrast to cyclical trends, their share more or less stabilized in central Amsterdam, before again decreasing between 2012 and 2013.

Overall, these data highlight a gradual shift of poverty away from the city, particularly the centre, towards the regions. An overarching suburbanization of poverty comes to the fore, which is progressing despite being influenced by boom-bust rhythms. In central Amsterdam, the share of all low income categories decreased during the pre-crisis boom period. Particularly the number of unemployed households moving to central Amsterdam decreased, likely due to the diminishing accessibility and availability of social rental housing. The subsequent economic downturn did not lead to a post-crisis increase in lower income households, except for the growing group of working poor households. The suburbanizing trend itself is multi-faceted, with the region experiencing the strongest relative increase in low income households. Furthermore, already in pre-crisis times the region experienced increases in working poor and low-to-middle income households, while the decrease in

unemployed households was below average. In contrast, Amsterdam's urban periphery shows more variegated patterns, depending on the time period and particular low income group. Interestingly, the share of low-to-middle income households increased especially in the urban region, while in the urban periphery the share of working poor households grew disproportionally, signalling a different residential orientation among these different groups.


FIGURE 7.1. Share of low income residents as a percentage of total movers per destination area 2004-2013 in the Amsterdam region. *Source:* SSD; own adaptation.

In Rotterdam we see similar patterns regarding the direction of changes, although they are not as marked as in Amsterdam (Figure 7.2). Here, the share of working poor households stayed relatively stable during the pre-crisis period, before increasing for all areas after the crisis began: in central Rotterdam, their share increased from 6.5% in 2008 to 8.6% in 2013. In the other areas, the percentage point increases were more or less similar. Consequently, throughout the 2004-2013 period, the share of working poor households remained highest in central Rotterdam. Regarding the other low-to-middle income households, there was a slight move away from central Rotterdam, which mainly occurred during the pre-crisis boom period and remained stable throughout the post-crisis period. In 2013, the share of low-to-middle income households moving to central Rotterdam dropped below the regional average. The biggest increase of low-to-middle income households was in the region,

from 10.7% in 2004 to 12.3% in 2013, bringing it up to almost match the share in the central city. Interestingly, this increase mainly occurred during the post-crisis bust period, contrasting a trend of relative stability during the pre-crisis period. In peripheral Rotterdam, the share of lower income employed households remained rather stable over time, with boom and bust trends more or less cancelling each other out. As a consequence, already during the boom period the share of low-to-middle income households in Rotterdam's peripheral neighbourhoods surpassed the share in the central city due to decreases in the centre.

The share of unemployed residents among movers is structurally higher in Rotterdam and its surrounding region than in Amsterdam. While this share quickly decreased during the pre-crisis boom, the post-crisis years saw a return to 2004 levels, although variation between areas exists: the region experienced an increase between 2004 and 2013 from 9.4% to 11.9%, while the central city saw an overall decrease from 16.4% to 15.4%. These different trajectories mainly formed during the boom period, when unemployment shares decreased most substantially in the central city (-4.7 percentage points between 2004 and 2008) and least in the region (-1.3). In the post-crisis period, all three areas show highly similar increases of 3.7 to 3.9 percentage points. This suggests that the pre-crisis upgrading patterns in the central city have not been as robust as in Amsterdam and are to a greater extent subject to cyclical trends.

Generally speaking, for both Amsterdam and Rotterdam these analyses highlight a suburbanization of poverty towards the surrounding regions. Compared to the total population, the low income groups are overrepresented among movers to/within the region for the 2004-2013 period, and increasingly so (compare Figures 7.1 and 7.2 with Table 7.2)[60]. Both cities' surrounding regions still host relatively few low income residents, with a large body of non-moving middle class residents obscuring the emerging patterns of change. The share of unemployed residents in particular has remained relatively low among the total population of both regions, but has been relatively high among movers.

Mapping changing patterns

These trends have been mapped onto both urban regions to further highlight spatial variations and nuances between postcode tracts (Figure 7.3a-f). For each of the three low income groups, these maps compare their share among movers in 2013 with their share in 2004 – showing percentage point changes. The maps illuminate how patterns of change differ across neighbourhoods, but most specifically how they differ between working poor, low-to-middle income, and unemployed households. By comparing 2004 and 2013, these maps combine pre-crisis and post-crisis trends.

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60. All analyses have also been conducted for the total as well as non-moving population. The direction of changes among these groups are highly similar to the changes among movers, but are not as marked. These analyses are therefore not presented but are available from the corresponding author upon request.

FIGURE 7.2. Share of low income residents as a percentage of total movers per destination area 2004-2013 in the Rotterdam region. *Source:* SSD; own adaptation.

For the Amsterdam urban region, it clearly shows that in all tracts in the urban periphery the share of working poor households among movers increased (3a). In addition, in the inner-ring neighbourhoods various tracts also saw an increase, particularly in the (often gentrifying) nineteenth and early-twentieth century belts surrounding the city centre. Even in the region, the share of working poor households among movers increased for most tracts, although often at a slower pace and mostly in higher density satellite towns such as Almere, Zaandam, and Haarlemmermeer. In contrast, the share of low-to-middle income households among the movers decreased in most tracts in Amsterdam's central city, with trends in the urban periphery variegated across different tracts (3b). While increases also occurred in the satellite towns, there was a more general increase in the region, including lower density suburban tracts and Amstelveen, a relatively middle class city bordering Amsterdam. The starkest shifts were, however, among the unemployed households (3c), as their share among the movers decreased across Amsterdam, barring some exceptions. Instead, particularly the new town of Almere, as well as Purmerend and Wormerland, have seen a strong increase in unemployed households among movers. While such satellite towns were for a long time typical (lower-) middle class milieus, these maps show that they are increasingly catering to different low income groups.

In the Rotterdam region, the working poor can be seen as strongly urbanized: Figure 7.3d shows that the actual number of working poor households moving to tracts outside the city were often very low (<10 per year). An exception is Schiedam, a city directly bordering Rotterdam to the west, that saw substantial increases in working poor residents, especially in pre-war neighbourhoods with a large share of often low quality private rental dwellings. Within Rotterdam, increases generally concentrated in neighbourhoods in the west (Delfshaven), where the housing stock is dominated by cheap rental dwellings. Strong increases were also found in low status neighbourhoods on the city's south bank, particularly in those neighbourhoods where the controversial 'Rotterdam Act' has been in force since 2006. This act forbids unemployed newcomers from settling in these neighbourhoods. Consequently, the cheap rental stock mainly attracts households that are employed but have a (very) low income. Regarding the moving patterns of low-to-middle income households, we can see generally decreasing shares in Rotterdam's central city and gentrification hotspots (Katendrecht), as well as its higher status peripheral tracts (Hillegersberg). Increases can be found in filtering peripheral tracts of the city (e.g. Prins Alexander) and bordering higher density areas (e.g. Capelle aan den IJssel). For unemployed households we see similar patterns, with the strongest increases in Prins Alexander as well as in tracts in the surrounding region (e.g. Hellevoetsluis, Lansingerland).

FIGURE 7.3A.

FIGURE 7.3B.

FIGURE 7.3C.

FIGURE 7.3D.

FIGURE 7.3E.

FIGURE 7.3F.

FIGURES 7.3A-F. Percentage point (pp) change in the share of working poor (Figure 7.3a Amsterdam & 3d Rotterdam), low-to-middle income (3b Amsterdam & 3e Rotterdam), and unemployed (3c Amsterdam & 3f Rotterdam) households among (in-)movers per postcode tract between 2004 and 2013. *Source:* Social Statistics Database; own adaptation. Base map: IRIS international.

Direct and indirect suburbanization of poverty

To gain a better grip on the overarching trend of poverty suburbanization, and how it comes about, it is imperative to look at where these moves originated from. Table 7.3 shows the percentage point change in the share of the different low income household types among movers between 2004 and 2013, differentiating according to area of origin (i.e. address in the previous year). For Amsterdam we find a clear *direct* suburbanization of poverty. Low income households move less within the central city, and more from the central city to the region. While the share of low-to-middle income and unemployed households moving within the central city decreased between 2004 and 2013 (-1.7 and -3.8 percentage point respectively), their share did increase among the total number of moves from the central city to the surrounding region (+1.5 and +3.5 respectively). The share of working poor households among movers within the central city did increase (+0.7), but the increase was substantially stronger among movers from the central city to the periphery or region (+2.7 and +2.8 respectively). However, crucially we also see a suburbanization of poverty through indirect exclusionary mechanisms. Generally speaking, the

share of low income households among movers into the central city – whether they come from the urban periphery, the surrounding region, or outside the region – also decreased (or in the case of working poor households, increased at a relatively slow rate for the central city). In contrast, their share increased among movers to the urban region. A direct suburbanization of poverty is thus being complemented by an indirect suburbanizing trend that functions through exclusionary measures.

For Rotterdam we find similar trends as in Amsterdam, but both the direct and indirect exclusionary suburbanization of poverty are more subdued. For instance, the share of unemployed households among movers within the central city even slightly increased (+0.1 percentage point), though it increased at a much stronger rate in both the urban periphery (+6.5) and surrounding region (+3.2). Nevertheless, here too we find a relative increase in low income households moving from the central city to the periphery and region, as well as increasing shares of those moving from elsewhere settling outside the central city.

Amsterdam and region				Rotterdam and region			
Origin ↓	Destination →			Origin ↓	Destination →		
Working poor	**Central**	**Peripheral**	**Region**	**Working poor**	**Central**	**Peripheral**	**Region**
Central city	0.7	2.7	2.8	Central city	2.3	2.1	2.4
Peripheral city	3.6	4.5	3.7	Peripheral city	2.8	2.3	2.3
Region	3.8	5.9	1.8	Region	1.1	3.5	2.4
Outside region	1.5	3.8	3.4	Outside region	1.5	2.7	2.6
Total	1.4	4.4	2.6	Total	2.1	2.7	2.5
Low-to-middle	**Central**	**Peripheral**	**Region**	**Low-to-middle**	**Central**	**Peripheral**	**Region**
Central city	-1.7	-1.1	1.5	Central city	-1.4	-0.5	0.9
Peripheral city	-2.6	1.2	5.0	Peripheral city	-1.6	1.6	3.3
Region	-3.1	-0.2	2.0	Region	-0.7	3.3	2.1
Outside region	-0.5	-0.3	2.3	Outside region	0.2	1.1	1.6
Total	-1.5	-0.2	2.0	Total	-1.0	1.0	1.5
Unemployed	**Central**	**Peripheral**	**Region**	**Unemployed**	**Central**	**Peripheral**	**Region**
Central city	-3.8	-0.8	3.5	Central city	0.1	6.5	3.2
Peripheral city	-4.8	-0.5	2.7	Peripheral city	2.3	1.2	7.5
Region	1.6	0.5	1.6	Region	-0.1	5.6	1.7
Outside region	-2.0	-3.4	-0.2	Outside region	-1.8	-2.9	2.5
Total	-3.2	-2.1	1.1	Total	-1.0	1.0	1.5

TABLE 7.3. Percentage point change in the share of working poor, low-to-middle income, and unemployed households among (in-)movers per destination area between 2004 and 2013, divided according to area of origin. *Note:* (1) Destination areas are in columns, origin areas in rows. (2) Origin is the place of residence in the previous year. 'Outside region' are in-movers from elsewhere in the Netherlands or abroad.

Housing outcomes

Despite clear overall trends of a suburbanization of poverty and the decreasing accessibility and affordability of inner city environments, the findings also highlight important differences regarding the moving patterns of the three different low income groups, for example regarding destination housing tenure (Figure 7.4). Tenure mixing and the provision of social housing can lend an important counterweight to the structural and cyclical trends that are impacting housing affordability, and can sustain housing accessibility for lower incomes despite gentrification. Tenure outcomes are the result of the spatially variegated housing market structure, but also reflect households' housing position, opportunities, preferences, and constraints.

In both cities, but more so in Amsterdam, working poor households move comparatively more often to dwellings that they share with at least one other household. For the Amsterdam periphery, this is as high as 61%. This is likely the consequence of coping strategies that allow such households to find housing and also forms a tentative explanation as to why a relatively large share of working poor households is able to move into gentrifying inner city neighbourhoods. A considerable portion of the low-to-middle income households is moving into owner-occupation – although this share is relatively low in central Amsterdam (9%), reflecting generally high house prices. The more affordable owner-occupied stock in Amsterdam's surrounding region and in Rotterdam overall continues to offer a larger group of low-to-middle income households the opportunity to buy. Unemployed households generally depend on social rental housing and only very rarely move into homeownership (2% or 3% per area). The fact that they are heavily overrepresented in the social rental sector indicates that these households may generally be in a more structurally low income position compared to the other groups that may be more socially mobile.

Although these data do not give insight into preferences, they do generally point to the importance of social rental housing in allowing low income households to continue to move to areas that would otherwise be unaffordable. Sharing as a coping strategy to overcome issues of affordability and accessibility also plays an important role in facilitating low income households' access to housing and neighbourhoods. Long average waiting times for social rental housing in Amsterdam (over nine years, but longer in popular areas) make such coping strategies important for outsiders (cf. Kadi & Musterd 2015). Comparing the two cities, it is interesting to note that a larger share of low income households moves into owner-occupancy or social rental housing in Rotterdam. This reflects Rotterdam's lower house prices in the owner-occupied sector and shorter waiting times for social rental housing (average 3.5 years).

FIGURE 7.4. Tenure outcomes per low income group per area in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 2013. *Source:* Social Statistics Database; own adaptation.

Discussion and conclusion

Many major cities across Europe and other contexts are being marked by growing social-spatial inequalities as a consequence of, among other things, economic restructuring, policies of housing commodification, and governmental strategies pushing gentrification. The onset of the global financial crisis and related austerity measures have further amplified already existing trends towards greater inequalities (Tammaru et al. 2016). This chapter investigated a key aspect of changing social-spatial inequalities, namely the residential moving patterns of low income households, focusing specifically on gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty. It is important to note that our findings do not point to one uniform trend in both cities and in both pre-crisis and post-crisis times, nor is there one uniform trend for the different types of low income households. This conclusion will therefore not answer the main research questions on moving patterns (RQ1), boom-bust differences (RQ2), and between-city differences (RQ3) separately, but will rather integrate the answers into a cohesive overview.

Gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty in many ways represent a long-term reversal of fortunes for inner city areas, and these patterns have survived several economic boom and bust cycles. Although this chapter only investigated one boom and one bust period, it may be expected that as housing is liberalized and social rental dwellings converted into owner occupancy, the impacts of financial crises and housing market fluctuations will become greater. It is important to consider the changing role of urban

politics in relation to these housing market shifts. As more market-oriented urban policies are rolled out, not least state-led gentrification (Peck & Tickell 2002; Smith 2002), older policies aimed at mitigating socio-economic divisions are being gradually eroded. Urban policies cast inner cities as the 'natural' location to accommodate the actual and desired growth of new middle class residents flocking to the city (Uitermark 2009; Van Gent 2013). Central neighbourhoods are selectively targeted for state-led gentrification, for example through tenure conversions from rental to owner-occupied, as was discussed in Chapter 2. Lower income households are increasingly confined to a shrinking social rental sector or affordable segments of the owner-occupied sector, and to low status or declining neighbourhoods. As these policies progress, the suburbanization of poverty is likely to take on ever more prominent forms.

Although in both cities gentrification constitutes an essential tool in the policymakers' toolkit (see Uitermark et al. 2007; Van den Berg 2012; Uitermark 2009; Van Gent 2013), the process itself is much more pervasive in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam. Amsterdam is more integrated in global capital circuits and labour markets (Engelen & Musterd 2010; Tammaru et al. 2016). In combination with the presence of multiple large universities and polytechnics, this ensures the city of a yearly batch of students moving to the city and graduates starting a career in it, pushing demand for housing in an already tight housing context. This also goes for Rotterdam, but to a lesser extent.

A key finding of this chapter is that when specifically focusing on low income residential moves, the stronger pervasiveness of gentrification in Amsterdam has much to do with its structural character in Amsterdam compared to its more cyclical trending in Rotterdam. While we can see that the 2008 crisis influenced gentrification processes in both cities, it did not simply lead to de-gentrification (cf. Hackworth & Smith 2001; Hedin et al. 2012; Lees & Bondi 1995). Gentrification is more prone to cyclical trends in Rotterdam: during the boom period, gentrification led to substantial decreases in the influx of low income households (similar to Amsterdam), but these were almost cancelled out during the subsequent bust. In Rotterdam's more relaxed housing context, gentrification processes tend to wax and wane during boom and bust times. In Amsterdam, the share of all low income household types decreased substantially in the central city during boom times, and this did not increase again during the post-crisis period, running counter to overarching trends of increasing poverty and unemployment. Thus during boom periods, gentrification can be seen to progress in both cities, but bust periods in particular lay bare the extent to which gentrification actually has a firm foothold in the city, and to which the process is structurally embedded in the city's economic development.

Focusing on the moving patterns of different types of low income households, we see different patterns. In general, the existing social rental sector continues to mitigate the exclusionary effects of gentrification. Notably, although the cities' inner urban zones have become more gentrified and housing less affordable and accessible, we also note an increase in urban working

poor households. These findings suggest that a large and growing group of working poor residents remain integral to the two cities' economic structures, despite overarching patterns of professionalization (Sassen 1991; Hamnett 1994). Although their incomes are very low, these households appear able to negotiate access to otherwise unaffordable or inaccessible housing through different coping strategies. Multiple households sharing one dwelling may be an important strategy that has received little attention in gentrification research. It does not represent direct or exclusionary displacement, but should rather be seen as a struggle to stay put, to gain access to housing, or to remain in certain neighbourhoods (also Newman & Wyly 2006). Among working poor households are included precariously (self-)employed – often relatively young – households. This could hint at new inequalities that cut through traditional class boundaries as a consequence of current labour market restructuring, but also of intergenerational disparities and the growing importance of intergenerational support in acquiring housing (Forrest & Hirayama 2015), especially in tight housing contexts and upmarket neighbourhoods (see Chapters 5 and 6).

A particularly large difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam exists regarding unemployed movers. While post-crisis trends in Amsterdam show relative stability and even a further decrease in unemployed in-movers in the central neighbourhoods, Rotterdam's crisis trends show substantial increases across the board. These differences need to be viewed in the light of both cities' different economic structures (Burgers & Musterd 2002). Employment in lower skilled manual labour shows long-term decreases in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, but in Rotterdam these jobs remain relatively more important. Such jobs are, however, facing structural decline through workforce professionalization (Hamnett 1994; Butler et al. 2008), and are also heavily impacted by economic cycles, which contributes to further decreases during periods of recession.

Inner city gentrification is mirrored by a parallel suburbanization of poverty in both investigated city regions. The question of where displaced groups move to has been a central concern – but difficult to answer question – in gentrification research (Slater 2009). We find that the changing residential moving patterns of low income groups are variegated. Apart from employing coping strategies, they are also increasingly moving to both the urban peripheries (the working poor) and the surrounding regions (the low-to-middle income and unemployed). Particularly those areas that already showed relatively negative trends before the crisis were the ones hardest hit by its onset. The higher density satellite and new towns originally built for the middle classes in particular have become the destinations for lower income households (also Tzaninis & Boterman 2014). Thus we see a rather 'bundled' suburbanization of poverty, as lower incomes concentrate in these areas.

Research on gentrification generally acknowledges the existence of different forms of direct and indirect (exclusionary) displacement (Slater 2009). Similarly, this chapter stresses that the suburbanization of poverty is not only the product of low income residents being displaced from the central city, but can also be the result of low income residents moving into suburban locations from elsewhere because they are no longer able to acquire housing

in the city centre. As such, gentrification also has a marked influence on residential moves within or to urban regions through exclusionary effects. In fact, it may be expected that as central cities continue to gentrify, the well of potential low income residents who could move directly from city to suburb will gradually dry up, making the suburbanization of poverty through exclusionary displacement all the more prominent. This chapter has found both a *direct* suburbanization of poor households moving from city to suburb, and a *broader* suburbanization of poverty caused not only by direct moves but also by broader indirect and exclusionary processes attributable to the increasing unaffordability and inaccessibility of central city locations. This broader process reflects the changing geography of urban regions marked by shifting socio-economic divides.

Finally, in this chapter we primarily focused on changing residential moving patterns rather than overall population change. Although Chapter 4 showed that residential moves do not necessarily drive neighbourhood change, they do form the nexus where issues of displacement, exclusion, housing affordability, and housing accessibility come to the fore and have their biggest impact. This is especially the case in contexts like the Netherlands, where tenant rights are relatively strong, protecting tenants in situ and providing an incentive to stay put. The focus on residential moves illuminates growing and important undercurrents that would otherwise have remained obscured or appeared relatively minor. Particularly trends that mark a reversal in the direction of development for neighbourhoods or areas are obscured by the large body of non-moving residents. When focusing on residential moves, it becomes apparent that gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty are forceful processes that both drive and reflect changes in the geography of urban regions.

CHAPTER 8 — Conclusions: Growing social-spatial inequalities

Gentrification processes are by now commonplace in most major cities, and may have significant implications in terms of social composition and geography. Gentrification is often considered the spatial expression of class inequalities (cf. Lees et al. 2008) and therefore assumed to be at odds with the ideal of the 'undivided city'. This dissertation has sought to establish how and to what extent gentrification processes actually influence urban social-spatial inequalities. It has done so by investigating the following overarching dual question: *How has gentrification been able to expand across space? And what is the impact of gentrification processes on social-spatial inequalities in urban regions?* In order to be able to answer these questions, it is necessary to look beyond the gentrifying neighbourhoods themselves, and instead focus on the role of gentrification within the broader urban-regional landscape.

Gentrification does not occur uniformly across space, but comes in a range of forms and expressions. Yet even though the process is able to take on different guises as it travels across space or time, its basic logics and the outcomes it produces may be highly similar; although the exact workings differ, the various forms of gentrification by definition contribute to a decreasing availability of affordable housing. It is therefore important to capture these different processes that fall under the banner of gentrification. Only by adding up the impact of the different forms of gentrification does it become possible to understand the process at the urban-regional level. Analyses that combine an urban-regional focus with a concomitant focus on the diversity of gentrification processes are therefore necessary to understand the impact of contemporary gentrification on social-spatial inequalities.

This dissertation has shown that gentrification influences social-spatial inequalities in a host of important ways. Based on comprehensive studies of gentrification in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the preceding chapters have shown that social-spatial inequalities are indeed shifting, and increasing, in both cities. Broadly speaking, gentrification processes play an important role in growing social-spatial inequalities, as centrally located neighbourhoods are remade into increasingly upmarket areas, while urban peripheries and suburban cores struggle. This dissertation has in particular focused on four specific dimensions of the link between gentrification and social-spatial inequalities, discussing the key findings and their theoretical implications. This conclusion therefore focuses on the following four key points. First, it considers the various roles of urban setting and policy context in either amplifying or mitigating the impact of gentrification. Second, it highlights the necessity of taking into account, from a demographic point of view, the various mechanisms that play a role in producing and reproducing social-spatial inequalities. Third, it stresses the increasingly pressing issue of divides that run along generational lines, but which are also handed over across generations. Fourth, it turns to a key challenge in gentrification scholarship by discussing the crucial but also complex role of displacement in its various forms.

The importance of urban and policy context

At various points in this dissertation, Amsterdam and Rotterdam have been compared. The two cities serve as contrasting cases: simply put, while Amsterdam constitutes a booming city, Rotterdam still struggles somewhat in the post-industrial economy. Consequently, the Amsterdam housing market is considerably tighter, which is also reflected in the magnitude and expression of gentrification processes. These different urban settings have an impact on the link between gentrification and social-spatial inequalities. To complicate matters, it is also important to acknowledge that the influence of urban context differs over time. Specifically, the difference between economic boom and bust periods comes to the fore. Finally, in assessing the role of urban context, it is key to zoom in on the role of urban policies, as Chapters Two and Three of this dissertation have done.

Urban context

In well performing urban contexts, high demand pressures and overspill ensure that gentrification progresses from one neighbourhood to the next. Consequently, gentrification spreads outward from the city's core like an oil stain – as the commonly used metaphor goes. Here, ongoing gentrification processes minimize housing affordability to such an extent that middle income households are also necessitated to opt for residential niches, propelling the spatial expansion of gentrification. In contexts of lower demand like Rotterdam, gentrification does not so much spread out across urban space but occurs much more unevenly and seemingly erratically, creating 'patchwork quilts' of gentrification (Chapter 4). Here it remains easier for households to adjust their housing situation to changes in socio-economic status, implying that households that achieve a higher income are better able to buy themselves into the city's already in-demand neighbourhoods. This limits the spatial reach of gentrification to those areas that possess the 'right characteristics' such as an attractive housing stock, or which are subject to intensive restructuring.

This matters for the link between gentrification and social-spatial inequalities. Because gentrification is spreading more vigorously in Amsterdam, it has a comparatively strong effect on the availability of affordable housing. This in turn confronts households with relatively strong exclusionary forces as the accessibility of the housing stock rapidly decreases, especially for outsiders to the housing market who struggle to get in (cf. Kadi & Musterd 2015) or for households that need to move, for instance due to an altered household composition or employment situation. Spatially, this leads to divides between an upgrading core and a struggling periphery. In Rotterdam, the patchwork form of gentrification processes leads to social-spatial divides that are not as clearly demarcated – there is no clear centre-periphery divide – but exist at finer grained scales nonetheless. In fact, because households in low demand contexts are better able to match their housing situation to their socio-economic status, this leads to starker differences between neighbourhoods – i.e. to more homogeneous areas in terms of income.

As this dissertation has shown, contextual differences regarding the effects of gentrification on social-spatial inequalities most clearly crystallized

in the post-2008 crisis landscape (Chapter 7). Although gentrification in Amsterdam was certainly not immune to the global financial crisis, it did prove relatively crisis resistant in terms of ongoing exclusionary displacement, despite plummeting real estate prices. Even during the crisis when unemployment and poverty levels rapidly increased in the Netherlands overall, the influx of low income residents into Amsterdam's gentrifying neighbourhoods either remained stable or decreased even further. This points to the structural and crisis resistant underpinnings of gentrification in contexts where demand for housing is high. Individual downward mobility here does not so much translate into neighbourhood level downgrading, but instead triggers a spatial shift of such households to the remaining reservoirs of affordability, such as post-war housing estates or suburban new towns. In lower demand contexts, gentrification processes typically have a weaker foothold and are therefore more prone to cyclical trends – as is the case in Rotterdam. More relaxed housing markets and lower prices may make neighbourhoods susceptible to crisis shocks, which might set in motion socio-economic downgrading processes that overtake incipient gentrification processes. This would allow low income residents to again move in in greater numbers.

Policy context

This dissertation confirms the crucial importance of gentrification as state policy. Housing interventions frequently play a central role in state policies that aim to spark or spur gentrification processes, especially in contexts where a large portion of the housing stock is regulated (Van Weesep 1994). How state involvement in gentrification *changes over time*, and how this has *variegated spatial impacts*, is, however, rarely considered. Chapter 2 provided a rare insight into how gentrification as state policy is able to mutate. In Amsterdam, a triple shift in urban policies was found. First, the demise of social rent has accelerated over time, indicating that gentrification as a state-led process has become more forceful. Second, policy focus has shifted from urban renewal and the accompanying demolition of older social rental stock, to the sale of existing social rental dwellings. This shift has become especially apparent since the onset of the crisis, though it had been set in motion beforehand. Third, and perhaps most importantly, these shifts are accompanied by a changing geography: urban renewal strategies were typically concentrated in post-war neighbourhoods, while social housing sales are increasingly concentrated in centrally located neighbourhoods where demand for housing is high. This documented change relates to broader questions regarding the contextual and temporal contingency of state-led gentrification.

In addition to social housing sales, housing associations are increasingly renting out dwellings in the rent liberalized housing sector, as Chapter 2 has highlighted. This constitutes a rapidly growing niche in the tight Amsterdam housing context and contributes to rental gentrification. The sale or rent liberalization of former social rental dwellings is frequently legitimized by pointing to the need to cater to an otherwise underserved group of middle income households, as discussed in Chapter 3. In policies and public debates, these households are often portrayed as highly educated, young, and

upwardly mobile, and which are ineligible for social rent but do not (yet) earn enough to buy into Amsterdam's more expensive owner-occupied segments. Such a conceptualization is reminiscent of the 'marginal gentrifier', which Rose (1996: 134) has defined as "certain fractions of the new middle class who [are] highly educated but only tenuously employed or modest earning professionals". By selling off social housing at comparatively low prices or by renting it out in the liberalized sector, the local state and housing associations argue that they are helping a population group otherwise struggling on the housing market. In a way, the relatively marginal character of these new in-movers – young but upwardly mobile – is used by policymakers to downplay the intensity of the gentrification processes taking place. This allows stakeholders in Amsterdam to explicitly represent gentrification as a positive policy instrument that contributes to a normalization of the housing stock, is important for Amsterdam's attractiveness as a place to live – especially for the middle classes – and increases the city's international competitiveness (cf. Harvey 1989).

National policies play an important role in prompting these shifts, producing spatially uneven impacts despite nationwide application. Under crisis conditions, states in a range of contexts have discontinued, or seriously cut back on, funding for integrated renewal. Other austerity measures further chip away at the heart of social housing by imposing restrictions and financial burdens on social housing providers, pushing them to scale back their operations. Across countries, such political and austerity decisions have triggered a shift away from integrated renewal. This points to a broader trend: cash-strapped states, unable to undertake capital intensive integrated approaches, may instead feel that they have to resort to efforts to accommodate and accelerate 'positive' market forces in order to be able to intervene at all. Gentrification is seen as one of the few policy options that is still affordable as a means of creating social mixing in disadvantaged areas. Likewise, the liberalization or sale of social housing is presented as a pure necessity for the financial continuity of social housing providers and the viability of social rent. Austerity and state restructuring therefore in fact push gentrification as a 'no alternative' policy instrument (Chapter 3). This is, however, also related to the Dutch urban context. As Chapter 3 has shown, in Berlin gentrification is a much more contested term and as such is downplayed as an important policy instrument by local actors.

These different types of policy privilege different areas. Urban policies that seek to capitalize on market processes will by definition be more oriented towards areas where market demand is already burgeoning. The likely consequence is that already existing gentrification processes will be accommodated and amplified. There is of course also a spatial flipside to this, as governments increasingly struggle to intervene in disadvantaged, low demand areas because funding for renewal has dried up. These spatially uneven policies are liable to have particular consequences on social-spatial inequalities. Certainly, regardless of location, state-led gentrification will by definition lead to a loss of affordable dwellings. Policies that focus on accommodating gentrification in already in demand areas will, however, also amplify already

existing or emerging divides between areas of privilege and disadvantage; in other words, producing notably sharper social-spatial divides (cf. Uitermark & Bosker 2014). This particular shift, as documented in Amsterdam, may hold true for a wider range of contexts where market forces can easily be mobilized to spur gentrification. Here, gentrification can be accommodated through low cost interventions such as the piecemeal sale of social housing or the support for specific amenities. Findings from Rotterdam signal that in lower demand contexts, such low cost market-enabling policies are insufficient to spark gentrification. This potentially makes state-led gentrification efforts in low demand contexts more vulnerable: the greater the reliance on intensive interventions, the more prone state-led gentrification is to crisis effects and austerity.

Understanding variegated population dynamics

Gentrification processes are commonly conceptualized as materializing primarily through residential moves, as higher income residents move in at the cost of displaced or excluded lower income residents. The dominant perception is that new waves of in-movers possess notably higher incomes than the neighbourhood average. Using novel methods to unravel population composition change, this dissertation challenges this perception. Chapter 4 of this dissertation 'anatomized' neighbourhood population composition change in order to establish the isolated influence of residential moves, *in situ* social mobility, and the ageing of successive population cohorts. It showed that there is not one decisive mode of neighbourhood population change; rather, residential moves tell only part of the story. Only by looking beyond residential moves does it become possible to understand the true spatial reach of gentrification.

A variety of gentrification processes coexist within a city, producing a spatially variegated gentrification landscape. In already expensive or gentrified neighbourhoods, residential moves are the most important drivers of socio-economic population composition change, thus staying closest to dominant perceptions of gentrification processes. Due to the exclusive character of these neighbourhoods' housing stock – high levels of homeownership combined with high house prices – new residents must have access to substantial economic capital in order to buy into these neighbourhoods. In cities' most exclusive residential spaces, this may ultimately result in forms of 'super gentrification' (cf. Butler & Lees 2006), where the hottest property is snapped up by the wealthy elites and those with top incomes. Longer-term residents leaving these neighbourhoods more often have lower incomes.

In low status gentrifying neighbourhoods, however, residential moves are typically not the driving force behind gentrification. Instead, *in situ* social mobility and demographic shifts are more important mechanisms. *In situ* social mobility – income gains achieved while staying within a neighbourhood – play a particularly prominent role in driving early gentrification in erstwhile low status neighbourhoods. Such social mobility should not, however, be attributed to changes in the situation of long-term residents who were previously living in poverty; instead, they should be considered the consequence of selective mobility patterns. These neighbourhoods are a common destination for

upwardly mobile residents, who nevertheless earn a low income upon entering the neighbourhood (cf. Rose 1984, 1996). Once achieving mobility, these residents will typically move on. Such gentrifying neighbourhoods therefore function as escalators for such residents, partly because of selective residential mobility, but also because these neighbourhoods may endow inhabitants with locational advantages such as proximity to jobs and amenities (Rérat & Lees 2011). These advantages do not exist for all, with the long-term population generally unable to benefit. Hence we should understand neighbourhoods of (early) gentrification as *selective* escalators, accommodating and facilitating the upward social mobility of a select group of residents. Chapter 5 explained how specific groups of low income but upwardly mobile residents are able to acquire housing in such neighbourhoods, a point I will return to below.

Demographic shifts, notably the gradual phasing out of ageing working class residents from gentrifying neighbourhoods, are particularly important in driving socio-economic population change in a select number of low income neighbourhoods dominated by social rental housing and an elderly population. Because residential turnover rates in such areas tend to be low, neighbourhood change often takes place through demographic succession: through deaths and moves into retirement homes, social rental dwellings are vacated in dribs and drabs. The subsequent sale or liberalization of these dwellings (see Chapter 2) facilitates market dynamics to take hold in such neighbourhoods, gradually driving gentrification combined with a quite literal rejuvenation of the neighbourhood population. This demographic mode of neighbourhood population change constitutes a concrete spatial expression of 'professionalization' (Hamnett 1994a, 1994b, 2003). Older blue collar workers 'disappear' from the labour force and are succeeded by younger age cohorts that are by and large higher educated, have a higher income, and/or are more upwardly mobile.

Studies that focus only on neighbourhoods where affluent residents move in and disadvantaged residents move out capture only part of the gentrification processes taking place. Even though this form comes closest to the popular understanding of gentrification and may indeed produce the 'harshest' outcomes in terms of displacement, failing to incorporate other forms leads to a serious underestimation of the total footprint of gentrification. Other forms of gentrification may in fact be more common and as such have a more pronounced effect on the social geography of cities. Conceptually, this implies that debates about whether gentrification processes reflect displacement or replacement (see Hamnett 2003; Butler et al. 2009; Slater 2006, 2009) are not mutually exclusive. Instead, this study has shown that displacement and replacement occur alongside each other, at the same time but in different neighbourhoods. Likewise, it is imperative to consider the intersection of demography, life course, and class to understand the key role of young upwardly mobile residents in driving specific forms of gentrification that are not directly visible when comparing the income levels of in-movers, non-movers, and out-movers (see Van Criekingen & Decroly 2003).

It is not only gentrification processes but also social-spatial inequalities that are shaped and reshaped by the different mechanisms of population

change. The downgrading processes that take place in downmarket neighbourhoods also occur through various mechanisms. As gentrification expands and permeates into ever more neighbourhoods, the remaining struggling low status neighbourhoods increasingly come to function as reservoirs of affordability. They absorb the low income residents displaced or excluded elsewhere. Relatively often, these are the low income residents that are also the most vulnerable – in times of economic crisis, for example – and hence prone to downward mobility. Social-spatial polarization between successful gentrifying areas in urban cores and struggling peripheral locations is becoming increasingly accentuated; and if not always in terms of static analyses of indicators such as housing prices or population composition, then certainly in the direction of development. But this is not simply due to residential moves and displacement; the spatially uneven impacts of demographic change and social mobility also play their part.

Growing generational divides

Inequalities between generations

This dissertation has shown that increasingly prominent social-spatial inequalities are emerging along generational lines. In the last decade, intergenerational disparities are reported to be on the rise, especially since the onset of the global financial crisis. Housing markets are increasingly geared towards serving 'prime households' (Forrest & Hirayama 2015), i.e. those households that have a high income, are securely employed, and in possession of other assets. Such prime households disproportionally belong to older generations that have on average a more secure labour market position and have been able to access housing in general, and homeownership specifically, under better terms and conditions. Those that bought have often been able to accumulate substantial housing assets through long-term house price inflation. Young people, on the other hand, struggle to enter homeownership (McKee 2012) and increasingly end up experiencing complex and insecure housing pathways (Clapham et al. 2014). Labour market restructuring has exacerbated employment insecurities, especially among younger generations, and these are amplified by the global financial crisis. These developments pose barriers for young middle class households to suburbanize or buy into gentrified segments of urban housing markets. Early life course and residential trajectories are thus further destabilized, resulting in the extension of a transitory life phase. Under such conditions, processes of marginal gentrification thrive. Despite heightened insecurities, young middle class households are often able to negotiate access to housing in desirable neighbourhoods, for instance by trading in security of tenure or by sharing housing (Hochstenbach & Boterman 2015). This dissertation therefore shows that the concept of marginal gentrification can usefully be linked to debates about intergenerational inequalities and the rise of a 'generation rent' (McKee 2012; Pattison 2016).

Chapter 6 established the rise of new forms of rental gentrification in Amsterdam, as the private rental sector increasingly serves those – often young – households unable or unwilling to buy. This sector has come into the crosshairs of investors looking to supply more upmarket rental dwellings.

This trend is also pushed by states seeking to accommodate middle income upwardly mobile households (Chapter 3). While the role of rental housing in gentrification has long been recognized, and is closely related to marginal gentrification (Van Criekingen 2010), the emerging situation in Amsterdam is different. The current rise of rental gentrification is, in a way, a new phenomenon that follows in the footsteps of homeownership gentrification – long the dominant and expanding mode of gentrification in Dutch cities due to the highly regulated character of rental housing. It is part of a broader reversal of fortunes for market rent that has been taking place since the global financial crisis. In fact, up until the crisis, private rental housing had been subject to decades of decline. Market oriented restructuring has made rental housing more attractive for investment, for individual households and larger investors alike (cf. Fields & Uffer 2016; Beswick et al. 2016; Ronald & Kadi 2016). Furthermore, contemporary rental gentrification should be linked, on the one hand, to the growing demand from young middle class households unable or unwilling to buy, while on the other hand, tenure is increasingly expensive, as it is repackaged and promoted as part of a flexible urban lifestyle aimed at a higher income clientele (cf. Davidson 2007). The spatial dimensions of the rise of expensive private rental housing clearly exposes its links to mature forms of gentrification.

We have thus arrived at a new housing situation: private rent is becoming increasingly upmarket and exclusive, but it also makes use of households' inability to buy. This dissertation has shown that some households can be considered marginal gentrifiers despite their relatively high income due to their insecure employment relations. Although employment insecurities and low wages often go hand in hand, this thesis has shown that temporary contracts have also become more common among higher income gentrifier households – especially younger households – suggesting that intergenerational inequalities cut through other dividing lines. Such insecurities impede access to homeownership despite otherwise high incomes. Likewise, young single person households earning a relatively high income are unable to compete with dual-earner households or the older prime households on the housing market. Thus despite their relatively high income, such households may be pushed into the rental housing market.

The intergenerational transmission of inequalities

Growing generational divides are, in turn, also translated into the increasing prominence of the reproduction of such divides across generations. Chapter 5 singled out the fact that relatively many young people leaving the parental home – so-called 'fledglings' – manage to gain access to housing in some of most expensive or rapidly gentrifying neighbourhoods in urban areas. This is despite their predominantly very low incomes, raising the question of how this is possible. Although the chapter focused on a very specific group, this question resonates more broadly: how do young 'marginal gentrifiers' on a low income gain access to gentrifying neighbourhoods in the first place, prior to achieving upward mobility? Apart from the provision of regulated housing as well as the sharp trade-offs young people are often willing to make, this

dissertation highlights the crucial importance of parental background, and particularly parental wealth. The majority of fledglings with wealthy parents move to Amsterdam's high status or gentrifying neighbourhoods, while many fledglings with asset-poor parents move to the city's low status peripheral neighbourhoods. This intergenerational transmission of inequalities takes place through various direct and indirect mechanisms. For one, parental, class, and neighbourhood background shape dispositions and expectations related to urban space (Smith & Holt 2007). In other words, background shapes preferences for certain types of living and certain residential environments. Furthermore, parents can lend non-financial support, e.g. by providing access to resourceful social networks. And last but not least, parents can provide substantial direct financial support. It is particularly this latter mechanism, I argue, that should be given more consideration in gentrification research.

Parental wealth constitutes an increasingly crucial factor that enables young people to acquire housing in gentrifying or gentrified neighbourhoods, as Chapter 5 has shown. Parents may provide financial support to help their children get ahead on the housing market. They can do so through the purchase of property, by making a down payment to help in the acquisition of a mortgage, or by helping to cover monthly rent or other living expenses. When parents (help) purchase property, this not only constitutes a social reproduction strategy or a form of intergenerational solidarity, but is a financial investment strategy as well. Households are increasingly regarded as 'investor subjects' for whom housing is an important financial asset to be strategically managed, and serves to augment other incomes (Langley 2006; Doling & Ronald 2010). An ageing group of 'prime' households is channelling accumulated capital into the urban housing market, for example in the form of buying property for their children. The purchase of urban apartments for pieds-à-terre or holiday rentals reflects the same strategic value. States facilitate such investments as part of strategies aimed at what has been dubbed 'privatised Keynesianism' (Crouch 2009): by making investments more attractive – e.g. by providing tax exemptions for intergenerational support – states attempt to unleash private wealth onto housing markets to spur investment. Given the crucial and growing importance of parental support for first-time buyers, the magnitude of such financial strategies should not be underestimated. Furthermore, because young middle class households are increasingly prolonging an urban orientation, parental support will often be directed towards urban areas, especially gentrifying neighbourhoods. These are the types of neighbourhoods typically preferred by the young middle classes, but are also the most attractive for investment due to anticipated house price inflation. The household as an investor subject should be considered a part of fourth wave gentrification, which is characterized by, among other things, the financialization of housing (Lees et al. 2008).

In sum, this study has innovatively shown not only how parental support lends access to certain housing segments, but also how it has clear spatial repercussions. Crudely put, it forges spatial segregation between young people based on class background, producing divides between the 'opportunity poor' and 'opportunity rich' already early on in the life course. It is

time for gentrification research to engage with intergenerational capital flows, considering the fact that they have become an important contributor to the exacerbation of social-spatial inequalities. Parental wealth thus flows via their children into gentrifying neighbourhoods, directly contributing to rising real estate prices and rent levels, and thus advancing gentrification processes. Acknowledging the importance of parental support also requires making further amendments to the figure of the marginal gentrifier. Although marginal gentrifiers typically start off on a relatively low income, this dissertation has shown that they may have other important sources of economic capital to draw on – especially if they are from well-to-do backgrounds. Parental capital augments the relatively low incomes of the young marginal gentrifiers themselves, allowing them to shoulder higher housing costs. This in turn enables them to outbid other households in a weaker socio-economic position. If access to homeownership becomes even more restricted – e.g. due to house price increases, stricter mortgage lending practices, and/or labour market flexibilization – the importance of parental support will increase along the life course. In that case, it will not only be students, recent graduates, or other still relatively marginal households that will have to draw on parental support, but also households in a more mature phase of life.

The social-spatial impacts of displacement

Displacement

A longstanding and elusive concern of gentrification research is what happens to lower income residents confronted with different forms of gentrification-induced displacement (cf. Marcuse 1986). Through displacement, gentrification has a deep and disruptive impact on the lives of disadvantaged populations. Although Chapter 4 has shown that residential moves do not necessarily drive neighbourhood change, they do represent the nexus where constraints related to displacement, exclusion, and housing affordability and accessibility take centre stage and have their strongest potential impact. Displacement – direct as well as exclusionary – not only impacts the life courses and residential opportunities of low income residents, but is also a crucial concept to understand how and to what extent neighbourhood-level gentrification processes reshape the social geography of entire city regions. To understand the scale, role, and impact of displacement, Chapter 7 analysed the effects of gentrification on the residential behaviour of low income residents, providing novel insight into how displacement processes map out in urban space.

Gentrification reshapes urban-regional social-spatial inequalities in profound ways. The overarching trends that we found are best described as the suburbanization of poverty (Hulchanski 2010; Cooke & Denton 2015). This is, however, far from a uniform process; rather, various subtleties are at work. Importantly, the suburbanization of poverty is not only a direct process of poor residents moving from the city to the suburbs. Gentrification also influences residential moves within or to urban regions through exclusionary effects. As central city locations grow increasingly unattainable, lower income households will increasingly opt to move to suburban locations in the first instance, bypassing the central city altogether. In a way, gentrification sets in

motion both a direct suburbanization of the poor and a broader more indirect shift of poverty towards the outskirts of cities. It should be emphasized that in both cases indirect exclusionary displacement is likely to be the main driver – especially in highly regulated housing contexts like the Netherlands, where tenant rights are well enshrined, tenancy thus more secure, and evictions relatively limited.

A variegated suburbanization of poverty

It should be emphasized that low income residents constitute a heterogeneous group that is affected by gentrification and displacement in various ways. Chapter 7 distinguished between unemployed, working poor, and low-to-middle income households; different socio-economic sub-groups that show divergent residential moving patterns. Working poor households in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam typically do not suburbanize to the region but instead are increasingly moving to peripheral locations, often post-war housing estates. They also frequently employ coping strategies that allow them to remain in the central city, for instance sharing a dwelling among multiple households. Such strategies and moving patterns relate to Sassen's polarization thesis (1991): working poor households are frequently in rather precarious employment positions, and consequently seek to locate close to opportunity rich labour markets, even if this means high rent burdens or precarious living arrangements. Furthermore, the relatively young working poor often do not have a sufficient number of years on the waiting list to be able to acquire secure social rental housing. Unemployed households in contrast *are* increasingly suburbanizing to the region, and especially to already struggling areas that were hit hardest by the crisis. These are often higher density satellite and new towns, originally built for the middle classes. Low-to-middle income households are also increasingly moving to such areas but, taken as a whole, are more spread out across the region, reflecting their slightly better socio-economic prospects, which allow them to buy property in certain areas where the housing market is more relaxed.

The question is whether shifting social-spatial inequalities – e.g. the suburbanization of poverty – translate into *worsening* social-spatial inequalities. Gentrification may, at least initially, dampen segregation, as it entails the middle classes moving into erstwhile low income neighbourhoods and thereby mixing the neighbourhood (cf. Musterd & Van Gent 2016). Likewise, suburban locations in many ways remain comparatively middle class, despite signs of downgrading. The suburbanization of poverty will therefore often lead to a more even distribution of low income households across space, implying that the aggregate scores on segregation indicators will go down. I would argue, however, that segregation indicators are not up to the task of gauging social-spatial inequalities, especially in the face of neighbourhood gentrification. Decreasing segregation levels, as measured by such indices, may suggest that gentrification functions as a great equalizing force, obscuring the fact that it does so by constraining the housing position of low income residents, diminishing their overall housing opportunities. Segregation indices also obscure the fact that even though gentrification may initially suppress

segregation levels, after a certain turning point it will produce starker spatial divisions – all the while constantly reducing the housing options available to disadvantaged residents.

I argue that it is more fruitful to establish whether lower income residents are able to access or remain in neighbourhoods with high or rapidly increasing housing values, as this provides better insight into the extent to which emergent areas of privilege remain accessible to lower income residents despite encroaching gentrification. Following this approach, this dissertation illuminates how social-spatial inequalities are in fact worsening, with lower income residents increasingly moving into struggling areas in the urban fringes or suburban cores. These are far from absolute trends, with some low income residents, in particular the working poor, aiming to remain in more expensive central locations. The enduring presence of low income residents, however, does not signal that the harmful effects of gentrification are absent or limited (Newman & Wyly 2006). For one thing, while social rental housing and protective policies do enable low income groups to stay put, it is nevertheless these very protective measures that are being undermined by contemporary urban policies that seek to spur gentrification through housing liberalization and re-regulation (Wyly et al. 2010). Furthermore, in order to stay put or to acquire housing in particular areas, low income residents must employ various coping strategies, accept precarious living arrangements, and/or shoulder increasingly high rent burdens. Their enduring presence in gentrifying areas then is *despite* the exclusionary and displacement effects of gentrification, not evidence against the existence of displacement (cf. Newman & Wyly 2006).

The findings from this study highlight that it remains difficult to establish the extent to which gentrification processes actually contribute to shifting social-spatial inequalities. Although this dissertation has shown that gentrification constitutes an increasingly forceful process of urban change with notable exclusionary effects, it must also be acknowledged that a degree of uncertainty regarding the precise effects continues to exist. Gentrification is not the only process influencing these inequalities. A host of other processes are also at work, producing and reproducing social-spatial inequalities in often complex ways. Furthermore, gentrification has both direct and indirect effects, which remain difficult to disentangle. It therefore continues to be important to conduct research into the key links between gentrification and social-spatial inequalities within urban systems. Doing so will require us to develop new approaches to track gentrification over space and time, and to follow those residential groups excluded or displaced due to gentrification.

In sum, this dissertation has shown how city centre neighbourhoods are increasingly becoming areas of privilege. The city, and in many ways also contemporary urban policies, are becoming ever more accommodating to middle class residential trajectories. Spatially, this is expressed in the form of variegated gentrification processes that expand across urban space. It should be stressed that not one form of gentrification is necessarily *softer* than another. Although the different gentrification processes are underpinned by different logics, a common denominator is the decrease in housing opportunities for lower income groups. Only by considering the different forms and expressions

of gentrification in conjoint fashion can the substantial impact of gentrification on the reshaping of social-spatial inequalities come to the fore.

The social-spatial consequence of ongoing gentrification in different forms is that low income residents increasingly have to resort to the remaining bastions of affordability in the urban peripheries, or leave the city altogether to settle in struggling new towns. Although poor residents may very well appreciate living in these locations, the changing residential moving patterns should primarily be considered the outcome of a decrease in housing options. Those low on the socio-economic ladder have to settle for less, for what is left behind. In classic models of filtering and middle class suburbanization, this used to be the struggling inner cities. With the deck of cards reshuffled, central areas have now become zones of privilege, while peripheral estates and suburban new towns are struggling. Gentrification has indeed become so influential that it does not merely lead to the reshuffling of urban social geographies, but it also deepens social-spatial divides in various profound ways.

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Summary

Inequality in the gentrifying European city

Gentrification – the transformation of urban space for more affluent users – is frequently attributed an important role in driving neighbourhood change in contemporary cities. However, considerably less attention goes out to the wider social-spatial impact of the process. Because gentrification has transformed into a widespread and mainstream process, this is a crucial omission. The main aim of this dissertation is therefore to understand the impact of gentrification on social-spatial inequalities at the urban-regional level to the full extent.

It is often taken for granted that gentrification contributes to stronger social-spatial contrasts. At the neighbourhood level gentrification may eventually lead to a homogeneous affluent population composition. With the advance of gentrification, this would translate into a more polarized urban landscape with a gentrified core and struggling periphery where stronger poverty concentrations emerge. This dissertation seeks to move beyond this simplified perspective, and aims to unravel the impact of gentrification on social-spatial divides in various ways. To do so, this dissertation employs an innovative multi-scalar methodology. This methodology combines a bird's eye perspective to understand gentrification's social-spatial consequences at the urban-regional scale, with a close-up perspective to unravel the conceptual and spatial diversity of gentrification. In doing so, this dissertation understands gentrification as a highly diverse and malleable process, but also emphasizes that the basic underpinnings of these variegated gentrification processes and the outcomes it produces are typically highly similar. Only by considering the whole of these gentrification processes does it become possible to understand the magnitude of gentrification. Together the range of gentrification processes may play an important role in shaping and rearranging social-spatial inequalities along different dividing lines. This dissertation addresses this relationship by tackling the following dual research question:

How has gentrification been able to expand across space? What is the impact of gentrification processes on social-spatial inequalities in urban regions?

The main question is answered through a comparison of gentrification processes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, representing relatively more and less successful cities respectively, while both situated in the highly regulated Dutch housing context. The dissertation mainly draws on longitudinal quantitative analyses, using individual-level register data from the Dutch Social Statistics Database (Statistics Netherlands). The dissertation combines insights from six studies, each addressed in a separate chapter. These studies highlight various aspects of the link between gentrification and social-spatial inequalities. Chapters 2 and 3 set out the policy context and the "geography of state-led" gentrification. Urban policies are an important driver of contemporary gentrification, but it is important to consider where and how this is done. Chapter

4 investigates the range of mechanisms that produce population composition change as part of gentrification processes and changing social-spatial divides. In doing so, it questions the dominant view that residential moves are most important in changing population compositions and thereby driving gentrification. Only by taking into account other mechanisms of population change does the full impact of gentrification become apparent. Chapters 5 and 6 introduce new social-spatial dividing lines into the gentrification framework. Chapter 5 highlights the divides that are reproduced through the intergenerational transmission of resources: Parental support influences young people's neighbourhood outcomes and fuels gentrification. Chapter 6 subsequently turns to divides between generations. Especially younger generations face increasing constraints on the housing market and struggle to enter home-ownership. Finally, chapter 7 of this dissertation zooms in on the residential behaviour of low-income groups to understand how displacement and broader issues of housing affordability and accessibility are implicated in reshaping the social geography of city regions.

The importance of urban policy context (chapters 2 and 3)

In contemporary gentrification processes the state often plays a key role, as city governments aim to attract and retain more middle-class households. Although states may support gentrification in a number of ways, housing policies are often pivotal and this applies all the more to the highly-regulated Dutch housing context. Policies of tenure restructuring that seek to replace affordable social rent with more expensive rental or owner-occupied dwellings for the middle classes are part and parcel of state-led gentrification. Previous scholarship has therefore emphasized the close linkages between gentrification policies and social-mixing strategies. The Dutch state has traditionally invested heavily in housing policies that specifically target low-status, disadvantaged neighbourhoods where they aimed to spark gentrification processes to counteract market developments.

How state involvement in gentrification *changes over time,* and how this may have a differential spatial impact, is rarely considered. This dissertation provides insight into how gentrification as state policy may mutate. Focusing on changes in Amsterdam during the period 1999-2015, this dissertation highlights a triple shift. First, the decline of the social-rental stock has accelerated, indicating that gentrification as a state-led process has become more vigorous. Financial restrictions necessitate housing associations to sell part of their stock to generate income to continue their basic operations. Second, policy focus has shifted from urban renewal including large-scale demolition, to the sale of existing social-rental dwellings. Third, these shifts are accompanied by a changing geography. Urban renewal concentrated in struggling peripheral post-war neighbourhoods, but social-housing sales increasingly concentrate in central neighbourhoods where demand for housing is high. Rather than countering market developments in low-demand areas, states are thus increasingly involved in facilitating market upgrading in inner-city gentrification frontiers.

These shifts are stimulated by the global financial crisis, austerity measures, and welfare-state restructuring in general, making it more difficult to engage in costly renewal. The sale of social-rental housing represents a comparatively affordable alternative, and takes place in areas where market processes can be enabled. Interestingly, similar shifts cannot be discerned in Rotterdam, where the global financial crisis has in fact slowed down the decline of social rent. Although urban renewal also grinded to a halt here, it was not compensated by increasing social-housing sales, nor did the geography of tenure restructuring change. These differences can at least partially be ascribed to differences in housing demand and market pressures.

Housing associations also increasingly often rent out dwellings at market rate rents. This constitutes a rapidly growing niche market in the tight Amsterdam housing context, and contributes to the rental gentrification processes described above. The sale or marketization of social-rental dwellings is frequently legitimized by arguing it helps a group of "middle-income" households struggling on the housing market. In policies and public debates, these are often portrayed as young and upwardly-mobile households that are not able to buy at a premium. This comparatively marginal character of new in-movers is used by policymakers to downplay the intensity of gentrification processes taking place. More critical representations of gentrification instead stress structural class differences between these "marginal gentrifiers" and the lower-income sitting population – even if income differences may initially be limited.

Anatomizing variegated gentrification processes (chapter 4)

Moving from gentrification as urban policy to the social-spatial effects, chapter 4 of the dissertation has unravelled how gentrification may materialize in different forms in different neighbourhoods. Gentrification processes are commonly conceptualized as taking place primarily through residential moves, with higher-income residents moving in, and lower-income residents displaced or excluded. However, recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of *in situ* social mobility in driving neighbourhood change, while also demographic shifts – where one age cohort comes to replace the other – may be at work. Using population register data, this dissertation "anatomized" population composition change in Amsterdam and Rotterdam with the goal to assess the influence of residential moves, *in situ* social mobility, and demographic shifts. A second goal is to assess where these different mechanisms play their part.

There is not one decisive model of neighbourhood change, not even within a single urban context, or at any one time. Different forms of gentrification may coexist within a city, taking place in different types of neighbourhoods or, in some cases, even within the same neighbourhood. In already expensive or gentrified neighbourhoods, residential moves are the most important drivers of socio-economic population composition change, staying closest to dominant perceptions of gentrification processes. Due to the exclusive character of these neighbourhoods' housing stock – high levels of home-ownership combined with house prices – new residents need to have access to substantial stocks of economic capital to buy into these neighbourhoods.

However, in other neighbourhoods *in situ* social mobility and demographic shifts appear more important in driving gentrification. In situ social mobility refers specifically to income gains achieved within a neighbourhood, thereby driving socio-economic upgrading. This "model" of upgrading plays a particularly prominent role in erstwhile low-status neighbourhoods where gentrification processes are in a relatively early phase. Demographic shifts represent the ageing and succession of population cohorts which implies the gradual phasing out of older, working-class residents from gentrifying neighbourhoods with an ageing population and large social-rental stock. Because residential turnover rates tend to be low here, neighbourhood change takes place via succession: Following deaths and moves into retirement homes, the vacated social-rental dwellings are often brought onto the market.

Studies focusing solely on those neighbourhoods where high-income residents move in and low-income residents move out therefore only capture part of the gentrification processes taking place. Even if this is the most obvious and vigorous form of gentrification, failing to incorporate other forms leads to a serious underestimation of the impact of gentrification on cities and residents.

Intergenerational support fuelling gentrification (chapter 5)

Intergenerational inequalities are on the rise and, in turn, also translated in the increasing reproduction of socio-economic divides across generations. This dissertation shows that relatively many young people leaving the parental home, "fledglings", manage to gain access to some of the city's most expensive or fastest gentrifying neighbourhoods, despite their predominantly very low incomes. This raises the question how these fledglings manage to get housing in such neighbourhood. This question resonates more broadly, and is related to the importance of social mobility highlighted in chapter 4: how do young "marginal gentrifiers" on a low income gain access to gentrifying neighbourhoods in the first place, prior to achieving upward mobility?

This dissertation introduces the crucial importance of parental class and parental support in explaining neighbourhood outcomes and gentrification processes. Parental assets are key. The majority of fledglings with "wealthy" parents move to Amsterdam's high-status or gentrifying neighbourhoods, while fledglings with asset-poor parents typically move to low-status peripheral neighbourhoods. Various mechanisms may be at work here. Wealthy parents may provide substantial direct financial support to their offspring. Parents can buy for their children, make a down payment to help with the mortgage, or help cover rents or other expenses. Furthermore, parents may also lend non-financial support, such as resourceful social networks. These forms of support may be part of broader social reproduction strategies, as parents help their offspring on their way on the housing market and help them to access specific neighbourhoods. In addition, the purchase of a dwelling may also constitute an investment strategy by parents expecting to make windfall gains. Parental background may also have a more indirect and subtle effect on neighbourhood outcomes, by shaping preferences for the urban and specific neighbourhoods.

It is time for gentrification research to engage with the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Particularly direct financial support is key, as it may be an important contributor to exacerbating social-spatial inequalities. Parental wealth flows via their children into gentrifying neighbourhoods, contributing to inflating house prices and rents, thus advancing gentrification. Acknowledging the importance of parental support also requires to make reconsider the figure of the marginal gentrifier – especially if they are from well-to-do backgrounds. Parental capital augments the relatively low incomes of the young marginal gentrifiers themselves, allowing them to shoulder higher housing costs. This in turn enables them to outbid other households in a weaker socio-economic position, aggravating the displacement and exclusion engendered by gentrification.

Generational divides and the rise of rental gentrification (chapter 6)

Apart from the intergenerational transmission of inequalities, it is also important to consider broader divides between generations. Housing markets increasingly prioritize serving the financially powerful, i.e. those households that are high income, securely employed, and in possession of other assets. These households disproportionally belong to older generations, while young people on the other hand are faced with greater employment insecurities, an increasing inability to enter homeownership, and a greater reliance on capricious and insecure housing pathways. It is within this context that this dissertation has established the rise of new forms of rental gentrification in Amsterdam.

Rental housing has come to be in the crosshairs of investors looking to supply more upmarket rental dwellings. States encourage this as they seek ways to accommodate middle-income upwardly-mobile households, for example in the private-rental sector (chapters 2 and 3). The role of rental housing in driving specific forms of gentrification is not new, but the current rise of rental gentrification in Amsterdam *is* in a way a new phenomenon. Notably, it follows in the footstep of homeownership gentrification, long the dominant mode of gentrification in Dutch cities due to the highly regulated character of rent. It is part of a broader reversal of fortunes for market rent that has taken place since the global financial crisis. Up until the crisis private rental housing had experienced decades of decline. Contemporary rental gentrification should on the one hand be linked to the growing demand from young middle-class households unable or unwilling to buy. On the other hand, the tenure is increasingly expensive, aiming at a higher income clientele. The spatial dimensions of the rise of expensive private rental housing clearly exposes its links to mature forms of gentrification.

The above points to a remarkable combination: the rise of private rent is increasingly upmarket and exclusive, but is also the consequence of households' inability to buy. This dissertation therefore forwards that some households should be considered marginal gentrifiers regardless of their high income. This is due to labour-market insecurities. This dissertation shows that temporary contracts have also become more common among higher-income

gentrifier households – especially younger households, suggesting that inter-generational inequalities cut through other dividing lines. Such insecurities impede access to homeownership despite otherwise high incomes. Yet, they are still able to "spend" on housing, hence their move into more expensive rental forms.

Displacement: gentrification and the suburbanization of poverty (chapter 7)

A long-standing and elusive concern of gentrification research is what happens to the lower-income resident who are confronted with gentrification processes. Displacement, direct and exclusionary, may not only have a deep impact on the life courses and residential opportunities of low-income residents, but may also be important in reshaping the broader social geography of entire city regions. To understand the scale, role and impact of displacement, chapter 7 of this dissertation therefore analyses the effects of gentrification on the residential behaviour of low-income residents. This provides novel insights into how direct and indirect displacement processes map out in urban space, illuminating their important but complex social-spatial consequences.

Gentrification reshapes urban-regional social-spatial inequalities in profound ways. The overarching trends found are best described as a suburbanization of poverty. However, the suburbanization of poverty taking place is far from a uniform process; with various subtleties at work. Importantly, the suburbanization of poverty is not only a direct process of poor residents moving from the city to suburb. Gentrification also influences residential moves within or to urban regions through exclusionary effects. As central city locations grow increasingly unattainable, lower-income households may increasingly often opt to move to suburban locations a priori. In a way, gentrification sets in motion both a direct suburbanization of the poor and a broader more indirect suburbanization of poverty.

There is considerable diversity in outcomes between population groups though. Distinguishing between unemployed, working poor, and low-to-middle income households this dissertation finds rather different outcomes. Working-poor households typically do not suburbanize to the region but instead increasingly often move to peripheral locations in both cities, often post-war housing estates. They also frequently employ coping strategies that allow them to remain in the central city for instance by sharing a dwelling with multiple households. Unemployed households in contrast *do* increasingly suburbanize to the region, and especially to already struggling areas that were hit hardest by the crisis. These are often higher-density satellite and new towns, originally built for the middle classes. Low-to-middle income households also increasingly often move to these areas but, taken as a whole, spread out more across the region reflecting their slightly better social-economic prospects which may allow them to buy in certain areas where the housing market is more relaxed.

Concluding remarks

The question is whether shifting social-spatial inequalities – e.g. the suburbanization of poverty – translate into *worsening* social-spatial inequalities. Gentrification may, at least initially, dampen segregation as it entails middle classes moving into erstwhile low-income neighbourhoods thereby mixing the neighbourhood. Likewise, suburban locations in many ways remain comparatively middle class despite signs of downgrading. The suburbanization of poverty may therefore lead to a more even distribution of low-income households across space implying that the aggregate scores on segregation indicators would go down. From this perspective, gentrification may at first glance appear a great equalizing force, while obscuring that it does so by constraining the housing position of low-income residents, diminishing their overall housing opportunities. Furthermore, even though gentrification may initially suppress segregation levels, after a certain turning point it will produce starker spatial divisions – all the while constantly reducing the housing options available to disadvantaged residents. It may therefore be more fruitful to establish whether lower-income residents are able to access or remain in neighbourhoods with high or rapidly increasing housing values. This illuminates to what extent emergent areas of privilege remain accessible to lower-income residents despite gentrification. Indeed, this dissertation has shown that social-spatial inequalities are worsening with lower-income residents increasingly moving into struggling areas in urban fringes or suburban cores. Yet, these patterns are variegated and complex, urging us to unravel social-spatial inequalities. As a final call it should be stressed that not one form of gentrification is necessarily *softer* than another. Although different logics may underpin gentrification processes, a common denominator is the decrease in housing affordability, contributing to different forms of displacement. Only by considering the different forms and expressions of gentrification in conjoint fashion, the substantial impact of gentrification on the reshaping of social-spatial inequalities comes to the fore.

Samenvatting

Ongelijkheid in de gentrificerende Europese stad

Gentrificatie – de transformatie van stedelijke ruimte voor draagkrachtigere bewoners en gebruikers – wordt in hedendaagse steden een belangrijke rol toegedicht in de verandering van stadswijken. Aanzienlijk minder aandacht gaat echter uit naar de bredere invloed van gentrificatie die plaatsvindt op een hoger schaalniveau dan de buurt. Dit is een opvallende, en bovenal belangrijke blinde vlek. Het proces van gentrificatie heeft immers een ontwikkeling doorgemaakt van een kleinschalige en uitzonderlijke tegenbeweging tot een wijdverspreid en veelvoorkomend proces dat zich niet langer beperkt tot enkele geïsoleerde buurten. Dit proefschrift heeft daarom tot doel de impact van gentrificatie op sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden op het schaalniveau van stad en regio te begrijpen.

Doorgaans wordt simpelweg aangenomen dat gentrificatie bijdraagt aan scherpere sociaalruimtelijke tegenstellingen en ongelijkheden. Op buurtniveau kan gentrificatie uiteindelijk leiden tot een homogeen welgestelde bevolkingssamenstelling. Op het niveau van de stad is dan sprake van een optelsom: voortschrijdende gentrificatie zou uiteindelijk zorgen voor een steeds sterker wordende polarisatie tussen een opgewaardeerde stedelijke kern en een periferie waar armoedeconcentraties groeien. Dit proefschrift beoogt verder te gaan dan dit gesimplificeerde perspectief, en heeft als doel de impact van gentrificatie op verschillende sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden te ontrafelen. Hiervoor wordt gebruik gemakt gemaakt van innovatieve methoden om de invloed van gentrificatie op verschillende schaalniveaus te begrijpen: een panoramisch perspectief brengt de invloed van gentrificatie op sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden op stadsregionaal niveau in kaart, terwijl een ingezoomd perspectief de conceptuele en ruimtelijke diversiteit aan gentrificatie processen centraal stelt. Gentrificatie wordt hierbij gezien als een zeer divers en kneedbaar proces, maar tegelijkertijd wordt erkent dat gentrificatie in haar verschillende vormen doorgaans dezelfde fundamenten kent, en bovendien gelijksoortige uitkomsten produceert. Alleen wanneer alle verschillende vormen van gentrificatie in ogenschouw worden genomen, is het mogelijk de omvangrijke invloed van gentrificatie op sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden te begrijpen. Dit onderzoek onderzoekt de relatie tussen gentrificatie en sociaalruimtelijke scheidslijnen aan de hand van de volgende dubbele onderzoeksvraag:

> **Op welke wijze heeft gentrificatie zich ruimtelijk uitgebreid? Wat is de impact van gentrificatie processen op sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden op stadsregionaal schaalniveau?**

Deze vragen worden beantwoord aan de hand van een vergelijking tussen Amsterdam en Rotterdam, twee steden die symbool staan voor respectievelijk meer en minder economisch succesvolle steden. Het proefschrift maakt hierbij vooral gebruik van longitudinale kwantitatieve analyses op basis van individuele register data afkomstig uit het Stelsel van Sociaal-statische Bestanden

beheerd door CBS. Het proefschrift bestaat uit zes afzonderlijke studies die elk in een afzonderlijk hoofdstuk aan bod komen. De studies benadrukken verschillende aspecten van de relatie tussen gentrificatie en sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden. De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 besteden vooral aandacht aan de invloed van stedelijk (woon)beleid en de specifieke geografie van overheid gestuurde gentrificatie. Stedelijk beleid speelt een belangrijke rol in het aanzwengelen van hedendaagse gentrificatie, maar het is van belang na te gaan waar en hoe dit gebeurd, en welke beleidsredeneringen hieraan ten grondslag liggen. Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert vervolgens de verschillende mechanismen die een verandering in de bevolkingssamenstelling van buurten kunnen bewerkstelligen. Zodoende trekt dit hoofdstuk het dominante perspectief dat gentrificatie voornamelijk of zelfs uitsluitend gedreven wordt door selectieve verhuisbewegingen in twijfel. Alleen wanneer ook de overige mechanismen van bevolkingsverandering in overweging genomen worden, wordt de volledige reikwijdte en impact van gentrificatie zichtbaar. De hoofdstukken 5 en 6 introduceren vervolgens nieuwe sociaalruimtelijke scheidslijnen die zelden aan bod komen in de gentrificatie literatuur. Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien hoe sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden gereproduceerd worden door de intergenerationele overdracht van vermogen en andere middelen. Ouderlijke steun beïnvloedt de buurtuitkomsten van jongvolwassenen en versterkt gentrificatieprocessen in bepaalde buurten. Hoofdstuk 6 besteedt vervolgens aandacht aan ongelijkheden tussen generaties. Vooral voor jongere generaties wordt het steeds moeilijker een woning te kopen. Zij drijven vervolgens nieuwe vormen van gentrificatie in de (particuliere) huursector. Hoofdstuk 7 gaat tenslotte nader in op de verhuisbewegingen van lagere inkomensgroepen. Hierbij staat centraal hoe verdringing en de afnemende toegankelijkheid en betaalbaarheid van de woningvoorraad zorgen voor een veranderende sociale geleding in stad en regio.

Overheidgestuurde gentrificatie en stedelijke woonbeleid (hoofdstukken 2 en 3)

Gentrificatie wordt vaak gezien als een autonoom en spontaan proces, maar is in werkelijkheid sterk gestuurd. De overheid speelt vandaag de dag een cruciale rol in het stimuleren van gentrificatie, als onderdeel van beleid dat zich richt op het aantrekken en behouden van de middenklasse. Woonbeleid speelt hierbij een cruciale rol, hoewel gentrificatie ook op andere manieren gestimuleerd wordt. Dit is des te meer het geval in de Nederlandse context waar de woningmarkt sterk gereguleerd is. Woningmarktherstructurering waarbij goedkope sociale huurwoningen worden vervangen door duurdere huur- of koopwoningen voor een draagkrachtigere doelgroep vormt een kern aspect van overheid gestuurde gentrificatie. Sociaalmengingsbeleid kan zo in bepaalde gevallen gezien worden als een uiting van door de overheid gestuurde gentrificatie. In het verleden hebben Nederlandse overheden veel geld gestoken in woningmarktherstructurering in sociaaleconomisch "zwakke" buurten. Hier was het doel veelal gentrificatie aan te wakkeren om zo negatieve marktontwikkelingen te keren, en de buurten er weer "bovenop" te helpen.

Dit proefschrift heeft onderzocht hoe gentrificatie als een beleidsinstrument zich gedurende de periode 1999-2015 ontwikkeld heeft in Amsterdam. Een drievoudige verschuiving komt naar voren. Ten eerste is de afname van de sociale huurvoorraad versneld. Dit geeft aan dat overheid gestuurde gentrificatie krachtiger is geworden, maar ook dat financiële beperkingen woningcorporaties er toe aanzetten een groter deel van hun voorraad af te stoten. Ten tweede is het beleid kwalitatief veranderd. Voorheen was stedelijke vernieuwing met daarbij de sloop van sociale huurwoningen dominant, maar dit is verschoven naar de verkoop van bestaande sociale huurwoningen. Deze kanteling is pas echt ontluikt sinds de crisis, maar was daarvoor al mondjesmaat in gang gezet. Ten derde worden deze kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve veranderingen vergezeld door een veranderende geografie. Waar stedelijke vernieuwing zich vooral richtte op sociaaleconomisch zwakke buurten in de naoorlogse periferie, daar concentreert de verkoop van corporatiebezit zich steeds sterker in centrale buurten waar de druk op de woningmarkt al hoog is. Dit betekent dat beleid zich minder richt op het tegengaan van negatieve marktontwikkelingen in zwakkere buurten, maar zich juist in toenemende mate heeft toegelegd op het faciliteren van "de markt" in populaire buurten waar gentrificatie al een voet aan de grond had.

Deze verschuivingen zijn gerelateerd aan de financiële crisis, bezuinigingspolitiek, en bredere herstructurering van de verzorgingsstaat. "Dure" stedelijke vernieuwing is steeds lastiger geworden om na te streven, terwijl de verkoop van corporatiewoningen een goedkoper alternatief is. Dit alternatief richt zich vooralsnog echter wel op buurten waar marktprocessen gefaciliteerd kunnen worden. Het is hierbij interessant om op te merken dat soortgelijke verschuivingen niet in Rotterdam waargenomen kunnen worden. Hier heeft de financiële crisis de afname van corporatiebezit afgeremd. Opmerkelijk genoeg vonden dergelijke verschuivingen niet in Rotterdam plaats, waar de financiële crisis juist de neergang van de sociale sector voorlopig heeft verzwakt. Hier kwam stedelijke vernieuwing ook tot stilstand, maar werd niet gecompenseerd door toenemende woningverkopen en was geen sprake van een veranderende geografie. De verschillen tussen Amsterdam en Rotterdam zijn op zijn minst ten dele toe te schrijven aan verschillen in woningvraag en druk op de woningmarkt.

Woningcorporaties verhuren daarnaast steeds vaker hun bezit in de geliberaliseerde, vrije, huursector. Dit is een snel groeiende niche in de gespannen Amsterdamse woningmarkt en draagt bij aan gentrificatie in de huursector. De verkoop of liberalisering van corporatiewoningen wordt veelal gelegitimeerd door betrokken actoren, in beleidsdocumenten en in het publieke debat door te wijzen naar de noodzaak "middeninkomens" tegemoet te komen. Deze groep zou tussen wal en schip vallen op de woningmarkt. Hierbij worden middeninkomens veelal impliciet dan wel expliciet gelijkgesteld aan jonge, hoogopgeleide en opwaarts mobiele huishoudens die moeite hebben te kopen. Deze omschrijving toont sterke gelijkenissen met het profiel van de "marginale gentrifier" zoals gedefinieerd door Damaris Rose. Het relatief marginale karakter van deze nieuwkomers – jong maar opwaarts mobiel – wordt bovendien aangegrepen door beleidsmakers om de intensiteit en gevolgen van

gentrificatie te bagatelliseren. Kritischere actoren wijzen echter op structurele verschillen in klassepositie tussen deze marginale gentrifiers en de zittende bewoners, ook al zijn inkomensverschillen aanvankelijk niet zo groot.

Het anatomiseren van gevarieerde gentrificatie processen (hoofdstuk 4)

Hoofdstuk 4 verlegt het zwaartepunt van de analyses van gentrificatie als beleid naar de sociaalruimtelijke dynamieken van gentrificatie, door te ontrafelen hoe gentrificatie op verschillende manieren in verschillende buurten een voet aan de grond kan krijgen. Gentrificatie wordt doorgaans getypeerd als een proces waarbij hogere inkomensgroepen zich vestigen in een buurt en lagere inkomens geleidelijk verdwijnen door verdringing en uitsluiting. Verschillende recente studies hebben echter al aangetoond dat ook interne sociale mobiliteit, waarbij zittende bewoners inkomensstijging bewerkstelligen of juist te maken krijgen met inkomensverslechtering, een belangrijke rol kan spelen in sociaaleconomische veranderingen. Ook demografische verschuivingen kunnen daarnaast van belang zijn. Hierbij gaat het om het ouder worden van de bevolking, waarbij het ene leeftijdscohort plaatsmaakt voor het andere. Met bevolkingsregisterdata heeft dit proefschrift veranderingen in bevolkingssamenstelling in alle Amsterdamse en Rotterdamse buurten ontleedt, met als doel de afzonderlijke invloed van verhuisbewegingen, interne sociale mobiliteit, en demografische verschuivingen vast te stellen. Een tweede doel is vast te stellen waar deze mechanismen van zich doen spreken.

De resultaten laten zien dat er niet één doorslaggevende vorm van buurtverandering bestaat, noch binnen Amsterdam, noch binnen Rotterdam. In plaats daarvan hebben de verschillende mechanismen in verschillende buurten invloed. In reeds dure buurten, en buurten waar gentrificatie zich in een vergevorderd stadium bevindt, zijn verhuisbewegingen de drijvende kracht achter veranderingen in de sociaaleconomische samenstelling van de bevolking. Hoge woningprijzen maken deze buurten immers bijna uitsluitend toegankelijk voor nieuwe bewoners met al een hoog inkomen.

In andere buurten spelen interne sociale mobiliteit en demografische verschuivingen echter een belangrijkere rol. Interne sociale mobiliteit speelt vooral een belangrijke rol in buurten met tot voor kort een lage sociaaleconomische status, en waar gentrificatie processen pas redelijk recent zijn begonnen. Demografische verschuivingen hebben zoals gezegd te maken met de opvolging van leeftijdscohorten. In praktijk betekent dit de vergrijzing van lagere inkomensgroepen en het toetreden tot de beroepsbevolking van jongere en doorgaans hoger opgeleide leeftijdscohorten. Dergelijke verschuiving stuwen gentrificatie processen in een aantal perifere buurten in zowel Amsterdam als Rotterdam. Deze buurten kennen doorgaans een hoog percentage sociale huurwoningen en de verhuismobiliteit is er laag. Buurtverandering vindt daarom plaats via opvolging: uiteindelijk overlijden of verhuizing naar een verzorgingstehuis zorgen er voor dat sociale huurwoningen mondjesmaat vrijkomen. Deze woningen worden vervolgens veelal verkocht of geliberaliseerd waardoor marktprocessen een grotere rol krijgen, welke gentrificatie en een verjonging van deze buurten drijven.

Kortom, deze studie laat zien dat het blindstaren op verhuisbewegingen als drijvende kracht achter gentrificatie zorgt voor een onderschatting van de omvang en de invloed van gentrificatie. Alleen door alle verschillende vormen van opwaardering samen in acht te nemen, komt de grote "voetafdruk" van gentrificatie aan het licht.

Intergenerationele steun als drijfveer achter gentrificatie (hoofdstuk 5)

Sinds de financiële crisis van 2008, maar vaak ook daarvoor al, nemen intergenerationele ongelijkheden in hoog tempo toe, en deze ongelijkheden worden vertaald in de reproductie van sociaaleconomische ongelijkheden tussen generaties. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat veel jonge personen direct na het verlaten het ouderlijk huis in staat zijn een woning te bemachtigen in de duurste buurten van Amsterdam, ondanks hun doorgaans zeer lage inkomen. Dit zijn veelal jonge personen zoals studenten, recent afgestudeerden en anderen die toetreden tot de woningmarkt. Dit roept de vraag op hoe deze "nestvlieders" daartoe in staat zijn. Deze vraag heeft ook bredere relevantie: hoe zijn marginale gentrifiers überhaupt in staat toegang te krijgen tot gentrificerende buurten?

Dit proefschrift laat de grote invloed van klasse achtergrond en ouderlijke steun op verhuisbewegingen en buurtuitkomsten zien. Ouderlijk vermogen is hierbij bijzonder belangrijk. Een meerderheid van de nestvlieders met vermogende ouders verhuist naar de duurste of snelst gentrificerende buurten van Amsterdam, ondanks hun eigen lage inkomen. Nestvlieders met weinig vermogende ouders vestigen zich doorgaans juist in buurten met een lagere status, veelal in de stedelijke periferie. Twee mechanismen verklaren deze verschillen. Ten eerste, vermogende ouders kunnen substantiële financiële steun aan hun kinderen verlenen. Zo kunnen zij een woning voor hun kinderen kopen, helpen met het verkrijgen van een hypotheek door middel van een schenking, of helpen de huur of andere lasten te betalen. Daarnaast kunnen ouders ook niet-financiële steun verlenen, bijvoorbeeld door sociale netwerken aan te boren. Dergelijke vormen van steun kunnen gezien worden als onderdeel van sociale reproductie strategieën, aangezien ouders hun kinderen op weg helpen op de woningmarkt en richting zelfstandigheid. Daarnaast is mogelijk ook sprake van een ouderlijke investeringsstrategie die bij het kopen van een woning inzetten op waardevermeerdering. Ten tweede heeft ouderlijke achtergrond ook een indirecte invloed op buurtuitkomsten. Klasse achtergrond vormt voorkeuren en verwachtingen met betrekking tot woonomgeving. Ouders kunnen bovendien de voorkeur voor een studentenleven dat samenhangt met de ervaring van het wonen in de (binnen)stad doorgeven.

Onderzoek naar gentrificatie neemt slechts zelden het belang van ouderlijk vermogen in acht. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat dit wel van belang is. Intergenerationele relaties hebben namelijk mogelijk een aanzienlijke invloed op gentrificatie processen. In het geval van directe financiële steun stroomt ouderlijk vermogen via hun kinderen de woningmarkt op en bepaalde buurten in. Op deze wijze draagt dit vermogen direct bij aan de stijging van woningprijzen en huren met als gevolg een verder voortschrijdende gentrificatie en

(directe of indirecte) verdringing. Het erkennen en in acht nemen van het belang van ouderlijke steun betekent ook dat de definitie van de "marginale gentrifier" aangepast dient te worden. Ouderlijk vermogen kan het lage inkomen van de jonge marginale gentrifier immers aanvullen, wat hen in staat stelt hogere woonlasten te dragen. Ouderlijke steun stelt hen in staat andere huishoudens met een laag inkomen te overbieden, waardoor door gentrificatie veroorzaakte verdringing en uitsluiting versterkt worden.

Ongelijkheden tussen generaties en gentrificatie in de huursector (hoofdstuk 6)

Naast de intergenerationele overdracht van ongelijkheden is het van belang bredere scheidslijnen tussen generaties te bestuderen. Hedendaagse woningmarkten richten zich in toenemende mate op financieel "sterke" huishoudens: huishoudens met een (dubbel) hoog inkomen, een vast contract, en ander vermogen ter beschikking. In toenemende mate zijn dit oudere huishoudens, terwijl jongvolwassenen te maken krijgen met meer arbeidsmarktonzekerheden, minder mogelijkheden om een woning te kopen, en een grotere afhankelijkheid van onzekere woonarrangementen en chaotische woontrajecten. Het is binnen deze context dat in Amsterdam momenteel nieuwe vormen van gentrificatie in de huursector opkomen.

In de post-crisis periode hebben investeerders de particuliere huursector in het vizier gekregen, en richten zich op het aanbieden van dure huurwoningen. Overheden steunen dit, bijvoorbeeld omdat dit past binnen beleidsdoelen om huurwoningen voor middeninkomens te realiseren (zie ook hoofdstuk 2). De rol van de huursector in het accommoderen van specifieke vormen van gentrificatie is zeker niet nieuw, maar de huidige opkomst van huurgentrificatie in Amsterdam is in verschillende opzichten wel een nieuw fenomeen. Zo is de uitbreiding van de koopsector geruime tijd een van de bouwstenen voor voortschrijdende gentrificatie in Nederlandse steden geweest. De huursector bood hier weinig mogelijkheden toe vanwege sterke regulering. De opkomst van huurgentrificatie is onderdeel van een bredere wederopstanding van particuliere markt huur sinds de financiële crisis van 2008. Tot de crisis had de huursector juist decennia van neergang gekend. De huidige opkomst van huurgentrificatie is enerzijds het product van groeiende vraag van jonge middenklasse huishoudens die nog geen woning kunnen of willen kopen. Anderzijds wordt de sector steeds duurder en richt het zich meer op hogere inkomens, waaronder internationale kenniswerkers. De geografie van de opkomst van huurgentrificatie toont de verbanden tussen dure huur en vormen van gentrificatie in vergevorderde stadia.

Het bovenstaande wijst op een opmerkelijke combinatie. De particuliere huursector in Amsterdam wordt steeds duurder en exclusiever, waardoor gentrificatie aangedreven wordt. Maar anderzijds is de opkomst van huurgentrificatie ook gevolg van het feit dat vooral jongvolwassenen steeds meer moeite hebben een woning te kopen. Huurgentrificatie in Amsterdam wordt gedreven door hogere inkomensgroepen die in toenemende mate naar huurwoningen verhuizen, maar is anderzijds ook verwant aan marginale gentrificatie omdat het gedreven wordt door het feit dat deze huishoudens

moeite hebben een geschikte koopwoning te bemachtigen. Deze tweeledige trend moet gezien worden als een gevolg van groeiende intergenerationele scheidslijnen, die ook onder hogere inkomensgroepen bestaan. Vooral jongere hoge inkomens verhuizen in toenemende mate naar een huurwoning, terwijl voor oudere hoge inkomens het tegenovergestelde geldt: zij verhuizen juist steeds vaker naar een koopwoning. Deze patronen hebben te maken met toenemende arbeidsmarktonzekerheden, zoals een afhankelijkheid van tijdelijke contracten, die vooral jongere leeftijdsgroepen treffen. Op basis van deze bevindingen kan gesteld worden dat dergelijke huishoudens met een hoog inkomen maar verder onzekere positie tot op zekere hoogte marginale gentrifiers zijn.

Verdringing: de suburbanisatie van armoede (hoofdstuk 7)

Een heersende vraag in gentrificatie onderzoek is wat er gebeurt met de lagere inkomensgroepen die geconfronteerd worden met gentrificatie. Centraal hierbij staat de vraag in hoeverre gentrificatie processen verschillende vormen van verdringing veroorzaken. Verdringing en uitsluiting beïnvloeden niet alleen de levensloop van huishoudens, maar ook de sociale geografie van steden en stadsregio's. Om de schaal, rol en impact van verdringing op stadsregio's te begrijpen, richt hoofdstuk 7 zich daarom op de effecten van uitgebreide gentrificatie processen op het verhuisgedrag van lage inkomens. De resultaten tonen welke ruimtelijke invloed directe en indirecte verdringing hebben. Hierbij komen belangrijke maar complexe sociaalruimtelijke consequenties aan het licht.

De invloed van gentrificatie op sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden is ook op het niveau van de stadsregio goed zichtbaar. Er is sprake van een overkoepelende en steeds sterker wordende "suburbanisatie van armoede" plaats. Dit is echter verre van een uniform proces, er bestaan belangrijke – soms subtiele – variaties. Ten eerste dient benadrukt te worden dat de suburbanisatie van armoede niet noodzakelijkerwijs een direct proces is waarbij arme huishoudens van stad naar suburb verhuizen. De suburbanisatie van armoede is óók het gevolg van sterke uitsluitingsprocessen: doordat centraal stedelijke buurten in toenemende mate onbereikbaar en onbetaalbaar zijn, zijn lage inkomens steeds vaker bij voorbaat niet in staat zich daar te vestigen en verhuizen daarom bij voorbaat al naar suburbia. Er kan gesteld worden dat gentrificatie zowel een directe suburbanisatie van lage inkomens als een bredere, indirecte suburbanisatie van armoede in gang zet.

Ten tweede zijn lage inkomens een heterogene groep die op verschillende wijzen beïnvloed worden door gentrificatie. Dit proefschrift stelt differentiatie op basis van bron en hoogte van inkomen centraal, waarbij onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen werkloze huishoudens, werkende armen, en lage-tot-midden inkomens. De werkende armen verhuizen overwegend niet naar de regio maar juist in toenemende mate naar de stedelijke periferie. Daarnaast passen zij strategieën toe om woonruimte te vinden in centrale of dure buurten, zoals het delen van een woning met meerdere huishoudens. Werkloze huishoudens, daarentegen, suburbaniseren wel in toenemende mate naar de regio, vooral richting satellietsteden en andere kernen die veelal hard

getroffen zijn door de crisis. Ook huishoudens met een laag tot-midden inkomen verhuizen steeds vaker naar de regio. Hierbij verspreiden zij zich meer over de regio dan werkloze huishoudens, en verhuizen naar verhouding vaker naar sociaaleconomisch sterkere gebieden. Dit verschil reflecteert de iets sterkere positie van lage-midden inkomens vergeleken met werkloze huishoudens.

Concluderende observaties

De vraag is of verschuivende sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden, zoals de suburbanisatie van armoede, zich vertalen in verslechterende sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden. Gentrificatie kan, op zijn minst in eerste instantie, segregatieniveaus drukken doordat middenklasse huishoudens zich vestigen in buurten met tot dan overwegend lage inkomens als bewoners. Zo ook blijven veel suburbane locaties overwegend middenklasse ondanks tekenen van neergang. De suburbanisatie van armoede kan dus leiden tot een meer gelijkmatige spreiding van lage inkomensgroepen over stadsregio's, met de implicatie dat geaggregeerde segregatiematen zouden dalen. Vanuit dit perspectief zou gentrificatie in eerste oogopslag als een verevenend proces gezien kunnen worden. Dit zou echter verhullen dat deze ogenschijnlijke verevening tot stand komt door de woningmarktpositie van lage inkomensgroepen te verslechteren door hen mogelijkheden op de woningmarkt af te nemen.

Bovendien, ook al kan gentrificatie aanvankelijk zorgen voor een demping van segregatieniveaus, er bestaat een omslagpunt waarna gentrificatie zal gaan bijdragen aan sterkere ruimtelijke scheidslijnen. En, wederom, zowel voor als na dit omslagpunt verslechtert gentrificatie de betaalbaarheid en toegankelijkheid van de woningmarkt. Het is daarom wellicht nuttiger om vast te stellen in hoeverre lage inkomensgroepen in staat blijven woonruimte te verkrijgen in buurten met hoge of snel stijgende woningprijzen. Een dergelijke benadering kan laten zien in hoeverre gentrificatie lage inkomensgroepen de toegang ontzegd tot opwaarderende buurten. Dit proefschrift heeft laten zien dat in dit opzicht sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden toenemen: lage inkomensgroepen verhuizen meer en meer naar buurten van neergang veelal gelegen in de stedelijke periferie of suburbane groeikernen. Deze patronen zijn echter geschakeerd en complex, en het is van belang deze sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden te ontrafelen.

Ten slotte is het van belang te benadrukken dat een specifieke vorm van gentrificatie niet per se zachter is dan andere vormen. Gentrificatie kan dan wel op verschillende wijzen en volgens verschillende logica voortschrijden, maar de gemene deler is een afnemende betaalbaarheid van huisvesting met als gevolg verschillende vormen van verdringing. Alleen wanneer alle vormen en uitingen van gentrificatie gezamenlijk en integraal in acht genomen worden is het mogelijk de aanzienlijke impact van gentrificatie op veranderende sociaalruimtelijke ongelijkheden te ontwaren.

Gentrification plays a key role in the class transformations many major cities are currently experiencing. Urban neighbourhoods are remade according to middle-class preferences, often at the cost of lower-income groups. This dissertation investigates the influence of gentrification processes on social-spatial inequalities in urban regions, focusing specifically on Amsterdam and Rotterdam. It shows that gentrification constitutes a forceful process of urban change, affecting many neighbour-hoods in different ways. These urban processes ultimately produce growing disparities between booming central areas and struggling peripheries and suburbs. In doing so, gentrification amplifies inequality between poor and affluent groups, but also exacerbates increasingly pressing inequalities between and within generations.