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Housing Issues in the 118th Congress

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Housing Issues in the 118th Congress

Housing affordability is a perennial policy issue, but it has become particularly salient in recent years in light of notable increases in house prices and rents, rising mortgage interest rates, and housing supply constraints in many housing markets. Although housing markets are local in nature, and housing market conditions vary across the country, concerns about housing affordability have been widespread.

Through hearings and proposed legislation, the 118th Congress has been considering the causes of, and potential solutions to, housing affordability issues. Bills to address housing affordability have included certain housing-related tax proposals and proposed modifications to existing housing assistance programs, among other things. In addition to considering housing affordability issues broadly, Congress has also taken an interest in the affordability of housing for specific populations or in specific areas. For example, there have been proposals in the 118th Congress related to rural housing programs specifically, and Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about housing issues on and around military bases.

In addition to considering new legislative proposals, the 118th Congress may also monitor the status or implementation of funding that was provided for certain housing-related programs in previous Congresses, including emergency supplemental funding provided for housing programs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, certain housing-related funding that was included in the Inflation Reduction Act in the 117th Congress, and funding for new initiatives provided through regular annual appropriations, such as a new competitive grant program for communities addressing regulatory barriers to housing.

Other issues that have been of ongoing interest to Congress include concerns related to the quality of the housing stock in general, and federally-assisted housing in particular; disaster response and recovery as it relates to housing; and fair housing issues, among others. In addition, the 118th Congress has been conducting oversight of executive branch actions, including certain mortgage pricing changes implemented by the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at the direction of their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

Housing issues of interest to the 118th Congress will likely continue to evolve as the Congress progresses; this report will be periodically updated to reflect that evolution.

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July 14, 2023

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Contents

Introduction	1
Housing Market Conditions	1
Housing Costs	2
Sales Prices for Single-Family Homes.....	2
Mortgage Interest Rates	3
Asking Rents.....	4
Housing Cost Burdens	5
Housing Supply.....	6
Inventory of Single-Family Homes for Sale	6
Rental Vacancy Rates.....	7
Housing Construction	7
Housing and the Broader Economy	10
Selected Current Issues.....	12
Housing Affordability	12
Appropriations for Housing Programs	13
Housing Tax Proposals.....	13
Competitive Grants for Land Use and Zoning Reform (CDBG-PRO)	14
Rural Housing Programs	15
Rural Housing and the Farm Bill.....	16
Rural Housing Program Reform Proposals.....	16
Status of COVID-19 Supplemental Funding for Housing	17
Treasury Programs	17
HUD Programs	18
Homelessness	19
Housing Quality	20
Implementation of Housing-Related Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act.....	21
Fair Housing.....	23
Disparate Impact Discrimination	25
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing.....	27
Military Housing	28
Basic Allowance for Housing	29
Housing Shortages	30
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Loan Level Price Adjustments	31
Housing and Disaster Response and Recovery	33
FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and HUD’s Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR).....	34
Interaction Between FEMA’s IHP and HUD’s CDBG-DR.....	36
FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).....	39
Housing and Climate Impacts.....	40

Figures

Figure 1. Real (Inflation-Adjusted) Median Sale Prices for New and Existing Single-Family Homes.....	3
Figure 2. Mortgage Interest Rates	4

Figure 3. Real (Inflation-Adjusted) Median Asking Rent 5
Figure 4. Homes for Sale, New and Existing 6
Figure 5. Rental Vacancy Rates 7
Figure 6. Housing Units Started 9
Figure 7. Housing Units Completed 9
Figure 8. Housing Units under Construction 10
Figure 9. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Shelter in U.S. City Average 11

Tables

Table A-1. Housing Bills in the 118th Congress that Received Committee or Floor Action
as of June 30, 2023 43
Table B-1. Housing-Related Hearings in the 118th Congress as of June 30, 2023 44

Appendixes

Appendix A. Housing Bills in the 118th Congress 43
Appendix B. Housing Hearings in the 118th Congress 44

Contacts

Author Information 45

Introduction

While housing in the United States is primarily a private market enterprise, regulated at the state and local levels, federal policymakers play an important role in regulating housing finance, providing affordable housing resources to state and local governments or other public or private entities, and enforcing fair housing laws, among other functions. Congress establishes laws governing U.S. housing policy, funds housing policies and programs via the annual appropriations process and the federal tax code, and oversees policy and program implementation by various federal agencies. The House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, in particular, play prominent roles in many of these functions as committees of jurisdiction over most federal housing policy and programs. Federal agencies involved in housing policy and programs include the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and others.

Recent Congresses have considered a range of housing policy issues that continue to be of interest to the 118th Congress, including, among other things, options to address growing concern about housing supply and affordability challenges, housing responses to natural disasters, and issues related to the quality of federally assisted housing and the housing stock more generally. Other issues of interest to the 118th Congress include the status or implementation of certain housing-related funding provided in previous Congresses and oversight of executive branch actions related to housing.

This report begins with an overview of certain housing market indicators to provide context for the policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report. It then provides a high-level overview of housing issues during the 118th Congress and, where applicable, refers to more in-depth CRS reports on the issues discussed. **Appendix A** lists housing-related legislation that has received committee or floor consideration in the 118th Congress and **Appendix B** lists this Congress's housing-related hearings. (The information in both appendixes is current as of June 30, 2023.) This report will be updated periodically.

Housing Market Conditions

There are about 128 million occupied housing units in the United States, of which 83.4 million (65%) are owner-occupied and 44.1 million (35%) are renter-occupied.¹ Of the total number of occupied housing units,

- 88 million (69%) are one-unit properties,²
- 23 million (18%) are units in buildings with five or more units,
- 9 million (7%) are units in two-to-four unit properties, and
- 7 million (5%) are manufactured or mobile homes or another type of housing.

¹ Statistics in this section are from U.S. Census Bureau, *American Community Survey 2021 One-Year Estimates*, Table S2504, <https://data.census.gov/table?q=s+2504&tid=ACSS1Y2021.S2504>.

² This includes both detached one-unit properties (properties with space on all sides) and attached one-unit properties (e.g., rowhouses/townhouses). For specific definitions of attached and detached units used in the American Community Survey, see U.S. Census Bureau, *American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey, 2021 Subject Definitions*, p. 42, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2021_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf.

While most homeowners (nearly 90%) live in one-unit properties,³ the types of housing renters live in are more varied: nearly a third of renters live in one-unit properties, another 17% live in units in properties with 2-4 units, and about 46% live in units in properties with five or more units. About 4% of renters live in manufactured or mobile homes.

House prices and rents have both increased significantly in recent years. While house price and rent increases have more recently shown signs of moderating, concerns about housing affordability remain high. Local housing markets vary, but many markets have seen housing cost increases driven in part by a lack of available housing supply. Rising mortgage interest rates have also contributed to affordability challenges.

This first section of the report provides background on housing market conditions at the outset of the 118th Congress to provide context for the housing policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report. It focuses on selected indicators related to housing costs and supply. While the discussion of market conditions presented in this section is at the national level, local housing market conditions can vary significantly, and national housing market trends may not reflect the conditions in a specific area. Nevertheless, national housing market indicators can provide an overall sense of general trends in housing in the United States.

Housing Costs

This subsection provides selected indicators related to housing costs, including home sale prices, rents, and housing cost burdens.

Sales Prices for Single-Family Homes


Single-family homes may be purchased by owner-occupants, individuals or families seeking second homes or vacation properties, or investors of different types, including both individual and corporate investors of various sizes who may purchase homes to hold for renting or to sell at a later date.

Figure 1 shows the trend in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) median sales prices for both new and existing homes since 1995 in 2022 dollars. While the median sales price of new homes has been consistently above that of existing homes, prices for both new and existing homes have generally trended upward over the past two decades, with the exception of a decline in prices during and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In 2022, the median sales price for an existing home was \$386,300 and the median sales price for a new home was \$454,900.

Real median sales prices for both new and existing homes have increased since 2012, and both increased by nearly 25% between 2019 and 2022 (from \$367,981 to \$454,900 for new homes, and from \$311,210 to \$386,300 for existing homes). Between 2021 and 2022, the median sales price for new homes increased by 6%, while the median sales price for existing homes increased more slowly (2%).

³ Another 6% of homeowners live in manufactured or mobile homes, 2% live in units in two-to-four unit properties, and about 3.5% live in units in properties with five or more units.

Figure I. Real (Inflation-Adjusted) Median Sale Prices for New and Existing Single-Family Homes
1995-2022



Sources: CRS calculations based on data from HUD's *U.S. Housing Market Conditions* reports, available at <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ushmc/home.html> (which use data from the National Association of Realtors for existing home prices, and the U.S. Census Bureau for new home prices), and data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the consumer price index. Figures are in 2022 dollars.

Notes: Gray bars indicate recessions. Figures are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) with 2022 as the base year.

Mortgage Interest Rates

Many homebuyers take out a mortgage to purchase a home, especially when purchasing a primary residence.⁴ The ability of prospective homebuyers to obtain mortgages, as well as the costs of those mortgages, impacts housing demand and affordability.

After several years of historical lows, mortgage interest rates rose notably in 2022, due in part to contractionary monetary policy.⁵ As shown in **Figure 2**, mortgage interest rates had been consistently below 5% for about 12 years beginning in May 2010. Lower interest rates increase mortgage affordability and make it easier for some households to purchase homes or refinance their existing mortgages.

Mortgage interest rates began to increase in early 2022 and rose rapidly over the course of the year. The rates averaged 3.45% in January 2022 and increased to a relative peak of 6.90% by October 2022, which was up from 3.07% a year earlier and was their highest level since 2002. As of June 2023, mortgage interest rates averaged 6.71%. This was lower than the October 2022


⁴ According to the National Association of Realtors, about 78% of homebuyers who purchased a primary residence between July 2021 and June 2022 financed the purchase. See National Association of Realtors, *Highlights from the 2022 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers*, November 2022, p. 8, https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2022-highlights-from-the-profile-of-home-buyers-and-sellers-report-11-03-2022_0.pdf.

⁵ When the Federal Reserve raises the target range for the federal funds interest rate, other interest rates in the economy, including mortgage interest rates, tend to increase as well. However, mortgage interest rates are not determined solely by monetary policy and are affected by other factors within the housing market. For more information on monetary policy, see CRS In Focus IF11751, *Introduction to U.S. Economy: Monetary Policy*.

peak but nearly 1.2 percentage points higher than June 2022, and over 3.7 percentage points higher than June 2021.

Figure 2. Mortgage Interest Rates

January 1995-June 2023



Source: Created by CRS based on data from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS), 30-Year Fixed Rate Historic Tables, available at <http://www.freddie.mac.com/pmms/>.

Notes: Gray bars indicate recessions. Data reflect average interest rates for conventional (i.e., not government-insured) conforming (i.e., conform to Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac standards, including loan limits) home purchase mortgages to borrowers with good credit and a 20% down payment. The actual interest rate paid by any given borrower will depend on a number of factors. In November 2022, Freddie Mac adjusted its methodology for the PMMS by replacing traditional survey methods with administrative datasets. Freddie Mac estimates that these changes would have only had a small impact on historical PMMS results. For more information, see <https://www.freddie.mac.com/research/insight/20221103-freddie-macs-newly-enhanced-mortgage-rate-survey>.


Asking Rents

Figure 3 shows the trend in the average annual real median asking rent for vacant units in 2022 dollars. Asking rents are an indicator of potential costs for renters seeking to newly lease a rental unit, but do not include rents paid by current tenants or potential rent increases for currently occupied units.

Like home prices, asking rents have been increasing in general over the past decade, and at a faster pace in recent years. Real median asking rents increased by nearly 14% from 2019 to 2022, although they barely changed between 2021 and 2022.⁶

⁶ In 2022, the nominal median asking rent rose by about 7.5%, but inflation rose by about 8%, leading to a slight decrease in real median asking rent between 2021 and 2022.

Figure 3. Real (Inflation-Adjusted) Median Asking Rent
1995-2022



Sources: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership Historical Tables, Table 11A, available at <https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html>, and data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the consumer price index.

Notes: Gray bars indicate recessions. Figures are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) with 2022 as the base year.

Housing Cost Burdens

Rising housing costs can contribute to housing cost burdens if these costs increase faster than household incomes. Under widely used measures of affordability, households are generally considered cost-burdened if they pay more than 30% of their income for housing, and severely cost-burdened if they pay more than 50% of their income for housing.⁷ While housing cost burdens can affect both renters and homeowners and households of differing income levels, they are most prevalent among low-income renter households.

The number of cost-burdened households has been increasing of late. In 2021, 21.6 million renter households, or nearly half of all renter households (49%), experienced cost burdens, an increase from 20.4 million cost-burdened renter households (46% of all renter households) in 2019. The number of cost-burdened renter households increased at all income levels. The number of cost-burdened homeowners also increased, to 19 million owner households in 2021 compared to 16.7 million owner households in 2019.⁸

⁷ Although these measures of housing affordability and cost burden are widely used, their shortcomings are also widely recognized. For one discussion of some of the limitations of these definitions, see HUD Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R), “Rental Burdens: Rethinking Affordability Measures,” *PD&R Edge* online magazine, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_092214.html.

⁸ Peyton Whitney, “Number of Renters Burdened by Housing Costs Reached a Record High in 2021,” Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, February 1, 2023, <https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/number-renters-burdened-housing-costs-reached-record-high-2021>; and Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, *State of the Nation’s Housing 2023*, Excel Data, Table A-1, available at <https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/state-nations-housing-2023>.

Housing Supply


Housing costs are influenced, in part, by the supply of homes available for sale or rent. This subsection provides selected indicators on the available housing supply, including the number of homes for sale, rental vacancy rates, and single-family and multifamily housing construction activity.

Inventory of Single-Family Homes for Sale

One indicator of housing supply is the number of homes for sale at a given point in time. Lower inventories of homes for sale can put upward pressure on house prices if demand is strong.

As shown in **Figure 4**, the number of single-family homes for sale has been relatively low in recent years. As of the end of 2022, there were about 1.4 million homes for sale (nearly 1 million existing homes and close to 500,000 new homes). This represented an increase over 2020 and 2021, but it was still low by historical standards. However, the number of *new* homes for sale was the highest since 2007.

Figure 4. Homes for Sale, New and Existing
1995-2022



Sources: Created by CRS using data from HUD's *U.S. Housing Market Conditions* reports, available at <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ushmc/home.html>, which use data from the National Association of Realtors for existing home inventories and from the U.S. Census Bureau for new home inventories.

Notes: Annual inventory represents homes for sale as of the end of the year.

The supply of homes for sale affects the number of homes sold. Sales of existing homes generally number in the millions each year, while new home sales are usually in the hundreds of thousands. In 2022, there were about 5.7 million home sales (over 5 million existing homes and over 640,000 new homes).⁹ This was the lowest level of combined home sales since 2014, when a total

⁹ See HUD's *U.S. Housing Market Conditions* reports, available at <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ushmc/home.html>, which use data from the National Association of Realtors for existing home sales and from the U.S. Census Bureau for new home sales.


of 5.4 million homes were sold. Lower home sales may reflect a variety of factors, including low housing inventory and higher mortgage interest rates.

Rental Vacancy Rates

The rental vacancy rate is the share of rental units that are currently vacant for rent.¹⁰ Low vacancy rates may put upward pressure on rents as renters compete for fewer available units.

As shown in **Figure 5**, the rental vacancy rate has generally been declining in recent years and was 5.8% in 2022. This was a decrease from 6.1% in 2021 and the lowest rental vacancy rate in several decades.¹¹

Figure 5. Rental Vacancy Rates
1995-2022



Source: Figure created by CRS based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership Annual Tables, Table 1, “Rental and Homeowner Vacancy Rates by Area,” <https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/prevann.html>.

Notes: Gray bars indicate recessions. Because data collection procedures were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic during some quarters in 2020 and 2021, the Census Bureau urges caution in interpreting estimates from affected timeframes and in comparing those estimates to previous or subsequent estimates.

Housing Construction

While specific estimates vary, research suggests that the United States has a shortage of housing units needed to meet housing demand, due in part to years of underbuilding and declining construction of smaller, less expensive homes in particular.¹² These estimates suggest that new

¹⁰ U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, “Definitions and Explanations,” p. 6, <https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/definitions.pdf>.

¹¹ Annual rental vacancy rate data are from U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, Annual Statistics, Table 1, “Rental and Homeowner Vacancy Rates by Area,” available at <https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/prevann.html>. The rental vacancy rate of 5.8% in 2022 was the lowest since 1983, when the rental vacancy rate was 5.7%.

¹² For example, Freddie Mac estimated a housing supply shortage of 3.8 million units at the end of 2020. See Sam Khater, *One of the Most Important Challenges our Industry will Face: The Significant Shortage of Starter Homes*, April 15, 2021, <https://www.freddiemac.com/perspectives/sam-khater/20210415-single-family-shortage>. In December (continued...)

construction is needed to help meet demand. A variety of statistics measure the amount of new housing construction underway, including housing permits, housing starts, and housing completions. Measures such as housing starts are often considered leading economic indicators that provide signals about the health of the economy.

Figure 6 and **Figure 7** show annual housing starts¹³ and housing completions,¹⁴ respectively. Starts and completions data are reported for three types of housing units: one-unit properties, units in two-to-four unit properties, and units in properties with five or more units. The numbers of one-unit starts and completions are typically much higher than starts and completions of units in multi-unit properties, and the trends in starts and completions generally track each other fairly closely. In 2022,

- construction was *started* on about 1.6 million housing units, of which about 1 million were one-unit homes, 533,000 were in buildings with five or more units, and 16,000 were in buildings with two-to-four units; and
- about 1.4 million new housing units were *completed*, of which about 1 million were one-unit homes, 360,000 were in buildings with five or more units, and 9,000 were in buildings with two-to-four units.


After a precipitous drop starting in the mid-2000s, both housing starts and housing completions have generally been rising since about 2011, although starts of single-family homes fell in 2022 relative to 2021. Completions of single-family homes have continued to increase, while completions of units in multifamily properties have been relatively flat. Starts and completions of one-unit properties, however, have not returned to the levels seen prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, while starts and completions of units in properties with five or more units are higher than they were prior to the financial crisis.

2022 congressional testimony, Mark Zandi, Chief Economist of Moody's Analytics, estimated a shortfall of about 1.6 million units. See Written Testimony of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist of Moody's Analytics, for a House Financial Services Committee hearing entitled "Boom and Bust: The Need for Bold Investments in Fair and Affordable Housing to Combat Inflation," December 1, 2022, <https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-117-ba00-wstate-zandim-20221201.pdf>.

¹³ Census defines starts as occurring "when excavation begins for the footings or foundation of a building. All housing units in a multifamily building are defined as being started when this excavation begins. Beginning with data for September 1992, estimates of housing starts include units in structures being totally rebuilt on an existing foundation." See U.S. Census Bureau, "Survey of Construction Definitions," <https://www.census.gov/construction/soc/definitions.html>.


¹⁴ According to the Census definition, "A house is defined as completed when all finished flooring has been installed (or carpeting if used in place of finished flooring). If the building is occupied before all construction is finished, it is classified as completed at the time of occupancy. In privately-owned buildings with two or more housing units, all of the units in the buildings are counted as completed when 50 percent or more of the units are occupied or available for occupancy." See U.S. Census Bureau, "Survey of Construction Definitions."

Figure 6. Housing Units Started
1995-2022



Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Census Bureau, New Residential Construction, Historical Data, available at https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/historical_data/index.html.

Figure 7. Housing Units Completed
1995-2022



Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Census Bureau, New Residential Construction, Historical Data, available at https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/historical_data/index.html.


Figure 8 shows the number of housing units under construction at the end of each year (i.e., started but not yet completed). There were about 1.7 million housing units under construction at the end of 2022, of which about 736,000 were one-unit homes, about 16,000 were units in two-to-four unit properties, and nearly 918,000 were units in properties with five or more units.

Unlike starts and completions, where single-family units consistently outnumber multifamily units, the number of multifamily units currently under construction has been higher than the number of single-family units under construction for much of the past decade. In general, it takes longer to construct multifamily units than single-family units,¹⁵ accounting for part of the reason that the number of multifamily units under construction is generally higher compared to single-family units than starts or completions data would suggest. Factors such as labor and material shortages that have contributed to construction delays for both single-family and multifamily properties have further impacted construction timelines.¹⁶ Also, as noted above, new multifamily housing starts have exceeded their levels from prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis in recent years, while single-family starts are below their levels from the late 1990s and early 2000s. As units under construction translate into completions, supply is expected to increase in the short term.

¹⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Length of Time from Start to Completion of Buildings Started in Permit-Issuing Places,” 1971-2022, https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/pdf/avg_starttocomp.pdf.

¹⁶ See, for example, National Multifamily Housing Council, “Multifamily Units Under Construction are Up, But Demand for Apartments Remains,” August 11, 2022, <https://www.nmhc.org/news/nmhc-news/2022/multifamily-units-under-construction-are-up-but-demand-for-apartments-remains/>; and National Association of Home Builders, “Supply Chain Issues Continue to Slow Housing,” February 17, 2022, <https://www.nahb.org/blog/2022/02/supply-chain-issues-continue-to-slow-housing/>.

Figure 8. Housing Units under Construction
1995-2022



Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Census Bureau, New Residential Construction, Historical Data, available at https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/historical_data/index.html.

Another metric to consider is spending on residential construction, as measured by residential fixed investment (described in greater detail in the following section). Residential fixed investment has fallen in both real and nominal terms since the second quarter of 2022, which could be a contributing factor in the recent decrease in housing starts.¹⁷

Housing and the Broader Economy

The housing market plays an important role in the larger economy, as it accounts for a significant portion of economic activity. Housing contributes to GDP in two direct ways: residential fixed investment and spending on housing services. Residential fixed investment includes all spending on the construction of new single- and multi-family structures, residential remodeling, and brokers' fees. Housing services includes all spending on renters' utilities and rent and homeowners' imputed rent¹⁸ and utility payments. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, residential fixed investment has been decreasing each quarter since the second quarter of 2021.¹⁹ Such slowdowns in residential fixed investment have been followed by periods of economic slowdown in the past, although the causal connection between the two is not certain.²⁰ On the other hand, real spending on housing services has been more robust than real residential fixed investment—while variable from quarter to quarter, real spending on housing services rose by 1.1% and 1.2%

¹⁷ Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), Table 1.1.1, "Percent Change From Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product" and Table 1.1.5, "Gross Domestic Product," <https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&categories=survey>.

¹⁸ *Imputed rent* is the estimate of the rent a homeowner would be willing to pay to live in their own house.


¹⁹ BEA, NIPA, Table 1.1.1, Percent Change From Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product, <https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&categories=survey#eyJhcHBpZCI6MTksInN0ZXBzIjpbMSwyLDNdLCJkYXRhIjpbWjJyYXRIZ29yaWVzIiwuU3VydmV5II0sWyJOSVBBX1RlYmxlX0xpc3QiLCJlI1dfQ==>.

²⁰ For more information, see CRS Report R47479, *Common Causes of Economic Recession*.

in 2021 and 2022, respectively.²¹ (For further discussion of housing and economic growth, see CRS In Focus IF11327, *Introduction to U.S. Economy: Housing Market.*)

One of the ways in which housing has most notably affected the economy recently is in its contribution to inflation. As shown in **Figure 9**, shelter inflation accelerated notably in 2021 and 2022 and has continued to increase while many other expenditure categories have decelerated in the first quarter of 2023. Shelter inflation, which includes both rental and owner-occupied housing, is a measure of the changes in cost to rent a home (or what it would cost to rent an owner-occupied unit).²² Notably, shelter inflation is not a measure of new leases, but rather all leases, so new higher rents can take several months to filter into the calculation of shelter inflation. While there is some evidence of cooling in the housing market (see the “Housing Costs” section) in recent months, these decreases may take time to affect the costs being paid by renters and homeowners on the whole and therefore be reflected in measures of shelter inflation.

Figure 9. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Shelter in U.S. City Average
January 1995-February 2023



Source: Created by CRS based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, at <https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm>.

Notes: Gray bars indicate recessions.

On average, spending on shelter is a large component of total expenditures for consumers. Increasing shelter costs, therefore, can add significant burden to households and potentially result in altered spending patterns, the need to change housing, or difficulties making ends meet, depending on the real incomes of each household in question. Additionally, the shelter component of inflation is weighted heavily to account for its large share of average expenditures.²³ As such,

²¹ BEA, NIPA, Table 2.3.1, Percent change From Preceding Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product, <https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&categories=survey#eyJhcHBpZCI6MTksInN0ZXBzIjpbMSwyLDMsM10sImRhdGEiOltbImNhdGVnb3JpZXMlLCJdTdXJ2ZXkiXSxbIk5JUEFfVGFibGVFTGlzdCIsljYxIl0sWyJGaXJzdF9ZZWFyIiwicjAyMCJdLFsiTGZzdF9ZZWFyIiwicjAyMjJdLFsiU2NhbGUlLCIwIl0sWyJkZXJpZXMlLCJBI1dfQ==>.

²² For details on how imputed rent is calculated, see CRS In Focus IF12164, *Housing and the Consumer Price Index.*

²³ Shelter generally has a *relative importance* in the Consumer Price Index of roughly 30%-35%. For example, in February 2023, the shelter expenditure category had a weight of 34.473. For the most recent relative importance weights, see BLS, Table 1. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: U.S. city average, by expenditure category, <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.t01.htm>.

shelter inflation is watched closely by the Federal Reserve and other policymakers and can influence policy decisions, notably with respect to monetary policy. Changes to monetary policy can affect economic growth and employment, among other aspects of the economy. (For more information on monetary policy and its effects on the economy, see CRS In Focus IF11751, *Introduction to U.S. Economy: Monetary Policy*.)

Selected Current Issues

The remainder of this report provides a high-level overview of housing issues that are or may be of interest to the 118th Congress.

Housing Affordability

While housing affordability, particularly for lower-income households, is a perennial policy issue for Congress, in recent years the house price increases and supply constraints described above in the “Housing Market Conditions” section have exacerbated housing affordability concerns. Affordability challenges can affect both owners and renters at varying levels of income; however, lower-income renter households are the most likely to face severe housing cost burdens, placing them at the greatest risk for housing insecurity.²⁴ Estimates vary, but they generally show that the primary federal rental assistance programs reach roughly one in four eligible households.²⁵

Proposals to address housing affordability in general, and for low-income renter households in particular, can take many forms. Broadly speaking, some types of proposals involve supply-side interventions intended to increase the housing supply more generally or the supply of low-cost or affordable housing more specifically. These can include proposals to provide additional funding for existing or new programs that support affordable housing development or proposals to encourage communities to address local regulatory barriers that may affect the supply or affordability of housing. An example of the latter approach in the 117th Congress was funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (CAA; P.L. 117-328) for a new grant program to support communities that are addressing regulatory barriers to housing supply (discussed further in the “Competitive Grants for Land Use and Zoning Reform (CDBG-PRO)” section).

Other types of proposals involve demand-side interventions to defray housing costs for individuals and families, such as proposals to expand rental assistance programs to serve more families, create new sources of down payment assistance funding for prospective homebuyers, or create renter or homebuyer tax credits to help offset housing costs for qualifying households.

In the 118th Congress, efforts to constrain federal spending may impact the extent to which Congress considers new resources for housing programs. Certain tax-related proposals that received attention in previous Congresses, including proposals to encourage new affordable housing supply, have been reintroduced in the 118th Congress. The 118th Congress may also take an interest in the implementation of programs that were established in prior Congresses, such as the CDBG-PRO program (discussed below). The following sections discuss appropriations for housing programs, housing-related tax proposals, and CDBG-PRO grants, respectively.

²⁴ Thyria Alvarez and Barry L. Steffan, *Worst Case Housing Needs 2021*, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Report to Congress, Washington, DC, July 2021, <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Worst-Case-Housing-Needs-2021.pdf>.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

Appropriations for Housing Programs

The majority of federal housing assistance programs are funded by annual discretionary appropriations. The largest share of those appropriations is devoted to covering the costs of maintaining federal rental assistance programs. Federal rental assistance programs provide subsidies to the lowest income tenants, allowing them generally to pay 30% or less of their incomes towards their housing costs.

More than half of HUD's appropriations each year are devoted to maintaining the cost of continuing to serve the more than 4 million households served by the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) and Section 8 project-based rental assistance programs. Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, both because of increases in the number of people served, as well as the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs due to rents increasing faster than tenant incomes. Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities.²⁶ A similar dynamic plays out in USDA's Rural Housing Service (RHS) budget. Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the largest share of RHS spending for rental housing programs is devoted to maintaining rental assistance for current residents.²⁷

In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, as were adopted in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (P.L. 118-5) in June 2023, pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs competes with pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing programs.

Housing Tax Proposals

Congress has considered changes to the tax code in efforts to help individuals secure affordable housing and to promote the production of affordable housing. In the 118th Congress, the Decent, Affordable, Safe Housing for All (DASH) Act (S. 680) contains the most comprehensive housing-related tax proposals. The DASH Act would, among other things,

- expand the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program,²⁸ which is intended to encourage the development of affordable rental housing for low-income tenants;
- create a middle-income housing tax credit to encourage the development of affordable rental housing for middle-income tenants;
- create a renter's tax credit for property owners who reduce rents on eligible tenants;

²⁶ See Figure 6 of Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, *America's Rental Housing*, 2017, p. 6, <http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research-areas/reports/americas-rental-housing-2017>.

²⁷ The bulk of the RHS budget for rental housing is devoted to renewing existing Section 521 rental assistance contracts in Section 515 and Section 514/516 rental housing properties. For more information about USDA's rural housing programs, see CRS Report RL31837, *An Overview of USDA Rural Development Programs*.

²⁸ For more information, see CRS Report RS22389, *An Introduction to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit*; CRS In Focus IF11335, *The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: Policy Issues*; and CRS Insight IN12070, *The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: Lowering the 50% Bond Threshold to 25%*.

- create a first-time homebuyers refundable tax credit of up to \$15,000; and
- institute the Neighborhood Homes Investment Act (NHIA), which would create a tax credit intended to encourage the development of affordable homes for ownership in lower-income areas.²⁹ The NHIA is being proposed in standalone legislation (S. 657 and H.R. 3940) as well.

The Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2023 (S. 1557/H.R. 3238), also introduced in the 118th Congress, is an exclusively LIHTC-focused proposal. Similar to the DASH Act, the proposal would expand the LIHTC program by increasing states’ per capita allocation authority up to \$4.875 beginning in 2024 (not including a required annual inflation adjustment). It would also make a number of changes pertaining to tenant eligibility and credit determinations for projects. In addition, it would change the program’s name to the “affordable housing tax credit.” Versions of the Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act have been introduced in every Congress since the 114th.

Competitive Grants for Land Use and Zoning Reform (CDBG-PRO)

A growing base of research indicates that laws and regulations that constrict housing supply—such as exclusionary zoning—might contribute to increased housing prices and construction costs.³⁰ Some studies suggest that these cost effects are more pronounced in large metropolitan areas on the east and west coasts of the United States.³¹ Others have suggested a more complex relationship between land use restrictions and the cost of housing, depending on other factors that may drive demand, such as the relocation of a major employer to a particular jurisdiction.³² Generally, it is difficult to measure the relative restrictiveness of land use controls at the national level, due in part to the wide range of methods used by local governments to control land use and development.³³

The federal government has historically played a limited role in the development of zoning and land use standards. Instead, local governments, acting in accordance with the constitutional police powers³⁴ delegated to them by state governments, have been the primary developers of zoning and land use standards.³⁵

Although land use controls are primarily driven by states and localities, some federal laws, programs, and regulations can affect the nature of local land use controls. The CAA (P.L. 117-

²⁹ For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11884, *Neighborhood Homes Investment Act: Overview and Policy Considerations*.

³⁰ Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Katherine O’Regan, *Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability*, NYU Furman Center, August 20, 2018, p. 4, https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf.

³¹ For example, see Joseph Gyourko and Jacob Krimmel, “The Impact of Local Residential Land Use Restrictions on Land Values Across and Within Single Family Housing Markets,” *NBER Working Paper Series*, July 2021, p. 4; and Jenny Schuetz, “Build More Homes Where People Want to Live,” in *Fixer Upper: How to Repair America’s Broken Housing Systems* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2022), pp. 23-24 (hereinafter, “Schuetz, *Fixer Upper*”).

³² Michael LaCour -Little and Weifeng Wu, “Density Control, Home Price Appreciation, and Rental Growth in the United States,” *Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2021), pp. 75-100.

³³ For example, see *ibid.*, p. 77; Schuetz, *Fixer Upper*, pp. 22-23; and Joseph Gyourko and Raven Molloy, “Regulation and Housing Supply,” *Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Volume 5B*, p. 1294, <https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Regulation-and-Housing-Supply-1.pdf>.

³⁴ Anika Singh Lemar, “The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use,” *North Carolina Law Review*, vol. 97, no. 2 (January 1, 2019), p. 297.

³⁵ *Ibid.*; and “Addressing Challenges to Affordable Housing in Land Use Law: Recognizing Affordable Housing as a Right,” *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 135, no. 4, February 2022, p. 1107, <https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/135-Harv.-L.-Rev.-1104.pdf>.

328, Division L, Title II), for example, included \$85 million in funds for a competitive grant program to remove and/or replace land use controls that limit the feasibility of affordable housing development (practices commonly referred to as *regulatory barriers to affordable housing*).³⁶

The grant program derives its authority from Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. §§5301 et seq.), the statute that authorizes the CDBG program.³⁷ The CAA measure also provides the HUD Secretary with authority to grant waivers and allow alternative requirements, except in cases pertaining to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, the environment, and low- and moderate-income benefit requirements. In May 2023, HUD published a *Federal Register* notice seeking approval from the Office of Management and Budget to collect applications for program funds, under the title Community Development Block Grant-Pathways to Removing Obstacles (CDBG-PRO).³⁸ As of the cover date of this report, HUD had not yet released program guidance or a Notice of Funding Opportunity to solicit applications.³⁹

Some Members of Congress have sought other options to influence local land use regulatory practices. For example, several Members in the 117th Congress introduced legislation that would have expanded requirements for grantees of certain federal block grant programs related to planning, implementation, and reporting on inclusionary zoning practices. These 117th Congress bills included the Yes In My Backyard Act (S. 1614/H.R. 3198) and the Housing, Opportunity, Mobility, and Equity Act of 2022 (S. 5223/H.R. 9466).

Rural Housing Programs

USDA's RHS administers several housing programs specifically for rural areas.⁴⁰ In the 118th Congress, there has been some interest in these rural housing programs in the context of the farm bill,⁴¹ as well as in standalone legislative proposals.

³⁶ See Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, "Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023," *Congressional Record*, daily edition, vol. 168 (December 20, 2022), p. S9340.

³⁷ For further information, see CRS Report R46733, *Community Development Block Grants: Funding and Allocation Processes*.

³⁸ HUD, "60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Community Development Block Grant-Pathways to Removing Obstacles (CDBG-PRO) Housing Competition Application Collection OMB Control No.: 2506-New," 88 *Federal Register* 32782, May 22, 2023. Although HUD appears to be referring to this grant program as CDBG-PRO, the joint explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 referred to it as the "Yes in my backyard incentive grant program."

³⁹ In general, HUD Notices of Funding Opportunity can be found at <https://www.hud.gov/grants>.

⁴⁰ For more information on rural housing programs administered by RHS, see CRS Report R47044, *USDA Rural Housing Programs: An Overview*.

⁴¹ See, for example, Caitlin Reilly, "Advocates eye farm bill to avert drop in affordable rural housing," *Roll Call*, April 11, 2023, <https://rollcall.com/2023/04/11/advocates-eye-farm-bill-to-avert-drop-in-affordable-rural-housing/>. See also a June 2023 letter to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry signed by over 100 organizations at <https://ruralhome.org/hacs-network-supports-improvements-to-usdas-rural-housing-service-in-letter-to-congress/>.

Rural Housing and the Farm Bill

The 118th Congress has begun work on the farm bill, an omnibus law addressing agricultural and food issues that is enacted roughly every five years.⁴² Prior to the 118th Congress, the most recent farm bill was the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334).

Farm bills typically include a Rural Development title⁴³ that reauthorizes and amends programs administered by USDA's Rural Development (RD) agency. RHS, which administers the rural housing programs, is part of USDA RD. However, farm bills—which are drafted by the House and the Senate Agriculture Committees—do not typically include rural housing programs, as rural housing has historically been under the jurisdiction of the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee, respectively.⁴⁴

While rural housing programs are not generally addressed in farm bills, there are past examples of farm bills including select provisions related to rural housing programs. For example,

- past farm bills have amended the definition of *rural* that is used for the RHS rural housing programs (see Section 6208 of the Agricultural Act of 2014 [P.L. 113-79] and Section 6305 of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 [P.L. 115-334]);
- the 2018 farm bill established a new grant program for eligible entities to provide shelter and housing assistance to domestic violence survivors and their pets or emotional support animals (see Section 12502(b) of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018)⁴⁵; and
- the 2008 farm bill revised the definition of *eligible farm laborer* for purposes of the Farm Labor Housing program to include references to aquacultural workers (see Section 6205 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-246]).

Rural Housing Program Reform Proposals

In recent Congresses, bills have been introduced to make changes to certain rural housing programs, with a particular focus on addressing concerns about USDA-assisted rental properties being lost from the affordable housing stock due to mortgage maturations or prepayments. One of these bills, the Strategy and Investment in Rural Housing Preservation Act, has been reintroduced in the 118th Congress (S. 1490). The bill would make several changes to rural housing programs in an effort to support the preservation of existing USDA-assisted rental properties and to expand rental assistance options to help maintain affordability for tenants in affected properties. Another bill that has been introduced in the 118th Congress is the Rural Housing Service Reform Act of 2023 (S. 1389). It includes identical or similar provisions to those of S. 1490 and would also make changes to several other rural housing programs. In May 2023, the Senate Banking

⁴² For more information on the farm bill in general, see CRS In Focus IF12047, *Farm Bill Primer: What Is the Farm Bill?*

⁴³ For more information on the Rural Development title of the farm bill, see CRS In Focus IF12038, *Farm Bill Primer: Rural Development Title*

⁴⁴ In addition to the rural housing programs, RHS also administers several community facilities programs. Unlike the housing programs, these community facilities programs are typically included in the farm bill.

⁴⁵ This program is codified at 34 U.S.C. §20127.

Committee’s Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development held a hearing on “Rural Housing Legislation” in which these proposals were discussed.⁴⁶

(For more information on USDA’s rural housing programs in general, including background on rural rental housing preservation concerns and past policy proposals, see CRS Report R47044, *USDA Rural Housing Programs: An Overview*.)

Status of COVID-19 Supplemental Funding for Housing

In response to housing-related concerns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 116th and 117th Congresses provided supplemental funding for several new and existing housing programs, including in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act, P.L. 116-136),⁴⁷ the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division M of P.L. 116-260), and the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA, P.L. 117-2).⁴⁸ Congress has expressed interest in the distribution, usage, and effectiveness of this funding, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA; P.L. 118-5) rescinded a portion of unspent COVID-19 relief funding for several housing programs.⁴⁹

Treasury Programs

Some of the COVID-19-related housing funding was provided to the Department of the Treasury for a new Emergency Rental Assistance (ERA) program and a new Homeowner Assistance Fund (HAF) designed to keep renters and homeowners, respectively, in their homes.

Treasury received two rounds of funding for ERA: ERA-1 (\$25.0 billion) was funded in the FY2021 COVID-19 supplemental appropriations law and ERA-2 (\$21.6 billion) was funded by ARPA. The obligation period for ERA-1 expired in the 117th Congress. Grantees have until September 2025 to obligate ERA-2 funding. Grantees with slow obligation and expenditure rates have been subject to recapture and reallocation of their funding. As of the cover date of this report, two rounds of ERA-2 funding reallocation have taken place in the 118th Congress, in January and April 2023.⁵⁰ Through the fourth quarter of 2022, the date of the most recent program expenditure reports published by Treasury as of the cover date of this report, grantees had expended more than \$33 billion in ERA funds to assist a total of nearly 6.9 million unique

⁴⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development, *Rural Housing Legislation*, 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 2, 2023, <https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/rural-housing-legislation>.

⁴⁷ For more information, see CRS Insight IN11319, *Funding for HUD in the CARES Act*.

⁴⁸ For more information, see CRS Insight IN11641, *Housing Funding in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021*.

⁴⁹ Specifically, the FRA rescinded unobligated balances of funding that were provided in the CARES Act for Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (§25 of the FRA), Native American housing programs (§26), Housing for Persons with Disabilities (§27), Project-Based Rental Assistance (§28), and Housing for the Elderly (§29); funding that was provided in the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act for Emergency Rental Assistance (or ERA-1) (§36); and funding that was provided in the ARPA for Fair Housing activities (§30), Native American housing programs (§59), and certain rural housing programs (§63). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score did not include separate estimates of the amount of the rescissions for these housing programs, as they did not include estimates for accounts where rescissions were estimated to be under \$50 million. See the CBO table at <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-06/59225-Rescissions.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Information about ERA reallocations can be found at <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-rental-assistance-program>.

households.⁵¹ (For more information about ERA, see CRS Report R46688, *Pandemic Relief: The Emergency Rental Assistance Program*.)

Treasury received \$9.6 billion for HAF in ARPA. Grantees have until September 30, 2026, to use their funds to provide assistance to eligible homeowners. Through the first quarter of 2023, the date of the most recent program expenditure reports published by Treasury as of the cover date of this report, states and other eligible entities had obligated \$4.9 billion and expended \$4.3 billion providing assistance to nearly 319,000 homeowners.⁵²

HUD Programs

Other pandemic-related funding was provided to HUD for a variety of programs and activities, including supplemental funding for CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME), Emergency Solutions Grants (ESG), Native American housing programs, and emergency housing vouchers. Some of this funding may receive attention in the 118th Congress because of expenditure deadlines or general oversight questions.

For example, HUD received \$5 billion from ARPA for new Emergency Housing Vouchers (EHVs), which are HCVs for persons who are homeless or at high risk of housing instability. HUD used this funding to award 70,000 new vouchers to local public housing authorities (PHAs) across the country in May 2021. Some PHAs struggled to *lease-up* the vouchers (i.e., award them to eligible households who successfully locate a unit that will accept the voucher). As of May 2023, approximately 74% of EHV were under lease. Beginning September 30, 2023, PHAs may not reissue EHV when a family receiving one leaves the program; never-leased vouchers can continue to be issued. In an attempt to improve leasing, HUD has issued guidance to PHAs on how they can voluntarily return EHV to HUD to be reallocated to other PHAs more likely to use them.⁵³ The agency also announced it may revoke EHV from PHAs that had not successfully leased any of their vouchers and reallocate them to other PHAs.⁵⁴

In addition, HUD's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been conducting oversight related to HUD programs and COVID-19, including work on HUD's administration of supplemental funding provided in response to the pandemic.⁵⁵ For example, over the last few years, the HUD OIG has released reports discussing implementation challenges, or lack thereof, faced by grantees

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Treasury, *ERA1 & ERA2 Quarterly Demographic Data for Q1 2021 through Q4 2022*, <https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Q1-2021-Q4-2022-ERA-Demographic-Data.xlsx>.

⁵² U.S. Department of Treasury, *HAF Quarterly Report Q1 2023*, available at <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/homeowner-assistance-fund/reporting>. In addition to the Treasury reporting, some states maintain public dashboards with data on HAF program activity. The National Council of State Housing Agencies provides links to state HAF program dashboards at <https://www.ncsha.org/homeowner-assistance-fund/>.

⁵³ See HUD Notice PIH 2022-06, *Emergency Housing Vouchers – Reallocation of Awards*, March 10, 2022.

⁵⁴ See HUD Notice PIH 2022-22, *Revoke and Reallocation of Emergency Housing Voucher Awards*, August 11, 2022.

⁵⁵ See the HUD OIG's website at <https://www.hudoig.gov/priority-focus-areas/covid-19-oversight>. See also the HUD OIG's list of ongoing work at <https://hudoig.gov/library/ongoing-work>, which includes some work related to COVID-19 funding.

under certain programs.⁵⁶ It has also released inventories of potential fraud schemes that could affect supplemental COVID-19 funding to assist HUD in safeguarding pandemic relief funds.⁵⁷

Homelessness

Housing affordability challenges and the increased visibility of people experiencing homelessness in some parts of the country have increased concerns that more people may be at risk of homelessness or have become homeless.⁵⁸ The most consistent and comprehensive measure of people experiencing homelessness is the annual point-in-time (PIT) count overseen by HUD and administered at the state and local level. The PIT count is meant to capture the number of people experiencing sheltered (living in emergency shelter or transitional housing) and unsheltered (living in places not meant for human habitation) homelessness on one night in January each year. According to PIT count data, the number of people who were unsheltered began gradually increasing each year from a low of 173,268 in 2015 to 233,832 in 2022 (an increase of 35%).⁵⁹ However, the number of people living in unsheltered conditions is still lower than it was at its height in 2007, when nearly 256,000 people were included in the unsheltered count. In 2021, the number of people who were sheltered during the PIT count reached its lowest point since HUD began collecting full-year data (in 2007), falling to 326,126. The following year, in 2022, the number increased by 7% to 348,630.⁶⁰

It is possible that resources made available due to the COVID-19 pandemic helped house people who might otherwise have been at risk of homelessness. Between the CARES Act and ARPA, Congress appropriated nearly \$15 billion for HUD programs targeted specifically to assist people experiencing homelessness through both temporary assistance as well as support for permanent housing through vouchers and the development of affordable housing. Further, ERA funds were used to cover rent payments for people who were at risk of housing instability and homelessness.⁶¹ In addition, some jurisdictions chose to use a portion of their state and local fiscal

⁵⁶ See, for example, HUD OIG, *Community Development Block Grant CARES Act Implementation Challenges*, 2022-LA-0003, September 28, 2022, <https://hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/community-development-block-grant-cares-act-implementation-challenges>; *Emergency Solutions Grants CARES Act Implementation Challenges*, 2022-LA-0002, August 17, 2022, <https://www.hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/emergency-solutions-grants-cares-act-implementation-challenges>; and *Public Housing Agencies' Experiences and Challenges Regarding the Administration of HUD's CARES Act Funds*, 2022-CH-0801, November 16, 2021, <https://hudoig.gov/reports-publications/memorandum/public-housing-agencies-experiences-and-challenges-regarding>.

⁵⁷ See, for example, HUD OIG, *Fraud Risk Inventory for the Tenant- and Project-Based Rental Assistance, HOME, and Operating Fund Programs' CARES and ARP Act Funds*, 2022-FO-0007, September 29, 2022, <https://hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/fraud-risk-inventory-tenant-and-project-based-rental-assistance-home>; and *Fraud Risk Inventory for the CDBG and ESG CARES Act Funds*, 2022-FO-0801, October 12, 2021, <https://hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/fraud-risk-inventory-cdbg-and-esg-cares-act-funds>.

⁵⁸ See, for example, “582,462 and Counting,” *New York Times*, February 3, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/economy/us-homeless-population-count.html>.

⁵⁹ HUD, *The 2022 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress*, December 2022, p. 10, <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2022-AHAR-Part-1.pdf>.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ For more information, see CRS Report R46688, *Pandemic Relief: The Emergency Rental Assistance Program*.

recovery funds for affordable housing and to assist people experiencing homelessness.⁶² As these resources expire, the risk of homelessness for some people may increase.⁶³

Leading into the 118th Congress, the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) released *All In: The Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness*.⁶⁴ This report is the most recent in a series of plans to prevent and end homelessness released by USICH, as required by statute.⁶⁵ On March 8, 2023, the Senate Banking Committee Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development held a hearing on the plan.⁶⁶

Housing Quality

In committee reports accompanying appropriations measures, via targeted funding,⁶⁷ in requests for GAO reports,⁶⁸ and through oversight hearings,⁶⁹ some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the physical quality of federally assisted housing specifically, as well as health and safety problems present in the U.S. housing stock more broadly.

For federally assisted housing—much of which is subsidized through HUD programs—Congress directed HUD to develop a standardized protocol to be used to inspect HUD-assisted housing across programs to replace the agency’s multiple inspection systems.⁷⁰ In response, HUD launched what it termed the National Standards for the Physical Inspection of Real Estate (NSPIRE) initiative to establish a new standardized inspection regime for HUD-assisted housing. The NSPIRE standards are more directly focused on health and safety concerns than previous inspections standards, and the initiative’s protocols are designed to increase consistency across

⁶² See, for example, National Council of State Housing Finance Agencies, *States Are Using Fiscal Recovery Funds for Affordable Housing*, <https://www.ncsha.org/advocacy-issues/coronavirus-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds/>, accessed April 17, 2023.

⁶³ See, for example, Kelley Bouchard, “End of rental assistance program hinders agencies’ ability to help those facing homelessness,” *Portland Press Herald*, December 3, 2022, <https://www.pressherald.com/2022/12/03/end-of-rental-assistance-program-hinders-agencies-ability-to-help-those-facing-homelessness/>.

⁶⁴ U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, *All In: The Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness*, December 2022, https://www.usich.gov/All_In.pdf.

⁶⁵ 42 U.S.C. §11313(a)(1). Previously, USICH released *Opening Doors, The Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness* in 2010, and updated the report in 2011 and 2015. Another plan, *Expanding the Toolbox, The Whole of Government Response to Homelessness*, was released in 2020.

⁶⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development, *The Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 2023, <https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/the-federal-strategic-plan-to-prevent-and-end-homelessness>.

⁶⁷ See, for example, special funding for radon mitigation and lead risk assessments discussed later in this section.

⁶⁸ See, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Real Estate Assessment Center: HUD Should Improve Physical Inspection Process and Oversight of Inspectors*, GAO-19-254, March 21, 2019, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-254>.

⁶⁹ See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development, “Safe at Home: Preserving and Improving Federally Assisted Housing, Examining Threats in Housing and Especially Public Housing,” hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021, S.Rept. 117-570 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2023).

⁷⁰ The history of congressional directives, beginning with the joint explanatory statement accompanying the FY2016 HUD appropriations act, is reviewed in the background section of HUD, “Notice of Continuation of Demonstration To Test Proposed New Method of Assessing the Physical Conditions of Voucher- Assisted Housing,” 84 *Federal Register* 24416-24417, May 28, 2019.

inspectors and allow for earlier intervention for properties in disrepair. NSPIRE was tested over several years and is scheduled to begin full implementation in 2023.⁷¹

Additionally, Congress has approved several laws in recent years directing HUD to increase safety requirements for federally assisted housing, including as they pertain to carbon monoxide,⁷² radon,⁷³ lead hazards,⁷⁴ and fire safety.⁷⁵ Some of these new requirements are included in the NSPIRE protocols, but in the response to comments on the NSPIRE final rule, HUD states that it will “continue to update and publish guidance on other environmental hazards that are not fully addressed by NSPIRE, such as radon, lead-based paint, carbon monoxide, and other environmental health hazards. The NSPIRE inspection is not intended to serve as the only way HUD assesses compliance with all environmental health laws and related requirements.”⁷⁶

In terms of unassisted private market housing, the federal government has historically provided resources to address residential lead-based paint hazards via grants to state and localities administered by HUD. Since 2018, Congress has not only increased the funding it provides for lead-based paint hazard reduction grants,⁷⁷ it has also provided HUD with additional funds to address other health and safety hazards in private, unassisted housing via the Healthy Homes Initiative.⁷⁸ Since FY2021, this has included funding for a new Older Adults Home Modification grant program, which provides funding via nonprofits and public agencies to make safety and functional home modification repairs and renovations for low-income elderly homeowners.

Implementation of Housing-Related Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act

The 117th Congress passed, and President Biden signed, budget reconciliation legislation known as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA, P.L. 117-169). While earlier versions of FY2022 budget reconciliation legislation in the 117th Congress would have included significant new funding for affordable housing programs,⁷⁹ most of that proposed housing funding was not included in the IRA. However, the IRA did include a number of programs that affect housing. These provisions

⁷¹ HUD published the final NSPIRE rule on May 11, 2023. It states that public housing inspections using NSPIRE will begin on July 1, 2023, and multifamily and all other programs subject to inspections using NSPIRE will begin on October 1, 2023. HUD, “Economic Growth Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act: Implementation of National Standards for the Physical Inspection of Real Estate (NSPIRE),” 88 *Federal Register* 30442, May 11, 2023 (hereinafter, “NSPIRE Rule”).

⁷² Section 101, Title I, Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) contained the text of Carbon Monoxide Alarms or Detectors in Federally Insured Housing, requiring CO alarms or detectors to be installed in certain HUD-assisted housing within two years of enactment.

⁷³ In each of FY2021-FY2023, Congress has funded a radon testing and mitigation resident safety demonstration. It was funded in the Public Housing Fund account in FY2021 and in the Lead Hazard Reduction account in FY2022 and FY2023.

⁷⁴ In FY2022 and FY2023, Congress funded a lead-based paint risk assessment demonstration in the Housing Choice Voucher program in the Lead Hazard Reduction account.

⁷⁵ Title VI, Division AA of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) contained the text of the Public and Federally Assisted Housing Fire Safety Act of 2022, which requires the installation of hard-wired smoke detectors in federally assisted housing.

⁷⁶ NSPIRE Rule, p. 30457.

⁷⁷ From FY2017 to FY2023, the amount of funding provided for Lead Hazard Reduction grants increased by 157%.

⁷⁸ From FY2017 to FY2023, the amount of funding provided for Healthy Homes Initiative grants increased by 183%.

⁷⁹ For a description of affordable housing funding included in earlier versions of the legislation, see CRS Report R46916, *FY2022 Reconciliation: Title IV, House Financial Services Committee Provisions*.

will likely be implemented over the next several years and their status may be of interest to the 118th Congress.

The IRA provided \$1 billion in mandatory funding to HUD for a Green and Resilient Retrofit Program to fund certain types of improvements to existing HUD-assisted multifamily properties. Specifically, this funding can be used for loans or grants to finance projects that improve energy or water efficiency, enhance indoor air quality or sustainability, implement the use of certain technologies, or address climate resilience. Properties assisted through the Project-Based Section 8, Section 202, and Section 811 programs are eligible. HUD released an implementation notice and funding availability announcement in May 2023 and has stated it will be accepting applications and making awards on a rolling basis over a 10-month period.⁸⁰

The IRA also included funding for two new home energy rebate programs through the Department of Energy (DOE): \$4.3 billion for Home Energy Performance-Based, Whole-House Rebates, also known as the HOMES (Home Owner Managing Energy Savings) rebate program; and \$4.5 billion for a high-efficiency electric home rebate (HEEHR) program (of which \$4.275 billion is for state energy offices and \$225 million is for tribes).⁸¹

- HOMES provides rebates for certain energy efficiency upgrades that improve the overall energy performance of single-family homes or multifamily properties, with larger rebates for households with incomes of less than 80% of area median income (AMI) or for dwellings in multifamily buildings occupied by such households. Multifamily buildings are eligible provided at least 50% of dwelling units are occupied by households with incomes less than 80% of AMI.
- HEEHR provides rebates for certain qualified electrification projects, such as purchase and installation of certain electrical appliances. The percentage of the rebate depends on whether the household has annual income below 80% of AMI, or from 80% to not greater than 150% of AMI, with lower percentages for the latter. Projects for households with incomes above 150% of AMI are generally not eligible. Multifamily buildings are eligible provided at least 50% of the residents are households that satisfy the income eligibility criteria.

For both of these rebate programs, DOE has announced allocations to states and indicated that funds are expected to be made available to states and tribes in summer 2023.⁸² (For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12258, *The Inflation Reduction Act: Financial Incentives for Residential Energy Efficiency and Electrification Projects*.)

In addition, the IRA provided \$27 billion to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a new Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF) to provide competitive grants to states, municipalities, tribal governments, and certain nonprofits.⁸³ The grants can be used to provide financial and technical assistance for projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a focus

⁸⁰ HUD Notice H 2023-05, Green and Resilient Retrofit Program for Multifamily Housing (GRRP), May 11, 2023, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/H-2023-05_GRRP_Notice_issued_2023-05-11.pdf.

⁸¹ Section 50121, Home Energy Performance-Based, Whole-House Rebates; and Section 50122, High-Efficiency Electric Home Rebate Program. The IRA also provided \$200 million for training and education for contractors involved in these rebate programs; see Section 50123, State-Based Home Energy Efficiency Contractor Training Grants.

⁸² Information on these rebate programs is available on DOE's website at <https://www.energy.gov/scep/home-energy-rebate-programs-guidance> and <https://www.energy.gov/scep/tribal-home-energy-rebates>. Frequently Asked Questions are at <https://www.energy.gov/scep/home-energy-rebate-programs-frequently-asked-questions>.

⁸³ Section 60103, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. More information is available on EPA's website at <https://www.epa.gov/greenhouse-gas-reduction-fund>.

on projects that benefit low-income and disadvantaged communities. In April 2023, EPA released a proposed program Implementation Framework for feedback.⁸⁴ While not focused on housing specifically, certain housing activities may be eligible uses of program funds. For example, in June 2023 EPA announced a Notice of Funding Opportunity for the first of the three complementary competitions under the GGRP. The new grant competition will award \$7 billion in funding to eligible entities to expand existing residential solar programs, or develop and implement new residential solar programs, in low-income and disadvantaged communities.⁸⁵ (For more information on the GGRF, see CRS In Focus IF12387, *EPA's Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF)*.)

Other housing-related provisions in the IRA included extensions and modifications of existing home energy tax incentives,⁸⁶ assistance to tribes for zero-emissions home electrification purposes,⁸⁷ and funding to assist states and local governments in adopting and implementing the latest building energy codes for residential and other buildings, including zero-energy stretch codes.⁸⁸

Fair Housing

The evolving administrative and judicial interpretations of certain requirements of the Fair Housing Act, including rulemaking during the 118th Congress, have been of ongoing interest to Congress.

Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act “to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”⁸⁹ Congress passed the act in 1968 after years of private and government-sanctioned housing discrimination that resulted in racially segregated neighborhoods and unequal access to housing.⁹⁰ As amended, the act prohibits discrimination in

⁸⁴ EPA, “EPA Releases Framework for the Implementation of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund as Part of President Biden’s Investing in America Agenda,” press release, April 19, 2023, <https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-framework-implementation-greenhouse-gas-reduction-fund-part-president>.

⁸⁵ For more information, see EPA’s website at <https://www.epa.gov/greenhouse-gas-reduction-fund/solar-all>.

⁸⁶ Section 13301, Extension, Increase, and Modifications of Nonbusiness Energy Property Credit; Section 13302, Residential Clean Electricity Credit; and Section 13304, Extension, Increase, and Modifications of New Energy Efficient Home Credit.

⁸⁷ Section 80003, Tribal Electrification Program. This section provided \$150 million to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for this purpose.

⁸⁸ Section 50131, Assistance for Latest and Zero Building Energy Code Adoption, provided \$1 billion to DOE for this purpose. *Zero energy stretch codes* refers to the voluntary zero energy provisions of the 2021 International Energy Conservation Code or equivalent stretch code. A stretch code is one that exceeds the expected energy-efficiency performance of a building energy code. For more information on this funding, see DOE’s website at <https://www.energy.gov/scep/technical-assistance-adoption-building-energy-codes>.

⁸⁹ 42 U.S.C. §3601. The Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§3601-3631) was originally enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-284).

⁹⁰ See *NAACP v. HUD*, 817 F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir. 1987); *Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Carson*, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2015). See also Thomas J. Sugrue, “From Jim Crow to Fair Housing,” in *The Fight for Fair Housing: Causes, Consequences, and Future Implications of the 1968 Fair Housing Act*, ed. Gregory D. Squires (New York, NY: Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), pp. 14-27.

the sale, rental, or financing of housing based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex,⁹¹ familial status, and disability.⁹²

The Fair Housing Act bars *intentional* discrimination, through which plaintiffs allege that a defendant made a housing decision based on “a discriminatory intent or motive.”⁹³ In addition, HUD and courts had historically recognized that the act also bars *disparate impact* (also referred to as *discriminatory effects*) discrimination—“facially neutral [housing] decision[s]” that have “a disproportionately adverse effect on [a protected class] and [are] otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”⁹⁴ However, the Supreme Court, in the 2005 decision *Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi*⁹⁵ (a case involving the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [ADEA]), indirectly called into question past decisions that had held that disparate impact claims are cognizable (i.e., viable) under the Fair Housing Act.

In *Smith*, the Court held that the ADEA supports disparate impact claims in part because the law expressly prohibits actions that “adversely affect” a protected class.⁹⁶ Due to the absence of similar statutory language in the Fair Housing Act, various court decisions following *Smith* raised questions about whether the act supports disparate impact claims, and if it does, what test courts should apply to evaluate them.⁹⁷

The Supreme Court settled some of this uncertainty in a 2015 opinion, holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act while providing guidance to HUD and lower courts regarding how such claims should be assessed.⁹⁸ During the Obama, Trump, and

⁹¹ HUD has interpreted sex-based discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation, in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Bostock v. Clayton Cty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars workplace discrimination on the basis of sex also forbids employers from making employment decisions based on an employee’s gender identity or sexual orientation). See HUD, “Housing Discrimination and Persons Identifying as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and/or Queer/Questioning (LGBTQ),” https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/housing_discrimination_and_persons_identifying_lgbt. For additional background on *Bostock*’s potential application to the Fair Housing Act, see CRS Report R46832, *Potential Application of Bostock v. Clayton County to Other Civil Rights Statutes*.

⁹² See P.L. 104-76 (authorizing certain housing for older persons); and P.L. 100-430 (adding protections for the disabled and families with children).

⁹³ *Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmities. Project*, 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally, *Bank of Am. v. City of Miami*, 581 U.S. 189, 194 (2017).

⁹⁴ *Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights*, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). There are two types of disparate impact discrimination: “The first occurs when that decision has a greater adverse impact on one [protected] group than on another. The second is the effect which the decision has on the community involved; if it perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial association it will be considered invidious under the Fair Housing Act independently of the extent to which it produces a disparate effect on different racial groups.” *Ibid*.

⁹⁵ 544 U.S. 228 (2005).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* at 235-238.

⁹⁷ See, for example, *Am. Ins. Assoc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2014) (interpreting the Fair Housing Act as only prohibiting intentional discrimination, not discriminatory effects, and vacating HUD’s 2013 rule). The district court’s decision was subsequently vacated and remanded for reconsideration in accordance with the Supreme Court’s *Inclusive Communities* ruling. *Am. Ins. Assoc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev.*, No. 14-5321 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in two cases to address the question of whether disparate impact claims were cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, which signaled to many that the Court was likely to reverse the prevailing understanding that the act bars disparate impact discrimination. *Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.*, 570 U.S. 904 (2013); and *Magner v. Gallagher*, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011). Both cases were dismissed before the Court heard any argument. *Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.*, 571 U.S. 1023 (2013); *Magner v. Gallagher*, 565 U.S. 1187 (2012). See also Joshua Thompson and Ralph Kasarda, *Symposium: Just give the Court a Chance*, SCOTUSblog (January 6, 2015), <https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/symposium-just-give-the-court-a-chance/>.

⁹⁸ *Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmities. Project*, 135 S. Ct. 2507576 U.S. 519, 545 (2015).

Biden Administrations, HUD issued differing regulations to implement disparate impact liability post-*Smith*, which sparked litigation.⁹⁹

In addition to prohibiting discrimination, the Fair Housing Act imposes a broad mandate on HUD and all other federal “executive departments and agencies [to] administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development ... in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of [the Fair Housing Act].”¹⁰⁰ This mandate, known as affirmatively furthering fair housing (AFFH), is not further delineated in the statute, and the Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations have implemented the mandate differently.

Disparate Impact Discrimination

Amidst the uncertainty regarding disparate impact discrimination under the Fair Housing Act following the Supreme Court’s *Smith* opinion discussed above,¹⁰¹ HUD, for the first time in February 2013 (during the Obama Administration), issued regulations to “formalize HUD’s long-held interpretation of the availability of ‘discriminatory effects’ liability under the Fair Housing Act and to provide nationwide consistency in the application of that form of liability.”¹⁰² In 2014, a federal district court briefly vacated the 2013 disparate impact rule after holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act and that HUD had exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the rule.¹⁰³ About a year later, a federal appellate court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded proceedings for reconsideration in accordance with the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, *Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.*¹⁰⁴ In *Inclusive Communities*, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.¹⁰⁵ The Court’s decision did not expressly adopt the disparate impact test implemented by HUD’s 2013 rule; rather, the Court adopted a three-step burden-shifting test using language similar, but not identical, to the 2013 rule and outlined a number of limiting factors that lower courts and HUD should apply when assessing disparate impact claims.¹⁰⁶

In September 2020, near the end of the Trump Administration, HUD issued a final rule intended “to better reflect the Supreme Court’s 2015 [*Inclusive Communities*] ruling.”¹⁰⁷ The 2020 rule would have significantly altered the 2013 rule by, among other things, imposing new pleading requirements on plaintiffs to maintain a prima facie disparate impact claim and establishing new defenses that a defendant could use to rebut disparate impact claims. Shortly after the rule’s

⁹⁹ See, for example, *Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 496 F. Supp. 3d 600, 603 (D. Mass. 2020), government appeal voluntarily dismissed, No. 21-1003 (1st Cir. Feb. 18, 2021); *Am. Ins. Assoc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated and remanded, No. 14-5321 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam).

¹⁰⁰ 42 U.S.C. §3608(d).

¹⁰¹ See supra n. 66-67 and surrounding text.

¹⁰² HUD, “Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,” 78 *Federal Register* 11460, February 15, 2013, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/02/15/2013-03375/implementation-of-the-fair-housing-acts-discriminatory-effects-standard>.

¹⁰³ *Am. Ins. Assoc.*, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 32 (interpreting the Fair Housing Act as only prohibiting intentional discrimination, not discriminatory effects, and vacating HUD’s 2013 rule).

¹⁰⁴ *Am. Ins. Assoc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, No. 14-5321 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam).

¹⁰⁵ 576 U.S. 519 (2015).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* at 531-545.

¹⁰⁷ HUD, “Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,” 85 *Federal Register* 60288, September 24, 2020, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/24/2020-19887/huds-implementation-of-the-fair-housing-acts-disparate-impact-standard>.

issuance, housing advocates filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the 2020 rule should be set aside because it was an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).¹⁰⁸ Before the 2020 rule went into effect, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining HUD from implementing and enforcing that rule, which had the effect of keeping the 2013 rule in place.¹⁰⁹

The court explained that the 2020 rule constituted a “massive overhaul” of the 2013 rule by “introducing new, onerous pleading requirements,” “easing the burden on defendants of justifying a policy with discriminatory effect while at the same time rendering it more difficult for plaintiffs to rebut that justification,” and “arm[ing] defendants with broad new defenses.”¹¹⁰ In the court’s view, these alterations “weaken[ed], for housing discrimination victims and fair housing organizations, disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act.”¹¹¹ HUD argued that these changes were justified because they brought the rule into alignment with *Inclusive Communities* and “provide[d] better clarity to the public.”¹¹² The court concluded that these major changes, “which r[an] the risk of neutering disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act, appear[ed] inadequately justified” and “accomplish[ed] the opposite of clarity.”¹¹³ Consequently, the court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits as to their claim that the 2020 Rule [wa]s arbitrary and capricious under the APA.”¹¹⁴

On January 26, 2021, President Biden issued a memorandum directing HUD to “take all steps necessary to examine the effects of the [2020 rule].”¹¹⁵ HUD responded to this presidential directive by voluntarily dismissing its appeal of the federal district court’s injunction¹¹⁶ and proposing a regulation that would recodify the 2013 rule and effectively rescind the 2020 rule.¹¹⁷ In the proposed rule issued on June 25, 2021, HUD expressed its belief “that the practical effect of the 2020 Rule’s amendments [wa]s to severely limit HUD’s and plaintiffs’ use of the discriminatory effects framework in ways that substantially diminish that frameworks’ effectiveness in accomplishing the purposes that *Inclusive Communities* articulated.”¹¹⁸ HUD further explained that “the 2013 Rule has provided a workable and balanced framework for investigating and litigating discriminatory effects claims that is consistent with the Act, HUD’s own guidance, *Inclusive Communities*, and other jurisprudence.”¹¹⁹

¹⁰⁸ Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 496 F. Supp. 3d 600, 603 (D. Mass. 2020).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* at 612.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* at 606-608.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* at 607.

¹¹² *Ibid.* at 610.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* at 611.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ The White House, “Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s History of Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies,” January 26, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum-on-redressing-our-nations-and-the-federal-governments-history-of-discriminatory-housing-practices-and-policies/>.

¹¹⁶ Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No 21-1003 (1st Cir. Feb. 18, 2021).

¹¹⁷ HUD, “Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,” 86 *Federal Register* 33590, June 25, 2021, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/25/2021-13240/reinstatement-of-huds-discriminatory-effects-standard>.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* at 33594.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

In March 2023, HUD issued a final rule reinstating the 2013 rule.¹²⁰

Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing

HUD has applied the AFFH requirement to formula grantees and public housing authorities (collectively called *program participants*) first through program guidance and then through regulations. At the beginning of the 118th Congress, the Biden Administration published a proposed AFFH rule in the *Federal Register*.¹²¹ The proposed rule would replace an interim final rule that took effect in June 2021 after the Biden Administration repealed a final rule issued by the Trump Administration.¹²² The first AFFH rule, issued by the Obama Administration in 2015,¹²³ had been replaced by the Trump Administration rule, which became final on September 7, 2020.¹²⁴ AFFH rules have been controversial, and in past Congresses legislation has been introduced to curb their application.¹²⁵

The meaning of AFFH is not defined in statute, and various court decisions regarding HUD’s obligations under the mandate have concluded that it means more than refraining from discrimination.¹²⁶ A 1987 federal appellate court decision examined the Fair Housing Act’s legislative history and concluded that the “law’s supporters saw the ending of discrimination as a means toward truly opening the nation’s housing stock to persons of every race and creed.”¹²⁷ With that goal in mind, the court stated:

This broader goal suggests an intent that HUD do more than simply not discriminate itself; it reflects the desire to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases.¹²⁸

The Biden Administration’s proposed AFFH rule would apply some aspects of the Obama Administration rule, but the process is meant to be less onerous for program participants, which was a criticism of the Obama-era rule.¹²⁹ The proposed rule would define AFFH in a way that is

¹²⁰ HUD, “Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,” 88 *Federal Register* 19450-19500, March 31, 2023, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/31/2023-05836/reinstatement-of-huds-discriminatory-effects-standard>.

¹²¹ HUD, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 88 *Federal Register* 8516, February 9, 2023, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/02/09/2023-00625/affirmatively-furthering-fair-housing>.

¹²² HUD, “Restoring Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Definitions and Certifications,” 86 *Federal Register* 30779, 30783, June 10, 2021, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/10/2021-12114/restoring-affirmatively-furthering-fair-housing-definitions-and-certifications>.

¹²³ HUD, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 *Federal Register* 42353, July 16, 2015, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/07/16/2015-17032/affirmatively-furthering-fair-housing>.

¹²⁴ HUD, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” 85 *Federal Register* 47899, August 7, 2020, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/07/2020-16320/preserving-community-and-neighborhood-choice>.

¹²⁵ For example, in the 114th Congress, the Local Zoning Decisions Protection Act of 2015 (S. 1909) would have prohibited federal funds from being used to administer, implement, or enforce the AFFH rule (similar versions were introduced in the 115th Congress). In the 115th Congress, the Restoring Fair Housing Protections Eliminated by HUD Act of 2018 (H.R. 6220) would have reinstated the Obama Administration AFFH rule. In the 116th Congress, the Economic Justice Act (S. 5065) would have repealed the Trump Administration rule.

¹²⁶ See, for example, NAACP v. HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Finally, every court that has considered the question has held or stated that Title VIII imposes upon HUD an obligation to do more than simply refrain from discriminating (and from purposefully aiding discrimination by others).”); Nat’l Fair Housing Alliance v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) (same).

¹²⁷ NAACP v. HUD, 817 F.2d at 155.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ 88 *Federal Register* 8517.

similar to the Obama Administration rule. Under the Biden Administration proposed rule, AFFH is defined as:

taking meaningful actions that, taken together, reduce or end significant disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity, replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns, transforming racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into well-resourced areas of opportunity, and fostering and maintaining compliance with civil rights and fair housing laws and requirements.¹³⁰

Program participants would identify fair housing issues in their communities through an analysis consisting of answers to questions posed in the rule to identify both issues and underlying causes. An example of a fair housing issue would be segregation of a protected class in a particular neighborhood or area.¹³¹ After determining relevant fair housing issues, program participants would establish fair housing goals to overcome the issues. An example of a fair housing goal would be reducing segregation by changing the location of newly developed affordable housing.¹³² Program participants would submit an *Equity Plan* to HUD laying out their analysis, issues, and goals. HUD would provide data and technical assistance to help with the process, and program participants would be required to engage in a robust process to engage members of the community.¹³³ Program participants would report annually on progress toward their goals.

Comments on the Biden Administration’s proposed rule were due April 24, 2023.¹³⁴

(For more information, see CRS Report R44557, *The Fair Housing Act: HUD Oversight, Programs, and Activities*.)

Military Housing

All active-duty military servicemembers are entitled to either government-provided housing or a housing allowance that they can use to rent or purchase a home in the private housing market. Servicemembers who are more senior or who have dependents are entitled to larger housing benefits. In recent years, Congress has taken an interest in reported shortages of both on- and off-base housing in some areas.

In general, there are three primary forms of housing on which the Department of Department (DOD) relies to provide for U.S.-based servicemembers’ housing entitlement:

- **Government Housing:** DOD uses military construction funds appropriated by Congress to build barracks and other housing facilities on military installations. Government housing is the primary form of housing provided to unaccompanied servicemembers.¹³⁵ In many instances, junior enlisted servicemembers who do not have dependents are required to live in on-base unaccompanied housing for a certain period of time. Installations provide maintenance services for government housing, funded through DOD Operation and Maintenance funds.

¹³⁰ 88 *Federal Register* 8557.

¹³¹ 88 *Federal Register* 8562-8563.

¹³² 88 *Federal Register* 8566.

¹³³ 88 *Federal Register* 8568.

¹³⁴ HUD, “HUD Announces Public Comment Period Extended by 2 Weeks Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) Proposed Rule,” press release, April 5, 2023, https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/hud_no_23_070.

¹³⁵ *Unaccompanied servicemembers* is the term DOD uses to describe servicemembers who are living by themselves and are not authorized to receive housing to accommodate dependents.

- **Privatized Housing:** DOD maintains business agreements with private housing companies to build, restore, maintain, and operate housing on leased military property.¹³⁶ Privatized housing is the primary form of family housing on military bases in the United States, according to the Government Accountability Office. Currently, about 99% of all family housing on U.S. military installations is operated under the privatized housing program, formally known as the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI).¹³⁷ There are currently about 211,000 privatized military housing units across all military installations.¹³⁸ The private housing companies provide and pay for maintenance at privatized housing projects.
- **Off-Base Housing:** The majority of servicemembers, about 64%, live outside military installations, either renting or purchasing homes in the private sector housing markets located in areas near the installations. For these servicemembers, DOD provides a Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), which is a tax-free allowance intended to cover most of the servicemembers' housing costs.¹³⁹ Maintenance is provided by either a private landlord (in rental homes) or the servicemember (if he or she is the homeowner).

It is DOD's policy to "rely on the private sector as the primary source of housing for accompanied and unaccompanied personnel normally eligible to draw a housing allowance."¹⁴⁰ One advantage to this policy is that it enables DOD in some situations to transfer large groups of servicemembers from one base to another or make other changes that affect the population of military installations without resulting in immediate excesses or shortages of housing infrastructure.

Basic Allowance for Housing

DOD provides a BAH for servicemembers who do not live in military-provided housing on a military installation. The BAH rates vary depending on location and are intended to align with the

¹³⁶ Congress authorized these activities under Title 10 United States Code, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 169, Subchapter IV, "Alternative Authority for Acquisition and Improvement of Military Housing," <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part4/chapter169/subchapter4&edition=prelim>.

¹³⁷ GAO, "Military Housing: DOD Can Further Strengthen Oversight of Its Privatized Housing Program, GAO-23-105377, April 2023, p. 1, at <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105377.pdf>.

¹³⁸ While most privatized housing is for family housing units, DOD does operate seven MHPI projects for unaccompanied housing. The Army maintains privatized housing projects for unaccompanied personnel at five locations: Fort Irwin, CA; Fort Drum, NY; Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), NC; Fort Stewart, GA; and Fort Meade, MD. The Navy maintains privatize housing projects for unaccompanied personnel at two locations: Naval Station Norfolk, VA; and Naval Station San Diego, CA. See GAO, *Military Housing: Information on the Privatization of Unaccompanied Personnel Housing*, GAO-14-313, March 2014, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-313.pdf>. For the total number of privatized housing units, see DOD, Office of Inspector General, *Audit of Medical Conditions of Residents in Privatized Military Housing*, DODIG-2022-078, December 2022, p. 1, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Dec/12/2003130831/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2022-078.PDF>.

¹³⁹ DOD provides BAH to servicemembers at locations in the United States. While family housing in the United States is usually provided in the form of privatized housing, family housing overseas is government-owned. Some servicemembers stationed overseas are permitted to live off-base; their housing costs are covered by the Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) program.

¹⁴⁰ Department of Defense Manual 4165.63, p. 1, <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/416563m.pdf?ver=2018-09-20-075812-223>.

cost of the local rental housing markets for those servicemembers to obtain housing from the private market. About 64% of servicemembers live off-base and receive a BAH.¹⁴¹

To calculate local BAH rates, the uniformed services have concurred in aggregating individual zip codes into groups called Military Housing Areas (MHAs). There are approximately 300 MHAs in the United States.¹⁴² DOD collects data for each of these housing markets and the rental costs associated with various types of housing, including apartments, townhouses/duplexes, and single-family rental units with varying numbers of bedrooms. The different types of units are referred to as *housing profiles* and their rental costs are then linked with particular pay grades.¹⁴³ More than 98% of servicemembers assigned to military duty stations in the continental United States are in one of the MHAs.¹⁴⁴

DOD, with input from Congress, sets policy for the BAH. The BAH policy typically sets BAH rates as a percentage of estimated housing costs. This policy has varied over the years. In the 1990s, the BAH was calculated and intended to cover about 80% of estimated average housing costs.¹⁴⁵ In the early 2000s, the policy called for the BAH to increase to cover 100% of estimated housing costs.¹⁴⁶ The current policy, in effect since FY2019, provides servicemembers with a BAH that intends to cover 95% of estimated housing costs.

Housing Shortages

At certain military installations at certain times, servicemembers face long waitlists to obtain on-base housing.¹⁴⁷ News reports have spotlighted the shortage in places like Las Vegas, NV, where some junior servicemembers were ordered to move off-base due to a shortage of on-base housing.¹⁴⁸ Some of those servicemembers faced financial hardships when forced to sign a lease—requiring a security deposit and first-month’s rent—before they began receiving a BAH.

¹⁴¹ 2020 Military Family Lifestyle Survey Comprehensive Report, Finding 10, p. 2, https://bluestarfam.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BSF_MFLS_CompReport_FINDING_10.pdf.

¹⁴² BAH Data Collection, Defense Travel Management Office, <https://www.travel.dod.mil/Allowances/Basic-Allowance-for-Housing/BAH-Data-Collection/>.

¹⁴³ Basic Allowance for Housing Rate Lookup, Defense Travel Management Office, <https://www.travel.dod.mil/Allowances/Basic-Allowance-for-Housing/BAH-Rate-Lookup/>.

¹⁴⁴ For more information, see GAO, *Military Housing: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for Setting Allowances for Servicemembers and Calculating Payments for Privatized Housing Projects*, GAO-21-137, January 2021, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/720/711967.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ See prepared statement of Paul Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Housing, contained in S.Hrg. 105-605, Part 3, p. 484.

¹⁴⁶ Congress removed the expectation that servicemembers would contribute to their housing costs in Section 605 of the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398), which changed the statute to authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide a BAH that was equal to the cost of adequate housing for civilians with comparable income levels in the same area. After a transition period, average out-of-pocket housing expenses were officially eliminated as of January 1, 2005.

¹⁴⁷ See, for example, *Marine Corps Camp Lejeune Family Housing*, accessed February 2023, showing wait times ranging from one to sixteen months for various housing complexes, at <https://www.lejeune.marines.mil/offices-staff/family-housing-division/wait-times/>.

¹⁴⁸ Humberto Sanchez, “Defense Department to pay single junior service members dislocation housing funds,” *The Nevada Independent*, May 23, 2022, <https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/defense-department-to-pay-single-junior-service-members-dislocation-housing-funds>. Also see Greg Hadley, “‘Not a Good Situation’: Off-Base Housing Crisis Has USAF Scrambling,” *Air and Space Force Times*, July 9, 2021, <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/not-a-good-situation-off-base-housing-crisis-has-usaf-scrambling/>.

In 2020, Congress revised statutes to allow DOD to provide a dislocation allowance to help those servicemembers cover such costs.¹⁴⁹

Numerous news reports have also spotlighted the challenges servicemembers can face in search of affordable housing, especially in high-priced coastal real estate markets.¹⁵⁰ In September 2022, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin acknowledged that there are housing concerns. He announced automatic increases in the BAH for servicemembers in 28 MHAs that experienced an average of more than 20% spikes in rental housing costs above the 2022 BAH rates.¹⁵¹ He also said DOD would review the prospective 2023 BAH tables to ensure calculations reflect the unusually dynamic fluctuations in the housing market.¹⁵²

To ensure better visibility on potential housing shortages in military communities, the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 117-263) in the 117th Congress contained a provision that requires the military departments to conduct Housing Requirements and Market Analysis (HRMA) for each installation under their jurisdiction every five years.¹⁵³ The HRMA is a detailed study of housing demand and supply within a defined market area. These analyses help identify affordable housing shortages and support decisionmaking about how to best meet the needs of servicemembers and their families. Prior to the FY2023 NDAA, the frequency of HRMAs was dictated only by DOD policy.

The FY2023 NDAA joint report directed the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2023, on “the housing realities, difficulties, and needs facing junior members of the Armed Forces.”¹⁵⁴ The report said the briefing should include an overview of the available on-base housing stock, possible options for housing junior servicemembers, and DOD plans for identifying installations with a shortage of on-base or off-base housing for junior enlisted servicemembers.

The 118th Congress may take an interest in military housing as part of its consideration of the FY2024 NDAA, the FY2024 Department of Defense appropriations act, or the FY2024 Veterans and Military Construction appropriations act.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Loan Level Price Adjustments

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) chartered by Congress to provide liquidity for the single-family and multifamily mortgage markets. After purchasing mortgages from originators, the GSEs guarantee the default risk associated with the

¹⁴⁹ See the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92, §607). The provision extended dislocation allowance (DLA) to servicemembers without dependents and allowed DOD to issue a partial DLA when installations order servicemembers to vacate on-base housing. DOD exercised that authority and expanded DLA in May 2022. See Karen Jowers, “New allowance greenlit for troops ordered to move from barracks to off-base housing,” *Military Times*, May 23, 2022, <https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/2022/05/23/new-allowance-greenlit-for-troops-ordered-to-move-from-barracks-to-off-base-housing/>.

¹⁵⁰ See, for example, R.J. Rico, “Military families’ housing benefits lag as rents explode,” *The Associated Press*, August 21, 2022, <https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/2022/08/21/military-families-housing-benefits-lag-as-rents-explode/>.

¹⁵¹ DOD, “DoD Announces Immediate and Long-Term Actions to Help Strengthen the Economic Security and Stability of Service Members and Their Families,” press release, September 22, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3167769/dod-announces-immediate-and-long-term-actions-to-help-strengthen-the-economic-s/>.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ See 10 U.S.C. §2821.

¹⁵⁴ Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, p. 420, <https://rules.house.gov/sites/repUBLICANS.rules118.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf>.

mortgages. In the years following the housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced financial difficulty, and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), took control of them from their stockholders and management in a process known as conservatorship. Although their financial condition has improved since that time, and they are now being allowed to accumulate capital reserves to hold against mortgage default risks,¹⁵⁵ Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain in federal conservatorship.

In addition to base guarantee fees that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge for guaranteeing mortgage default risks on their purchased mortgages, they also charge additional upfront fees, known as loan-level price adjustments (LLPAs),¹⁵⁶ for single-family mortgages. The amount of the LLPAs varies based on the characteristics of the mortgage. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac publish matrices showing the LLPAs, which depend on features such as a borrower's credit score, the loan-to-value ratio, and other factors relating to certain types of mortgages or property types.

In January 2023, FHFA directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to implement changes to the LLPAs. Following concerns regarding the policy objective for the new fee structure, the FHFA Director stated that the changes “will strengthen the safety and soundness of the Enterprises by enhancing their ability to improve their capital position over time” as well as facilitate “equitable and sustainable access to homeownership.”¹⁵⁷ Under the new fee structure (as under the old fee structure), borrowers with low default risk will generally pay less than those with high default risk. When comparing the new and old fee structures, some low default risk borrowers may pay more under the new fee structure than they would have under the previous LPA fee structure, and some higher default risk borrowers may pay less under the new fee structure than they would have under the previous fee structure.¹⁵⁸ Most of the LPA changes went into effect on May 1, 2023, although one particular fee, based on debt-to-income ratios, was initially delayed and later rescinded.¹⁵⁹

FHFA's LPA pricing directive could arguably serve multiple policy objectives. For example, low-risk borrowers, who tend to have high credit scores, may subsidize some of the costs to insure against the default risk of borrowers with low credit scores, which may be one policy objective. In addition, a larger share of revenues collected from low-risk borrowers may expedite the GSEs' ability to accumulate more retained earnings necessary to exit conservatorship, thus serving a different policy objective. Also, charging high-risk borrowers slightly lower premiums could potentially increase affordability and promote more stable payment behavior from this group, possibly increasing the amount of revenues that could also facilitate earlier exit from conservatorship. Given that fewer high-risk borrowers may qualify for as many or for mortgages

¹⁵⁵ See FHFA, Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, <https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Purchase-Agreements.aspx>.

¹⁵⁶ While these fees are often collectively referred to as *loan-level price adjustments*, technically, loan-level price adjustments is the term Fannie Mae uses for these upfront guarantee fees, while Freddie Mac refers to them as *credit fees*.

¹⁵⁷ FHFA, “FHFA Announces Updates to the Enterprises' Single-Family Pricing Framework,” press release, January 19, 2023, <https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Updates-to-Enterprises-SF-Pricing-Framework.aspx>.

¹⁵⁸ See Fannie Mae's LPA matrix incorporating the changes announced in January at <https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/9391/display>.

¹⁵⁹ FHFA, “FHFA Director Sandra L. Thompson's Statement on Upfront Fees Based on Certain Borrowers' Debt-to-Income (DTI) Ratio,” press release, March 15, 2023, <https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-from-FHFA-Director-Sandra-Thompson-on-Upfront-Fees-Based-on-Certain-Borrowers-DTI-Ratio.aspx>; and FHFA, “FHFA Announces Rescission of Enterprise Upfront Fees Based on Debt-To-Income (DTI) Ratio,” press release, May 10, 2023, <https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Rescission-of-Enterprise-Upfront-Fees-Based-on-Debt-To-Income-Ratio.aspx>.

as large as those obtained by low-risk borrowers, more of the revenues collected under the new LLPA schedule are likely to be applied toward improving the financial conditions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The new fees went into effect on May 1, 2023. The Middle Class Borrower Protection Act of 2023 (H.R. 3564), introduced in May 2023 and reported by the Financial Services Committee and passed by the House in June 2023, would require the FHFA Director to revert to the prior fee structure and would place certain restrictions on future fee changes. Also in May 2023, FHFA released a Request for Input (RFI) on Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s pricing framework for single-family mortgages.¹⁶⁰ In addition, the House Financial Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance held a hearing on the pricing changes,¹⁶¹ and the full Financial Services Committee held a hearing on FHFA oversight shortly thereafter.¹⁶²

For more information, see the following:

- CRS Insight IN12151, *Recent Mortgage Pricing Directive for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac*
- CRS Report R44525, *Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions*
- CRS Report R46746, *Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Recent Administrative Developments*

Housing and Disaster Response and Recovery

The extent to which federal policies adequately and effectively address the housing needs of disaster survivors is of ongoing interest to policymakers. In the 118th Congress, concerns and questions have arisen regarding individual compensation for disaster-caused decreases in property value (even when a person’s residence is not directly damaged or destroyed), options for simplifying the application process for disaster assistance, and considerations for addressing unmet needs. In addition, the location and frequency of natural disasters may be affecting the housing market, with the threat of natural disasters to housing stock increasing in recent years.¹⁶³ Nearly one-third of the U.S. housing stock—about 35 million homes—is considered to be at high risk of damage from a natural disaster.¹⁶⁴

When disasters occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288, as amended). The declaration can authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency

¹⁶⁰ FHFA, “FHFA Requests Input on the Enterprises’ Single-Family Pricing Framework,” press release, May 15, 2023, <https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Requests-Input-on-the-Enterprises-Single-Family-Pricing-Framework.aspx>.

¹⁶¹ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, *The Current Mortgage Market: Undermining Housing Affordability with Politics*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 2023, <https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=408776>.

¹⁶² U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, *FHFA Oversight: Protecting Homeowners and Taxpayers*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 23, 2023, <https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=408797>.

¹⁶³ Howard Kunreuther, “Reducing losses from catastrophes: role of insurance and other policy tools,” *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 58, no. 1 (January/February 2016), pp. 30-37.

¹⁶⁴ CoreLogic, “Risk Redefined: CoreLogic Climate Change Catastrophe Report Emphasizes Need to Address Increasing Frequency of Hazard Events,” January 27, 2021, <https://www.corelogic.com/press-releases/risk-redefined-corelogic-climate-change-catastrophe-report-emphasizes-need-to-address-increasing-frequency-of-hazard-events/>.

(FEMA) to provide short- and intermediate-term housing assistance for disaster survivors through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP).¹⁶⁵

In addition to disaster relief provided by FEMA, Congress may make supplemental appropriations of Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR), allowing HUD to administer grants to states, localities, and insular areas for long-term recovery needs, including those of disaster survivors.

There are also some disaster assistance programs that may be available to individuals regardless of whether there is a declared disaster or congressional appropriation—for example, funding provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and some FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance programs.

The following sections provide brief overviews and selected considerations related to housing assistance provided through FEMA’s IHP and HUD’s CDBG-DR program, including the interaction of these programs. There is also discussion of the role of flood insurance. The final section provides an overview of how the changing climate may affect housing.

FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and HUD’s Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)

FEMA may assist individuals with their recovery from disasters when the President authorizes the Individual Assistance (IA) program pursuant to a Stafford Act declaration of emergency or major disaster. The IHP is the form of IA through which FEMA may provide temporary financial and/or direct assistance for housing (referred to as Housing Assistance).¹⁶⁶ Examples of financial Housing Assistance include Rental Assistance and Home Repair Assistance, and examples of direct assistance include temporarily providing a person with a Manufactured Housing Unit or Direct Lease Assistance.

Despite the range of existing IHP financial and direct assistance options, concerns have arisen related to the IHP’s ability to meet the needs of disaster survivors.¹⁶⁷ Because the program is generally authorized to address uninsured or underinsured damages caused by an emergency or major disaster, IHP housing assistance is structured to address survivors’ disaster-caused housing needs when they are displaced or their homes are rendered uninhabitable. Moreover, FEMA does not have the statutory authority to provide temporary rental or mortgage payments when people experience disaster-caused financial hardship.¹⁶⁸ As an additional example, the IHP cannot

¹⁶⁵ 42 U.S.C. §5174. See also 44 C.F.R. §206.110(a), and FEMA, *Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG)*, FP 104-009-03, v. 1.1, May 2021, pp. 6, 41, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_iappg-1.1.pdf (hereinafter, “FEMA, IAPPG”). For information on other forms of federal disaster relief, see CRS Report WMR10001, *CRS Guide to Federal Emergency Management*.

¹⁶⁶ The IHP is authorized under Stafford Act Section 408 (42 U.S.C. §5174); FEMA’s IHP regulations are codified at 44 C.F.R. §§206.101 et seq. For additional information on the IHP, including the process by which it is authorized and the assistance that may be made available, see CRS Report R47015, *FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP)—Implementation and Considerations for Congress*.

¹⁶⁷ IHP assistance is limited (e.g., it is available for a limited period of time and financial housing assistance includes a funding cap).

¹⁶⁸ This has not always been the case. Prior to May 2002, temporary mortgage or rental payments could be provided to or on behalf of individuals and families meeting certain criteria. Section 206 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2K, P.L. 106-390), amended the Stafford Act to remove temporary mortgage and rental payments, and it also added the language predicated assistance on displacement. During a Senate hearing in 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) cited the reason Congress eliminated the temporary mortgage and rental payments program as the fact that the program was seldom used, and also cited FEMA’s program (continued...)

compensate disaster survivors for all losses (e.g., it does not compensate disaster survivors for loss of property value resulting from disasters).¹⁶⁹

Congress has also provided supplemental funding for long-term disaster recovery and other related purposes for selected incidents under the statutory authority of HUD’s conventional Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program—a usage commonly referred to as CDBG-DR.¹⁷⁰ Typically, CDBG-DR funds are directed to jurisdictions with the most impacted and distressed areas that have federal emergency or disaster declarations under the Stafford Act.¹⁷¹ To that end, CDBG-DR can supplement federal recovery assistance provided through FEMA’s IHP and has been used to address remaining unmet needs after FEMA’s implementation of the IHP.¹⁷²

Unlike IHP, which allocates funds directly to individuals, CDBG-DR funds are allocated to units of government such as states and localities. These entities have fairly broad flexibility in the use of CDBG-DR funds.

CDBG-DR is not a program with a standing authorization or regulations.¹⁷³ While CDBG-DR funds are subject to the CDBG program’s statutory and regulatory requirements, each supplemental appropriation effectively establishes a new CDBG-DR program—meaning the rules that govern the funding use and oversight may vary with HUD guidance accompanying each allocation.¹⁷⁴ This process provides a certain amount of flexibility and allows Congress, the federal government, and HUD to adapt program requirements to the specific needs of affected communities. However, some analysis suggests that it may also contribute to protracted

implementation challenges. Despite challenges with the program, the DHS OIG recommended that Congress consider reinstating it (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety, *Review of the General Accounting Office Report on FEMA’s Activities After the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 24, 2003, S.Hrg. 108-364, pp. 253-254, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg92386/pdf/CHRG-108shrg92386.pdf>).

¹⁶⁹ Congress has provided assistance to compensate losses associated with selected incidents. For example, through the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance Act (Division G of P.L. 117-180), allowable damages related to loss of property included “a decrease in the value of real property” (see §104(d)(4)(A)(ii)). Notably, the U.S. Forest Service assumed responsibility of the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire, and it was determined that the United States should compensate the victims (see Section 102(a), which details the congressional findings). More recently, there was no Stafford Act declaration for the February 2023 incident in East Palestine, OH, when a Norfolk Southern freight train derailed and 20 of the affected cars contained hazardous materials (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “East Palestine, Ohio Train Derailment,” last accessed May 2, 2023, <https://www.epa.gov/east-palestine-oh-train-derailment>). Concerns have included the potential loss in property value resulting from the train derailment (see, for example, Anna Bahney and Chris Isidore, “Norfolk Southern balks at compensating homeowners in East Palestine,” *CNN*, March 14, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/12/homes/norfolk-southern-east-palestine-home-values/index.html>).

¹⁷⁰ 42 U.S.C. §5301.

¹⁷¹ CDBG-DR funding allocations are based on availability of funding, as well as HUD assessments of disaster impact and needs unmet by other forms of federal assistance.

¹⁷² HUD, “Fact Sheet: Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR),” p. 1, <https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/CDBG-DR-Fact-Sheet.pdf>. For example, see the CDBG-DR-funded recovery work in Puerto Rico, which was authorized to support the Commonwealth’s recovery from Hurricanes Irma and María. For additional information, see CRS Report R46609, *The Status of Puerto Rico’s Recovery and Ongoing Challenges Following Hurricanes Irma and María: FEMA, SBA, and HUD Assistance*.

¹⁷³ HUD, *CDBG-DR Overview*, <https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/overview/>.

¹⁷⁴ HUD, *Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery: CDBG-DR Overview*, January 30, 2023, p. 9, <https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CPD/documents/CDBG-Disaster-Recovery-Overview.pdf>.

rulemaking periods, inconsistent administrative time frames, and funding delays, posing coordination and planning challenges.¹⁷⁵

Interaction Between FEMA’s IHP and HUD’s CDBG-DR

Recovery Assistance Timeline

When funded, CDBG-DR grantees may continue or expand upon recovery work initiated with FEMA IHP assistance.¹⁷⁶ Unlike the IHP, which assists with short- and interim-term housing needs of individuals (e.g., housing assistance is generally limited to a period of 18 months from the date of the disaster declaration, unless extended),¹⁷⁷ some communities may choose to use CDBG-DR to address ongoing, outstanding unmet needs and provide long-term recovery support.¹⁷⁸ However, without a standing authorization, CDBG-DR funds are provided on a supplemental basis at the discretion of Congress, and funding is not assured for all disaster-affected areas. Additionally, some analysis indicates that CDBG-DR implementation may take place over an extended timeline, which, among other issues, can pose a potential risk of duplication of benefits (this is discussed in more detail below).¹⁷⁹

Both HUD’s Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG) and GAO have recommended authorization and codification of federal investments in long-term disaster recovery for unmet needs, such as CDBG-DR or a similar program.¹⁸⁰ Recently, HUD has taken steps to enhance CDBG-DR standardization and HUD administrative capacity. These steps include (1) issuing a consolidated notice and guidance on CDBG-DR grant processes,¹⁸¹ (2) seeking input on establishing a

¹⁷⁵ GAO, *Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grant Funds is Needed*, GAO-19-232, March 2019, p. 66, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-232.pdf>.

¹⁷⁶ See, for example, the CDBG-DR-funded recovery work that is ongoing in Puerto Rico, which was authorized to support the Commonwealth’s recovery from Hurricanes Irma and María. Additional information on the transition of recovery assistance in Puerto Rico from the FEMA IHP to HUD CDBG-DR can be found in the “Assistance to Individuals and Households—Ongoing Housing Recovery Through HUD’s CDBG-DR Program” section of CRS Report R46609, *The Status of Puerto Rico’s Recovery and Ongoing Challenges Following Hurricanes Irma and María: FEMA, SBA, and HUD Assistance*.

¹⁷⁷ 42 U.S.C. §5174(c)(1)(B)(iii); 44 C.F.R. §206.110(e); and GAO, *Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program*, GAO-20-503, September 2020, p. 10, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/709775.pdf>. The period of assistance may be extended—by the President according to 42 U.S.C.

§5174(c)(1)(B)(iii), or the FEMA Assistant Administrator for the Disaster Assistance Directorate according to 44 C.F.R. §206.110(e)—if it is determined that “due to extraordinary circumstances an extension would be in the public interest.”

¹⁷⁸ HUD, *Fact Sheet: Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)*, <https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/CDBG-DR-Fact-Sheet.pdf>.

¹⁷⁹ GAO, *Disaster Block Grants: Factors to Consider in Authorizing a Permanent Program*, GAO-21-569T, May 19, 2021, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-569t>; Carlos Martin et al., *Housing Recovery and CDBG-DR: A Review of the Timing and Factors Associated with Housing Activities in HUD’s Community Development Block Grant for Disaster Recovery*, HUD, April 2019, pp. 51-61, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/HousingRecovery_CDBG-DR.pdf.

¹⁸⁰ HUD Office of Inspector General (OIG), “HUD’s Office of Block Grant Assistance Had Not Codified the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program,” Audit Report Number: 2018-FW-0002, July 23, 2018, <https://www.hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/final-audit-report-huds-office-block-grant-assistance-had-not-codified>; and GAO, *Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grant Funds is Needed*, GAO-19-232, March 2019, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-232>.

¹⁸¹ HUD, “Allocations for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery and Implementation of the CDBG-DR Consolidated Waivers and Alternative Requirements Notice,” 87 *Federal Register* 6364, February 3, 2022; and HUD, “CDBG Consolidated Notice Guidebook,” July 2022, <https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/CDBG-DR-Consolidated-Notice-Guidebook.pdf>.

universal CDBG-DR notice,¹⁸² and (3) establishing two formal offices focused on disaster recovery and management with increased staffing levels.¹⁸³ Although HUD has taken some steps to standardize CDBG-DR processes to the extent practicable within the current framework, Congress may wish to consider permanently authorizing CDBG-DR or establishing a similar program, in order to enhance certainty in the grant process and timeliness in funding disbursement.¹⁸⁴ In May 2023, the Reforming Disaster Recovery Act (S. 1686) was introduced in the Senate. Among other things, the bill would

- establish the Office of Disaster Management and Resiliency within HUD;
- establish the Long-Term Disaster Recovery Fund; and
- authorize CDBG-DR as a program, with directions to the HUD Secretary to establish standing regulations.

Substantially similar bills were introduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 4707 and S. 2471). In December 2021, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs conducted a hearing to consider authorization of CDBG-DR as a standing program.¹⁸⁵ In the 116th Congress, a substantially similar bill, H.R. 3702, was passed by the House under suspension of the rules by a vote of 290-118 in November 2019.

Several other bills introduced in the 117th Congress would have authorized similar forms of federal assistance for disaster recovery, outside of the CDBG-DR structure. For example, the Expediting Disaster Recovery Act (H.R. 5774) would have authorized the provision of assistance for unmet needs by FEMA. H.R. 5774 was passed by the House under suspension of the rules by a vote of 406-20. Another bill, the Natural Disaster Recovery Program Act of 2021 (H.R. 2809), would have established a separate program to address unmet needs of states and tribal entities in disaster recovery.

Duplication of Benefits

The Stafford Act and CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations acts prohibit the duplication of benefits from other sources of disaster assistance.¹⁸⁶ Disaster survivors may have access to a number of resources to assist their recovery process, including insurance, charitable donations, and government assistance.¹⁸⁷ FEMA seeks to avoid duplicating benefits by following the “delivery sequence”¹⁸⁸ in its regulations that lists the order in which assistance is to be provided

¹⁸² HUD, “Request for Information for HUD’s Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) Rules, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements,” 87 *Federal Register* 77864, December 20, 2022.

¹⁸³ HUD, “HUD Announces Overhaul of Disaster Recovery Program to Better Deliver for Impacted Communities,” press release, March 15, 2023, https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/hud_no_23_052.

¹⁸⁴ HUD OIG, *Top Management Challenges: Facing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in FY2023*, November 8, 2022, p. 41, <https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/FY%202023%20Top%20Management%20Challenges.pdf>.

¹⁸⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *Disaster Recovery Assistance - Authorization of the Community Development Block Grant – Disaster Recovery Program*, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., December 15, 2021, https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/disaster-recovery-assistance_-authorization-of-the-community-development-block-grant-disaster-recovery-program.

¹⁸⁶ 42 U.S.C. §5155; HUD, “Updates to Duplication of Benefits Under the Stafford Act for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Grantees,” 84 *Federal Register* 28837, June 20, 2019.

¹⁸⁷ 44 C.F.R. §206.191; FEMA, *IAPPG*, p. 10.

¹⁸⁸ The order of the sequence of delivery is emergency assistance (voluntary agencies), insurance, housing assistance, other needs assistance which is not income-based, Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans, other needs assistance which is income-based, and unmet needs (voluntary agencies). See FEMA, *Order and Components of the Sequence of Delivery*, https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0403/groups/29.html.

to disaster survivors.¹⁸⁹ While the regulations specify selected forms of assistance, including FEMA Housing Assistance and Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans, the delivery sequence does not list HUD’s CDBG-DR program.¹⁹⁰ When a duplication of benefits occurs, the IHP recipient must typically repay the duplicated benefit, unless conditions require FEMA to waive recoupment.¹⁹¹

HUD similarly requires CDBG-DR state or local grantees to prevent duplication of benefits and ensure reasonable expenditures, and to establish compliance monitoring and funding recapture processes.¹⁹² Some grantees have indicated that a lack of consistent rules and streamlined interagency coordination contributes to the administrative burden of calculating and documenting potential duplications, by subrecipients.¹⁹³ Further standardization of the CDBG-DR process could potentially address these concerns.

HUD and FEMA have an agreement to share information to complete duplication of benefits checks.¹⁹⁴ Historically, HUD has considered whether the provision of CDBG-DR may constitute a duplication of previously provided FEMA assistance.¹⁹⁵ Still, disaster survivors seeking assistance from multiple sources may face challenges related to duplication of benefits, including because of the cascading timelines and availability of federal assistance. An additional challenge is that the different forms of federal disaster assistance each have separate application processes, which may confuse and frustrate some disaster survivors. To redress such challenges, Members of Congress have introduced bipartisan legislation, including in the 118th and 117th Congresses, to help simplify the application process to receive federal disaster assistance.¹⁹⁶

¹⁸⁹ 42 U.S.C. §5155; 44 C.F.R. §206.191; FEMA, *IAPPG*, pp. 10, 78, 145, 176-178.

¹⁹⁰ 44 C.F.R. §206.191(d)(2); FEMA, *IAPPG*, p. 10.

¹⁹¹ 42 U.S.C. §5155(b)(1) and (c); 44 C.F.R. §206.191; and FEMA, *IAPPG*, pp. 51, 78, 176-182. FEMA reclaims funds constituting a duplication of benefits through a process known as recoupment (FEMA, *IAPPG*, p. 178). There are some circumstances when FEMA may not pursue recoupment. Section 5602(a) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263) amended Section 1216(a) of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (Division D of P.L. 115-254) to require FEMA to waive recoupment of IHP assistance in two situations, provided the debt does not involve fraud, a false claim, or misrepresentation by the debtor or party having an interest in the claim: (1) “if the covered assistance [i.e., IHP assistance] was distributed based on an error by the Agency [i.e., FEMA] and such debt shall be construed as a hardship”; and (2) “if such assistance is subject to a claim or legal action.”

¹⁹² HUD, *Duplication of Benefits: Case Studies*, p. 9, <https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/CDBG-DR-Duplication-of-Benefits-Slides.pdf>.

¹⁹³ Carlos Martin et al., *Housing Recovery and CDBG-DR*, p. 50, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/HousingRecovery_CDBG-DR.pdf.

¹⁹⁴ HUD, “Privacy Act of 1974; Matching Program,” 87 *Federal Register* 7859-7862, February 10, 2022, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-10/pdf/2022-02966.pdf> (hereinafter, HUD, “Matching Program”).

¹⁹⁵ HUD, “Matching Program.” See, for example, Puerto Rico’s implementation of CDBG-DR-funded programs following Hurricanes Irma and María in 2017 (Puerto Rico, *Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery Action Plan: For the Use of CDBG-DR Funds in Response to 2017 Hurricanes Irma and María*, Amend. 10, February 17, 2023, pp. 20, 102, 105, 130, https://cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/download/action-planamendment-10-nonsubstantial-effective-on-february-16-2023/?ind=1676677455854&filename=ADM_POLI_Action%20Plan_Amendment%2010%20-%20NONSUBSTANTIAL_EN.pdf&wpdmdl=35213&refresh=640b4a0a61f9a1678461450).

¹⁹⁶ In the 118th Congress, Senators Gary Peters, Rand Paul, and James Lankford cosponsored the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act (S. 1528) to simplify the application process itself by creating a consolidated application for federal disaster assistance. Previously, during the 117th Congress, Senators Peters and Lankford cosponsored the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act (S. 4599); see also U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Peters and Lankford Bipartisan Bill to Simplify Application Process for Federal Disaster Assistance Advances in Senate: Legislation Would Create Universal Application for Disaster Survivors,” press release, August 5, 2022, [https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-and-lankford-bipartisan-bill-to-simplify-application-process-for-\(continued...\)](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-and-lankford-bipartisan-bill-to-simplify-application-process-for-(continued...))

FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is authorized by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (Title XIII of P.L. 90-448, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§4001 et seq.) and is the primary source of flood insurance coverage for residential properties in the United States.¹⁹⁷ In a community that participates or has participated in the NFIP, owners of properties in the mapped Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)¹⁹⁸ are required to purchase flood insurance as a condition of receiving a federally backed mortgage. Congress established certain limits on the availability of federal disaster assistance dependent on whether individuals had flood insurance, as set out by the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 (FDPA; P.L. 93-234; 87 Stat. 985). In addition to requiring property owners with federally backed mortgages to have flood insurance, the FDPA restricts access to federal financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes¹⁹⁹ in the SFHA unless covered by flood insurance.²⁰⁰ Since the end of FY2017, 25 short-term NFIP reauthorizations have been enacted, and the NFIP is currently authorized until September 30, 2023.²⁰¹ Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire on September 30, 2023.²⁰² Under such circumstances, borrowers would not be able to close, renew, or increase loans secured by property in an SFHA until the NFIP is reauthorized (unless they were able to buy private flood insurance). This could have an impact on housing markets in SFHAs. For example, when the NFIP lapsed for the whole of June 2010, estimates suggest that over 1,400 home closings were canceled or delayed each day, representing over 40,000 sales per month.²⁰³

The effects of flooding on disaster survivors, including on their ability to receive further disaster assistance, has been of ongoing congressional interest.²⁰⁴ Individuals and households who receive federal financial assistance for flood-related damage—including IHP assistance for Home Repair, Home Replacement, Permanent Housing Construction, or Personal Property Assistance—are required to buy and maintain flood insurance for future flood damage to insurable real and

federal-disaster-assistance-advances-in-senate/. Similarly, in the 118th Congress, Representatives Dina Titus, Garrett Graves, Troy Carter, and Marcus Molinaro, and Resident Commissioner Jennifer González-Colón, cosponsored the Disaster Survivors Fairness Act of 2023 (H.R. 1796), which includes a universal application for individual assistance.

¹⁹⁷ For additional information on the NFIP, see CRS Report R44593, *Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)*.

¹⁹⁸ An SFHA is defined by FEMA as an area with a 1% or greater risk of flooding every year.

¹⁹⁹ *Financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes* is defined at 42 U.S.C. §4003(4) and means “any form of financial assistance which is intended in whole or in part for the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, repair, or improvement of any publicly or privately owned building or mobile home, and for any machinery, equipment, fixtures, and furnishings contained or to be contained therein, and shall include the purchase or subsidization of mortgages or mortgage loans but shall exclude assistance pursuant to the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.] (other than assistance under such Act in connection with a flood).”

²⁰⁰ 42 U.S.C. §4012a(a).

²⁰¹ See P.L. 117-328. For further information on NFIP reauthorizations, see CRS Insight IN10835, *What Happens If the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Lapses?*

²⁰² 42 U.S.C. §4026.

²⁰³ Alexander P. Casadonte and John G. Nevius, “Insurance for Insurance: Adapting the National Flood Insurance Program to the Challenges of the Present and the Future,” *Environmental Claims Journal*, vol. 24, no. 4 (November 5, 2012), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10406026.2012.730931>.

²⁰⁴ See, for example, Testimony of Carolyn Kousky, Environmental Defense Fund, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *Reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program: Improving Community Resilience*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 2, 2023, <https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kousky%20Testimony%205-2-23.pdf>.

personal property as a condition of future IHP eligibility.²⁰⁵ This requirement to obtain and maintain flood insurance applies to any structure at that address, even if the damaged building is replaced by a new one. In addition, if the property is sold, the new owners must maintain flood insurance on that address for as long as it exists and for at least the assistance amount awarded for flood-damaged, NFIP-insurable losses. Applicants who do not purchase and maintain flood insurance will be ineligible for IHP assistance for flood-damaged real or personal property in future disasters with flood-related damage.²⁰⁶ Similar requirements apply to CDBG-DR funding for repairs, rehabilitation, or construction.

Housing and Climate Impacts

The impacts of natural hazards are expected to increase during the useful lifetime of much existing and new U.S. property and infrastructure,²⁰⁷ placing an increasing burden on federal, state, and local governments, as well as individuals and businesses. In the United States, as in many countries, this increasing risk can be attributed to a combination of factors: rapid expansion of population into areas that are susceptible to natural disasters, rising property values in hazardous areas, inadequate building codes, and climatological and environmental changes. Many extreme weather and climate-related events are expected to become more frequent and more intense in a warmer world.²⁰⁸ These risks are exacerbated as population increases in hazardous locations; for example, in floodplains or at the wildland-urban interface (WUI).²⁰⁹ Some 51.5 million households now live in areas under at least a moderate threat of annual losses from natural disasters, including 11.6 million lower-income households with limited resources to recover or relocate.²¹⁰

Housing economists face challenges in predicting housing price changes in areas likely to be affected by natural disasters, particularly those that may be exacerbated by climate change.²¹¹ Some studies suggest that more than 14.6 million properties in the United States face at least a 1% annual probability of flooding, with expected annual damages to residential properties exceeding \$32 billion. The increasing frequency and severity of flooding under climate change is predicted by 2050 to increase the number of properties exposed to flooding by 11% and average annual losses by at least 26%.²¹² Recent research also suggests that approximately 71.8 million

²⁰⁵ 44 C.F.R. §206.110(k)(3) and FEMA, *IAPPG*, p. 63. Section 582 of the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-325) prohibits the provision of federal financial assistance for repair, replacement, or restoration of damaged personal or real property if the receipt of financial assistance was conditioned on obtaining and maintaining flood insurance and the homeowner failed to do so.

²⁰⁶ FEMA, *Flood Insurance and FEMA Assistance*, September 30, 2022, <https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/flood-insurance-and-fema-assistance>.

²⁰⁷ Multihazard Mitigation Council, National Institute of Building Sciences, *Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves*, 2017 Interim Report, Washington, DC, December 2017, p. 17, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_ms2_interim_report_2017.pdf.

²⁰⁸ R. Reidmiller et al., *Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment*, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Volume II, Washington, DC, November 23, 2018, pp. 1-47, <https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/>.

²⁰⁹ The WUI is the zone where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels. See U.S. Fire Administration, *Wildland Urban Interface (WUI)*, <https://www.usfa.fema.gov/wui/>.

²¹⁰ Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, *The State of the Nation's Housing 2022*, June 2022, p. 8, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_Nations_Housing_2022.pdf.

²¹¹ Sean Beckett and Brock Lacy, *Life's A Beach*, Freddie Mac, Economic and Housing Research Insight, April 2016, p. 6, <https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20160426-lifes-a-beach>.

²¹² Jesse D. Gourevitch et al., "Unpriced Climate Risk and the Potential Consequences of Overvaluation in U.S. Housing Markets," *Nature Climate Change*, February 16, 2023, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-023-01594-8>.

properties, almost half of the total number of properties in the United States, have some level of wildfire risk in 2023; this could grow to 79.8 million by 2053.²¹³

In particular, the increasing risk of flooding under climate change has led to concerns that housing markets are mispricing these risks, and a number of studies suggest that risks associated with sea level rise are not fully reflected in home prices.²¹⁴ There are already indications of reductions in property prices in homes subject to recurring flooding,²¹⁵ with some studies suggesting that there are at least 3.8 million floodplain homes in the United States that are overvalued by a total of \$34 billion.²¹⁶

In the event of property price deflation, many homeowners would be at risk of losing value in their largest asset—their home—with low-income property owners potentially at greater risk of losing home equity from price deflation.²¹⁷ Freddie Mac economists suggest that although the economic losses due to sea level rise may happen gradually, they are likely to be greater in total than those experienced in the 2007-2009 housing crisis and Great Recession.²¹⁸ As climate impacts grow over time, the mortgages on affected properties may become riskier.²¹⁹ Recently, there has been some concern that financial institutions could deliberately sell off mortgages in high-risk areas to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with taxpayers guaranteeing the risk rather than private lenders.²²⁰ There is some evidence that this is already starting to occur.²²¹

Such declines in property values due to climate risk are unlikely to be temporary, particularly for properties affected by sea level rise,²²² where the risk is predictable and quantifiable.²²³ A recent

²¹³ Testimony of Matthew Eby, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of the First Street Foundation, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, *Rising Seas, Rising Costs: Climate Change and the Economic Risks to Coastal Communities*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 1, 2023, p. 8.

²¹⁴ See, for example, the review by Laura A. Bakkensen and Lint Barrage, *Flood Risk Belief Heterogeneity and Coastal Home Price Dynamic: Going Under Water?*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 23854, Cambridge, MA, February 2021, pp. 8-10, <https://www.nber.org/papers/w23854>.

²¹⁵ See, for example, Benjamin J. Keys and Philip Mulder, *Neglected No More: Housing Markets, Mortgage Lending, and Sea Level Rise*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 27930, Cambridge, MA, October 2020, p. 3, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27930/w27930.pdf; and Stephen A. McAlpine and Jeremy R. Porter, “Estimating Recent Local Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Current Real-Estate Losses: A Housing Market Case Study in Miami-Dade, Florida,” *Population Research and Policy Review*, vol. 27 (2018), pp. 871-895.

²¹⁶ Miyuki Hino and Marshall Burke, *Does Information About Climate Risk Affect Property Values?*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 26807, Cambridge, MA, February 2020, <https://www.nber.org/papers/w26807>.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²¹⁸ Sean Beckett and Brock Lacy, *Life’s A Beach*, Freddie Mac, Economic and Housing Research Insight, April 2016, p. 6, <https://www.freddie.com/research/insight/20160426-lifes-a-beach>.

²¹⁹ Lael Brainard, Member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, “Financial Stability Implications of Climate Change,” speech at “Transform Tomorrow Today,” Ceres 2021 Conference, Boston, MA, March 23, 2021, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210323a.htm>.

²²⁰ See, for example, Zack Coleman, “How Climate Change Could Spark the Next Home Mortgage Disaster,” *Politico*, November 30, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/30/climate-change-mortgage-housing-environment-433721>; and Jodi Helmer, *Climate Change Floods North Carolina’s Housing Market*, Natural Resources Defense Council, October 6, 2020, <https://www.nrdc.org/stories/climate-change-floods-north-carolinas-housing-market>.

²²¹ See, for example, Miyuki Hino and Marshall Burke, *Does Information About Climate Risk Affect Property Values?*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 26807, February 2020, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w26807>.

²²² Asaf Bernstein, Matthew T. Gustafson, and Ryan Lewis, “Disaster on the horizon: The price effect of sea level rise,” *Journal of Financial Economics*, vol. 134, no. 2 (November 2019), pp. 253-272.

²²³ Stephen A. McAlpine and Jeremy R. Porter, “Estimating Recent Local Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Current Real-Estate Losses: A Housing Market Case Study in Miami-Dade, Florida,” *Population Research and Policy Review*, vol. 27 (2018), pp. 871-895.

report estimated that nearly 650,000 properties will be at least partially submerged by 2050.²²⁴ Most mortgages in the United States are 30-year loans. In areas where sea level rise may make homes uninhabitable within 30 years, lenders may become reluctant to offer 30-year mortgages.²²⁵ Homeowners may be less likely to continue to repay mortgages if their homes are literally underwater.²²⁶

The increase in severe weather-related losses has led a number of insurance companies to withdraw from offering homeowners insurance in areas at high risk of wildfire (such as California) or hurricanes (such as Florida, Louisiana, and Texas).²²⁷ Wind and wildfire coverage are included as covered perils in homeowners' insurance policies sold by private insurance companies and, as such, are regulated by states rather than the federal government. However, if insurers' withdrawal from markets leads to increased uninsured losses, this may shift the risk to individuals, lenders, taxpayers, or the government. This industry reaction is not new—the NFIP was created in 1968 following widespread insurer withdrawals from offering coverage for flooding.²²⁸

²²⁴ Climate Central, *Sinking Tax Base: Land and Property At Risk From Rising Seas*, September 8, 2022, p. 4, <https://www.climatecentral.org/report/sinking-tax-base>.

²²⁵ Testimony of Dr. Sean Beckett in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, *Rising Seas, Rising Costs: Climate Change and the Economic Risks to Coastal Communities*, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 1, 2023, p. 1.

²²⁶ Sean Beckett and Brock Lacy, *Life's A Beach*, Freddie Mac, Economic and Housing Research Insight, April 2016, p. 6, <https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20160426-lifes-a-beach>.

²²⁷ See, for example, Christopher Flavelle, Jill Cowan, and Ivan Penn, "Climate Shocks Are Making Parts of American Uninsurable. It Just Got Worse," *New York Times*, May 31, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/31/climate/climate-change-insurance-wildfires-california.html>; Chris Isidore, "Florida's Home Insurance Market Was a Mess Before Ian. It's About To Get Worse," *CNN Business*, September 30, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/business/florida-homeowners-insurance-ian/index.html>; Michael R. Blood, "California Insurance Market Rattled by Withdrawal of Major Companies," *AP News*, June 5, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/california-wildfire-insurance-e31bef0ed7eeddcde096a5b8f2c1768f>; Jon Schuppe, "Louisiana Faces an Insurance Crisis, Leaving People Afraid They Can't Afford Their Homes," *NBC News*, September 16, 2022, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/louisiana-homeowners-insurance-crisis-hurricanes-rcna46746>; and Thomas Frank, "Growing Insurance Crisis Spreads to Texas," *E&E News*, April 17, 2023, <https://www.eenews.net/articles/growing-insurance-crisis-spreads-to-texas/>.

²²⁸ Kristina Garcia, "The Risky Business of Homeowners Insurance," *Penn Today*, June 12, 2023, <https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/risky-business-homeowners-insurance-climate-change-fire>.

Appendix A. Housing Bills in the 118th Congress

This appendix lists housing-related legislation that has received committee or floor action during the 118th Congress as of June 30, 2023. Given limitations of the search parameters used, it should not be considered exhaustive. In addition, broader bills that contain some housing-related provisions are not included.

Table A-1. Housing Bills in the 118th Congress that Received Committee or Floor Action as of June 30, 2023

(ordered by chamber and bill number)

Bill Number	Bill Title	Latest Action
S. 1528	Disaster Assistance Simplification Act	Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Reported by Senator Peters with amendments. With written report (S.Rept. 118-39).
S. 735	A bill to strengthen the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings held.
S. 185	Native American Direct Loan Improvement Act of 2023	Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Ordered to be reported without amendment favorably.
S. 70	Tribal Trust Land Homeownership Act of 2023	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development. Hearings held. Committee on Indian Affairs. Reported by Senator Schatz without amendment. With written report (S.Rept. 118-33).
S. 32	Choice in Affordable Housing Act of 2023	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings held.
H.R. 3564	Middle Class Borrower Protection Act	Passed/agreed to in House.
H.R. 1796	Disaster Survivors Fairness Act of 2023	Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by Voice Vote.

Source: The bills in this table are primarily those that were identified by a CRS search conducted on <https://www.congress.gov> on June 30, 2023.

Notes: The search was limited to bills that had received committee or floor action and were (1) classified with the policy area “Housing and Community Development,” or (2) classified with the policy area “Finance and Financial Sector,” “Native Americans,” or “Emergency Management” and certain housing-related subject terms. Some housing-related bills may not be captured by this search and therefore do not appear in this table; selected bills that were not captured by these search terms but are discussed in the report were added at CRS analyst discretion. Some of the standalone measures shown in this table, or similar provisions, may be included in broader bills that receive additional action, but such broader bills would not be reflected in this table unless they are primarily housing-related.

Appendix B. Housing Hearings in the 118th Congress

This appendix lists hearings that have been held during the 118th Congress as of June 30, 2023, and have been primarily focused on housing-related issues.

Table B-1. Housing-Related Hearings in the 118th Congress as of June 30, 2023
(ordered by chamber and date)

Title	Committee	Date
Senate Hearings		
State of Native American Housing	Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development	June 13, 2023
Rural Housing Legislation	Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development	May 2, 2023
Building Consensus to Address Housing Challenges	Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs	April 26, 2023
The Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness	Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development	March 8, 2023
Tax Policy's Role in Increasing Affordable Housing Supply for Working Families	Senate Committee on Finance	March 7, 2023
The State of Housing in 2023	Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs	February 9, 2023
House Hearings		
HUD Oversight: Testimony of the HUD Inspector General	House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance	June 21, 2023
FHFA Oversight: Protecting Homeowners and Taxpayers	House Committee on Financial Services	May 23, 2023
The Current Mortgage Market: Undermining Housing Affordability with Politics	House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance	May 17, 2023
Oversight Hearing – Tribal Perspectives on Housing and Transportation	House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies	April 28, 2023

Title	Committee	Date
Office of Inspector General, Department of Housing and Urban Development; Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation	House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies	March 28, 2023

Source: The hearings in this table are those that were identified by a CRS search conducted on ProQuest Congressional on June 30, 2023.

Notes: The search was limited to hearings that included certain housing-related terms in the hearing title. Hearings focused on the President’s budget requests were excluded. Some relevant hearings may not be captured by this search because their titles did not include the search terms used or because they were not yet available on Proquest Congressional as of the date of the search.

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